Abstract: This article examines the definition of knowledge as a genuine substantiated opinion, as well as considers certain quasi-standard definitions of knowledge. The arguments are adduced that in order to solve its issues, epistemology requires the philosophy of language and philosophy of consciousness. Particularly, the author pursues parallel between a “difficult problem” of the philosophy of consciousness and the problem of definition of knowledge. The article suggests the definition of knowledge as a “successful” opinion, namely a genuine substantiated opinion, on the condition that an epistemological “gap” between the substantiation (opinion) and the fact (knowledge) is “pragmatically” closed in the sense of Wittgensteinian problem of rule-following. The second Wittengstein’s philosophy combines with the knowledge first epistemology of Timothy Williamson. Knowledge is accepted as a fundamental epistemic rule (norm) for the opinion. It is stated that the so-called Gettier-cases first and foremost have a conceptual status, underlining that the standard definition of knowledge leaves something out of account. The proposed point of view on knowledge is similar to such of Stephen Hetherington, according to which knowledge is a genuine substantiated opinion, on the condition that any specific circumstance is being understood in epistemological sense.

Abstract: The subject of this research is the existence of supposed connection between the anti-luck epistemology of cognitive abilities of Duncan Pritchard and epistemology of Sanford Goldberg. The latter one appeals to the notion of epistemically admissible suggestions and sympathizes with the beginning-knowledge-epistemology, while the firs one offers a dual-component analysis of the term of knowledge. The common of these two approaches lies in the introduction of a condition of explicability of the veritical explanandum – the fact that an opinion is true. At the same time, the nature of explanation to which resort the philosophers, is different. Within the framework of Pritchard’s approach, explanation is given using the terms of epistemology of epistemic abilities, and in the context of Goldberg’s approach – in terms of epistemically admissible suggestions. The work compares the functionality of both approaches leaning on one of the proposed by Pritchard examples, when the true opinion is secured and received as a result of application by a subject of this epistemic abilities, but is not the knowledge. The author believes that the approaches of Pritchard and Goldberg are joint, as well as manifest as a rational reconstruction of the more fundamental approach that is referred as the beginning-knowledge-epistemology. The article also interprets the Gettier problems as cases of the “gap” in implicit assumptions in the process of implementation of the concept of knowledge.  

Abstract:  
 
The subject of this research is the arguments of Mark Schroeder claiming that the perceptual mental state “seeing that”, as a matter of fact, is not knowledge, and thus, knowledge is not the most common factive mental state. This conclusion contradicts the position of Timothy Williamson. The article particularly analyzes the Schroeder’s positions that the existence of knowledge necessitates the existence of opinion, and knowledge is the norm for an opinion, which he shares with Williamson. Methods of this research consist in the knowledge-first epistemology of Timothy Williamson, and Wittgensteinian in spirit therapeutical method of the analysis of notion of perceptual experience, suggested in the works of Jocelyn Benoist. It is established that Schroeder’s arguments are based on the false prerequisite that the perceptual experience itself can have a representational content. “Seeing that” is not a pure perception, but a conceptualized perceptual experience suggesting knowledge. The author expresses preference towards the position of Williamson. The scientific novelty of this work consists in combination of the analytical and therapeutical methods.
 
 

Abstract: This article examines the problem of the value of knowledge and certain approaches towards its resolution, particularly the classical point of view of Plato, approaches of Duncan Pritchard, Timothy Williamson, and Ernest Sosa. The proposed by D. Pritchard difference between the primary, secondary, and tertiary problems of the value of knowledge is being analyzed. Accent is made on the special value of knowledge. The author reviews Pritchard’s argument aimed against the thesis on the final value of knowledge, protected by epistemology of capabilities/advantages of Sosa and claiming the special value of understanding, as well as the position of Carter and Gordon that special value belongs to the objective understanding. Comparative analysis of the various positions allows identifying their strong and weak sides. If the special value of knowledge does exist, it must be universal for all types of knowledge, including such, which according to John Greco, comply with the diverse (more or less strong) epistemic norms. The author rejects the positions of Pritchard, Carter, and Gordon that favor the special value of knowledge, and adopt the externalist point of view of Timothy Williamson, suggesting the special value of knowledge consists in its factivity. The author also supposes that Williamson’s positions is compatible with the position of Wittgenstein.

Abstract: The article narrates the approach of John McDowell towards the Wittgenstein’s problem of rule-following and proposes comments on the McDowell’s criticism of Robert Brandom’s approach towards this problem. The author compares points of view of the two philosophers upon the Wittgenstein’s notion of interpretation, concept of the implicit normalization, and the problem of regulism and regularism. Focus is made on the fact that the rule is followed in practice, in action, that is primal and where is no “gap” between the rule and its use from the very beginning. The approaches of McDowell and Brandom are compared with each other, as well as with the position of Wittgenstein within his “second philosophy”. It is stated that the theoretical approach of Brandom in its major features is compatible with the therapeutic approach of Wittgenstein and the therapeutic interpretation of the problem of rule-following proposed by McDowell. At the same time, Brandom’s approach gives grounds for criticism, including the facts related to the existence of two levels of normalization.

Abstract: The subject of the present research is the concept of knowledge and, in particular, the case described by Timothy Williams when a subject knows  p in spite of the fact that the available evidence states he doesn't know p. The author of the article interprets this case from the point of view of the difference between instinctive knowledge and reflexive/introspective (and, in particular, phenomenal) knowledge. The author uses a classical definition of knowledge as a justified true belief. The author assumes existence of special causal and standard process of formation of the reflexive knowledge establishing the relation of family similarity between more or less reflexive types knowledge. The main conclusion of the conducted research includes possibility of existence of deeply instinctive knowledge treats without the corresponding reflexive knowledge and vice versa. The author also believes that any knowledge finally has the phenomenal (in a broad sense) nature that allows to close epistemological "failure" between reasonable opinion and knowledge. The author interprets Gettier cases as the cases of true beliefs with incomplete justification.

Abstract: The paper introduces
the explanatory gap problem
 in the philosophy of mind. A review of the mainapproaches to the problem shows that the traditional materialism/physicalism encounters the principaldifficulties.
The article introduces the explanatory gap problem gap in the philosophy of mind. The author provides a brief review of the main approaches to the problem. The author focuses on attempts to overcome physical approaches, on the one hand, and critics of dualism, on the other hand. For example, Blok offered the definition of implicit physical phenomenal concepts. Papineau admitted that phenomenal concepts had a singular nature. Levin spoke of the concept of acquaintance. Varela offered to extend the scope of the traditional science and developed so called neuro-phenomenology. The research is based on the method of comparison of the main approaches to solving the explanatory gap problem. Preference is given to phenomenal realism. The author demonstrates that the traditional materialism/physicalism encounters the principal difficulties when solving the explanatory gap problem. At the same time, property dualism is an essential concept only a non-metaphysical version of naturalistic phenomenal realism, or nontraditional contextual naturalism/physicalism of Wittgenstein type may compete with. 

Abstract: The solution of the problem of access to theories of an epistemological disjunctivism proposed by Duncan Pritchard who claims is stated and analyzed that in paradigmatic cases of perception the agent knows that p, owing to the rational bases for his opinion that p which are at the same time available reflections and factual, that is with need attract existence of the fact, p. The problem of access consists that acquisition of knowledge about belonging to the outside world (that is empirical) the fact by means of only one reflection (that is a priori) is impossible. This problem, however, in the theory of an epistemological disjunctivism is illusory. It is offered to treat an epistemological problem (any, and not just perceptual) knowledge in close connection with a problem of an explanatory failure in consciousness philosophy which in turn can be treated in terms of a Wittgenstein problem of following to the rule. In case of knowledge "failure" between the rational bases for opinion and the fact (knowledge) is closed pragmatically, or phenomenologically in a broad sense. In this sense any knowledge, and not just knowledge perceptual, has phenomenological measurement. Classical definition of knowledge as reasonable true opinion remains provided that justification assumes the rootedness in the fact, that is is justification original (full). The knowledge can also be defined as "successful opinion".

Abstract: In article evolution of views of David Papineau on phenomenal concepts is considered, and, in particular, two of its are in detail stated the main approach to them (Father's-2002, Father's-2006). The emphasis is placed on property of phenomenal concepts at the same time to mention and use phenomenal experience which is offered to be interpreted in the context of the vittgenshtaynovsky concept "uses" (language game). Within such interpretation the "used" phenomenal experience makes the contribution to the cognitive act. For Papineau, on the contrary, the experience associated with the use of phenomenal concepts allows to explain only existence of illusory intuition about a so-called explanatory failure in psychophysical identities, but in semantic and epistemological meanings is neutral. Similarity between phenomenal concepts and concepts perceptual, and also "similarity" between phenomenal concepts and phenomenal experience, is interpreted in the vittgenshtaynovskikh terms of family similarity. Approach Father's is compared to Ned Blok's approach. At both philosophers the solution of a so-called problem of an explanatory failure contains pragmatical measurement in psychophysical identities. In more general plan evolution of views Father's can be characterized as rapprochement with a pragmatism of vittgenshtaynovsky type which relieves of illusion of existence of an explanatory failure. "The minimum approach" Father's-2014 to concept of a phenomenal concept is limited to introduction of only one essential property of phenomenal concepts – their aprioristic independence of theoretical/scientific concepts that allows to relieve this concept of many standard objections. It is possible to agree with Father's-2014 that in effect, antimaterialistic arguments are based only on aposteriorny nature of psychophysical identities.

Abstract: Recently David Papineau reasoned that phenomenal concepts are incompatible with Wittgenstein's private language argument and that it is Wittgenstein's argument but not phenomenal concepts that is problematic. The author of the present article analyzes Papineau's argument. In particular, Pris analyzes and criticizes  some of his interpretations related to a well-known mental experiment of Jackson and Mary and its modification, "zombie" argument and Wittgenstein's private language argument. At the end of article the concept of psychophysical identity from the point of view of the analytic pragmatism of Robert Brendom is offered. We combine an analytical method of modern philosophy of consciousness with a pragmatism and late Wittgenstein'snaturalism as well as some elements of "continental" realistic philosophy of Jocelyn Benoist. We conclude that phenomenal concepts are compatible with private language argument. Incompatibility can arise at limited or wrong understanding of Wittgenstein's argument or phenomenal concepts. In particular, Papineau's statement about possibility of direct identification of a new type of phenomenal experience due to a drain of available potential phenomenal concepts doesn't contradict Wittgenstein's philosophy. 

Abstract: In the article discussion between Blok & Stalnaker and Chalmers & Jackson about physico-physical and psychophysical identities and, in particular, about (not) possibilities of their a priori conclusion is analyzed. It is offered to allow this discussion by correction of both positions, generalizations of concept of a conclusion of a priori, and also elimination of some mixtures between epistemological and ontologic research levels. In the article the points of view of other philosophers relating to a considered perspective also are in brief analyzed. The analysis of positions is carried out in the spirit of late Wittgenstein's pragmatism and in a context of a so-called problem of an explanatory failure to consciousness philosophies. Thus as the basic of not defined concept the vittgenshtaynovsky concept of spontaneity is used. Is established that Chalmers & Jackson exaggerate a priori role in traditional sense whereas Blok & Stalnaker underestimate it. "Aprioristic" elimination of an explanatory failure in identities is possible, and it is possible only post factum and that is generalized a priori with residual spontaneity.

Abstract: The problem of an explanation of illusions of possible violations of physical and psychophysical identities is stated and analyzed. The epistemic and settlement explanations offered by Kripke and the "if - in - reality" explanation are unsatisfactory. They, in particular, do not always satisfy to Stephane Uayblo's psychoanalytic criterion. These explanations also assume that some real opportunities which existence explains illusions always are behind illusory opportunities. Explanations of illusions of the opportunities offered by Perry and Hill who don't assume that there are real opportunities behind illusory opportunities are provided. Research is conducted within the framework of Wittgenstein's standard pragmatism and naturalism. The concept of family similarity plays the central role. the author of the article suggests that we should use Wittgenstein's explanation of illusion of possibility violating a necessary posteriori identity which, according to the author, satisfies Stephane Uayblo's psychoanalytic criterion. Illusion is explained by the fact that in other contexts concepts entering identity could be used in a different way. It is claimed also that in mathematics not all illusions of opportunities are purely epistemic.

Abstract: In article arguments of that Heidegger's phenomenology, also as well as late Vittgenshtayn's philosophy, can be useful to a solution of the problem of measurement in quantum mechanics and to understanding of nonclassical physics in general are adduced. Realistic understanding of quantum mechanics possibly only within not metaphysical realism. Distinction between classical and quantum concepts is entered and their application is illustrated. Connection between a measurement problem, a difficult problem of philosophy of consciousness and a vittgenshtaynovsky problem of following to the rule is established. Research relies on alleged communication between Heidegger and Vittgenshtayn's philosophy, on vittgenshtaynovsky pragmatical "dissolution" of a problem of measurement, and also on interpretation of philosophies of Heidegger and Vittgenshtayn as standard pragmatism and naturalism. Is established that quantum concepts function as vittgenshteynovsky rules for formation of new objektivirovanny reality, but not as the concepts describing the metaphysical reality which isn't depending on the observer in absolute sense. The measurement problem in quantum mechanics has the same structure, as the difficult problem in consciousness philosophy, and can be reduced to a vittgenshteynovsky problem of following to the rule. In theoretical metaphysical language of Heidegger language game of Vittgenshtayn is Dazayn. Addition of this philosophical concept to a conceptual framework of quantum mechanics allows to solve a measurement problem theoretically.

Abstract: In this paper I seek to find a middle way pragmatic solution to Williamson-Travis’s controversy about the principle of bivalence within a Wittgensteinian pragmatism. It seems to me that Travis does not distinguish between the new applications of one and the same concept and the applications of a similar, but different concept (for example, a more general concept). And his examples do not support his thesis about the violation of the principle of bivalence. On the contrary, Williamson, I think, does not take into account the pragmatic “open texture” phenomenon. I partly agree with Williamson that Travis’s examples look like those in which in different contexts words refer to different properties. Unlike Williamson, who operates with the notions of a character (linguistic meaning) and content, and unlike Travis who operates with the notions of a semantic meaning and understanding, I introduce tree levels of meaningfulness: the linguistic, the semantic (or the level of a rule/concept), and the pragmatic one (the level of the use of a rule/concept, or the meaning-use level). I agree with Williamson that the classical principle of bivalence holds. It is “violated” only in a domain of potential new utterances, whose truth-conditions are not pre-determined (such utterances are not fully meaningful). This is the phenomenon of the conceptual (hence, I think, also ontological) under-determination of the world. Travis’s «Aristotle condition» is equivalent to the condition that the gap between thought, language and the world is closed.

Abstract: The article analyzes Kripke’s skeptical paradox, that is the interpretation of the Kripke-Wittgenstein problem of following the rule applied to the addition operation. The paradox states that it is impossible to naturalize the sense and the problem of following a rule in the networks of a classical (non-normative) naturalism. It is suggested to view the problem from the point of view of Wittgenstein’s normative naturalism. The notion of a normative disposition is introduced. The article criticizes the solution of the paradox recently suggested by Ginzborg, particularly her naturalistic “middle way” between the dispositionalism and mentalism. Kripke’s paradox and Ginzborg’s approach are analyzed within the networks of the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s second philosophy which is understood as a normative naturalism of language games that are natural and spontaneous at the same time. It is also found that the paradox appears as a result of neglecting of pragmatics and normative measurements of the operations. Ginzborg’s approach is close to Wittgenstein’s normative naturalism but the notion of primitive normalization which she introduces is not satisfying. It is more correct to speak not about the naturalism with the minimum of normalization added (as Ginzborg does) but about the normative naturalism.