Bulent Ecevit and Turkey’s Security Policies after Cyprus Conflict (1974)

Kurochkin Ruslan Vladimirovich Senior Lecturer, Department of Foreign Languages of Professional Communication, Kazan Innovative University named after V.G. Timiryasov 422011, Russia, Republic of Tatarstan, Kazan, Moskovskaya str., 42 K.1, room 402 ruslankurochkin@gmail.com

The Republic of Turkey claims primacy in its Middle East region in the modern geopolitical arena. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 and the proclamation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the country's leadership sought to restore its influence in the territories of the former Ottoman Empire. Throughout the twentieth century, Turkey has sought to successfully maneuver in the political arena with the countries of the capitalist and socialist bloc. The doctrine of "zero problems with neighbors", adopted when Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu took office, was another tool for achieving his political goals.  It is worth noting that this doctrine has replaced the pro-European vector in Turkey's foreign policy, when the task of joining the European Union has remained unfulfilled since 1987 as a candidate for membership. One of the problems that has become an obstacle to becoming a full member of the EU is the Cyprus issue ^[1].

Our research is based on the hypothesis that Bulent Ejevit, while serving as Prime Minister of Turkey in 1978, in his message to Western partners entitled "Turkey's Security Policies", published in "Survival: Global Politics and Strategy" ^[2], laid the foundations of Turkey's modern geopolitical strategy, proposed measures, which were ahead of time and were reflected in the subsequent decisions made by the leaders of Turkey over the next decades. In our opinion, the doctrine of "zero problems with neighbors" and the growth of the military-industrial complex of the Republic of Turkey are the result of these measures.

The outbreak of the conflict began when the citizens of the island, who participated in the events of World War II, began to hope for a possible liberation from English oppression, which was preceded by three hundred years of obedience to the Ottoman Empire. The British government of E. Eden took a tough position on the independence of the island, refusing to discuss the Cyprus problem with Greece, pointing out that Cyprus is the sphere of exclusive British interests. Back in 1954 and in 1955, the Greek government submitted the Cyprus issue to the UN General Assembly for consideration, but this proposal was then rejected ^{[3, p. 91]}.

Anti-British sentiments on the island were so active that in April 1955 a military campaign was launched by the Greek Cypriot National Organization for the Liberation of Cyprus (EOKA) against the British army and ethnic Turks ^{[4, p. 75]}. London was forced to act and decolonize the island by signing the Zurich-London Agreements between Great Britain, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus in 1959 ^{[5, p. 114]}. The Treaty of Guarantees between the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, which was signed and entered into force in Nicosia on August 16, 1960, concerned the creation of the Republic of Cyprus and included provisions defining the citizenship of persons residing on the island, as well as an agreement on the territorial definition of this republic ^{[6, pp. 481-482]}.

In 1960, Cyprus gained independence from Great Britain. The Constitution of the new country, ratified on August 16, 1960, provided that the president should be a Greek Cypriot, the vice-president a Turkish Cypriot, 70% of Greek Cypriots and 30% of Turkish Cypriots in public service ^{[7, p. 60]}. The document also proclaimed the existence of two communities: Greek (about 78% of the population) and Turkish (about 18%) ^[8].

Greece and Turkey acted as accomplices and provided comprehensive assistance to two related communities. Athens adhered to the following position regarding Cyprus: "Cyprus decides, Greece supports." Nevertheless, at first Athens and Ankara, realizing the danger of the conflict, were satisfied with the Zurich-London agreements. Greece and Turkey jointly sought to influence both communities so that the latter adamantly respected the agreements reached and, thus, preserve peace on the island. However, the joint efforts of 2 countries were not crowned with success ^{[9, p. 147]}.

At the same time, the provisions of the constitution caused certain discontent ^[10], over the next three years social tension grew, and this resulted in a series of open armed conflicts starting on 12/21/1963 (this event is known among Turkish Cypriots as "Bloody Christmas") [11c. 3]. Pierre Oberling noted that, according to official According to the data, the crisis of 1963-64 led to the deaths of 364 Turkish Cypriots and 174 Greek Cypriots ^{[12, p.120]}.

On February 15, 1964, representatives of the United Kingdom and Cyprus requested urgent action by the UN Security Council. Already on March 4, the Council unanimously adopted resolution No. 186 (1964), in which it noted that the situation in Cyprus threatens international peace and security and recommended the creation of a contingent of the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) with the consent of the Government of Cyprus ^{[13, p. 99]}. Relations between Greek Cypriots and Turks after independence were not easy, and during the 14 years preceding the coup, there were outbreaks of violence between nationalist groups ^{[14, p. 88]}. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that EOKA did not cease its activities after Cyprus gained independence, on the contrary, it continued its activities in secret, with the support of the "black colonels" of Greece in the period from 1967 to 1974 ^{[15, p. 133]}.

Nevertheless, the situation remained unresolved for a decade. Since Greece and Turkey became the guarantors of Cyprus' sovereignty, in addition to the ex-metropolis, this determined the possibility of foreign interference in its affairs [16 p. 100]. In 1974, a military coup took place in Cyprus, led by forces advocating the annexation of Cyprus – enosis (a movement whose goal is to return the historical lands of Greece) ^[17]. The President of Cyprus, Makarios III, was deposed. The acting president was Nikos Sampson, who was the leader of EOKA-B (an underground organization of Greek Cypriots, whose goal was to expel the British) ^{[18, p. 91]}.

Under the pretext of the impossibility of a peaceful settlement of the conflict and the protection of the Turkish community, the Turkish government has introduced its military units to Cyprus ^{[19, p. 430]}. Turkey itself considered the coup d'etat as a reason for the unification of Cyprus with Greece. In response, the Turkish Government announces a "peacekeeping operation in Cyprus." Codenamed "Operation Atilla", the start of the operation was scheduled for July 20, 1974. On July 20, 1974, the Turkish army of 10 soldiers landed on Pentemili Beach, located on the northern coast of Cyprus ^{[18, p. 91]}. On July 23, active hostilities were stopped, but local clashes occurred until mid-August. As a result, the island of Cyprus was divided into two parts, one of which was under the control of Greek Cypriots (actually Greece), the other under the control of Turkish Cypriots (actually Turkey), which marked the beginning of the still unfinished process of international diplomatic settlement of the Cyprus problem, known as the "Cyprus settlement" ^{[20, c. 58]}.

After the 1974 hostilities, the Security Council adopted a number of resolutions expanding the mandate of UNFICYP. The changes included monitoring the actual ceasefire, which came into force on August 16, 1974, and maintaining a buffer zone between the lines of the National Guard of Cyprus and the forces of the Turks and Turkish Cypriots ^{[13, p. 100]}.

Turkey's actions were condemned by the international community. Nevertheless, for Turkey itself, in particular, Prime Minister Bulent Ejevit, it was a grand achievement. Turkey has declared itself as a force to be reckoned with at least at the regional level.  In his address to the International Institute for Strategic Studies dated May 15, 1978, Edzhevit outlined the provisions in the field of national security policy of his country ^[2].

Firstly, Ecevit begins by saying that in the context of the events and the changes that they have entailed, the government needs to take careful actions aimed not only at strengthening Turkey's national security, but also to strengthen its peacekeeping potential. The ability to protect the interests of one's State is inseparable from its economic situation. In this regard, he recalls that Turkey has been contributing to NATO for many years, much more resources, military forces and a share of national income, unlike other participating countries ^{[2; p. 203]}. The burden that Turkey bore to NATO in the name of collective security turned into those military expenditures that slowed down the development of the agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy.

Here, the Turkish Prime Minister talks about the need to realize that the Cold War period is over, and that it is necessary to reconsider the obligations to NATO: it is necessary to make Turkey's economy and its defense capability more independent. He also states that the sources of the imminent threat to Turkey have changed significantly and that the national security doctrine should change accordingly.

In addition, he recalls the current situation in relations between Turkey and the EEC. Despite the fact that Turkey was an associate member of the EEC, it was isolated due to the events in Cyprus in 1974. Here he argues on the justice of the fact that Greece, which is soon to become a full member of the EEC, will have the right of veto in those matters that are somehow related to Turkey and its economy. In connection with this circumstance, Ejevit also says that the national security policy needs appropriate changes ^{[2; p. 204]}.

After the events of 1974, the United States imposed an embargo on Turkey. B. Ejevit also did not ignore this circumstance: he claims that due to the restrictions imposed by the States, the Turkish defense structures turned out to be incapacitated, since their own economy could not provide sufficient support. The Prime Minister says that Turkey has reached the level where it should focus more on economic development.

 Historically, since the end of World War II, Turkey has been a free and democratic country. Turkish society is developed in the socio-political aspect, however, in the economic sense it remained much less developed. The economic crisis has resulted in a number of socio-political crises, and the imposition of the embargo has only worsened the situation. According to Ejevit, the first thing that needs to be done to resolve the socio-political crisis is to accelerate Turkey's economic development in order to be able to meet the needs of an open and free society. Defense structures cannot be built on a weak and weak economy, they cannot be considered reliable and effective ^{[2; p. 204-205]}.

The new principles of the concept of national security and foreign policy should include, first of all, good, trusting relations with neighbors based on an atmosphere of mutual trust – which resembles the concept of "zero problems with neighbors", which will come 30 years later ^[21]. The theoretical origins of the neighborhood policy were presented in the work of A. Davutoglu, Professor of Beikent University (1999-2004), Chief Adviser on Foreign Policy Issues A. Gul (2002-2003) and R. T. Erdogan (2003-2014), Ambassador-at-Large, since 2003 Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Minister of Foreign Affairs (2009-2014), Prime Minister of Turkey (2014-2016). In his book "Strategic Depth. The international situation of Turkey" A. Davutoglu outlined his ideas about what course the Republic of Turkey should follow in the implementation of foreign policy. Throughout the book, the idea is carried out about the need to improve relations with neighboring states in order to establish lasting peace and stability around Turkey. This approach reflects the idea of K. Ataturk "Peace at home, world peace" ^[22].

B. Ejevit states that in the formation of new principles of national security policy, it is necessary to take into account the historical and geographical realities of Turkey. As time passes, conditions change, as well as the forms of unions, alliances, associations and interactions change. But history and geography remain the same, so the principles based on historical and geographical realities are supposed to be the most reliable. According to the Prime Minister's position, it is necessary to return to the origins, to the times when the Republic of Turkey appeared, and establish as close relations with the countries of the Middle East as possible ^{[2; p. 205]}.

Secondly, B. Edzhevit emphasizes that within the framework of the new concept of national security policy, defense structures should not be a burden, but a support, support for the country's economy. The new structure of defense systems should be compatible with further membership in NATO, at the same time, the contribution to the North Atlantic Alliance should correspond to the contribution to the security of Turkey. At the same time, it should be taken into account in the future that military spending for NATO should not carry a serious risk to the economy. This thesis also did not go unheard – after 40 years, the Turkish defense industry has reached such a level that it successfully exports its weapons to different countries, and the current President of Turkey, R.T. Erdogan himself, declares that "the development of the defense industry is one of the important priorities for Ankara, since the country must gain independence from foreign companies in the military industry since 2023." ^[22]

In addition, B. Ejevit suggests building new relations in the context of the NATO partnership. Turkey will continue to contribute to NATO, but in such a way that it does not create a serious risk for Turkey itself, does not expose it as a provocateur in its region. Further, B. Ejevit states that two main points should be taken into account when forming a new doctrine of Turkey's national security: relations with the United States and with Europe. In the case of the former, the prime minister himself stated that he was not very optimistic that the United States would lift the embargo in the near future, and it was necessary to prepare for the fact that it would not be lifted at all (the arms embargo was lifted in the same 1978) ^[23]. As for the European partners, B. Ejevit says that the European countries should take on greater responsibility and become more self-sufficient in many aspects.

In continuation of his appeal to Western partners, B. Ejevit reminds Western countries and asks them to remember several factors. The first thesis is about Turkey's contribution to democracy. Turkey, with the exception of some episodes after the Second World War, was and continues to be a democratic developing state. The Republic of Turkey can serve as a model for other developing countries, which, with the help of democratic instruments, can successfully develop even in conditions of limited economic resources. B. Ejevit also states that Turkey no longer wants to be treated only as the last line of defense of the Western Alliance. The second thesis appeals to the obligations of the partners. The Prime Minister hastens to remind that the allies have obligations under the alliance aimed at supporting the defense and economy of Turkey, which must be fulfilled at a higher level, which is often forgotten by the members of the alliance ^{[2; p. 206]}.

With the help of these theses, B. Ejevit calls on NATO's European partners to include Turkey in production schemes for the production of military ammunition and equipment aimed at getting rid of dependence on the United States in defense terms.  According to the Turkish Prime Minister himself, the degree of industrial development has reached the necessary level to solve such problems. Turkey can no longer have close relations based solely on unequal trade relations. By itself, Turkey, whose population is already 40 million (as of 1978), represents a promising market that can become an ideal partner for some Western countries: an industrialized society (at least standing on the threshold of industrialization), a growing market, good relations with neighboring countries (with only one exception in relations with the only NATO partner in the region). ^{[2; p. 207]}

At the end of his address, the Prime Minister pays special attention to the pressing problem of that period - Cyprus. In developing a new concept of Turkey's national security and international relations, it is necessary to take into account the current problems in relations with Greece and Cyprus. He talks about the need to establish a friendly dialogue between Turkish Cypriots and Greeks. He also states that the Turkish Cypriot administration was ready to resolve the problem: a number of specific proposals were prepared aimed at accelerating the resolution of the already protracted conflict. But Greece immediately rejected these proposals, which contributed to the formation of an opinion among Western partners about their insolvency, without having the opportunity to familiarize themselves with them.  The proposals of the Turkish side implied a discussion of territorial changes in 6 regions, the transfer of Varosha for settlement to Greek Cypriots (the transfer of Varosha was also proposed according to the Annan plan in 2004) ^[24]. The tension over the Cyprus crisis has worsened relations between Turkey and Greece itself. Bulent Ejevit has secured a meeting with Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis. However, after the lifting of the US embargo, Greece suspended the dialogue (however, it was later resumed). According to B. Ejevit, this clearly indicates that the Cyprus problem cannot be solved "in the shadow of others" ^{[2; p. 207]}. Even after the First World War, after the bitter events of the Greco-Turkish war, Ataturk and Venizelos managed to establish friendly relations. After World War II, in the 1950s, Greece and Turkey also managed to establish strong and trusting relations, which as a result were overshadowed by the events in Cyprus. Thus, non–interference from the outside will only contribute to the improvement and stabilization of relations between Turkey and Greece," Bulent Ejevit, the man who laid the foundation for the principles of Turkey's national security, which remain relevant to this day, believed.