Transformation of constitutionalism in contemporary society: conceptual foundations

Poyarkov Sergei Yur'evich PhD in Pedagogy Scientific Secretary; All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Physico-Technical and Radio Engineering Measurements (FSUE) 140570, Russia, Moscow region, Mendeleevo village, VNIIFTRI industrial zone, 11 psu70@bk.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction

Modern society is an extremely complex and contradictory system, within which there is a deep reassessment of previously stable legal and political-legal categories. One of these categories, of course, is constitutionalism, a phenomenon that has historically been formed as a result of the struggle to limit power and ensure human rights, as a set of ideas, principles and institutions aimed at establishing a legal order in which power operates within the limits outlined by law and justice. However, in a rapidly changing reality, when the state is facing new challenges — from the expansion of digital technologies to changing the geopolitical balance and deepening globalization processes — the old conceptual foundations of constitutionalism are under pressure and require rethinking.

Actually, the problem that modern legal science draws attention to is not only a change in the forms of power implementation, but also a change in the very nature of its legitimization. If in the classical model of constitutionalism the emphasis was on institutional guarantees of freedom, such as separation of powers, legal responsibility of authorities, priority of human rights and legal force of the constitution as the basic law, then in today's conditions these guarantees are subject to both external and internal transformations. The question arises: is it possible to preserve traditional forms and mechanisms without prejudice to the content of constitutional values, and, moreover, is it possible to keep the very idea of constitutionalism in the new conditions without resorting to its radical reappraisal?

The relevance of addressing this topic is due not so much to the loss of importance of classical principles as to the need to adapt them to a changed context. The technological revolution, accompanied by the digitalization of public life, is changing the ways citizens interact with the state, creating new channels of political participation, and at the same time creating threats to privacy, replacing democracy with technocratic governance, and increasing the risks of digital inequality. In these circumstances, it becomes obvious that the previous models of constitutional protection of rights and freedoms require updating not only at the legislative level, but also at the level of conceptual apparatus and scientific ideas. The concept of constitutionalism, if it claims to have a living connection with social reality, must be able to meet the challenges of the time without losing its value basis.

Thus, the purpose of this study is to identify and analyze the conceptual foundations of the transformation of constitutionalism in modern society. This is not a formal enumeration of changes, but an attempt to identify the internal logic of this process, to consider it not as a rejection of classical principles, but as a form of their development in other conditions. Special attention is paid to the author's concept, which considers transformation not in a negative, but in a constructive perspective — as a process that allows preserving the value core of constitutionalism while simultaneously updating its institutional shell. The scientific novelty of this approach lies in the desire not only to describe the changes taking place with the institutions of constitutionalism, but to offer a holistic theoretical model that can explain how the ideas of freedom, the rule of law, democracy and the legal responsibility of government can be rethought and implemented in a digital society, increasing global interdependencies and fragmentation of political identity. We are talking about the need to synthesize axiological, institutional and functional approaches to understanding constitutionalism, to develop a concept in which the legal form is organically combined with a social function, and the normative foundations are combined with an appropriate legal process.

The traditional understanding of constitutionalism

Constitutionalism, being one of the cornerstones of modern legal civilization, throughout its history has represented not just a legal doctrine or a system of norms, but an integral ideology of the rule of law, rooted in humanistic values, as well as a certain type of political and legal thinking that sets standards for the relationship between personality and power ^[1]. Its formation took place under the influence of philosophical, political and social ideas of Modern times, where the issue of the limit of state power, the justification of its legitimacy and the protection of human freedom was particularly acute.

The classical model of constitutionalism was founded by thinkers whose views have become defining for entire eras. Thus, John Locke asserted the priority of natural law and the right of the people to resist tyranny, proclaiming personal freedom and private property as integral attributes of a just legal order ^{[2, p.335]}. Charles Louis de Montesquieu laid the foundations of the theory of separation of powers, pointing out the need for institutional separation of functions of state power as a condition for ensuring freedom ^{[3, pp.288-289]}. Alexander Hamilton, in turn, belongs to the idea of the supremacy of the constitution as a limiter of arbitrariness and a means to achieve a stable and just order ^[4]. These and other concepts formed the basis of the normative structure, which later became perceived as a universal standard of the rule of law.

Based on this, the traditional understanding of constitutionalism was closely linked to the idea of a pre-established legal order, where each element of government is in a state of balance with others and operates within the limits defined by fundamental laws. At the same time, the Constitution was considered not only as a legal act, but also as a manifestation of the collective will, expressing the basic values of the community: freedom, justice, legal certainty, equality before the law. Its text symbolized the normative core around which the entire system of rights and institutions was built ^{[5, p.22-23]}. This model assumed not only the fixation of rights and duties, but also the establishment of a special worldview attitude towards power — an attitude of restraint, accountability and predictability.

However, it should be noted that already at the early stages of the formation of constitutionalism, there was a methodological stratification. The Anglo-Saxon legal tradition, built on an evolutionary approach and judicial precedent, focused on living law, flexible in application and practice-oriented. In this model, parliament, rather than a textual constitution, was the main source of legitimacy. The continental, primarily French and German, traditions, on the contrary, emphasized the importance of a written act at the constitutional level as the basis of the legal order. Here, the constitution was perceived as a normative document standing above the entire legal system and defining the principles of its functioning ^[6]. Despite the difference in forms, both models proceeded from the same basic assumptions: the rule of law, limitation of power, recognition of human dignity and individual rights.

The central element of classical constitutionalism has always remained the idea of subjective rights — rights that belong to every person from birth, regardless of the will of the state ^[7]. According to the Enlightenment theorists, these rights were universal and indivisible. The Constitution, in this understanding, was supposed not so much to grant rights as to recognize existing ones as axiomatic and prior to the state organization itself. Hence the special status of rights and freedoms in the structure of the constitutional legal order: they become not the object of regulation, but the limit of possible interference. Constitutionalism, therefore, appears as a doctrine of the limits of power, law, and administrative expediency.

In addition, the mechanism of institutional restraint of power was also essential in the traditional construction. The separation of powers, the independence of the court, and the existence of formal constitutional control were all seen as a system of guarantees against the concentration of power and arbitrariness, as conditions for the sustainability and fairness of public administration. It is important to note that the institutional mechanisms were effective only insofar as they were based on generally accepted values and respect for the law as such. Constitutionalism, therefore, was impossible outside of a legal culture, outside of a certain level of legal awareness capable of perceiving power not as a source of rights, but as an instrument for their protection.

Throughout the 20th century, the idea of constitutionalism retained its importance, although it underwent a certain transformation. It was developed in the context of the establishment of international mechanisms for the protection of human rights, the expansion of the sphere of public interests, and the strengthening of the role of constitutional courts. However, even in this context, the fundamental attitude remained: law should be above power, and the state should be accountable to society. Constitutionalism remained not just a system of institutions, but a symbol of legal organization and political legitimacy ^{[8, p.968]}, based on compliance with established rules.

However, already in the second half of the 20th century, new lines of tension began to be identified within the traditional approach. The concept of the welfare state, which intensified after the Second World War, called into question the absoluteness of the individualist paradigm ^{[9, p.8]}. The emphasis shifted from protecting negative freedoms to ensuring social rights, from protection from interference to active intervention in order to achieve equality. This did not mean the abandonment of constitutionalism, but it testified to its gradual evolution, the expansion of its scope and the complexity of its internal logic. Constitutionalism ceased to be an exclusively protective system and began to be perceived as a tool of social engineering, which, in turn, led to new discussions about the limits of permissible interference by public authorities in the private sphere. Nevertheless, despite all the variety of forms and models, classical constitutionalism continues to serve as a reference point in scientific and practical thought. Its principles remain the foundation of any legitimate legal system, regardless of the specifics of the national structure. However, the challenges of the 21st century — digitalization, fragmentation of identities, and the growth of global interdependencies — place new demands on it that go beyond its original design. The task for public law science is not only to preserve this construction, but also to adapt it to the realities of modern times without losing its value and normative content.

Factors of the transformation of constitutionalism in modern society

Modern society is in a state of continuous and comprehensive transformation, encompassing various levels of its existence — from micro-changes in the daily practices of citizens to macro-transformations of the institutional foundations of political and legal systems. These changes, being not just quantitative, but of a qualitatively different order, require a rethinking of the basic categories on which law and order and state power were built in previous historical eras. Constitutionalism, a concept that combines the ideas of the rule of law, limitation of power and protection of individual rights, turns out to be not just an object of scientific analysis, but also a field of struggle between the desire to preserve legal foundations and the need to adapt them to new challenges. As a historically stable and institutionally anchored phenomenon, it is now being tested by globalization, digitalization, changes in public consciousness and the transformation of political culture.

Thus, one of the most intense and fundamental factors influencing the transformation of constitutionalism is the rapid development of digital technologies. The impact of these technologies is not limited to technical innovations — they penetrate the sphere of public administration, transform the model of interaction of citizens with state institutions, and change the very understanding of public interest and the private sphere ^[10]. Modern information architecture based on algorithms, platform solutions and artificial intelligence systems forms new forms of legitimization of power, often bypassing the traditional mechanisms of popular sovereignty and representative democracy. At the same time, legal systems based on the presumption of a reasonable and autonomous subject are not ready for the challenges posed by "inhuman" forms of decision-making, when control over legal consequences is lost in the opaque logic of the code. The question arises: how effective are traditional constitutional guarantees in an environment where the subject of law increasingly finds himself the object of analysis, surveillance and predictive control?

In this context, the digital state, which claims to be efficient and technologically advanced, paradoxically demonstrates a tendency to reduce the level of transparency, accountability and procedural fairness ^[11]. The tools of "smart governance" and digital monitoring can alienate citizens from the processes of political participation, thereby undermining one of the key foundations of constitutionalism — the democratic legitimate foundation of power. Instead of participation, monitoring; instead of public discussion, automated resource allocation; instead of guarantees, data usage agreements written in technical language and without meaningful consent. All this requires law researchers to rethink the concept of constitutional subjectivity in the era of digital autonomy and algorithmic management.

At the same time, the process of globalization is unfolding, which is blurring sovereign borders and putting the traditional understanding of state power to the test. Global threats such as climate disasters, transnational crime, pandemics, and migration flows require a collective response, within which States are becoming increasingly interdependent. This, in turn, leads to institutional duplication of norms: national constitutions are forced to take into account the norms of public international law, regional unions and supranational organizations ^[12]. In such circumstances, there is a latent conflict between the universalist claims of international norms and the local specifics of legal systems. Constitutionalism is losing its former monopoly on defining higher norms — it is forced to enter into dialogue, and sometimes into competition, with other sources of legitimacy. Moreover, international organizations and multinational corporations are increasingly acquiring quasi-sovereign powers, influencing legal decisions within States. At the same time, it is not obvious who determines legal standards in such conditions and on what basis: democracy remains national, while power is becoming more global. There is a legal asymmetry when States are obliged to comply with external norms, without having sufficient mechanisms for their democratic discussion and legitimization within the country. As a result, the tension between the need to integrate into the global legal order and the desire to preserve the autonomy of national constitutional regulation is increasing.

The next important factor of transformation should be considered a change in the structure of society and the aggravation of social contradictions, accompanied by a crisis of institutional trust ^[13]. The growing inequality, the marginalization of certain groups of the population, and the fragmentation of the public sphere all create a sense of alienation from the State and the unfairness of the existing legal order. Constitutionalism, which historically was intended to be a guarantor of justice and social solidarity, is increasingly perceived as a formal framework that does not reflect the real needs of society. This leads to an increase in protest sentiments, radicalization of political positions, and sometimes to a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the constitutional order. Against this background, new forms of civic participation are emerging, which do not always fit into the framework of traditional democratic institutions ^{[14, p.75]}. Protest movements, digital self-government platforms, and direct democracy initiatives attest to citizens' desire to directly influence political processes. However, such forms, on the one hand, testify to the vitality of civil society, and on the other, they cast doubt on the stability and predictability of a legal order based on representative mechanisms and institutional slowness.

In addition, in the context of generational change and the reassessment of values, the very understanding of human rights is being transformed. If the classical generations of rights focused on freedom, property, and participation in governance, today the focus is on the rights to digital security, environmental stability, and protection from discrimination and gender inequality ^[15]. Constitutionalism has to take into account new forms of vulnerability and new expectations of citizens, including with regard to future generations, which requires going beyond legal positivism and including categories of responsibility, solidarity and long-term sustainability in constitutional discourse. Based on this, at the intersection of these processes, a phenomenon arises that can be described as "transitional constitutionalism" — a state in which neither the old institutions nor the new practices have sufficient legitimacy and effectiveness. This condition is associated with a high level of uncertainty, in which the legal system is under pressure from multidirectional vectors of change. In such circumstances, the main challenge is to find new forms of institutionalization of political will that combine flexibility and resilience, as well as the ability to take into account the complexity of modern society.

Thus, the transformation of constitutionalism in the modern world is due to a variety of factors, from the digital revolution and globalization to changes in the social structure and political culture. Each of these factors calls into question not only individual elements of the constitutional order, but also its systemic integrity. In these circumstances, the task of public law science is not to restore previous models, but to develop new conceptual frameworks capable of retaining the meaning of constitutionalism as a guarantee of freedom and justice in a changing reality.

Prerequisites for the formation of the concept of transformation of constitutionalism

It should be recognized that the need to form a concept of the transformation of constitutionalism in modern society is a consequence of deep processes taking place both within individual states and in the international environment. Constitutionalism, as a complex and multilayered phenomenon encompassing both legal, political, and ideological aspects, cannot remain static in a rapidly changing reality. Its historical development testifies to its ability to adapt to new challenges without losing key ideas such as the recognition of human rights, the limitation of State power, and the rule of law. However, in the conditions of the 21st century, it is precisely the need for such an adaptation mechanism that is becoming more acute than ever before, as the world is facing unprecedented changes in scale and intensity.

First of all, it is worth noting that the modern transformation of constitutionalism is not a deviation from its original logic, but represents an evolutionary development driven by internal and external impulses. The most significant of these impulses is the change in the very nature of public administration in the era of post-industrial society. The state, operating within the framework of traditional models, can no longer effectively cope with the growing challenges arising from globalization, digitalization, environmental challenges, changing models of social mobility and political legitimacy.

In this context, the very understanding of constitutionalism is undergoing qualitative changes.: It is increasingly perceived not as a system of prescriptions, but as a living and changing structure capable of self-regulation and rethinking its own foundations. At the same time, one of the most important shifts that forms the prerequisites for transformation is the transition from a normativist perception of constitutionalism to a more pragmatic, result-oriented one. If the classical theory of constitutionalism focused on the consolidation of legal norms in the text of the constitution and the construction of the institutional architecture of government, today the question of how effectively these norms are implemented in practice comes to the fore. Theorists, including B. Ackerman and M. LaLo, emphasize that without effective implementation mechanisms, without monitoring compliance with constitutional provisions and real accountability of the authorities, the very idea of constitutionalism loses its meaning, turning into a formality. Thus, the transformation does not begin with the abandonment of the previous content, but with an emphasis on its applied significance and social effectiveness.

The next important direction defining the new contours of constitutionalism is the strengthening of the role of constitutional rights in the context of a diversity of cultural, ethnic and social identities. Modern society, especially in multinational and multicultural states, requires not abstract universalism, but flexible legal structures capable of taking into account the specifics of different communities and ensuring real equality. From this point on, rights and freedoms, as the fundamental values of constitutionalism, should not only be formally enshrined, but also protected from discrimination, stigmatization and social exclusion. Thus, the formation of a new concept of constitutionalism cannot take place without taking into account issues of social justice and inclusivity, which, in turn, requires the expansion of classical tools and categorical apparatus.

Along with this, the need for institutional renewal is becoming more and more obvious. Constitutional institutions formed in the modern era often fail to respond to the challenges of the digital age. Here, another prerequisite for transformation is revealed — the technological revolution. Digitalization is changing not only the ways of communication and management, but also the very nature of public power. New forms of citizen participation in politics are being formed, from digital petitions to online referendums, from social networks as an arena of public opinion to blockchain technologies in electoral processes. This necessitates the integration of concepts such as electronic citizenship, digital rights, and algorithmic responsibility into the theory and practice of constitutionalism. All this poses the challenge for legal science of revising ideas about sovereignty, state control, and the distribution of power in an environment where the boundaries between public and private are blurring, and traditional institutions are losing their monopoly on making politically significant decisions.

An equally significant area of transformation is the reassessment of the role of international and supranational law in shaping the internal constitutional order. In the context of the deepening interdependence of States caused by economic, environmental, humanitarian and other factors, national constitutionalism is increasingly forced to take into account the requirements emanating from international organizations and treaty structures. This is especially relevant in the context of the activities of institutions such as the European Court of Human Rights, the World Trade Organization, and the International Criminal Court. At the same time, national constitutions are increasingly forced to adapt to universalizing norms without coming into conflict with the basic principles of national sovereignty. This process requires the development of complex mechanisms of interaction between the levels of legal regulation, which also becomes a significant incentive for a theoretical reassessment of the nature and functions of constitutionalism.

In addition, a significant role in rethinking the foundations of constitutionalism is played by a change in social consciousness. Citizens of modern society are making new demands on the state, expecting not only a declaration of rights, but also their daily provision, a high degree of openness to government, and participation in decision-making. The importance of legal education, digital literacy and the ability of citizens to think critically is increasing, which entails the need to include new forms of communication between the state and society in the legal system.

This means that constitutionalism must be transformed not only as a system of institutions and norms, but also as a cultural phenomenon, as a way of thinking and understanding law. In this context, the issue of stability and legitimacy of public power deserves special attention. In the context of political turbulence, populism and the increasing polarization of public opinion, it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain the stability of the system. The Constitution can no longer be considered solely as a tool for legalizing power; it must also be a symbol of social harmony, a platform for dialogue between various social groups, a source of trust and political order. Therefore, a key element of the transformation is the rethinking of the constitutional treaty as the foundation of a political community, as a mechanism capable of consolidating society in times of crisis.

Finally, one cannot ignore the importance of the environmental imperative, which changes perceptions of the goals and functions of the state. Sustainable development, climate justice, and the protection of the rights of future generations are becoming the subject of not only political declarations, but also legal regulation, including at the constitutional level. This indicates a shift in emphasis within the very structure of rights and freedoms, a shift from an exclusively anthropocentric model to a more comprehensive one that takes into account natural and intergenerational interests. In this light, constitutionalism takes on a new dimension — an ecological one, focused on the long-term preservation of the human and natural environment.

Thus, the formation of the concept of the transformation of constitutionalism cannot be reduced to a simple modification of legal norms or a revision of institutional structures. This is a deep theoretical and practical process in which the very foundations of the social contract, the mechanisms of power and legal culture are being rethought. Numerous prerequisites — from technological to cultural, from social to environmental — form a complex vector of development, in which constitutionalism appears as a mobile, open to innovation system, striving to preserve its value base with constant readiness for transformation.

The conceptual foundations of the transformation of constitutionalism

It seems that the issue of the transformation of constitutionalism in modern conditions goes far beyond the classical normativist analysis and requires a rethinking of the paradigms within which the legal understanding of this category is traditionally carried out. For a long time, the theory of constitutionalism has developed mainly in line with formal legal understanding, where the emphasis was on codified norms, the institutional architecture of power and the rigor of legal procedure. However, the changes taking place in the socio-political, economic and technological spheres have inevitably raised the issue of the limits of the applicability of such an approach.

Currently, it is becoming increasingly obvious that the legal prescriptions set out in the text of the Constitution alone are not enough to explain and regulate complex transformational processes involving all levels of government and social structure. In the context of an increasingly complex political and legal reality, a conceptual turn from the idea of radical restructuring to a model of gradual adaptation makes it possible to maintain continuity and legal stability without abandoning the necessary modernization. In this context, the transformation of constitutionalism appears not as a rejection of its classical foundations, but as a consistent renewal of them, taking place in the logic of the internal development of the legal system itself. This is not a revolutionary break, not the destruction of the foundations, but an evolutionary process of institutional and semantic reconfiguration of the constitutional order in response to the challenges of the time.

The proposed concept proceeds from understanding transformation not as a temporary, situational shift, but as a deep structural process occurring at the intersection of normative, institutional and value planes. This approach avoids the reductionism associated with attempts to explain the changes taking place solely through the prism of political factors or technological progress. Instead, transformation is seen as a complex, integral phenomenon in which public law acts not only as an arbitrator, but also as an active participant in the design of new forms of statehood.

The essence of the proposed concept is that the adaptation of the constitutional order to changing social, technological and cultural conditions is carried out through legal rather than political-situational mechanisms. This fundamentally distinguishes it from concepts based on the primacy of political goal-setting or sociological description. It is important here not only to fix the changes, but also to legitimize them in the legal space — through procedures, institutions, norms, interpretations and, ultimately, through the formation of a new paradigm of legal understanding that corresponds to the spirit of the times and does not contradict the fundamental principles of the constitutional system.

Within the framework of this concept, transformation is carried out in three interrelated directions. Firstly, at the regulatory level, there is not so much a rejection of previous constitutional norms as a rethinking of their content and functions. It is not the formula of rights that is changing, but their interpretation and methods of application. Thus, ideas about freedom of speech, the right to privacy, and the limits of government intervention are undergoing significant evolution, reflecting not so much a change in the legal structure as a reassessment of the relationship between personality and power in a digital society and global interdependence. The right remains, but its meaning is shifting from the plane of a formal guarantee to the plane of a concrete implementation.

Secondly, the institutional aspect of transformation encompasses the evolution of public authority in its organizational and legal dimension. Here we are talking not only about the external reconfiguration of traditional institutions such as parliament, government or the judicial system, but also about the emergence of new forms of interaction between the branches of government, hybrid management models, the strengthening of the role of supranational and regional structures, as well as institutions of civic participation. This is manifested, in particular, in the proliferation of electronic voting practices, online consultations, digital petitions and other forms of direct or indirect involvement of citizens in the decision-making process that go beyond the classical mechanisms of representative democracy.

Finally, the ideological (value) level of transformation encompasses profound changes in the perception of fundamental constitutional values. Freedom, equality, justice, and security — all these categories are being reinterpreted under the influence of new risks, threats, and social expectations. For example, the growing importance of the principle of solidarity in the context of global crises — pandemics, environmental disasters, technological transformations — calls into question the previous model of individualistic constitutionalism based on the priority of private rights over public interests. There is a need for balancing, for finding new points of balance between the right to freedom and the right to protection, between individual autonomy and responsibility to society.

Thus, the transformation of constitutionalism, understood as adaptation, encompasses not only the structure of legal regulation, but also the very philosophy of constitutional order. This means a shift from a static model to a dynamic one, from a fixed system of norms to an open system of meanings, from dogmatic orthodoxy to a dialogical legal culture capable of accepting and processing new challenges without destroying its own foundations.

At the same time, the analysis of the transformation of constitutionalism inevitably leads to the question of the means by which this transformation is carried out. In modern scientific discourse, there is a tendency to interpret transformational processes mainly through the prism of political, socio-cultural or technocratic factors, while the legal aspect is often overshadowed. Meanwhile, it is public law — as a normative form of organization of public power and as a set of procedures defining the limits and possibilities of power — that is the channel through which transformations are not only legitimized, but also acquire stability, internal consistency and institutional completeness.

Within the framework of this concept, public law is conceived not just as an accompanying tool or as a tool for ensuring current political will, but as an independent and determining force capable not only of responding to modern challenges, but also of forming a response that is systematic, predictable and compatible with the foundations of the rule of law. This distinguishes the proposed model from situational and pragmatic approaches, where law adapts to changing circumstances, while losing its autonomy and normative value. Here, law retains its constructive function, remaining a space in which transformation not only takes place, but also finds its institutional expression and boundaries.

The most significant and visible mechanisms of public legal transformation are, firstly, constitutional law-making, carried out both in the form of formal amendments to the texts of constitutions and through the adoption of new normative acts with constitutional or quasi-constitutional status. But a much deeper and more lasting effect is not the quantitative accumulation of legal norms, but the qualitative reorientation of normative logic. There is a need for synthetic lawmaking that combines legal accuracy with socio-political sensitivity, in a law that not only captures changes that have already occurred, but anticipates and directs them.

Secondly, the most important role in the transformation processes is played by legal interpretation, carried out primarily by the constitutional courts and other higher judicial instances. The interpretation of the norms of the basic law in a changing social context is of particular importance. Here, the judiciary acts not only as an arbitrator, but also as a kind of mediator between tradition and novelty, between the letter of the law and the spirit of the times. This is not about discretion in favor of the political situation, but about the ability of justice to maintain the relevance of constitutional provisions without going beyond the legal field. Judicial interpretation becomes an instrument of "quiet transformation" — gentle, gradual, but therefore no less radical in its consequences.

The third important vector of transformation is the digitalization of public power, a process that encompasses both the managerial and legal spheres. The creation of electronic platforms for citizens to interact with government agencies, the development of e—justice, and the use of big data in managerial decision-making are all changing the very nature of public power, making it more technologically advanced, but at the same time raising new questions of legitimacy and accountability. Public law is being drawn into a dialogue with the digital environment, in which it is necessary to ensure a balance between efficiency and the protection of human rights, between transparency and the preservation of personal autonomy.

Particular attention should be paid to institutional innovations, among which are the emergence of new models of interaction between the branches of government, the development of coordination and coordination procedures, the strengthening of the role of the expert community and formalized feedback channels. The transformation of public power here is not limited to the technical reconfiguration of institutions: it affects the structure of decision—making, the redistribution of political and legal responsibilities, as well as mechanisms for the inclusion of new actors such as digital platforms, civic initiatives, and online communities in the process of shaping public will.

In this context, the category of public control is particularly relevant, which is being filled with new content. Modern public law can no longer be limited by the traditional mechanisms of representative democracy. There is a demand for more flexible and multi-channel forms of participation, including digital petitions, public discussions, ombudsman institutions, human rights organizations, and expert councils attached to government bodies. These mechanisms do not replace state institutions, but create a system of legal feedback capable of correcting the vector of development of public power without destroying its legitimacy.

Thus, in the context of transformation, public law performs functions much more complex than simple regulation. It becomes a space of institutional self-renewal, a legal language of adaptation, within which society, government and law are in constant dialogue. At the same time, public law does not lose its normative nature: on the contrary, it is its ability to set the limits of what is acceptable, define procedures, and consolidate institutional guarantees that allows transformation not to escalate into destruction, but to preserve the integrity of the rule of law. And this shows its deep essence — to be not just a reflection of changes, but their semantic core and legal form.

Conclusion

Thus, the study of the phenomenon of the transformation of constitutionalism in modern society leads to the need to rethink the very nature of this phenomenon. Contrary to the idea of constitutionalism as an exceptionally stable and static model that preserves the constancy of basic norms and institutions, modern practice demonstrates its ability not only to preserve its essential identity, but also to adapt to changing realities through internal transformations. At the same time, we are not talking about a radical paradigm shift, but about subtle, sometimes almost imperceptible work to harmonize fundamental legal principles with new challenges — technological, political, and socio-cultural. Constitutionalism, being a product of the Enlightenment and the rationalist model of society, was initially based on normative stability and a strict hierarchy of public authority. However, in the conditions of the post-industrial era, it increasingly manifests itself as a living legal matrix capable of self-adjustment. His transformation in this context appears not as a rejection of historical foundations such as the rule of law, the protection of individual rights, the principle of separation of powers, popular sovereignty, but as their internal rethinking and contextual actualization. Constitutionalism does not break down under the pressure of time, it strives to comprehend it, translate it into the language of law, and make it manageable and predictable.

The transition from the normative to the functional dimension is of particular importance here. In the classical model, it was enough to fix the norm in the constitutional text in order to assume its implementation. Currently, it is becoming obvious that the true value of a legal norm is manifested not in its declarative sound, but in the degree of its realizability, in institutional guarantees and in the ability of the legal system to adapt it to a changing social fabric. Constitutional principles, brought from abstraction to the level of real action, require a new understanding — as guarantees embedded in the living fabric of public life.

Modern constitutionalism shifts the focus from form to content. Institutions in themselves — parliament, the court, the presidency — are not an absolute guarantee of rights and freedoms. What matters is how they function, how they respond to crises, and how capable they are of ensuring the stability of the system in the face of polarization, globalization, and digitalization. The evolution of the constitutional order is manifested not in a change of scenery, but in a change in the logic of institutions' interaction with society, in the ability to consistently integrate new practices, whether digital participation, hybrid forms of public power, or an increased role of public control.

At the same time, digital citizenship and e-constitutionalism are becoming an integral part of this transformation. Citizens' participation in public life is less and less limited by the framework of representative democracy and increasingly takes the form of direct and network participation. However, the opening of new channels of political communication and digital interaction poses a different challenge for the law: protecting personal data, ensuring digital security, and creating new standards of transparency and accountability. Thus, digitalization acts both as a catalyst and as a test for constitutional order.

Along with this, the role of the judiciary as an arbitrator is being strengthened in conditions of turbulence and dispersion of traditional centers of power. However, this strengthening is fraught with the danger of its instrumentalization, with attempts at political pressure and manipulation through formal mechanisms. The independence of the judiciary is becoming not only a guarantee of justice, but also a condition for the stability of the rule of law, especially in cases where other institutions are losing legitimacy. The stability of the rule of law in such conditions largely depends on the ability of the courts not to substitute politics, but also not to lock themselves into technocratic neutrality.

In addition, one of the most difficult, but also fundamentally important challenges remains the problem of the balance between individual rights and public interests. The concept of modern constitutionalism cannot be reduced to the unilateral protection of private autonomy, ignoring the requirements of social cohesion and collective security. In the context of a crisis of trust, global threats, and growing social polarization, the search for this balance becomes a matter not only of legal technique, but also of philosophical understanding of the very nature of law, as a space of reconciliation rather than opposition of interests.