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Liu, Y. (2025). The division of roles of China and Russia in the SCO: A strategy for balancing regional security and economic development. International relations, 2, 65–75. . https://doi.org/10.7256/2454-0641.2025.2.74302
The division of roles of China and Russia in the SCO: A strategy for balancing regional security and economic development
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0641.2025.2.74302EDN: IAPDIBReceived: 28-04-2025Published: 05-05-2025Abstract: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) represents a unique platform for Eurasian interaction, focused on synchronizing regional security and economic progress. The central focus of the research is the strategic interaction between China and Russia within the SCO, where each country implements specialized functions based on competitive advantages. Russia, using its historical experience in geopolitical stability, concentrates on counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, and border strengthening. China, leveraging its economic potential, promotes projects in transport infrastructure, digitalization, and energy networks. The role of the SCO's "two-wheel model," which integrates security and economy into a unified management mechanism, is emphasized. Special attention is paid to the transformation of the organization into a tool for reshaping the global order through the lens of the interests of developing countries. The research combines qualitative analysis of SCO documents with a comparative study of the theoretical concepts of Yan Xuetong and A. Dugin. Case study methods and expert interviews are used to verify hypotheses. The study integrates Chinese and Russian theoretical paradigms for the first time to deconstruct the management model of the SCO. It is established that the complementarity of Moscow and Beijing's roles creates an innovative format of "asymmetric synergy," where the combination of power and economic resources minimizes competition and maximizes the organization's functionality. The scientific novelty manifests in the conceptualization of the SCO as a "hybrid institution" that transforms the norms of global governance through a balance of realism (security) and liberalism (development). Practical conclusions emphasize: 1) the effectiveness of the "two-wheel" model for integrating economies at different levels, and 2) the potential of the SCO as a laboratory for a post-Western world order, where national sovereignty and collective goods coexist. It is shown that the institutional flexibility of the SCO allows for the mitigation of contradictions between geopolitics and geo-economics, offering developing countries an algorithm for "soft balancing" against unipolarity. Keywords: SCO, China, Russia, strategic cooperation, balancing, consensus mechanisms, security, policy, economy, global governanceThis article is automatically translated. Introduction The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a key Eurasian multilateral platform since 2001, has been balancing regional security and economic development. China and Russia, as founders, have formed a complementary model: Russia focuses on security through the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS), strengthening the fight against terrorism, border control and stability. China is using its economic potential to promote trade, energy, and infrastructure by integrating the Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). According to the AIIB (2023), Chinese investments in the SCO countries exceed 30% of global investments, including the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway and Kazakhstani photovoltaic plants. Russia, through the Peaceful Mission exercises and technology exports, has increased the effectiveness of intercepting drones to 85% (Carnegie Moscow Center, 2023). This division reflects resource differences and strategic priorities: Russia is strengthening the security discourse, China is expanding its economic influence, forming a security-economy synergy within the SCO. Theoretical framework: The theoretical foundations of Sino-Russian strategic cooperation On June 15, 2001, the first meeting of the Council of Heads of SCO Member States was held in Shanghai (China). At the meeting, the heads of state of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed a Declaration on the establishment of the SCO, announcing the official establishment of the SCO. On June 7, 2002, the second meeting of the Council of Heads of State was held in St. Petersburg, where three important documents were signed: the Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Agreement on the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) and the Declaration of the Heads of the SCO member States. The Declaration of the heads of the SCO member States and three other important documents laid the foundation for the institutionalization and legalization of the SCO. The SCO has gradually evolved from a mechanism for dialogue on border security issues into a comprehensive regional organization covering a wide range of political, economic and cultural fields[1]. Yan Xuetong's moral realism has become an important theoretical innovation in the Chinese School of International Relations. The concept synthesizes traditional political realism with normative ethics, integrating the category of "morality" into the analysis of power. While preserving the basic principles of realism (international anarchy, competition of forces, priority of national interests), the theory expands them with a moral and value dimension.The key idea is that public policy should combine coercive measures with the principles of legitimacy. Justice, responsibility and trust — these values not only realize national interests, but also strengthen the strategic legitimacy of international actions[2]. Yan Xuetong's point of view is consistent with the goals of the SCO aimed at strengthening trust and cooperation between member states in various fields[3]. China is implementing the Belt and Road initiative within the framework of the SCO, based on the principle of mutual benefit. Projects such as the New Asia-Europe Continental Bridge and the China-Mongolia-Russia and China-Pakistan economic corridors are strengthening global ties. By the end of 2023, the volume of Chinese investments in the Belt and Road countries will exceed $300 billion, which will confirm the relationship between economic cooperation and strategic trust[4]. The neo-Eurasianism of the Russian scientist A.G.Dugin provides theoretical support for the analysis of Russia's strategy. Its main provisions include: 1) multipolar institutional balance: building a "non-Western" regional order through mechanisms such as the SCO and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), 2) geocivilization: emphasizing Russia's role as a civilizational mediator in the Eurasian "heart", and 3) security and economic dualism embedded in the SCO framework[5]. Within the framework of the SCO, Russia, heading the RATS Counter—Terrorism Center, conducted 11 Peace Mission transnational exercises (2017-2022), covering 80% of the borders of the organization's members, while simultaneously developing energy cooperation through the Energy Club - this demonstrates institutional complementarity in achieving regional stability. Yan Xuetong's moral realism emphasizes the combination of strength and morality, explaining the logic behind China's provision of public goods under the Belt and Road Initiative to enhance its strategic legitimacy. At the same time, Dugin's new Eurasianism highlights Russia's intention to maintain its geopolitical influence through security cooperation. The uniqueness of Sino-Russian cooperation lies in the mechanism of institutional nesting, where the SCO combines a Chinese-led development system with a Russian-led security system. By working together, the SCO creates a dual engine of security and economics, allowing China to exchange capital and technology for access to markets in Central Asia, and Russia to manage security in exchange for the right to set energy prices. The SCO Energy Club and related projects such as the photovoltaic project in Kazakhstan and the agreement on the safety of oil and gas pipelines in the Caspian Sea illustrate this cooperation.
The theoretical approaches of Yan Xuetong and Dugin not only explain the motivation of the two countries, but also form a conceptual framework for analyzing their interaction within the SCO. Separation of roles: differentiated cooperation in the field of security and economics A. P. Tsygankov noted that the SCO has one essential feature: it is aimed at combating terrorism, separatism and extremism, and illicit drug trafficking[6].Since its establishment in 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has been paying special attention to security and counterterrorism issues. Due to its founding status and geostrategic advantages, Russia continues to strengthen the effectiveness of SCO cooperation in the field of security in three areas: legal construction, joint actions and technical developments. On the founding day of the SCO in June 2001, the participating States signed the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, which for the first time in the international arena clearly defines three forces and puts forward specific directions, methods and principles of combating them. For the first time in the world, a clear definition of the "three forces" has been given and specific directions, methods and principles of combating them have been put forward[7]. In the context of evolving security threats, Russia, drawing on its experience in combating terrorism in Syria, took the initiative to include new provisions on cyberterrorism management in the new edition of the convention in 2017 in order to modernize and update its legal instruments for combating terrorism. In the context of the changing situation in Afghanistan, Russia initiated the creation of the SCO-Afghanistan Liaison Group in 2018, which by 2023 had coordinated 17 rounds of joint consultations of the member states, effectively integrating regional security resources. The Russian-led SCO Peace Mission exercises with the participation of 5,500 military personnel from 8 SCO member states (2021). Mi-8 helicopters, Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft, Su-34 fighter-bombers and Il-76 military transport aircraft participated in the exercises [8]. The FSB's operation "Web" (2019) destroyed a drug network in Central Asia, seizing $228 million and depriving terrorists of funding, and in 2022 RATS prevented 12 attacks through the daily exchange of 500+ reports. Russia exports anti-terrorist technologies: SORM-3 in Tajikistan (2021) neutralized the ISIS group and 37 extremists, the Kazan training center trained 2,809 special forces with 83% successful certification, and the Insect Repellent complex (2023) blocks drones on the borders of Kazakhstan with 91.7% effectiveness. These measures confirm Russia's leadership in strengthening the multi-level security of the SCO. Within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China, with its vast economic scope, strategic cooperation initiatives, and multidimensional economic diplomacy, has become a central force in promoting regional economic integration and development. As the world's second largest economy, China has not only strengthened its economic ties with its member states by deepening trade, investment, energy, financial and technological cooperation, but has also gradually formed a multilateral cooperation network with the Eurasian continent as its internal space, which has dual significance for both geopolitical and economic development.. China is a key economic partner of Central Asia due to its large-scale market. In 2022, trade turnover with regional countries reached $70.2 billion, and direct investments by March 2023 amounted to more than $ 15 billion [9]. The trade structure between China and Central Asia is complementary: China imports raw materials such as oil and cotton, and exports industrial products. Cross-border infrastructure projects such as container trains are being developed, which significantly reduce delivery time. This enhances the potential of regional trade and creates a stable logistics network. China is actively developing multilateral cooperation within the framework of the SCO and the Belt and Road Initiative, integrating the national strategies of the participating countries to create synergies in infrastructure and economic projects[10]. In the energy sector, the Vostochny (38 billion m3/year) and Central Asia–China gas pipelines have become key achievements, as well as "green" projects: a solar power plant in Pakistan (900 MW) and the Kazakh Zanatas wind farm, which strengthens China's technological exports[11]. Financial cooperation includes settlements in yuan (over 70% in trade with Russia) and coordination of the AIIB with the SCO Development Bank to diversify financing[12]. In the field of the digital economy, Huawei, ZTE and other companies are deploying 5G networks and smart city systems for Russia and Central Asian countries to promote regional digital integration. The state's choice of an inclusive balancing strategy depends on calculating benefits and striving for legitimacy, as demonstrated by Russian—Chinese cooperation in the SCO aimed at curbing US global influence and promoting common interests through institutional mechanisms[13]. The prospects for deepening the SCO's role in the field of security and development depend on the degree to which the national interests of the member states coincide, supported by external factors. The organization's ability to shape the regional economic and political architecture will remain limited and phased due to the geopolitical heterogeneity of Central Asia, South Asia and the Middle East. Discussions about the transformation of the SCO into a NATO-type structure are hypothetical, and their realism will be determined by the evolution of US-Chinese and US-Russian relations[14]. In general, China and Russia demonstrate a complementary division of roles: Beijing focuses on economic integration through infrastructure projects (Belt and Road), green energy, and financial initiatives (yuan settlements, AIIB), while Moscow strengthens the security agenda by ensuring military and political stability in the region. Russia, as a key guarantor of the SCO's security, is strengthening coordination in the fight against terrorism, cyber threats and transnational crime by conducting joint exercises (for example, the "Peace Mission") and developing a legal framework for crisis response. This synergy allows China to consolidate economic leadership while minimizing geopolitical risks, and the SCO to evolve from a predominantly security-oriented platform to a multipolar institution combining economics, politics and security. For sustainable integration, Beijing needs to balance its "soft power" ambitions with the interests of its partners, especially Russia, whose dominance in security matters remains a strategic counterweight to Western influence in Eurasia. Strategic importance: demonstration effect in global governance Beijing and Moscow see the advantages of forming a Large non-Western Eurasian Community to protect their core interests and rely on the region's natural resources and economic potential to strengthen their power and influence in the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world[15]. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), as a multilateral platform under the joint leadership of China and Russia, has demonstrated its strategic importance both regionally and globally and has a unique demonstration effect in promoting a new model of global governance. The following is a comprehensive analysis of the SCO in five areas: philosophy, mechanism, practice, expansion, and inspiration. First, the conceptual innovation based on the Shanghai spirit has changed the norms of international relations. The Shanghai spirit of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for different civilizations and the pursuit of common development, which China and Russia advocate, has destroyed the hegemonic logic and zero-sum game thinking in traditional international relations[16]. For example, the SCO does not create military alliances within the framework of security cooperation, but focuses on non-traditional security issues such as the fight against terrorism and drugs, and creates a "common security" management structure through documents such as the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism. This non-confrontational way of cooperation, especially reflected in the institutionalization of the Treaty of Good Neighborly Relations, Friendship and Cooperation between China and Russia[17], provided the international community with a new way to resolve conflicts through consultations on equal terms. Against the complex geopolitical background of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, China and Russia's commitment to the principle of "non-alignment and non-targeting of third parties" once again underlines the inclusivity and sustainability of this concept. Secondly, by creating multi-level mechanisms, China is helping to find ways to institutionalize global governance. The SCO, led by China and Russia, has created a three-dimensional cooperation structure covering four main areas - politics, security, economics, and humanities. At the legal level, the SCO Charter[18] and the Treaty on Long-term Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization member States established norms of multilateral cooperation in accordance with the principles of international law based on the UN Charter[19]. At the executive level, the division of labor from the Council of Heads of State to sectoral meetings ensures coherence of actions from strategic decision-making to implementationprojects. A typical example is the joint anti-terrorist military exercises "Peace Mission": This mechanism, which initially emerged on the basis of bilateral cooperation between China and Russia, has subsequently been expanded to a regular multilateral operation involving all member countries, which not only strengthens regional anti-terrorist capabilities, but also avoids sensitive disputes over a military alliance. Such innovative mechanisms serve as a model of "flexible and pragmatic" institutional design for global governance. Thirdly, the SCO responds to global challenges through pragmatic cooperation and provides a variety of public goods. Since its establishment, the SCO has signed more than 1,400 documents in the field of security, 46 percent of which are related to security cooperation, and the "Tianshan Series" of counter-terrorism operations led by the SCO has significantly limited the penetration of extremist forces into Central Asia. In the economic sphere, China and Russia are promoting the Belt and Road and the Eurasian Economic Union, and have also created a Demonstration zone for local China-SCO economic and trade cooperation, thanks to which the trade volume of the participating countries has increased 100 times in 20 years, and the share in global trade has increased from 5.4% to 17.5% [20]. In the face of global challenges such as climate change, the SCO has put forward initiatives such as the Energy Club and the Digital Silk Road, such as the adoption in 2023 of a "Set of Renewable Energy Cooperation between SCO member States," which not only serves the development needs of the region, but also fills gaps in the supply of existing international management systems. This demand-driven way of exporting public goods not only serves the needs of regional development, but also fills the supply gap in the current system of international governance. This demand-driven model of exporting public goods highlights the potential for collective action by developing countries. Fourthly, the expansion strategy breaks Western centrism and rebuilds the model of multilateral cooperation: after the accession of India and Pakistan in 2017, the SCO covers almost half of the world's population with a quarter of total GDP, forming a huge network of cooperation throughout Europe and Asia. This expansion is not just an "expansion of the camp", but an organic integration based on common security and development requirements.: India, being a key partner in the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" of the United States, nevertheless chooses in-depth participation in the SCO, which confirms the inclusiveness of the mechanism. Unlike the systemic confrontation caused by NATO's eastward expansion, the inclusion of new members such as Iran in the SCO based on the principle of "consensus" demonstrates the viability of non-coercive, non-ideological multilateralism. As emphasized in the declaration of the 2022 Samarkand Summit, its goal is to build a "new type of international relations" through a "dialogue between equals" - a path that is a direct counterweight to the Western-led management of the "small circle". This path is a direct means of protection from the Western-led management of the "small circle"[21]. Fifth, it provides practical inspiration for the reform of the global governance system. Cooperation between China and Russia within the SCO shows that relations between great powers can go beyond the "Thucydides trap": the two countries coordinate their positions through regular meetings of heads of state and joint statements, but always maintain strategic autonomy. This model of "joint governance, but not coexistence" serves as a guideline for solving complex problems in relations between China, the United States, Europe and Russia. A deeper inspiration lies in the change in the logic of governance: firstly, from "defining values" to "problem-solving cooperation", such as the SCO's acceptance of countries with different political systems to jointly combat terrorism; secondly, from "setting the rules" to "observing the rules"; and, thirdly, from "setting the rules" to "following the rules." from "setting the rules" to "forming the rules", for example, promoting a settlement system in local currencies to challenge the hegemony of the US dollar; thirdly, from the "center-periphery" to the "network of nodes" Thirdly, from the "center-edge" to the "network of nodes", the SCO will connect the BRICS ASEAN and other mechanisms as a node for the formation of a decentralized management system. During the G20 summit in New Delhi in 2023, the SCO member states jointly demanded that developing countries have more say in international financial institutions, further reinforcing this demand for change. Thus, the governance paradigm formed by China and Russia through the SCO is non-confrontational, inclusive and pragmatic, serves the convergence of their strategic interests (for example, stability and energy security in Central Asia) and provides the countries of the "Global South" with options for cooperation that differ from the Western model through institutional innovation and conceptual exports. At a time when unilateralism is gaining momentum and geopolitical divisions are deepening, the value of this experiment lies not only in its results, but also in the fact that it proves the possibility of multiple civilizations co-existing - as SCO Secretary General Zhang Min said: "While the world is looking for a direction in the midst of disagreement, we have proved that the other the path still exists. it exists." The Russian-Chinese division of labor in the SCO embodies both the logic of realistic force and the normative structure of multilateralism. The two countries' "dual drive" in the field of security and economics not only ensures the stability and prosperity of the Eurasian hinterland, but also creates a new paradigm of cooperation in the face of a lack of global governance. In the future, with the development of the digital Silk Road and the Arctic sea routes, the SCO should become a control center connecting land and sea and connecting East and West. References
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