Interaction between Russia and China in the military-technical field: features and trends

Li Valerii N. Postgraduate student, Department of theory and history of international relations, Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia 117198, Russia, Moscow, Miklukho-Maklaya str., 10/2, room 302 valeriy_li_ir@mail.ru Other publications by this author

An important indicator that reflects the close degree of strategic cooperation is military-technical cooperation (MTC). Military-technical cooperation is closely linked to military-political interaction, as it increases the mutual dependence and compatibility of military equipment, which can be crucial for allies during the war, when joint supplies of equipment and logistical and technological support can determine the effectiveness of the partner's armed forces. At the same time, having experience in the field of technology requires significant political trust. In addition, the organization of the production and technological base for military-technical cooperation requires a high level of coordination between numerous institutions (research centers, manufacturers and various government agencies), common procedures and standardized training. The progress from a low to a high level of cooperation within the framework of the military-technical cooperation is evidenced by the transition from the simple provision of technical training and assistance related to the purchase of weapons to the actual transfer of military technologies and long-term projects for the joint design and production of weapons and their components.

An illustrative example of a meaningful modernization of military-technical cooperation is the relations between Russia and China, which have gone from the transfer of individual units of military equipment to technology transfer. The ability to access advanced Soviet technologies gave the PRC a chance to re-equip the PLA relatively quickly and with minimal costs for system interaction, logistics and basic doctrinal postulates. For Russia, it was an opportunity to earn much-needed hard currency and purchase goods in exchange for former Soviet military surplus. It was also an opportunity to provide the Russian defense industry with the opportunity to receive financing to support this industry. Therefore, it is not surprising that just four years after the Western countries imposed an arms embargo, a number of major defense contracts were signed, and Russian military equipment began to arrive in China in large quantities.

The purpose of this article is to identify the features of military-technical cooperation between Russia and China, with an emphasis on technology transfer, their adaptation and integration into the Chinese armed forces. The key areas of military-technical cooperation, including aviation, missile, radio-electronic and marine technologies, as well as the impact of this interaction on the strategic balance and prospects of bilateral relations in the field of defense, are considered.

The methodological foundation of this research is an interdisciplinary approach based on the basic principles and methods of structural realism (neorealism). Referring to this scientific school allows us to analyze the tools and content of Russian-Chinese cooperation in the military-technical sphere. The study uses historical-comparative, historical-typological, and problem-chronological methods, which allowed the author to study the approaches of the two countries to military-technical cooperation, as well as evaluate its results for China's military modernization.

Historical periods of military-technical cooperation between Russia and China

Russian experts M.S. Barabanov, V.B. Kashin, and K.V. Makienko divide Sino-Russian military–technical cooperation into four periods ^[1]. The first stage, covering 1992-1999, was related to China's purchase of export modifications of standard Soviet weapons, which were at the technology level of the 1970s – mid-1980s. These systems had simplified specifications, like all export versions of Soviet weapons. In particular, the Su-27SK fighters, developed back in the late 1970s, had an outdated H001 airborne radar, the technology of which dates back to the 1960s. A similar situation was observed with the destroyers of the 956E project of the Modern type, the technical design of which was approved back in 1977. During this period, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) mainly purchased existing serial weapons and did not order their adaptation to their needs.

In May 1990, China began negotiations on the purchase of Su-27 fighter jets, sending General Liu Huaqing to Moscow. In 1992, China received the first 24 Su-27s worth $1 billion (35% in currency, the rest in barter). By 1996, the parties had agreed on the licensed production of 200 Su-27s in China with technology transfer ^[2]. In the 1990s, China purchased up to 25% of Russian weapons: 138 Sukhoi aircraft (Su-27, Su-30), 40 Il-76/78, hundreds of Mi-17 helicopters, S-300 and Tor-M1 air defense systems, destroyers, submarines, missiles, aircraft engines, and more. ^[3]. Since 1992, the joint commission on military-technical cooperation has been working annually.

In the second phase, from 1999 to 2004, China began to acquire weapons designed specifically for the PLA. Despite the increase in the technological level, there was no significant breakthrough: the purchased equipment were upgraded versions of standard models, and reliability and proven technologies remained the priority, not innovation. The most notable acquisitions of this period were the Su-30MKK multipurpose fighters and the upgraded 956EM project destroyers. However, during the same period, China for the first time ordered advanced air defense systems such as the S-300PMU-2, which indicated an increase in its requirements for the quality of weapons.

The third stage, which lasted from 2004 to 2012, was a period of pause in the procurement of major combat systems. Instead, China focused on acquiring auxiliary equipment such as transport planes and tanker planes, as well as individual high-tech components such as engines, radars and missile homing heads, which were used in the development of its own Chinese weapons. In parallel, purchases of ammunition and helicopters continued. During this period, the volume of new contracts with Russia decreased sharply, and by 2006-2007. China lost leadership to India, Algeria, and Venezuela, and by 2009-2010, to Vietnam as well. However, thanks to previously concluded contracts, the total volume of supplies remained significant, ensuring China's first place among buyers of Russian weapons in 2004-2005 and second in 2006-2007.

After 2006, military-technical cooperation between Russia and China noticeably weakened and remained at a low level until 2013-2014. The main reasons were the reduction in Chinese purchases, the expansion of Russia's customer base and its priority on domestic orders ^[4].

China expected the lifting of the European embargo, but it remained due to US pressure. Russia, in turn, has focused on technological alliances with the West, which has also affected the defense sector. By 2011, China's share in Russian arms exports had decreased from 46.5% (in 2005) to 5%, as Beijing mastered its own production ^[5].

However, China continued to depend on Russia in the field of aircraft engines. The signing of an intellectual property agreement in 2008 reduced Russian concerns about technology copying, which allowed the resumption of supplies of modern weapons. In 2012, aircraft engines and anti-aircraft systems accounted for 90% of Russian arms exports to China ^[6].

Major contracts included the supply of Mi-14 helicopters, Su-35 and Il-76MD-90A fighters, S-400 air defense systems, as well as joint projects to modernize the RD-33 engine and manufacture Tiger armored vehicles in China ^[7]. These supplies have strengthened China's defense capabilities in strategically important regions, including Taiwan and the South China Sea.

The fourth stage, which began in 2013 and continues to the present, was marked by China's return to purchasing modern Russian combat platforms. This may be due to the fact that China has faced difficulties in developing its own advanced military equipment, especially in the field of aviation and shipbuilding. This showed the limits of his technological development in the defense industry, as a result of which he again turned to Russia for the latest available systems. In particular, in 2013, an agreement was signed to purchase 24 Russian Su-35 fighter jets, which confirmed China's interest in high-tech Russian weapons.

In 2015, contracts for the Su-35 and S-400 worth $5 billion were signed, which resumed large-scale arms supplies to China. This was followed by deals on helicopters, aircraft engines, and submarine technology ^[8], indicating a shift from arms sales to technology transfer. Joint projects cover new strategic areas, including armaments, space, and AI ^[9].

The importance of military-technical cooperation between Russia and China for the military modernization of China

Military-technical cooperation between Russia and China is important for the development of the Chinese defense industry, since the principle of the PRC's action in the military-technical cooperation with Russia is the purchase of military-technical equipment units with the further acquisition of licenses and/ or design documentation (CD) for the samples they are interested in. For example, based on the Russian Su-27 fighter jets, China has developed its own J-11 fighter. He did this faster than originally planned, so he prematurely stopped licensed production, while simultaneously stating that he had completed the development of the J-11B ^[10].

China is also actively pursuing reverse engineering (reverse engineering), while acquiring manufacturing experience that has helped China develop domestic structures. This procedure includes the process of developing design documentation based on the initial data obtained in the form of a finished product sample.

Today, within the framework of military-technical cooperation, China is showing interest in a number of Russian weapons. One of the key areas is the Su-35 fighter, which attracts the Chinese side with the Al-41F jet engine with supercruise capability, the N035 Irbis multi-mode radar with a passive electronically scanned array (PESA) and modern avionics. It is noteworthy that China has purchased six spare Al-41F engines for each Su-35 instead of the standard two, which indicates its intention to use these engines for its own program to create fifth-generation J-20 fighters.

China also continues to receive S-400 systems, but deliveries have been difficult. The first batch arrived in 2018, but some of the equipment was damaged during transportation due to a storm, and the completion of deliveries was delayed due to the pandemic. In addition, China is showing interest in diesel-electric submarines of the Lada 677 project, probably in order to gain access to advanced sonar technologies and noise reduction systems, which, combined with Chinese power plants and fire control systems, can form the basis for the development of a new generation submarine.

The issue of the supply of Russian RD-180 rocket engines deserves special attention. For a long time, Russia was in no hurry to sell these engines to China, preferring to offer services for the delivery of Chinese astronauts on Russian carriers. However, in 2022, China achieved a breakthrough by successfully testing the YF-130 two-cylinder liquid rocket engine developed by CASC Corporation. With a maximum thrust of 500 tons, this engine surpassed the Russian RD-180, which calls into question China's continued interest in this technology.

Despite progress in certain areas, Russian aircraft engines remain an important factor in military-technical cooperation between the two countries. In the period from 2017 to 2021, aircraft engines accounted for more than 54% of Chinese arms imports in value terms, with most of them supplied from Russia ^[11]. For example, Chinese Chengdu J-20 stealth fighters are equipped with Russian Al-31 engines, and the Shenyang J-35/FC-31 fighter under development uses RD-93 engines.

Assessment of the current stage of military-technical cooperation

Important for characterizing the current stage of the military-technical cooperation between the Russian Federation and China is the fact that traditional roles are changing, with China also becoming a supplier to Russia of the most important items for the development and modernization of Russian weapons. Areas in which the Russian supplier remains include electronic components, for example, for the Russian space program; marine diesel engines, where the Chinese Henan Diesel Engine Corporation has already received an order for 8 diesel engines for the Buyan-M rocket corvette and patrol boats. The purchase of composite materials and unmanned technologies also looks attractive to Russia.

The "joint projects" of Russia and China are a separate area of development of promising types of weapons and military equipment. In the "joint" heavy–lift helicopter project, Russia's role was reportedly reduced to technical support and supply of engines, transmission and tail rotor, while China's role was reduced to the overall helicopter design, assembly and testing. At the same time, Russia will reportedly transfer its core technologies of the Mi-26 heavy multipurpose transport helicopter to China as a contribution to the design of the new helicopter ^[12]. Having declared its willingness to cooperate with China on the deployment of the early warning system (early warning system), Russia officially received only one software development contract, although it is reported to provide technical assistance on space control issues and possibly on other aspects of the system ^[13].

Russia and China are participating in a joint development project for a "new generation non-nuclear submarine." In this project, China is mainly interested in sonar systems and noise reduction technologies. Another potentially new and interesting joint Russian-Chinese project concerns the research and development of an experimental "reconnaissance UAV" launched from the shell of an ammunition launched by the Smerch MLRS ^[14].

Beijing and Moscow "recognize the potential synergies from joining forces in the development of these dual-use technologies, which have clear military and commercial significance." As a result, Russia and China are developing cooperation in such technology sectors as artificial intelligence, robotics, 5G telecommunications, biotechnology, and the digital economy. The technological partnership, based on subcontracting work on various joint defense innovation programs, is changing the nature of the usual transactional Sino-Russian military-technical cooperation, translating it into a more complex interdependence.

Military-technical cooperation between Russia and China has not stopped after the start of the Russian military-technical cooperation in Ukraine. Russia and China continued to implement the previously concluded contracts for 7 units of Tiger armored vehicles and 18 units of Mi-18 transport aircraft ^[15]. It is worth noting that China does not supply weapons and military equipment to Russia against the background of the events in Ukraine. Officially, Beijing means that "the US intelligence [on arms supplies to the Russian Federation] is speculation and slander against China ^[16]. Since the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, Beijing has consistently called for peace and negotiations, playing a constructive role in resolving the situation, as clearly evidenced by the 12 points of political settlement of the Ukrainian crisis proposed by China in February 2023 ^[17]. Despite the neutral position of Chinese diplomacy, the PRC rather adheres to a pro-Russian position, given that the Russian Federation is opposed by the entire consolidated West. This is evidenced by the statement of Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun dated January 31, 2024, where he informed Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu that Beijing would not abandon Moscow's "support" on the "Ukrainian issue" ^[18]. It is worth paying attention to the wording of the Chinese statement, because for the first time since the beginning of its military operation, China publicly announced Russia's "support" in the Ukrainian conflict. From the point of view of Russian experts, this support may consist in facilitating military production ^[19] deployed in the Russian Federation, facilitating the receipt of military components and dual-use products (UAVs and anti-UAV systems).

Thus, technology transfer from Russia to China is a trend in the Russian-Chinese military-technical cooperation, there are no prerequisites for its change. Moreover, this trend will continue, given China's strong desire to develop its own defense production facilities. Russia's role remains in the field of turbofan engines for helicopters, various systems for the submarine fleet, as well as in weapons samples that were not transferred to China (for example, the Iskander-E missile defense system). Russian-Chinese transactions are currently unilateral in nature, i.e. mainly Russian technologies are being transferred. This usually happens in so-called "collaborative development" projects. However, this can be explained by the catch-up development of the Chinese defense industry, which undermined Russia's previous strategy of selling its "second-rate" systems to China, while maintaining a generation ahead in weapons development. At the present stage, raising the issue of addiction looks controversial. Rather, we can talk about the operational integration of the armed forces of the two countries, at least at an informal level, because this is facilitated by the common production and technological base of the two countries. In the absence of fundamental changes in this area, the scenario of gaining wider access to Chinese commercial and dual-use technologies looks beneficial for Russia, which would help both support its defense industry in the face of military confrontation with the Collective West and develop a more innovative economy.