Abstract: The subject of this research is the set of actions taken by command group of the Western front of the Russian Army as a defense against chemical warfare during the World War I. The author thoroughly examines such aspects of the topic as the supply of military staff with the personal chemical gear, training on how to use those, creation of the system of meteorological observation; as well as analyzes the combination of orders and instructions that regulated chemical defense on the front line. Special attention is given to cooperation of the various military administration bodies involved in the sphere of chemical defense. In the course of this research, the author applies systemic approach, method of systemic reconstruction, as well as follows the principles of historicism, scientific objectivity and verifiability. The conclusion is made that the Western front command group has done everything possible to minimize casualties in the conditions of chemical warfare by supplying the crew with the personal protection gear. The Western front used the Zelinsky-Kummant gas mask; as well as organized training of the crew by deploying mobile detachments. The established system also has a number of flaws, but yet allowed familiarizing the soldiers with the basics of defense against the new type of weapon. At the same time, some fatal mistakes were made in organization of the chemical defense. The front staff neglected the questions of chemical reconnaissance and gas warning, therefore, the corps and army command groups had to rectify such deficiencies, often at the cost of harrowing experience.

Abstract: The subject of this study's research is the state of the defensive lines of the Russian army's Western front at the dawn of the trench stage of the First World War on the Eastern front. The article's author examines the reports of General of the Infantry K. A.  Kondratovich, which were prepared by him on behalf of the front commander-in-chief A. E. Evert. Having visited all four armies of the front with revisions, the general prepared a rich factual material resource. On the basis of this material, the author describes the fortifications erected by the troops both on the front lines and in the rear, analyzes their main defects and how they came about. The author dedicates particular attention to the organizational component, which includes the interaction between the corps and army engineering control bodies. The study applies the systematic approach and the method of system reconstruction on the primary source material, while the author adheres to the principles of historicism, scientific objectivity, and verifiability. Based on the results of the conducted study, the author concludes that the Russian army at the beginning of 1916 was unable to fully adapt to the realities of the trench war. Despite the long respite that the enemy gave, the troops did not manage to sufficiently strengthen their positions. The location of the defensive positions on the Western Front was accidental, and the troops were strengthened where they stopped after the last battle. The organization of defensive work was also often not up to par. The already scarce resources, primarily human resources, were scattered, and tasks were not ranked in order of importance. The principle of unity of command was not observed, notably, corps and army engineers competed with each other. This situation could not give the command of the Russian army confidence in their own defensive lines, chaining large forces and means, and holding down offensive initiatives.