The specifics of the left-wing political spectrum in post-Soviet Russia

Ionov Dmitriy Dmitrievich ORCID: 0009-0008-8598-0189 Student; Department of Political Science; Nizhny Novgorod State University named after N.I. Lobachevsky Documentologist; Institute of International Relations and World History of N.I. Lobachaevsky National Research University 603000, Russia, Nizhny Novgorod region, Nizhny Novgorod, Ulyanova str., 2 dmitriy.ionov@unn.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction

The study of the left-wing political spectrum in post-Soviet Russia is not only a historical, but also an urgent research challenge. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was not only a geopolitical catastrophe, but also an ideological collapse for the left-wing spectrum, which had existed for seven decades within the monolithic system of Marxism-Leninism. If during the Soviet period the "left" discourse was institutionalized and under the control of the state, then after 1991 it found itself in a situation of ideological vacuum, fragmentation and competition with other political forces. This transformation is still poorly understood compared to the attention paid to Western leftist movements or the Soviet legacy. Meanwhile, the analysis of Russian specifics makes it possible to reveal not only the peculiarities of the adaptation of socialist and communist ideas in the context of the "turn" to capitalism, but also the general patterns of the crisis of leftist ideologies. The post-Soviet period was marked by a profound transformation of leftist ideas, their adaptation to capitalist reality and the search for a new identity in an ideological vacuum. This evolution, however, did not lead to the formation of a single leftist project, but on the contrary, gave rise to a fragmented and eclectic spectrum, whose specificity is determined by three interrelated factors: the legacy of the Soviet model, the hybridization of ideologies and the institutional limitations of the political system.

The relevance of the study is due to several factors. First, in modern Russia, despite the marginalization of leftist forces, their rhetoric and symbols are periodically reanimated in the public field, both in criticism of social inequality and in the official narrative exploiting the Soviet legacy. Secondly, the processes of fragmentation and institutional adaptation of leftist parties and movements reflect broader problems of political pluralism in hybrid regimes. Finally, the reconstruction of the history of the post-Soviet left makes it possible to better understand the nature of the ideological crisis experienced by society.

The purpose of the study is to identify the features of the left-wing political spectrum in post-Soviet Russia. The object of the research is the left–wing political spectrum of Russia itself, the subject is its specifics, shaped by the influence of the Soviet legacy, the hybridization of ideologies and the institutional constraints of the political system. The focus is not only on organizational changes, but also on the transformation of ideological doctrines, strategies of legitimization and interaction with the authorities.

The chronological framework of the work covers the period from the end of the 1980s, when the crisis of the CPSU marked the beginning of the disintegration of the united left field, to 2011, the milestone associated with the wave of protests that marked new challenges for political forces in Russia. This periodization reflects three key stages: the disintegration of the Soviet model (late 1980s- 1991), the emergence of ideological pluralism in the 1990s, and institutional stagnation in the 2000s. Each stage demonstrates how leftist actors balanced between the legacy of the past, the pressure of the political system and the search for new identities in the context of socio-economic transformations.

Methods and methodology

The study of the evolution of the left-wing political spectrum in post-Soviet Russia requires a comprehensive approach that takes into account both historical dynamics and the specifics of ideological transformations. The work is based on the historical and comparative method, which allows tracing the stages of development of leftist movements. This method provides identification of key turning points and their impact on the structure and strategies of left-wing actors. A comparative analysis of the periods helps to identify common patterns and unique features of each stage.

For an in-depth study of organizational changes and the interaction of leftist forces with the political system, an institutional approach is used. He focuses on the structures of parties, their internal hierarchy, forms of participation in elections, and relations with the state. This method also helps to explain why some leftist organizations have integrated into official politics, while others have been pushed to the periphery.

The third key tool is critical discourse analysis, aimed at deconstructing ideological narratives, symbols, and rhetorical strategies. It reveals how leftist actors reinterpreted the Soviet legacy, reacted to the challenges of neoliberalism in the 1990s, or adapted their rhetoric to the anti-capitalist protests of the late 2000s. For example, a comparison of the program documents of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and radical socialist groups shows discrepancies in the interpretation of the class struggle, attitudes towards globalization, or assessments of the role of the state. Discourse analysis also helps to capture how the government has co-opted certain elements of left-wing rhetoric (for example, social justice) to legitimize its own policies.

Auxiliary methods include qualitative analysis of documents, which provides insight into the internal dynamics of movements and the evolution of their ideological attitudes, and media content analysis to assess the public representation of leftist ideas in the media of different periods.

The crisis of the legitimacy of the CPSU and the fragmentation of the left movement

The end of the 1980s marked the time of the ideological disintegration of the CPSU, whose monopoly on the leftist agenda was undermined by both internal contradictions and the external challenges of perestroika. The glasnost policy initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev legalized criticism of Soviet socialism not only from the dissident movement, but also from within the party itself, intensifying the split. Opposing platforms have formed within the CPSU. For example, the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" tried to combine socialist ideals with market reforms, which reflected the identity crisis of the party elite ^[6]. The Bolshevik platform of the CPSU, N.A. Andreeva, criticized the course towards perestroika and Glasnost from Stalinist positions ^[2]. The Marxist platform in the CPSU criticized the party for revisionism and advocated reforms both within the party and within the state ^{[19, p. 6-8]}.

This split worsened after the XIX Party Conference (1988) and the III Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (1990), when the repeal of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution and discussions about "socialism with a human face" escalated into a public confrontation ^[20]. In fact, the CPSU has become an arena for the struggle to rethink the very essence of "leftism" – from the rejection of the dictatorship of the proletariat to the recognition of a multiparty system.

However, the crisis of the CPSU did not mean the disappearance of the leftist agenda. On the contrary, the collapse of the party monopoly has released a demand for alternative socialist projects. Informal left-wing groups began to arise outside the official structures, often marginalized, but reflecting the diversity of the ideological spectrum: from Trotskyist circles to anarcho-syndicalists and "renovationist" Marxists inspired by Western critical theory. At the same time, the key watershed was the attitude towards the Soviet past: some emphasized the "betrayal of the ideals of October" by the bureaucracy (the position of the RCRP, created in 1991 ^[15]), others – the need to synthesize socialism with human rights (as in the Confederation of Anarcho-Syndicalists). This period was also marked by the emergence of Viktor Anpilov's left–wing radical party Trudovaya Rossiya, the most successful and influential communist organization in the 1990s, which, on the one hand, retained the communist ideology not only in form but also in content, and on the other hand, was not involved in alliances with national patriotic organizations ^[5].

The socio-economic context exacerbated fragmentation. Hyperinflation, commodity shortages, and rising inequality in the late 1980s and early 1990s created the ground for leftist criticism, but the lack of a unified center for mobilization led to the dispersion of protest potential. The miners' strikes of 1989-1991, initially of an economic nature, quickly became politicized.

A special feature of this period was the dual role of the intelligentsia. On the one hand, academic Marxists (like Alexander Buzgalin) tried to modernize leftist theory by translating the works of Western neo-Marxists and criticizing dogmas. On the other hand, radical activists, disillusioned with the CPSU, joined ultra–left groups that denied dialogue with the authorities. At the same time, the trade union movement, traditionally important for the left, was integrated into the state system in the USSR, which deprived it of autonomy.

The collapse of the USSR in 1991 completed the crisis: the ban of the CPSU de jure eliminated the institutional basis of the left spectrum, but de facto accelerated its degeneration. New parties such as the Socialist Workers' Party (SPT) or the Russian Communist Workers' Party (RKRP) tried to occupy the vacant niche, but their influence was limited by lack of funding, internal splits and competition with liberals or national populists. The key legacy of this period was the ideological ambivalence of the post-Soviet left: they were forced to simultaneously distance themselves from the discredited CPSU and appeal to nostalgia for Soviet social security, which predetermined their further marginalization in the context of market reforms.

The crisis of socialist ideology that arose after the collapse of the USSR did not destroy the public demand for leftist ideas, but reformatted it. On the one hand, nostalgia for social guarantees preserved the legitimacy of socialist rhetoric. On the other hand, the degradation of the party elite and the crisis phenomena of the late Soviet period forced the left to look for new forms of activity, which led to ideological pluralism and syncretism. This period was a time of experimentation, when the left-wing spectrum turned into a laboratory of controversial projects, from social democratic to national Bolshevik.

The Left in the age of ideological pluralism

The 1990s were a time of radical transformation of Russia's left-wing spectrum, which was undergoing both institutional disintegration and ideological revision. After the ban of the CPSU in 1991, many parties and movements emerged that claimed the legacy of Soviet socialism, but their ideological platforms ranged from orthodox Bolshevism to post-Marxist syntheses.

All major left-wing political parties in the 1990s were created on the basis of the platforms of the former CPSU – VKPB, RKP, RKRP, KP RSFSR and a number of others. Their activities unfolded in the context of the ideological and political pluralism proclaimed in the new Constitution, multiparty system and prohibition on the establishment of any ideology as state or mandatory. This diversity of leftist parties reflected the split between reformists and radicals. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation, headed by Gennady Zyuganov, has chosen a strategy of integration into the parliamentary system. In contrast, the RCRP and the VKPB rejected compromises with the "bourgeois government", advocating the restoration of the USSR through revolutionary methods.

In parallel, there was the creation of left-wing radical organizations of anarchist, Trotskyist and neo-Marxist persuasions (the Committee for the Marxist International, the Confederation of Revolutionary Anarcho-Syndicalists, the Violet International, etc.), which, however, could not strengthen themselves (the tactics of entrism and the tactics of "small deeds" did not bring the desired results), which led to their marginalization. The left-wing radicals were faced with a choice: either to leave the political scene; or to integrate into the world of "big politics" within the framework of much more moderate left-wing parties; or to isolate themselves within the framework of circle organizations without any prospects for development.

At the same time, the 1990s marked the time of the formation of a unique phenomenon of post-Soviet leftism – "red-brown" syncretism, which combined socialist rhetoric and criticism of capitalism with imperial revanchism and anti-Western sentiments ^[17]. The recognition of the dissolution of the USSR as unconstitutional and disagreement with the implementation of liberal reforms led to the formation of the so-called "united opposition", which aimed to unite the left and the right ^[11]. The most striking example of such a synthesis was E.V. Limonov's National Bolshevik Party (NBP), formed in 1993, which combined leftism in economics with right-wing rhetoric in politics ^[8]. According to the NBP program of 1994, "the global goal of National Bolshevism is the creation of an Empire from Vladivostok to Gibraltar on the basis of Russian civilization..." ^[14].

Such syncretism was a response to the challenges of the era. First, the collapse of the USSR created a demand for the restoration of "great power," which leftist movements tried to intercept by competing with right-wing forces. Secondly, the rapid privatization and impoverishment of the population in the 1990s made criticism of oligarchic capitalism a key topic for the left, but the lack of a clear ideological base forced them to borrow slogans from political opponents. As a result, the left-wing spectrum of the 1990s resembled a mosaic of contradictory elements, where Marxist terminology was juxtaposed with conservative rhetoric. And while in the first half of the 1990s criticism from the "left" was directed towards the CPSU, since the mid-1990s the vector of criticism has shifted towards criticism of the emerging capitalist system.

The ideological pluralism of the 1990s was accompanied by attempts to rethink Marxism in post-Soviet conditions. The works of Alexander Buzgalin and Andrey Kolganov ^[3] proposed a synthesis of Marxist theory with a critique of globalization, which, however, remained marginal in the context of the dominance of the capitalist agenda. Paradoxically, the leftists of the 1990s often became hostages of simulated ideological pluralism. As noted by D.E. Letnyakov, many parties used socialist rhetoric as a tool of mobilization, without offering real alternatives to the neoliberal agenda. This turned them into "political technology projects" devoid of connection with social movements ^[10]. Despite the ideological pluralism of the 1990s, the left failed to consolidate its protest potential. E.G. Solovyov attributes this to their inability to establish a dialogue with the working class, which, having suffered from shock therapy, turned out to be susceptible to populist rather than class slogans ^[16]. The same thesis is confirmed in the work of E.Y. Yemkova: the theoretical research of intellectuals remained the property of academic journals, while the working class, disillusioned with politics, increasingly focused on patriotic or apolitical narratives ^[7].

The Russian leftists of the 1990s actively borrowed the experience of foreign movements. Trotskyist groups (for example, the Socialist Resistance) focused on the Fourth International, while anarchists participated in global actions against the IMF and the WTO ^[18]. However, the lack of a stable social base limited their influence.

By the end of the 1990s, the left-wing movement found itself in an ambivalent situation. On the one hand, the Communist Party retained influence in the State Duma, on the other, radical groups were marginalized, facing administrative barriers and internal divisions. The crisis of the left during this period was associated with the lack of a project for the future: instead of modernizing the socialist idea, they exploited images of the past, which made them vulnerable to the authoritarian turn of the 2000s.

Institutional adaptation and marginalization in the 2000s

Vladimir Putin's rise to power in 2000 and the strengthening of the "vertical of power" radically changed the conditions of existence of the left spectrum. The 2000s became the period of finalizing its division into systemic and non-systemic actors.

The Communist Party of the Russian Federation, as the largest systemic left-wing party in post-Soviet Russia, is a unique phenomenon that combines elements of ideological continuity with pragmatic adaptation to political realities. In the early 2000s, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation retained the characteristic features of a real opposition - it organized mass protests ^[12], criticized privatization and oligarchic capitalism, and its program included demands for the nationalization of strategic industries and the restoration of a welfare state.

However, already during this period, the features that determined its further development began to appear. First, the ideological platform of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation has been syncretic since its foundation, combining Marxist-Leninist terminology with elements of national-patriotic discourse. For example, in the 1995 program, criticism of neoliberalism was juxtaposed with theses on the "protection of Russian civilization" ^[13], which reflected an attempt to appeal to different groups of the electorate – from nostalgic for the USSR to supporters of "statehood". Secondly, the party, while remaining formally in opposition, gradually integrated into the institutional framework of "managed democracy," participating in elections and parliamentary work, which limited its radicalism. Over time, her rhetoric shifted towards popular patriotic discourse and moderate criticism of the political system. These changes are due to both pressure from the state and the pragmatism of the party leadership.

Beginning in the 2000s, non-systemic left-wing parties and organizations began to form their identity, rejecting the traditional rhetoric of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, considering it opportunistic, and developing alternative ideologies, from classical social democracy (Russian United Social Democratic Party) and orthodox communism (Russian Communist Workers' Party - CPSU, "Left Front") – before Trotskyism (the Revolutionary Workers' Party) and various forms of anarchism (Autonomous Action). The formation of non-systemic left-wing parties throughout the period was closely linked to the development of social movements such as trade unions, anti-capitalist and anti-globalist organizations, which became an important part of the opposition left bloc ^[9].

At the same time, pressure on non-systemic leftist movements was increasing. The adoption of Federal Law No. 114-FZ dated 06/25/2002 "On Countering Extremist Activities" allowed the authorities to deal with the most radical organizations. In 2007, the NBP was banned ^[4], and its activists were persecuted; anarchist and Trotskyist organizations were pushed to the periphery of the political field. Their social base – workers, students, and intellectuals – was fragmented, and attempts to form alliances with non-leftist or non-political organizations failed due to ideological and organizational contradictions. The response to this was the shift of part of the left to grassroots initiatives unrelated to direct political struggle. Environmental actions, the creation of independent trade unions (for example, MPRA), and the struggle for youth rights have all become forms of adaptation to the narrowing of the political space.

The leftists of the 2000s tried to overcome the legacy of the Soviet past, but remained hostage to its symbols. For example, the Socialist Movement Forward and Skepsis magazine promoted criticism of neoliberalism through the prism of Western Marxism, but their audience was limited to a narrow circle of intellectuals. Paradoxically, even anti-capitalist slogans were often intercepted by the state: the rhetoric of "social justice" was used in the official narrative to legitimize the authoritarian model. The use of Soviet symbols by systemic leftists such as the Communist Party of the Russian Federation cannot be reduced to tactical populism. This strategy reflects a deep connection with the civilizational code, where "the Soviet past becomes an instrument of legitimizing not only social justice, but also geopolitical positioning" ^[1]. The non-systemic left, on the other hand, criticized nostalgia as a form of simulation, but their alternative projects remained marginal due to incomplete reflection on the Soviet period. Attempts to modernize leftist ideology were met with resistance both within the movements and from society. Russia inherited a "fractured consciousness," where leftist ideas were associated either with a "totalitarian" past or with utopian projects.

Conclusion

By 2011, Russia's leftist political spectrum had acquired features that radically distinguished it from both the Soviet model and global leftist trends. Firstly, ideological hybridity has become its systemic characteristic – the combination of socialist slogans with statism and conservatism reflects an attempt to adapt to the demands of a society where nostalgia for the USSR coexists with anti-communist sentiments. Secondly, statism dominates emancipation goals. Even non-systemic groups are forced to appeal to the state as a guarantor of social justice, which contradicts the anti-authoritarian ideas of the global left. Thirdly, the marginalization of left-wing radicalism has led to a division of the spectrum into "systemic" and "non-systemic" actors, which has narrowed the field for class mobilization.

The Communist Party of the Russian Federation, in turn, embodies the post–Soviet paradox of the left spectrum - an attempt to combine socialist ideals with conservative discourse in an environment where the legitimacy of "leftism" remains in question. Its evolution reflects the general tendency of left-wing ideas to adapt to the dominant political context, where statism and patriotism become tools of survival rather than a strategy for transformation.

Thus, the post–Soviet left spectrum is not a continuation of the Soviet tradition, but a product of its disintegration, hybridization and adaptation to the realities of capitalist Russia. Its specificity demonstrates how ideologies are transformed under the pressure of historical, institutional, and cultural constraints, creating unique forms that cannot be reduced to universal patterns. This led to an active rethinking of the Soviet legacy and the political situation on the left. Under the conditions of political pressure and economic instability, the left is facing new challenges, including internal disagreements and the need to adapt theory and new forms of practice. However, they still continue to be an important element of the political spectrum, promoting ideas of social justice and equality.