Abstract: The article is devoted to the study of public attitudes by identifying beliefs and values, collectively shared meanings about the place and role of Russia and the "Russian World" in the modern world. It is based on the correlation of online survey data with All-Russian representative opinion polls and the involvement of the results of other studies. Most of the respondents are young people under 35 years old, constantly interested in politics, financially well–off, students or working in state institutions. A negative attitude to the collapse of the USSR and the change of power in Ukraine during the Maidan was recorded in more than sixty percent of respondents. The annexation of Crimea, the formation of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics, and the entry of new regions into the Russian Federation in 2022 were positively assessed by two-thirds to three-quarters of respondents. There is an ambiguous attitude towards the special military operation and mobilization. In general, more than two thirds of the respondents are patriotic citizens who support the politics of the current government. It shows the coexistence of beliefs, at least of some respondents: on the one hand, the immanent acceptance of democratic institutions and traditions, relevant values, including the protection of human rights, on the other, the support of the state discourse of confrontation with the "collective West" – the source of these cultural and law ideas. The factors bearing the unifying potential for modern Russian society, in our opinion, can be expressed in such beliefs as: "Russia is an empire", "Russia is a great (world) power", the strong state that you can be proud of. The Russian idea (in the ethnic sense), a special civilizational, Orthodox identity, Messianism have fewer supporters.

Abstract: Based on the data of obtained in the course of interviews of students of the Southern Federal District and North Caucasian Federal District conducted in 2019, the author analyzes the value preferences and ideological views. Modern youth gives priority to individual rather than group values (freedom of movement, personal security, independence of thought and action, etc.). A third of young people were undecided about their ideological-political preferences; while one fifth indicated that share liberal views. Youth promotes ecological values and care for the world. Majority of the interviewed students believe that it is essential to comply with the norms, rules, and laws, and support peaceful relations with others. Many respondents share tolerant views. All this signifies legal awareness of modern youth. Such social values as the ability to vote, social justice and equality are of high importance, which alongside anticipation of escalation of economic problems and demand for change, leads to social tension. The author also notes a high level of emigration moods; only a quarter of respondents have no intentions of leaving the country. Based on students’ understanding of the concept of patriotism, the author demarcates two points of views: the firs incorporates patriotic views with the Western liberal values; the second sees Russia as a separate unique country. However, these ideas did not directly contradict each other in mentality of the majority of students, but the selected answers in various question often opposing in meaning. This proves the theoretical hypothesis on the existence of cognitive-ideological matrices in mentality of the individual as a pre-reflexive environment, which shapes deliberate political beliefs.

Abstract: Due to spread of telecommunication networks and multifold increase in the sources of information over the last decades of the XX century, emerges a phenomenon of cognitive censorship, based not on limitation of information, but prevention of people’s ability to adequately perceive this information and correctly analyze it. Success in exercising cognitive political censorship depends on many factors, and one of the main ones is control of the media (information) field. This article explores how separate episodes within the framework of presidential race campaign in Ukraine were subjected to censorship. The research examines two eye-catching events of the presidential race in Ukraine, one of which can be viewed as a phenomenon of cognitive political censorship: expected event – candidate debates right before the second tour of election completely capture the audiences’ attention and there is no predicted sensational reaction to details of the functionality of Zelensky camp. Cognitive censorship is used in conjunction with manipulations – shift of attention, as well as feed of information from a different angle for the purposes of distortion, diminishing of its importance, promotion of alternative points of view and others.

Abstract: This article examines the sociopolitical moods of student youth based on survey results conducted in the universities of Southern and North Caucasian Federal Districts in 2019. The study carried out with the support of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research was aimed at clarification of the relevant questions: how do the students in the South of Russia estimate the situation in Russia and the world, which sources of political information are most trusted, what is their attitude to protest actions, etc. The article explores the summarized results of sociological survey on the bases of frequency analysis; comparative analysis is applied for correlation with the data from other research. The respondents demonstrate the negative perception of lingering economic difficulties on the background foreign policy ambitions: over 70% feel escalation of tension in the society; and 3/4 of them would like to see noticeable changes. The main cause for possible protest actions consists in the fear of compounding economic problems in the country. A significant trend is the strengthening role of Internet sources and social networks in obtaining political information. The modern generation of youth is characterized by the high importance of personal values, readiness to defend their rights, readiness to political participation, respect of law. Young people also share the values of social justice, oppose war, and are environmentally friendly. A relatively high protest potential of youth is explained by the desire to defend their rights and restore social justice, acting within the legal framework.

Abstract: This article is dedicated to the examination of public opinion of the Russians and Ukrainians regarding the ongoing armed conflict in the Donbass Region in the context of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the simplified procedure for obtaining Russian citizenship for residents of the unrecognized Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic. The author also analyzes the reflection of this political decision in the Ukraine’s media space. For more than five years, the negative image of Russia is consensual in the Ukrainian mass media; however, there is a trend of improving attitude of Ukrainians towards Russians after a sharp decline 2014-2015. For substantiation of the proposed theses, the author uses the data of the Russian and Ukrainian sociological surveys, as well as instruments of the monitoring systems “Medialogy”. Public opinion among the Ukrainians directly depends on place of residence of the respondents: for example, almost three fourth of Donbass population have a positive attitude towards Russia against just a quarter in the west of the country.  Same pattern is traced with regards to the War in Donbass and possible ways for its settlement – the closer to the epicenter of conflict, the lesser people approve the hostilities. The great majority of Russians support the President’s decision on the simplified procedure for obtaining Russian citizenship. The author underlines the direct dependence of the fluctuations in public opinion on the presence or absence of massive propaganda in mass media. The scientific novelty of this article consists in examination of the relevant questions using the most recent data from various sources.

Abstract: This article is dedicated to the analysis of public speeches of Dagestan presidents and utterances of the representatives of political opposition from the perspective of articulation of the problems of national (ethnic) representation in government structures of Dagestan, as well as correlation with the actual political practices of distribution of the offices between ethnic groups. The scale of this problem in society is assessed by means of verbalization of the national affiliation of the officials, assignment of the post after a certain ethnic group, or the agreement-based distribution of offices, depending on the emotional coloring, essence and context of the utterance. The main method consists in discourse-analysis of the following texts: Dagestan Presidential Address, speeches and interviews of the political actors and representatives of opposition, laws, and collective addresses. In speeches of the three Dagestan presidents we can observe the evolution from admission of the need of considering the national factor in appointing to the position (the first two presidents) to the top priority of officials’ professionalism (the third president); and only R. Abdulatipov in disguised form shows preferences towards the national representation. Currently, in the official political rhetoric, the problem of distribution of power between various national (ethnic) groups is not enunciated, which corresponds with the Constitution of the Russian Federation. However, Dagestan political culture on the level of political practice in one or another level preserves the system of proportional representation of ethnic groups. Scholars note the decrease in the importance of national question in political sphere for the broad population groups.