Abstract: The subject of this research is the works of the Russian legal scholar of the second half of the XIX century P. V. Delarov, better known to his contemporaries as a collector of antiques. Since the late 1870s he wrote several essays covering the fundamental and applied topics and problems of legal science and practice. His works are poorly studied within the framework of legal disciplines of historical and philosophical-legal profiles, however represent particular interest for the history of establishment of legal thought in Russia. This particular pertains to the author’s reference to the tasks on reforming legal science into psychology of law; renewing the theoretical-methodological principles and characteristics, which allowed the Russian legal scholar to resolve the fundamental contradictions in the area of cognition and interpretation of law, associated with idealistic or realistic arguments. The scientific novelty of this research lies in the following aspects: description and analysis of the legal views of P. V. Delarov, which were not been previously studied in the history of legal thought; substantiation of the conclusions that he formulated the first theoretically mature and developed psychological concept of law within the Russian legal literature; the concept of P. V. Delarov appeared much earlier than the psychological concept of L. I. Petrażycki;. Delarov’s concept in its essence represented a variety of realistic theories that rely on the tendency of “scientification” of jurisprudence within the framework of natural-scientific worldview of the XIX century. This article also presents other generalizations and explanations of P. V. Delarov's legal views, which allow introducing significant clarifications into understanding the processes of the emergence of psychological approaches towards law in the Russian and Foreign legal literature.

Abstract: The subject of this research is the concept of activity – one of the semantic characteristics of conceptual legal realism. The latter is viewed as a certain paradigm or gnoseological strategy, which serves as the basis for the development of cognitive attitudes. Legal realism is often erroneously reduced to the regional and local schools and trends of the legal thought. However, the study of legal realism as a conceptual technique, which has different interpretation of one of the central and meaning-making themes in the history of legal thought, allows introducing significant clarifications into the understanding of realism in jurisprudence from the perspective of the history of its formation, as well as heuristic capabilities in modern legal science. Activity is viewed as one of the key characteristics of the realistic approach towards law, taking into account various interpretations of realism. The novelty of this research consists in examination of the problem of realism in jurisprudence and its fundamental semantic characteristics through the prism of conceptual approach. The problem of psychology of activity, which was actively developed by the Soviet philosophical-psychological school, is closely related to the development of realistic interpretations of law in the contemporary history of legal thought. The author substantiates the position that application of the construct on the differentiation of the objective meaning from subjective-personal sense in the area of cognition of law allows to critically reconsider such trends on the modern legal thought that position themselves as the varieties of legal realism, clarify possible directions in the development of realism in jurisprudence.

Abstract: The subject of the study is the American legal thought of the period of its establishment and theoretical conceptualization, which was closely related to such characteristic as the realistic approach towards law that stood apart in the sociological and realistic directions. The attempts of interpreting the views of this regional intellectual group of legal experts as the classical version of legal realism are subjected to critical reevaluation. For assessing the specificity and content of the direction of legal thought referred to as “American legal realism”, the author explores the philosophical-methodological grounds of the cognition of law and interpretation of its concepts in the context of the aforementioned trend, separate substantial aspects of the genesis of realistic approach towards legal problematic in the history of American legal thought, as well as specificity of such characteristics of the court function as “judicial legislation” in through the prism of “legal realism”.  The novelty of this research consists in detailed clarification of certain essential aspects of the genesis and evolution of American legal thought. Emphasis is placed on the poorly studied aspects of the criticism of legal realism in American literature. The latter is used rarely or fragmentally in the Russian research dedicated to the application of realistic approach towards law in the United States, including correlations with some European direction of “realistic” jurisprudence. Examination of philosophical-methodological framework of American legal realism allows revealing significant inaccuracies and distortions in classification of this trend as realistic, which in fact is rather of nominalistic nature. Realistic in relation to this trend of American legal thought is applicable only to separate characteristics of the sociological study of justice.

Abstract: The subject of this research is one of the trends in the American legal thought – legal realism in the context of clarification of its specificity, key theoretical-methodological perspectives formed in the classical period, represented by the founders of this direction O. W. Holmes, R. Pound and K. Llewellyn. Studying the heritage of the classical American realists is important for the purpose of elucidation of their views, since many aspects remain unclear or simplified, and interpreted in form of patterns and schemes; as well as due to the fact that in the modern American legal science and well beyond it, more popularity multiple variations of “clarification” of realism in form of “neo-“ versions, and realism itself is declared the symbol of modern age. Main attention is given to the question of overcoming simplifications with regards to legal views of the classical American realists. The scientific novelty of this work consists in elucidation of the perceptions of the nature and specificity of legal views of the representatives of classical American legal realism. This is primarily associated with the fact that orientation towards demythologization of conceptualism in the works of legal realists of the period of establishment of this trend is erroneously identified with the rejection of moral arguments in substantiation of law, which to a large extent was justified by the desire of some researchers to substantiate the meaning of radical pragmatism as a philosophical foundation of the modernized legal theory. Secondly, unjustified broadening of the concept of legal realism and its identification with naturalization of conceptual apparatus of law is one of the factors that led to multiple simplifications and distortions of the methodological importance of the fundamental principles of legal realism.

Abstract: The subject of this research is one of the trends in the American legal thought – legal realism in the context of clarification of its specificity, key theoretical-methodological perspectives formed in the classical period, represented by the founders of this direction O. W. Holmes, R. Pound and K. Llewellyn. Studying the heritage of the classical American realists is important for the purpose of elucidation of their views, since many aspects remain unclear or simplified, and interpreted in form of patterns and schemes; as well as due to the fact that in the modern American legal science and well beyond it, more popularity multiple variations of “clarification” of realism in form of “neo-“ versions, and realism itself is declared the symbol of modern age. Main attention is given to the question of overcoming simplifications with regards to legal views of the classical American realists. The scientific novelty of this work consists in elucidation of the perceptions of the nature and specificity of legal views of the representatives of classical American legal realism. This is primarily associated with the fact that orientation towards demythologization of conceptualism in the works of legal realists of the period of establishment of this trend is erroneously identified with the rejection of moral arguments in substantiation of law, which to a large extent was justified by the desire of some researchers to substantiate the meaning of radical pragmatism as a philosophical foundation of the modernized legal theory. Secondly, unjustified broadening of the concept of legal realism and its identification with naturalization of conceptual apparatus of law is one of the factors that led to multiple simplifications and distortions of the methodological importance of the fundamental principles of legal realism.

Abstract: The subject of the study is one of the actively developing trends in Western legal thought over the past two decades, especially American, which is called "new legal realism" and positions itself both as a special variant of the "organizational paradigm of interdisciplinary research" and as a progressive empirical doctrine of law that overcomes the shortcomings of "traditional approaches to law".. The program of this direction is based on the idea of the possibility of effectively solving the problems of classical American legal realism by updating, first of all, the methodology of legal research. The study critically analyzes not only the content of the main ideas of the "new legal realists", but also an attempt to articulate the well-known developments of their predecessors, especially European ones, as a "new" direction in legal science. The methodology of the research is based on such methods of working with the ideas of foreign authors as the study of original texts, program statements (materials of conferences, symposiums and speeches), tracing the connection of past and modern teachings, analysis of involvement in the discussion of traditional issues and topics of legal issues. The conclusions of the essentially critical analysis of the content of the ideas of "new legal realism" are as follows: a narrowly focused behavioristic analysis of judicial activity with the pathos of the scale of the tasks being solved creates a paradox of the absence of a problem of law (even in the sense of classical realists) in the "new" legal doctrine; the methodology of "new realists" in the form of interdisciplinary practices and orientation to the analysis of "big arrays of data" is not something new, remaining within the framework of sociological approaches to law; manipulation of traditional legal issues leads to the reproduction and distortion of the ideas of predecessors.