Russian food security in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian geopolitical conflict: issues and solutions

Zhang Xinxin PhD in History Researcher; Moscow City Pedagogical University 129226, Russia, Moscow, 2nd Agricultural passage, 4 K. 1 zhangxinxinn@mail.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine, being one of the largest geopolitical events of the 21st century, is reshaping the political landscape of the Eurasian continent and has a profound and widespread impact on global food security. Russian and Chinese researchers, based on economic and political perspectives, focused on how the conflict between Russia and Ukraine affects the global food crisis, and also proposed joint solutions for Russia and China in overcoming emerging challenges. Some Russian scientists believe that one of the most important components of the economic security of the state is food security, which is experiencing both external threats (economic sanctions, fluctuations in the national currency, etc.) and internal threats (high levels of indebtedness of the country's population, concentration of agricultural production, underdeveloped infrastructure, etc.)^{[1, pp. 115-122]}. In realizing food security, Russia faces two macro challenges: environmental and resource-related. Economic accessibility and access to full-fledged and high-quality nutrition are also significant problems in ensuring Russia's food security^[2]. According to a study by Chinese scientists, the main task of food diplomacy in Russia has become the transition from receiving economic dividends to a strategic tool to overcome Western sanctions and maintain stable relations with non-Western countries. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict forced Russia to turn food diplomacy into a powerful foreign policy tool in addition to energy diplomacy^{[3, pp. 61-83]}; ^[4].

I. The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict on the global food supply chain

The "butterfly effect" caused by the conflict between Russia and Ukraine not only directly endangers the food security of countries that import food from these two countries, but also leads to varying degrees of risks in the field of food security around the world ^{[5, pp. 29-41]}.

The direct impact of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has caused a sharp jump in global prices for energy, grain crops and fertilizers. At the same time, the indirect impact on the global fertilizer and energy market has further increased the cost and final prices of food worldwide. According to a report by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), regional conflicts have already provoked serious food security risks; in some areas in the Middle East and Africa, many people are on the verge of starvation^[6]. Russia and Ukraine are key global food producers and exporters. Their grain crops (wheat, corn, barley, oats, etc.) occupy a significant share in international trade, and the geography of exports covers Europe, Asia, and Africa— the regions with the densest populations. About 50 countries and regions are highly dependent on wheat supplies from Russia and Ukraine. In 2021, Russia exported 42.49 million tons of wheat (21.99% of global exports) and was the largest exporter in the world; Ukraine supplied 20.36 million tons (10.54%). The total exports of both countries reached 62.85 million tons, which is one third of the global wheat market^[7]. At the same time, in most countries of the Middle East and Africa, more than half of wheat supplies come from Russia and Ukraine. For example, 60% of Egypt's wheat imports come from Russia and 25% from Ukraine; while in Lebanon, the share of Russian and Ukrainian grain is 15% and 61%, respectively. All this led to the fact that the conflict primarily dealt a blow to the food security of the countries of the Middle East and Africa, especially those whose economies are poorly diversified, the level of development is low, and resource opportunities are limited ^{[8, pp. 15-27]}.

The indirect impact of the conflict has led to a reorganization of global supply chains. After the outbreak of hostilities, transportation through the Black Sea ports was severely affected, and grain exports faced blockages and restrictions, which led to a significant increase in transportation costs. According to the Global Report on Food Crises 2023 (GRFC), published on the website of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the ongoing Russian—Ukrainian conflict continues to negatively affect global food security, in particular, disrupting agricultural production and trade in the Black Sea region. This caused an unprecedented rise in global food prices in the first half of 2022. Although the cost of grain subsequently decreased somewhat due to the Black Sea Grain Initiative and the EU Solidarity Corridors Initiative, the conflict itself continues to indirectly affect global food security, particularly affecting low-income countries dependent on food imports ^[9].

The political impact of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is exacerbating geopolitical tensions, affecting complex international relations and competing interests of many countries. In such a conflict, food, being a tool for maintaining the stability of major Powers, turns into an instrument of political confrontation. As the conflict worsens, the increasing involvement of the parties in the multilateral confrontation is increasingly affecting the structure of the global food market. For example, since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, international sanctions have made it difficult for Russia to use payment channels for food exports (in particular, the SWIFT system), which has negatively affected the normal course of foreign trade. As a response to the policy of "turning food into weapons" by the United States and its Western allies, Russia decided to withdraw from the Black Sea Grain Agreement in order to limit exports of Ukrainian grain. This strategic action, involving "arming with food," has directly exacerbated food security problems in the countries of the West Asia and North Africa region. The African states and regions of Yemen, where the bulk of food is imported from wheat and other agricultural crops from Russia and Ukraine, can serve as vivid examples here. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has led to serious internal food crises in these low-income countries^{[3, pp. 61-83]};^[10]. In addition, there is an increase in trade protectionism in some countries, which puts additional pressure on the global market share of food exports. For example, India, the ASEAN countries and other major exporters of agricultural products are gradually tightening the rules of foreign trade in food. As a result, many states are beginning to diversify their import channels, trying to reduce their dependence on Russian and Ukrainian supplies. Such a reorganization not only affects the global structure of the food trade, but can also lead to a further escalation of geopolitical tensions.

II. The current state of Russia's food security and geopolitical challenges

Russian food exports are generally characterized by a tendency towards diversification. In 2023, the volume of exports of Russian agricultural products exceeded 45 billion US dollars for the first time. The geography of grain supplies is very wide: wheat is exported to the markets of the Middle East, North Africa, Asia and Africa, and the main recipients of Russian soybeans are mainly China, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Russia holds a significant share of the wheat supply market in the Middle East and Asia. Thus, in the first half of the 2023/24 grain year (from July to December), Turkey imported 4,281 million tons of grain from Russia, which is about 12.7% less than 4,903 million tons in the same period last year, but Turkey remains the largest importer of Russian grain. During the same period, Iran, not Egypt, became the second largest buyer of Russian grain, importing 3.902 million tons, which is 4.9% higher than the figure of 3.718 million tons for the same period a year earlier^[11]. In the Asian market in 2023, the volume of exports of Russian wheat flour to China increased 4.5 times, reaching 143 thousand tons. At the same time, over the past 10 years, Russia has exported one fifth of all soybeans in Russia, that is, almost 1 million tons per year, and 82% of this volume to China^[4];^[12].

However, special vigilance should be maintained: Russia's food security is still subject to the influence of many factors, especially those related to European geopolitical threats. First of all, Russian grain exports are heavily dependent on the Black Sea ports, among which the port of Novorossiysk plays a key role. During the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, these ports were blocked, which led to a 15% reduction in Russian grain exports in 2022. On the one hand, the military actions have seriously damaged the port infrastructure, drastically reducing cargo transshipment capabilities. On the other hand, risks to the safety of navigation have increased, and many international shipping companies, in an effort to ensure the safety of their vessels, began to curtail or suspend operations in the region, which caused a serious shortage of ships for transporting grain. In addition, some European states have imposed blockades or restrictions on Russian ports, which has further complicated export shipments.

Secondly, in the context of the current conflict, food has already become a "weapon of sanctions" used by major powers to carry out targeted political strikes, and thus the classic features of the "zero-sum game" have emerged. Each side considers the production or supply of food as an instrument of pressure on the other side ^{[3, pp. 61-83; 10]}. In 2022, the Bayer company in Germany announced the termination of the supply of seeds in Russia that serious blow to the Russian grain industry^[13]. At the same time, European sanctions against Russian agricultural equipment have significantly reduced production efficiency. Restrictions on the import of agricultural machinery may undermine the production capabilities of the Russian agricultural sector in the long term. Taken together, all these factors lead to a reduction in grain export revenues and fluctuations in domestic food prices. In response, Russia banned the supply of fertilizers to "unfriendly" states and regions^[14]. All this indicates that food security is increasingly becoming part of the geopolitical confrontation between the world's largest players.

Finally, in the context of the "post-conflict period" it is necessary to pay special attention to the new round of the food crisis, which may arise due to the "spreading effect" of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. As the Russian-Ukrainian conflict weakens somewhat, there is a high probability that the crisis it has caused may spread to other regions. The countries of the Middle East and Africa are extremely dependent on the Russian-Ukrainian grain market, and their food crisis has noticeably worsened during the conflict. The military actions led to restrictions on grain production and exports from both countries, which caused sharp fluctuations in world food prices, depriving Middle Eastern and African states of the opportunity to consistently receive inexpensive food. At the same time, the negative consequences of the conflict are spreading through economic, political and other channels, exacerbating internal military and political contradictions, stimulating the growth of nationalist sentiments and the activity of terrorist groups, as well as increasing the level of traditional security threats. For example, protests, armed clashes and social unrest of various scales have already taken place in Egypt and Tunisia, caused by problems of hunger and food distribution; in some cases, such events led to changes in domestic policy and paved the way for the intervention of external forces^{[15, pp. 15-27]}. In the short term, due to disruptions in food supplies caused by the conflict and rising global prices, Russia's income as one of the largest grain exporters looks very impressive. However, in the long term, the economic development of the countries of the Middle East and Africa, which have already been affected by the food crisis, will slow down even more; the solvency of the population there will decrease, and demand for Russian grain will gradually begin to decline. As a result, Russia will be forced to redirect its supplies to other markets, which will inevitably weaken its influence over time and disrupt the established geopolitical and economic balance.

III. An approach to overcoming the food crisis in Russia

In order to cope with the instability of international financial flows, increased protectionism, and rising energy and food prices, Russia must not only step up the modernization of its economic structure and increase its resilience to crises, but also establish economic connectivity and political trust with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, primarily China. Formation of a new type of relations between great Powers based on the principles of "non-alignment, non-confrontation and non-targeting against third parties"^[16], may become a key path for Russia in overcoming the difficult international situation.

First, Russia should be extremely attentive to the risk of "turning food into weapons" used for political purposes. From the point of view of geopolitics, as part of the "Turn to the East" strategy, it is extremely important for Russia to deepen cooperation with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, especially to strengthen and expand comprehensive strategic cooperation with China in the Far East. This is essential for the formation of a reliable strategic rear. On the one hand, the Far East has extremely rich natural resources, and their further development, combined with a reasonable distribution of agricultural production, will give a powerful internal impetus to economic growth. Since both Russia and Ukraine are important partners of China in grain trade, the conflict between them led to a reduction and sometimes complete cessation of grain supplies to China ^{[17, pp. 18-24]}. In this situation, increasing Russian grain exports to China will allow us to receive financial support and strengthen mutual political trust. On the other hand, China and Russia can gradually expand the use of national currencies in mutual settlements, reducing dependence on the US dollar and the American economy, and jointly seek ways to diversify the international monetary system and models of economic cooperation. China, being one of the world's key economies, can work with Russia to not only counter global challenges in the field of food security, but also contribute to the destruction of the food monopoly built by the four largest agricultural companies in the world (ADM, Bunge, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus) by creating deep partnerships in multilateral and bilateral formats. This will encourage the international community to rethink the trend towards politicization of food issues, promote the return of the global grain market to rationality and fairness, and create a favorable international environment for Russia's food security, strengthening its position in geopolitical competition.

Secondly, it is necessary to expand multi-format grain transportation routes by sea and land. In the field of maritime transportation, the accelerated development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) is of particular importance. As a key element of Russia's long-term economic and geopolitical strategy, the NSR has enormous potential. However, in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, relations between Russia and the West have become seriously complicated, and Western sanctions are preventing foreign investment in Russian energy development projects in the Arctic. In this situation, China is becoming an important partner of Russia in the development of the Arctic and the inclusion of the Northern Sea Route in the initiative of the "Ice Silk Road". In a joint statement on the 75th anniversary of the establishment of Russian-Chinese diplomatic relations, the parties expressed their desire to turn the Northern Sea Route into a significant international transport corridor, as well as to encourage companies from the two countries to cooperate more closely in increasing traffic volumes and creating appropriate logistics infrastructure^[18]. In terms of overland transportation, deep coordination with the Chinese "One Belt, One Road" initiative is important. The Northern Corridor within the framework of this initiative, in particular the routes Siberia — Moscow — Baltic Sea — Poland and Kazakhstan — Baltic Sea — Poland, is the main trunk route along which about 90% of China—Europe freight traffic passes ^{[19, pp. 33-38]}. Thanks to a strategy consistent with the development of the Eurasian continent, Russia can diversify overland routes by using freight trains on China—Europe lines, thereby reducing dependence on Black Sea ports and ensuring greater safety and variability of grain transportation routes.

Thirdly, it is necessary to increase the level of food self-sufficiency. To counter a possible food crisis, Russia can use the grain industry as a basis for building an integrated set of strategic solutions in the format of a "hybrid war" ^{[20, pp. 34-49]}. This implies systematic measures in key areas related to production, inventory, logistics, and innovative food technologies. Cooperation in the fields of digital economy, green energy and high technologies should be expanded within the framework of agricultural cooperation. At the same time, it is necessary to step up the development of critically important technologies, in particular seed breeding: to encourage joint research by Russian and Chinese specialists focused on breeding new high-yielding varieties of crops that are more resistant to external factors. In terms of the development of the bilateral trade mechanism, it is appropriate to establish channels of financial cooperation that would provide Russian agro-industrial enterprises with access to loans on preferential terms, investments and other types of support, contributing to the expansion of production and improvement of its infrastructure. Given the differences in the ability of specific types of food to withstand geopolitical risks, Russia should develop clear and effective policy measures, form a full-fledged food reserve system and a legal framework for its use. A rational allocation of resources will strengthen the country's ability and allow it to reliably increase its level of independence in a complex and volatile international environment.

Conclusion

The geopolitical conflict between Russia and Ukraine entails multifaceted threats to Russia's food security. In the future, Russia should take into account both geopolitical factors and the "spreading effect" of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which not only affects the development of the Russian economy, but also rebuilds the global political system. Against this background, the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, relying on their own advantages and friendly relations with Russia, are able to provide significant support in overcoming the food crisis. With close cooperation and strengthening of international cooperation, China and Russia can not only effectively mitigate food risks, increase the level of development of the Russian agro-industrial sector, but also further strengthen and expand the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries in a new era. This will make a positive and stabilizing contribution to ensuring global food security and realize mutually beneficial cooperation and common development of both sides in a difficult international situation.