The role of the armed forces in the April 2002 coup attempt in Venezuela

Sizenov Pavel Igorevich Postgraduate student, Department of Modern and Contemporary History, Moscow State University 127591, Russia, Moscow, Moscow, ul. 800th Anniversary of Moscow, 11 K. 6 sizenovp@mail.ru

Hugo Chavez's victory in the 1998 presidential elections in Venezuela marked the beginning of significant changes throughout Latin America and served as a catalyst for the start of the "pink tide" (left turn) in the region. After initiating his first steps as head of state, among which was the amendment of the country's constitution, which destroyed most of the existing system of checks and balances, Chavez was expected to meet resistance from the "right-wing" political elite that had lost power in Venezuela. In addition, Hugo Chavez began to rapidly change the country's political and economic course, as well as the approach to international relations (ties were being established with Cuba and other leftist states at that time) ^{[1, 2, 3]}. In addition, the new leader focused on helping low-income segments of the population, who became his main electoral base. Of course, these steps have provoked resistance from business, representatives of transnational capital, the upper and middle classes, who disagree with the reforms of the new head of state.

Circles that are extremely negative towards the new leader, opposed to the implementation of the course of left-wing capitalism, expected to return to the path of neoconservatism. Given the right-wing levers of influence on the socio-political situation in the country, as well as the continued support in the middle strata of society, an attempt to displace Chavez, who was at the beginning of his changes, was brewing. In turn, a significant difference in views between the opposition and the government led to the fact that an institutional way out of the escalating confrontation became unlikely ^{[4, p. 30]}.

The catalyst for the protests and the coup were: laws on agrarian reform and hydrocarbons aimed at increasing the state budget and adopted in 2001, as well as, given the importance of control over the oil industry in Venezuela, an attempt to strengthen state control over the PDVSA oil company, when in early 2002 Chavez first replaced a number of officials with his supporters, and then he fired the PDVSA leadership (part of which he recently appointed) ^{[5, 6]}. These events became the actual starting point of the culmination of the confrontation and the coup d'etat on April 11, 2002 ^[7].

Representatives of the National Armed Forces of Venezuela played a significant role in both the initial success of the coup and its final failure, under the influence of which Hugo Chavez first resigned as head of state, and then, using their support, returned to the Miroflores Palace. However, before considering the "contribution" of the army to the entire epic of the coup, it is worth considering in general what the Venezuelan Armed Forces were like at that moment.

Given that the Venezuelan military has repeatedly played a significant role in the political life of the country, initiating coups, suppressing anti-government uprisings, as well as simply participating in government, their influence has almost always remained extremely significant ^{[5, 8, 9]}. Therefore, it was really important for the leaders of the country as a whole to gain the loyalty of the military circles, whose support could become a decisive factor in critical conditions. At the same time, over the past 15 years before the incident in April 2002, the army, one way or another, participated in two significant political events for Venezuela: the mass protests of 1989 "Caracas", as well as 2 coup attempts in 1992 carried out by the "Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement – 200" (one of them led by Colonel U. Chavez).

In the context of the 2002 coup, the actions of the military can be compared precisely with the time of "Caracas", during which President C.A. Perez initiated the Avila plan developed by the Venezuelan military in case of emergency situations. At that time, troops of the Venezuelan National Guard and other military units participated in the suppression of protests and opened fire on those who disagreed with the government's actions. As a result of the confrontation, several hundred Venezuelans died, while the events of "Caraxo" subsequently led to even greater political instability and formed a demand in society, especially among the poor, for a new political elite (which was later created by Chavez), instead of the one that violated the social pact between the authorities that existed tacitly after the revolution of 1958 and citizens ^{[9, pp. 194-226]}. Thus, the participation of the military and their loyalty to the then government had an impact on the subsequent historical development of the country.

As for the immediate state of the Venezuelan Armed Forces by the April coup, according to the yearbook "Military Balance" for 2001, the National Armed Forces of Venezuela (Fuerza Armada Nacional de Venezuela) consisted of about 82 thousand people, including 31 thousand National guardsmen responsible for ensuring the internal security of the country and capable of operationally, unlike directly army units, start solving tasks within the country ^[10]. At the same time, it makes no sense to talk about the combat capability and military-technical condition of the Venezuelan Armed Forces in this context, because regardless of the qualitative composition and technical and tactical characteristics of weapons and military equipment, with a hypothetical escalation of the conflict, army units still have an absolute advantage over the crowd, even armed.

As for the importance of the country's armed forces, it should be noted that Colonel Chavez planned to rely on the military in his future reforms, so the institutional role of the army has already grown over the 3 years of the socialist president's rule^{[1] [1, 11]}. At the same time, since Chavez himself came from the army, his popularity in the troops was also considerable. However, there was also a critical attitude towards the president within the armed forces due to "nepotism" and politicization in the army, as well as Chavez's loyal position to the Colombian radical left group FARC, which had camps in Venezuela ^{[6, p.126]}. Moreover, despite the appointment of his associates by Chavez to a number of significant posts, in general, the armed forces of the Republic of Venezuela in 2002 have so far undergone few changes in their personnel after the change in the country's political course. Given the fact that a significant part of the officers of the then Venezuelan army were trained either at US military academies or by American instructors, their preferences for the most part should have been on the side of Chavez's opponents ^[11]. Thus, a significant number of supporters of the previous government remained in the ranks of the Armed Forces, especially among the top command.

One way or another, it was the senior officers who enjoyed sufficient authority in the troops who had to play a decisive role in the army's acceptance of one side or another of the conflict. Among them, the most important figures for the Venezuelan Armed Forces as a whole were the commander of the Ground Forces, Efrain Vasquez Velasco, as well as Manuel Rosendo, the head of the Joint Command of the National Armed Forces (KUFAN). In addition, in the subsequent coup, given its widespread media coverage, Vice Admiral Ramirez Perez, one of the original initiators of the conspiracy to overthrow Chavez among the military, ^[6] as well as the Inspector General of the Venezuelan Armed Forces, Lucas Rincon Romero, will play significant media roles. In addition to them, the situation will subsequently be influenced by officers who led individual elite units of the Venezuelan army: the commanders of the Presidential Guard of Honor and the Aragua airborne brigade, Jesus Morao Cardona and Raul Baduel, the future commander of the Venezuelan ground forces.

The high authority and influence of individual high-ranking military personnel and the simultaneous difference in their views on the future of the Bolivarian Republic led to the fact that there was no consensus in the ranks of the armed forces regarding the coup. Thus, on the eve of the April events, there was no unified consolidated opinion among army officers regarding the already actively developing crisis of power that led to the coup.

The existing split was the reason for the temporary success of the coup. When on April 11, 2002, the situation was approaching the peak of tension and the general march of Chavez's opponents was moving towards the Miroflores Palace, the armed forces for the most part were still waiting for orders. However, the tragic events in Puente Llaguno^[2], information about which was promptly disseminated by private media, which blamed Chavez and his supporters for the shooting, strengthened the positions of opponents of the regime and supporters of the coup. The subsequent order of the Venezuelan president to activate the Avila plan only aggravated the "gap" that arose between Chavez and the military ^{[6, p. 123]}. The refusal of E. Vasquez Velasco and M. Rosendo to carry out this order indicated a clear split within the military close to Chavez (at that moment, in fact, the only one ready to implement Avila, General Jorge Garcia Carneiro, would be blocked in Fort Tiuna) ^{[6, p. 129]}. At the same time, there was a turning point in the coup: the commander of the ground forces, General E. Vasquez Velasco, enlisting the support of wavering and "anti-fascist" officers, said in his televised address surrounded by officers that he would not obey presidential directives to suppress anti-government demonstrations and implement the Avila plan, and also ordered all his troops to remain at bases. In his speech, he described President Chavez's orders as illegal, and soon senior generals of the National Guard and admirals of the Navy repeated his opinion on radio and television ^{[5, 6]}. At that time, even officers close to Chavez, such as R. Baduel and L. Rincon, also did not agree with the initiation of the Avila plan ^{[6, pp.123, 131]}. Thus, there was some temporary consensus among the military in favor of at least temporarily limiting the actions of President Chavez, based on the general belief of the officers that they should not participate in the suppression of civilian anti-government demonstrators ^{[6, 11]}. At the same time, the most active opponents of Chavez's actions, observing the hesitation of officers loyal to the president, called for his resignation from the post of head of state. Thus, the president actually temporarily lost control of the army, and the military who joined golpe provided an advantage to the putschists. In the current situation, including to avoid further bloodshed (as well as possible his own death), U. Chavez accepts the demands of the president's opponents and agrees to resign. In this context, it is worth noting that the military did not position themselves as non-participants in the coup, but emphasized their role as guardians of the democratic order in the country ^{[6, 11]}. This was confirmed by L. Rincon's overnight statement, which indicated that it was the command of the National Armed Forces of Venezuela that "asked the President of the republic to resign from his post, to which he agreed" ^[12]. Some time later, Chavez was taken from the presidential palace to Fort Tiuna, accompanied by M. Rosendo, and one of the main conspirators, a business representative Pedro Carmona, temporarily took over the presidency. Thus, the coup would seem to have been successful.

After that, on April 12, the proclaimed president P. Carmona almost immediately begins to destroy the "legacy of Chavez," but his actions looked chaotic, inconsistent and created prerequisites for the country to slide into even greater chaos. Carmona dissolved the National Assembly, the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General's Office of the country and declared the 1999 Constitution invalid. He also appointed a new cabinet of ministers, while not including any of the senior officers who supported the coup, including the real leader of those who disobeyed the president, General Vasquez Velasco ^[11]. The only exception is the participant in the conspiracy, Vice Admiral Ramirez Perez, who was close to the top of Venezuelan business and initially openly opposed Chavez ^{[6, pp. 198, 13]}. In fact, these actions of Carmona were an attempt to end "Chavismo" as quickly as possible, in one day.

Further, representatives of the right forces, who believed in their return, make another mistake, declaring a complete restructuring of the supreme command of the armed forces, in fact dismissing many high-ranking generals, including Vasquez Velasco ^{[5, p. 232]}. This justifiably causes dissatisfaction with the military, who have the impression that they were simply used to return the right to power ^{[6, 11]}. The radical program is extremely negatively perceived by many officers of the country's army. These circumstances bring discord into the already formed part of the conspirators from the military, and also force the doubters to change their preferences again and lean more towards preserving the current institutions of power and supporting the legitimately elected president. At the same time, the vast majority of army officers have not yet expressed their open position, preferring not to interfere in the crisis and only following the orders of their superiors ^[5].

At this point, it turns out that the coup d'etat, initially perceived by Hugo Chavez as well-organized and prepared, in reality has a lot of problems ^[6]. At the same time, Chavez, who was not completely isolated from the outside world, began to understand that the military did not control the coup, and, consequently, he still had the opportunity to continue the fight against the putschists. For the conspirators, the situation was further aggravated by the fact that Chavez had not signed the resignation papers and was still the universally recognized head of state.

However, in order to bring the military back to his side, Chavez needed a voice from the dissenters – a speech by personalities who enjoy authority among the commanders of the armed forces and are ready for decisive action. Such a speech in support of Chavez was necessary to consolidate the disparate military in the absence of a recognized president. Moreover, on the side of the Bolivarian leader was the head of the Presidential Guard of Honor guarding the Miraflores Palace, Colonel J. Morao Cordon, ready to provide Chavez with control over the residence and his safe return there ^{[6, 13]}. One of the first to unite the military loyal to Chavez around himself was the commander of the elite airborne brigade R. Baduel, who was close to the president on MVR-200, who headed the military in Maracaibo and contacted H. Morao to begin restoring constitutional order. In addition, General Garcia Carneiro, who had previously been blocked in Fort Tiuna, spoke on behalf of the armed forces, stating that the country's armed forces did not recognize the coup ^{[5, pp. 233-236]}.

Meanwhile, the putschist officers, as well as those who joined them, split over Carmona's actions. General Vasquez Velasco, who recently determined the removal of Hugo Chavez from power, made a statement about the actual non-recognition of the actions of the new government ^[6]. Thus, Carmona and his associates lost the support of the wavering part of the army and were left only with those officers who were initially in the conspiracy. These forces were definitely not enough to keep power in their hands, so the fate of the most zealous putschists was decided at that moment. However, it should be noted that the complete collapse of the coup occurred not only after the military refused to support the putschists, but also after the restoration of Chavista control over the state channel, through which the population was subsequently informed that Chavez remained the legitimate president ^[14].

In turn, the military, who agreed with Vasquez Velasco, at that moment established a temporary consensus with the Chavistas in the capital of the country, found the country's hiding vice-president Diosdado Cabello and sworn him in as head of state, hoping that the transfer of power to Chavez would not take place ^[6]. At the same time, in Maracaibo, R. Baduel, who does not have complete information about the events in Caracas, receives a note from U. Chavez, in which the president stressed that he "did not renounce legitimate power" and is the head of Venezuela ^{[6, p. 244]}. This allows Baduel to organize a rescue operation by his brigade on April 14 to rescue the president from the naval base on the island of La Orchila, where he was imprisoned and was ready to go into exile to Cuba. After that, military helicopters with Hugo Chavez on board are sent to the Miroflores Palace, already controlled by the presidential Guard, where the legitimate head of state, surrounded by his military and civilian supporters, returns power to his hands ^{[5, 6]}. Thus, the coup ends in failure, and power is restored in the hands of Chavez and his supporters.

As a result, both the initial success of the coup and its further failure were ensured by representatives of the country's armed forces. Despite the significant influence of the media in covering events for the masses, it was the military decisions taken that proved to be the most significant both during the temporary deposition of the Venezuelan president and in the subsequent return of Chavez to the Miroflores Palace, already controlled by the fighters of the Presidential Guard loyal to him. At first, the actions of the top of the army that disagreed with the activation of the Avila plan played completely into the hands of the putschists, but as soon as the unconstitutional nature of the transitional government of the putschists became apparent to the military, who did not act in the interests of senior officers, the consensus between the army and them disintegrated. At the same time, in reality, all groups of the military, both for and against Chavez, acted for the most part independently in conditions of a vacuum of power and general chaos, with a difference only in the final beneficiaries of their actions. Thus, the high command, which initially sided with the putschists, actually allowed a small number of military and civilian conspirators to seize power for a short time. In turn, the Chavista military, for the most part representatives of real combat units, for some time not knowing where their leader was, were ready to take decisive action to prevent the country from returning to the path of neoconservatism, regardless of with or without Chavez. At the same time, based on this division, it can be assumed that the military uprising in reality never spread far beyond the upper ranks of the officer corps, and directly the rebellious elements of the armed forces almost did not control the combat units, the most important of which were stationed in Maracaibo and supported the Chavistas ^[11]. At the same time, we must also not forget that the middle and lower command staff also remained mostly loyal to Chavez, who passed the note to his supporters through a simple soldier ^{[6, p. 244]}.

Despite the failure of the coup, the opposition, which had control over the Supreme Court of the country, was able to prevent four high-ranking officers who were directly involved in the coup attempt from being brought to justice ^{[5, pp. 238-244, 6]}. The decision of the Supreme Court of Venezuela, which exempted the military from responsibility, allowed several more attempts to remove U. Chavez in the future, including based on a certain, albeit significantly reduced, support in the ranks of the armed forces of the Republic ^{[4, 6]}. As a result, after the coup for several years, tension in society, coupled with the presence of economic problems, led to the continuation of the confrontation between Chavez and the opposition at a fairly high level until 2004, when they tried to pass a vote of no confidence in the president of Venezuela ^[15]. However, not everyone was able to escape punishment and for the Venezuelan Armed Forces, the coup attempt did not go unrequited. Despite a rather mild reaction against a number of military personnel, after the incident, Chavez nevertheless began to reorganize the top command, replacing officers who supported the opposition with loyal ones and remained faithful to the constitutional system ^{[5, 6]}. Thus, Chavez further politicized the army, which was also opposed by the conspirators. Generals Vasquez Velasco and Rosendo, although they were able to avoid imprisonment, but their military career ended there ^[16].

Subsequently, Chavez and his supporters also expressed that the coup was coordinated with the United States, since state officials in Venezuela held active consultations with the putschists, including through military attaches. Moreover, based on the available information, the federal structures of the United States knew about the impending escalation of the confrontation and at least did not interfere with the process ^{[5, 17]}. In turn, according to part of the research community, the United States as a whole was involved in organizing a coup against the objectionable President Chavez ^{[3, 13, 18, 19, pp. 165-172]}, including because the "Council of the Rebels" included officers of the US military mission in Caracas, as well as the military attache of the Venezuelan embassy in Washington, General Enrique Medina Gomez ^{[5, p. 228]}. In addition to the US intervention, the issue of Cuba's participation in Chavez's return to power was also raised. However, although the president contacted Fidel Castro after his "resignation", but apart from consultations and dissemination of information that the Venezuelan president did not actually abdicate power ^{[5, 6]}, the Republic of Cuba and its leader did not have a noticeable impact on resolving the April crisis.

The events of the first half of April 2002 were the culmination of the confrontation between Chavez and the old Venezuelan elite for control of the country. Given the intransigence of the warring parties – Chavez and the large monopolists and entrepreneurs who opposed the moderate socialist transformations of the president, it becomes obvious that the success of the coup would mean a complete revenge of the former Venezuelan elite during the Fourth Republic. The loyalty of a number of important army officers to Colonel Chavez and the presence of active supporters in society, as well as the extremely unsuccessful steps of the interim government during its stay in power, determined the failure of the coup and the return of the legitimate president to the Miraflores Palace 47 hours after his removal.

The very same coup attempt in 2002 served as a catalyst for the radicalization of the still moderate left-wing democratic course of President Chavez. If before these events, Hugo Chavez was not an absolute opponent of the United States (although he criticized the policy of the United States from anti-imperialist positions) and advocated primarily for the sovereignty of Venezuela in internal and external affairs, then after the coup, relations with the United States and its allies in the region sharply worsened ^{[5, 6, 11]}, and the Bolivarian The government accelerated the change of the country's development vector from the capitalist model to the socialist one, but of the "new XXI century" ^[20].

At the same time, the events of April 2002 themselves turned out to be extremely chaotic and spontaneous, as well as the initial participation of the armed forces in them. Key army officers had to actually "improvise" and make quick decisions in a crisis of power. In this regard, it should be noted that there was a high probability that there was still no army-wide conspiracy, unlike the actually existing small group of putschists associated with large capital, and the catalyst for the removal of Chavez from power by the military command was precisely the president's desire to brutally suppress the protesters by activating the Avilla Plan, with which most officers disagreed ^{[6, 15]}.

Later, the country's armed forces turned into one of the main pillars of the Bolivarian people, who have continued to rule the country for 25 years. At the same time, the military structures became even more politicized and controlled by the Socialists, which manifested itself at the peak moments of the 2019 crisis in the country, when the National Bolivarian Armed Forces, with some exceptions, remained loyal to the Maduro regime and did not support H. Guaido and his supporters.

^[1] For example, the new constitution of 1999 allowed the military to enter the government of the country

^[2] Unidentified shooting that led to the deaths of both protesters and Chavez supporters