The Central Election Commission and the first multiparty elections in the Russian Federation in 1993: organizational and political aspects

Volgin Evgeny Igorevich ORCID: 0000-0002-9690-448X PhD in Politics Associate Professor, Department of the History of Social Movements and Political Parties, Lomonosov Moscow State University 119192, Russia, Moscow, Lomonosovsky ave., 27/4, office 415 plytony@yandex.ru Other publications by this author     Mihailova Natal'ya Vyacheslavovna ORCID: 0000-0003-2842-9143 Doctor of Politics Professor; Institute of Public Administration and Management; Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration 82 Vernadsky Ave., building 1, Moscow, 119571. natulya_m@mail.ru

Amiantova Irina Sergeevna ORCID: 0000-0003-1543-0815 PhD in Politics Associate Professor; Law Institute; Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia Miklukho-Maklaya str., 6, Moscow, 117198, Russia amiantova_is@rudn.ru

Formation of the Central Election Commission in the conditions of

political time constraints

The presidential decree "On phased constitutional reform in the Russian Federation" took contemporaries by surprise. On the one hand, many understood that the dissolution of parliament and the holding of early elections was a matter of time, but neither the President's supporters nor his opponents were ready for the election campaign itself, and even under the new rules, as the "father" of electoral reform, V. L. Sheinis, rightly notes ^{[1, p. 642] [2, p. 136-142]}. The formation of a new Central Election Commission was to be the first step in organizing and conducting the election campaign in a short time. According to the "Sheinis law", the Central Election Commission was formed by the Supreme Council and the President on a parity basis, consisting of a chairman and 20 members. The Chairman of the Central Election Commission was elected by the Supreme Court on the proposal of the Constitutional Court. The Chairman and at least half of the CEC members had to have a law degree or a law degree. The election regulations approved by Decree No. 1400 reinforced the presidential role in the formation of the Central Election Commission. Thus, although the candidacy of the CEC Chairman was approved by the Constitutional Court, it was already on the recommendation of the President (and not the Supreme Council). In addition, 10 members of the Central Election Commission, nominated by the President, did not need additional approval from the deputies of the Supreme Council (as stipulated by the "Sheinis law").

The figure of the Chairman of the Central Election Commission became crucial. On September 24, 1993, Boris Yeltsin appointed Nikolai Ryabov to this position. For Yeltsin, it was undesirable for someone from his entourage to take this post (the elections were already held according to the presidential "score"). In this regard, the candidacy of N. T. Ryabov seemed almost ideal. And it wasn't just about the higher legal education that Nikolai Timofeevich received at the evening department of Rostov State University. A "loyal Hasbulatov" (Ryabov served as deputy chairman of the Supreme Council), after the April referendum he abandoned the policy of confrontation with the President and took an active part in the Constitutional Meeting, and later joined the work on the formation of the Federation Council (for which he was reprimanded by his immediate superior, who also threatened him with resignation) (Tsukanova L. Go I don't want to compromise, but I need to // Russian news. 1993. September 11; New appointments // Today. 1993. September 25; Nikolai Ryabov was given a "warning" // Today. 1993. No. 51; The Commission will be headed by N. Ryabov // Trud. 1993. September 24).

N.T. Ryabov did not wait for his deposition. After the promulgation of Decree No. 1400, he asked to be relieved of his duties as Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council right at the Supreme Council session. Just at that moment, the current Chairman of the Central Election Commission, V.I. Kazakov, who initially opposed holding elections on party lists, actually refused to perform his duties. "It is impossible to hold elections in these terms. I won't play along. I will not participate in the collapse of the country," Kazakov said. The next day, Nikolai Ryabov was appointed to his post, who risked accepting Yeltsin's offer and heading the Central Election Commission in an extremely difficult situation. Of course, his appointment was not approved by the Constitutional Court, as required by Article 13 of the Presidential Election Regulations. Contemporaries emphasized the loyalty of the new head of the Central Election Commission. It was not for nothing that the President ordered a direct telephone connection to be established in the office of the head of the Central Election Commission and gave the go-ahead to "call at any time" (I must say that Ryabov did not abuse this right) (Solovyov A. Elections at the temple // Russia. 1993. September 29–October 5; Bychkova O., Skorobogatko T., Pushkar D. Heirs of October // Moscow news. 1993. October 24; Kiselyov S. Parliamentary democracy in the "situation" // Moskovskie Novosti. 1993. October 17; Lugovskaya A. The Central Election Commission clarifies the schedule of the election campaign // Izvestia. 1993. October 22; Ryabov assumed the duties of Chairman of the Central Election Commission // Kommersant. 1993. September 25).

On September 29, 1993, a Presidential decree was issued "On the composition of the Central Election Commission for Elections to the State Duma ...", which eliminated previous aberrations such as the participation of deputies of the Supreme Council or members of the Constitutional Court in the process of forming the Central Election Commission. From now on, the entire Central Election Commission was appointed by the President. At the same time, the remaining members, including the deputy chairman, were appointed on the recommendation of N. T. Ryabov. The first ten CEC members were appointed from among the candidates represented by the local legislative authorities, while the other ten were appointed by the heads of the executive authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. This procedure provided the regions with a serious channel of influence on the organization of elections. The first composition of the CEC included representatives of 20 subjects of the Federation. Preference was given to those candidates who received the support of both legislative and executive authorities. Tatarstan was represented here (although the nominee from this republic, R. Biktagirov, did not immediately receive the go-ahead from his leadership for a train to Moscow), Karachay-Cherkessia, Buryatia, Chuvashia, Tyva, Moscow and St. Petersburg, Krasnoyarsk, Stavropol Territories, Astrakhan, Leningrad, Tyumen, Saratov, Vladimir, Arkhangelsk, Magadan, Voronezh, Omsk, Chelyabinsk regions, as well as Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug ^[3].

All CEC voting members had higher legal education, six of them were candidates of Law. Three members of the Central Election Commission (including Deputy Chairman of the Central Election Commission A.V. Ivanchenko, as well as I. P. Fomichev, representing St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region, and A. G. Beloborodov, nominated from Krasnoyarsk) worked in law enforcement agencies at different times. All of them (except Ryabov and the secretary of the Central Election Commission, V. A. Zagulyaev) worked on a permanent basis. For comparison, in the composition of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, approved on December 1, 1988, only two members had higher legal education. In 1989, there were five lawyers among the members of the Central Election Commission for the Election of People's Deputies of the RSFSR. Only the chairman of that commission worked on a permanent basis. The powers of the first CEC lasted from September 1993 to March 1995, and the place of its "temporary residence" was Novy Arbat, 19 ^{[4, p. 19-21] [5, p. 7, 12]}.

Together with N. T. Ryabov, many deputies and specialists from the former Supreme Council joined the Central Election Commission. Previously, the CEC relied on the organizational and technical assistance of the Armed Forces, but the new apparatus (100-115 people) functioned almost independently, relying on its own capabilities. The employees of the Central Election Commission are "highly qualified people." The staff tried to recruit experienced personnel (including employees of the former Central Election Commission), for whom elections were not a new thing and who knew the regions well. Seven working groups have been established in the structure of the Central Election Commission, including those on cooperation with district election commissions and public associations, on financing and logistical support for elections, on preparing instructions and methodological materials, which, according to the head of the CEC press service, A. Bukhvalov, "is extremely important in the context of our legal illiteracy" (the Central Election Commission It works // Russian news. 1993. September 29; the Central Election Commission operates according to a set schedule // Russian news. 1993. October 5; The Central Election Commission continues to work // Rossiyskaya gazeta. 1993. October 5; Koreshkov V. In full-impact mode // Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 1993. October 26).

According to the order of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation, the Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law under the former Supreme Council was entrusted with legal, informational and methodological support for the activities of the Central Election Commission. The editorial board of the People's Deputy magazine and the Izvestia of Soviets of People's Deputies publishing house were supposed to publish a weekly CEC Bulletin (the first issue was published at the end of October). In addition, various foreign governmental and non-governmental organizations offered assistance to the new Central Election Commission (V.Koreshkov In the interests of publicity // Rossiyskaya gazeta. 1993. October 29) ^{[6, pp. 28-34]}.

In order to hold elections in the federal district, the Central Election Commission actually had to carry out the organizational and technical functions of the All-Russian district commission. The fact is that the new system of territorial election commissions omitted the district and city levels. The rejection of intermediate links was due to the fact that the reform developers, realizing that most political parties, without an extensive network of regional branches, would not be able to control the local counting of votes cast for the lists of electoral associations. This process was to be conducted directly by the CEC, where the PEC protocols were sent immediately after the voting. Practice has shown that the absence of a district and city level negatively affected the process of establishing voting results in the federal district, when almost one hundred thousand protocols flooded into the Central Election Commission (V. L. Sheinis later admitted this mistake). In addition, the CEC was soon charged with ensuring a popular vote on the draft Constitution (Uglanov A. Will the elections and the Constitution fail? // Arguments and facts. 1993. No. 51; Ryabov N. We profess only one attachment – to the law // Rossiyskaya gazeta. 1995. May 16) ^{[4, p. 18] [1, p. 587] [5, c. 6] [6, 28-34] [7, pp. 125-147]}.

The primary tasks of the new Election Commission

On October 1, 1993, the first meeting of the Central Election Commission was held. Opening it, N. T. Ryabov said that before the results of the vote are summed up, the CEC will be "an important political nerve of Russia," since the elections are being held against the background of political instability and a crisis of power. The Chairman of the Central Election Commission stressed the need for its members to maintain full political neutrality: "We must work without expressing political bias, ensure that all events are fully transparent and open to all political parties and movements." The primary concern of the CEC was the preparation and conduct of the election campaign in an extremely short time. The developers of the electoral law had planned for at least 135 days for early elections. In fact, they were announced in 80 days, but in reality the election campaign was conducted within 73-75 calendar days. The election campaign started under the conditions of the state of emergency in Moscow (where the main political life was concentrated) (Former and Duma // Labour. 1993. October 2; Rodin I. The Central Election Commission began its work // Nezavisimaya gazeta. 1993. October 2) ^{[8, c. 3] [9, 59] [1, p. 642] [10, p. 46] [6, p. 28-34]}.

In order not to waste time, the Decree of September 29, 1993 approved the schedule of the main organizational events of the Central Election Commission for the elections to the State Duma. Thus, after the formation of the Central Election Commission, the approval of the scheme of 225 single–mandate districts was to take place (until October 13), as well as the formation of district election commissions (October 23-28). The formation of precinct commissions was planned to be completed by November 2 (there were over 94 thousand in total in the country). PEC; in Moscow alone – 3250). Electoral associations had to submit federal lists to the CEC by November 7, along with signature lists and statements of candidates agreeing to run. The registration of the federal lists was carried out within five days after the submission of the necessary documents. Early voting was scheduled to begin on November 27, and elections to the State Duma were scheduled to be held on December 12.

The dramatic events in Moscow did not affect the work schedule of the Central Election Commission. On October 5, the CEC held a regular meeting dedicated to the creation of single-mandate constituencies. The Central Election Commission asked the representatives of the regions to provide maps of their territories and schemes for cutting territorial electoral districts. Due to the change in the representation system, the boundaries of the previously existing electoral districts had to undergo changes, but due to lack of time, it was not planned to radically change the entire scheme. According to N. T. Ryabov, the CEC was going to complete the approval of all 225 single-member districts by October 10 (which was completed) ^[11]

On October 21, the Central Election Commission approved the DEC chairmen nominated by the subjects of the Federation. N. T. Ryabov described them as "exceptionally interesting" people. Indeed, whereas previously the chairmen of district commissions were usually senior party and Soviet cadres, now they included administration officials, representatives of Councils, economic and law enforcement agencies, rectors of educational institutions, heads of enterprises and legal consultations. Although things did not always go smoothly: for example, the CEC had to dismiss the chairman of the Krasnodar DEC for showing his political sympathies towards individual candidates. Nevertheless, by the twentieth of October, the formation of district commissions was almost completed.: They were established in all regions of the Russian Federation except Chechnya (the Central Election Commission failed to involve the rebellious republic in the all-Russian electoral process).

During the election campaign, the Central Election Commission held consultations with representatives of more than 50 socio-political associations, and issued the necessary regulatory documents for the elections to the Federal Assembly. Sometimes there were curious situations: people called the CEC, demanding to resolve the issue of a massive delay in salaries and pensions under threat of non-participation in the elections. Of course, Nikolai Ryabov could not solve these problems, but he informed Boris Yeltsin about the current situation, and the President told "who needed it." In this regard, Deputy Prime Minister V. F. Shumeiko, who was running for the Federation Council, promised the regions to pay off the mortgages. Thus, in addition to its immediate duties, the CEC tried to influence the crisis socio-economic situation (Ryabov N. Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation. Calendar of elections to the Federation Council and the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation // Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 1993. October 28; O. Odintsovo Preparing for the elections // Nezavisimaya gazeta. 1993. October 12; District election commissions formed // Moskovskaya pravda. 1993. October 23; Tregubova E. Nikolay Ryabov announced the composition of the Central Election Commission // Today. 1993. October 2; Rodin I. The Central Election Commission is working // Nezavisimaya gazeta. 1993. October 21; Yanchenkov V. The election campaign enters a new stage // Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 1993. October 22; Tsukanova L. The Central Election Commission works with the regions // Russian news. 1993. October 8; Sargin A. Miracles in the Election Commission // Arguments and facts. 1993. No. 48; Balashov A. The Central Election Commission began to create electoral districts // Kommersant. 1993. October 6; Batalova N. The most important precinct // Moskovskaya Pravda. 1993. October 28) ^{[3] [12, p. 30] [8, p. 7]}.

Cooperation with international observers has become a completely new area of work for the Central Election Commission. The decision to invite them to the Russian elections was announced by the Presidents during a visit to Japan in October 1993. Since the Russian electoral procedure had not previously known such a practice, the CEC promptly prepared a Regulation on the status of foreign observers...". According to this document, the international observers accredited by the CEC were under state patronage. The Russian side guaranteed the foreign observers non-interference in their professional activities and all possible assistance from the competent authorities (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Central Election Commission). The observers had the right to receive the necessary information related to the elections, to monitor the election campaign, assessing each of its phases from the point of view of democracy and compliance with international standards. At the same time, they could not interfere in the electoral process. The observers reflected their conclusions and observations in expert opinions, which were advisory in nature (Filatov S. Observers are coming to us // Truth. 1993. November 19; Demchenko V. EU representatives have a chance to be observant // Novaya Daily Gazeta. 1993. December 7; Shinkarenko V. More than 100 international experts will observe the course of the election campaign in Russia // Russian News. 1993. October 26; Achalova E. December elections will be held in the presence of foreigners // Kommersant. 1993. November 2) ^{[13, pp. 44-46]}.

In total, about 1,100 international observers from 58 countries in Europe, America, Asia, Africa, and Australia were accredited to the Central Election Commission. The most numerous groups were sent by the States of the European Union, the CSCE countries, as well as Japan, Thailand, and Indonesia. Representatives from the former Soviet republics (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, as well as the Baltic States) were present. In addition, the CEC has also accredited 37 international parliamentary, governmental, public, and research associations. During their stay in Russia, foreign observers visited about 60 republican, regional and regional centers, cities and towns. In addition, the Central Election Commission accredited 700 journalists from 30 countries of the near and far abroad, who attended meetings and meetings of the Central Election Commission, official meetings and press conferences. International observers were satisfied with the organization of the voting, highly appreciating the professionalism of the Central Election Commission. These positive assessments became the CEC's democratic alibi after information appeared in the press about mass falsifications that allegedly took place during the election campaign ^{[12] [14, pp. 31-36]}.

The electoral dilemma of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation

At the beginning of the election campaign, Boris Yeltsin guaranteed equal opportunities to all political parties that had not been tainted by direct participation in the rebellion. Despite the large number of public associations that have been granted the right to nominate lists of candidates or participate in election blocs, some groups accused of political extremism have not been included in this list. Initially, the Communist Party was not there either. At the same time, the Communist Party of Russia was not included in the "blacklist" of the Minister of Justice Y. H. Kalmykov, who on October 4, 1993 suspended the activities of eight of the most odious organizations. Answering a question about whether the Zyuganov party would participate in the elections, the head of the Presidential Administration, S. A. Filatov, replied: "Not on this list, so it will be ... on another list." Indeed, on October 6, 1993, by order of the head of the Moscow Department of Justice, Yuri Kostanov, the activities of the Moscow branch of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation were suspended. The official announcement "on the imposition of sanctions" on the Communists appeared on October 8, which caused rumors that there was no consensus "at the top" about the future fate of the Communist Party.

(Gvozdev L. The Reds should not enter the Duma // Moskovskaya Pravda. 1993. October 9; "We have accelerated the pace of democratic transformations and economic reforms." Statement by the President of the Russian Federation // Russian News. 1993. October 9; Kuznetsov D., Tregubova E. Opposition parties are banned, but they do not lose hope of putting up their lists at the elections // Today. 1993. October 12).

Nevertheless, on October 7, 1993, N. T. Ryabov included the Communist Party of Russia among the organizations eligible to participate in the elections. The Chairman of the Central Election Commission explained his decision by the "absence of an order from the Ministry of Justice" regarding the Communist Party. Obviously, the head of the Central Election Commission assumed that sanctions against the Communist Party of Russia could be lifted after the expiration of the state of emergency in Moscow (therefore, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation did not appear on the lists of potential election participants). However, the press service of the Ministry of Justice did not comment on Nikolai Ryabov's actions. All this testified to the inconsistency of the two federal agencies responsible for organizing the elections. The final point in the unspoken dispute between the Central Election Commission and the Ministry of Justice was put by the Presidential Decree "On certain measures to ensure state and public security during the 1993 election campaign." This document appeared on October 19, 1993, i.e. the day after the expiration of the state of emergency in Moscow. The decree deprived six associations whose leaders were involved in organizing mass riots and armed confrontation of the right to participate in elections. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation was not on this list. G. A. Zyuganov hastened to inform that the Communist Party had received the go-ahead from the Minister of Justice and the Chairman of the Central Election Commission, as it opposed "political extremism" (SAPP RF. 1993. № 43. St. 4080; Let's choose // Labor. 1993. October 8; Balashov A. Communists will be able to participate in the elections // Kommersant. 1993. October 8; Kuznets D., Tregubova E. Opposition parties are banned, but they do not lose hope of putting up their lists at the elections // Today. 1993. October 12; Sidorov I. Communists and "Rutskites" will be able to participate in the elections // Kommersant. 1993. October 21; Todres V. Boris Yeltsin issues election permits// Today. 1993. October 21).

It should not be forgotten that the Communist Party of the Russian Federation was allowed to vote only after the executive branch had indicated its participation in the elections through the formation of pro-government electoral associations (the Choice of Russia movement of First Deputy Prime Minister E. T. Gaidar and the Party of Russian Unity and Consent of Prime Minister S. M. Shakhray), and the President provided government officials with The "parties of power" in the future Duma have an appropriate legal formalization. Nevertheless, despite all the preferences that were given to these two "administrative parties," Boris Yeltsin refused to honor the constituent congress of the "Choice of Russia" with his presence and thus openly support the "Gaidar party." However, after that, N. T. Ryabov suggested that BP activists rely on the heads of executive power in the regions on which the President relied. "The Chairman of the Central Election Commission expressed his thoughts in a simple way and did not consider himself bound by his status and legal conventions," testifies V. Sheinis (Telen L. Under the sign of "storm and onslaught" // Moskovskie Novosti. 1993. October 31; Zhuravlev P. The Central Election Commission expects 60% voter turnout // Today. 1993. October 23; Todres V. Boris Yeltsin issues election permits // Today. 1993. October 21) ^{[1, p. 649]}.

Verification of subscription lists: strict control or formal procedure

A characteristic difference between the 1993 election campaign and the Soviet electoral procedure was that the condition for the nomination and registration of candidates for deputy mandates was a certain number of signatures of voters collected in favor of federal lists or individual candidates. Initially, electoral associations had to collect at least 200,000 signatures in support of their lists. Upon completion of the signature collection, the federal list (together with the signature lists, as well as statements of candidates agreeing to run) It was submitted for registration to the Central Election Commission. The latter, having limited himself to a formal verification of the received documents, registered the list of candidates within ten days or refused registration. Single-mandate candidates had to collect at least 2% of signatures from the total number of voters in the district. The wording of the Election Regulations of October 1, 1993 provided for a reduction in the number of signatures required for registration of the federal list (up to 100,000 signatures) and single-mandate candidates (1% of the total number of voters). At the same time, the time allotted to the Central Election Commission for checking subscription lists was reduced to 5 days. At the same time, the new edition did not tighten the procedure for verifying election documents. This approach was based on the extremely limited time allocated for the election campaign, when the CEC was physically unable to cope with the volume of documentation received.

At the same time, there was one interesting caveat in the new version of the Regulation: if invalid signatures were found in the signature lists during upcoming inspections, the number of which would exceed 3% of their total number, and if it turned out that the number of valid signatures remaining after verification was insufficient to register a list or an individual candidate, their accreditation could may be retroactively annulled by the Duma on the recommendation of the mandate commission. Apparently, with the help of this "rubber" formulation, the Kremlin planned to keep the future parliamentary opposition on a "short leash" ^{[4, p. 484]}.

Initially, 55 public associations declared their intention to participate in the elections. The lists were certified by the CEC and 35 organizations began collecting signatures. The parties and blocs had to submit their signature lists no later than November 6 (before 24:00). 21 electoral associations have completed this task. All of them managed to collect about 3 million signatures in total. A peculiar record was set by the Agrarian Party – 500 thousand signatures. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation did not lag behind – 187 thousand. In total, the Communists raised 438,000, although they joined the election campaign late. The results of the pro–government forces looked solid: "Russia's Choice" and the press - more than 200 thousand. Approximately 170 thousand each were presented by Yablochniki and Zhirinovo residents. A little less was collected by the "Women of Russia" – 130 thousand (Outsiders have been officially announced // Nezavisimaya gazeta. 1993. November 12; Rodin I. So far, 21 electoral blocs have been allowed before the elections // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 1993. November 9; Garbuzova O., Achalova E. 13 electoral associations participate in the elections // Kommersant. 1993. November 11; Zhukov A. The Devil's Dozen goes to the second round // General Weekly Newspaper. 1993. November 12-18; The opposition will form a majority in the State Duma // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 1993. November 10; S. Chugaev. People who do not disdain to bribe voters are rushing to the new parliament. // Izvestia. 1993. November 5; the CEC met with the blocs // Nezavisimaya gazeta. 1993. November 6; Chugaev S. Collection of signatures for candidates for members of the Federal Assembly is completed. The stakes are rising // Izvestia. 1993. November 6).

After receiving the subscription lists, the Central Election Commission began checking the election documentation. According to the CEC leadership, the examination was conducted at the highest level. Graphologists from the Ministry of Internal Affairs or the All-Russian Research Institute of Forensic Examinations, equipped with the latest foreign equipment, promised to be involved in the well-known event "in an atmosphere of the strictest secrecy." At the same time, the very quality of verification raised some doubts. The candidates were rejected on purely formal grounds: incorrect registration of signature lists, exceeding the limit of electoral autographs per subject of the Federation (no more than 15%), insufficient number of signatures. As a result, 13 associations were tested. It was on formal grounds for the rest of the parties and blocs. There were no formal falsifications in the subscription lists. Although there is reason to believe that not all electoral autographs were authentic (Maslinin V. What the Central Election Commission is silent about // Pravda. 1993. November 16; Achalova E. Eight electoral associations failed to register // Kommersant. 1993. November 12; Achalova E. Electoral associations submitted signatures to the Central Election Commission // Kommersant. 1993. November 9; Todres V. The authenticity of the signatures is already being questioned // Today. 1993. November 9th; The first barrier is behind // Today. 1993. November 9th).

The question arises: how did the Central Election Commission, without resorting to detailed graphological expertise, identify the "weak links" of the subscription campaign? We dare to assume that pro-government parties, as well as influential opposition associations that collected signatures "with a margin", were excluded from the list of potential "victims". Checking the latter would mean a pointless waste of time and effort, because the same communists, knowing about the attitude of the authorities towards them, carried out a preliminary reorganization of the subscription lists. Thus, those electoral associations that, firstly, collected a little more than 100 thousand signatures turned out to be "on suspicion"; secondly, they appeared at the CEC on November 6 a few minutes before midnight. These circumstances indicated that the party was teetering "on the edge" and if the inspectors showed more bias, the number of participants in the election race would decrease. All eight electoral associations that were denied registration (or who themselves refused to participate in further struggle) met the two criteria mentioned above.

Issues of organizing an agitation campaign using

state-owned electronic media

Election 93 was the first election campaign in which parties and movements had a guaranteed right to use state-owned electronic media for election campaigning purposes. The new electoral legislation was supposed to flexibly regulate legal relations that arose in connection with the need to provide all participants in the electoral process with equal access to state television and radio broadcasting during the campaign period. The well-known problem was taken into account in the "Sheinis law", the norms of which then migrated to the Election Regulations. However, the articles directly related to the well-known issue were too general. In this regard, the heads of federal TV channels have asked the Central Election Commission to develop a document that would regulate the issues of agitation and propaganda on TV. The Central Election Commission prepared the relevant document, when suddenly the initiative was taken by Presidential Adviser Y. M. Baturin, who at the same time taught at the School of Media Law and instructed the students of his seminar to develop an appropriate regulatory act. This is how the Provision on information guarantees of election campaigning appeared, approved by Presidential Decree dated October 29, 1993. Nikolai Ryabov did not object to such competition. "A woman with a cart is easier for a mare," said the head of the Central Election Commission (Zhukov A. How to divide the TV so that there is enough for everyone? // General weekly newspaper. 1993. November 19-25; R.I. Nikolay Ryabov expressed concern // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 1993. October 27; Prelovskaya I. The television screen is not going to vote for anyone // Izvestia. 1993. October 23rd; There will be no monopoly on the air // Moskovskaya Pravda, 1993. October 27).

After the President outlined the general parameters for conducting an agitation campaign using the mass media, the CEC could regulate the immediate procedure for providing free-to-air coverage to participants in the election marathon. "The broader the legal framework for the use of mass media, the better," Ryabov said. On November 1, 1993, the CEC Regulation on the procedure for the use of mass media by electoral associations and candidates for deputies during campaigning during the elections to the Federal Assembly appeared. The document prescribed that electoral associations should be given at least two hours of general airtime every day on working days (morning or evening) so that each of them would receive an equal broadcast time (at least 20 minutes). The schedule for the appearance of party representatives on television (on the radio) was developed by the leadership of the federal state television and radio companies and approved by the Central Election Commission. Each electoral association independently determined the format of its election campaigning (P.Zhuravlev, Electoral blocs will be allocated 20 minutes on television // Today. 1993. November 2; Zhuravlev P. Nikolay Ryabov – for expanding the legal framework for the use of mass media // Today. 1993. October 28) ^{[13, pp. 12-16]}.

On November 16, 1993, the Central Election Commission held a draw for the distribution of free airtime on federal television and radio broadcasting channels between thirteen electoral associations. Representatives of parties and movements chose envelopes, while everyone wanted to pull out December 8. By coincidence, this particular day went to the "Choice of Russia", which raised doubts about the sincerity of the lottery itself. On November 18, at a meeting of the Central Election Commission, the official schedule of free television and radio appearances by candidates from electoral associations was approved from November 22 to December 8, 1993. Based on party applications, television and radio companies took into account the wishes, starting from the time of the show, splitting the allotted hour into two or three "portions" and ending with the form of submission of the material (speech-monologue, interviews, TV debates, prepared videos) (Lugovskaya A. The television "Hour of the voter will strike" on November 22 // Izvestia. 1993. November 19; Ivanov I. The die is cast. Everyone's faces fell // Komsomolskaya Pravda. 1993. November 17; Achalova E. The airtime was distributed among the candidates for deputies // Kommersant. 1993. November 17; Demchenko V. The candidates divided the air. There are dissatisfied people // New Daily Newspaper. 1993. November 17) ^{[15, pp. 27-35]}.

At the same time, according to some reports, at the insistence of N. T. Ryabov, representatives of electoral associations abandoned such forms of election campaigning as TV debates or "round tables", preferring lengthy monologues in front of the camera by the same candidates who did not have sufficient media experience. The TV journalists who served the pre-election broadcasts were relegated by the relevant directives to ordinary entertainers or, as their colleagues from the print media called them, "sprechstallmeisters" (circus workers who announced the next performance, if we mean the elections themselves by such a circus). They did not participate in the discussions and could not give their assessments to the provocative and irresponsible statements of individual politicians (Wilczek V. The pre–election television screen is opium for the people // Izvestia. 1993. November 25) ^{[16, 26, 93]}.

"Closed" topics of party propaganda

Meanwhile, harsh attacks on the President, the Government, as well as mutual insults of political competitors were often heard on the air. We should not forget that the first Duma campaign was conducted against the background of a political confrontation that had not yet completely died out, when other participants, having avoided the fate of the "Lefortovo sidekicks," were allowed to participate in the elections. The consequences of that conflict willy-nilly affected the general atmosphere of the pre-election speeches, which sometimes went beyond what was allowed. The costs of the TV campaign required the President's personal intervention. On November 26, 1993, Boris Yeltsin held an hour-and-a-half meeting with the leaders of thirteen electoral associations behind closed doors in the Kremlin. The President drew particular attention to the inadmissibility of indiscriminate criticism of the constitutional draft: "I am displeased that some of you have begun to criticize the draft Constitution ... Your topic is your program." Yeltsin warned that if representatives of electoral associations continued their "unconstitutional" attacks, they would lose free television. "We will fight for the Constitution. I ask you not to touch the Constitution," said its future guarantor. The parties managed to reach a gentleman's agreement, according to which the election campaign will be conducted in a civilized manner and without excessive peddling of the Constitution (Yanchenkov V. The conversation is serious, in a big way // Rossiyskaya gazeta. 1993. November 27; Kuznetsova V. President on elections and other matters // Nezavisimaya gazeta. 1993. November 26; Kuznetsova V., Rodin I. The President asked not to touch the Constitution // Nezavisimaya gazeta. 1993. November 27).

The topic of "propaganda lawlessness" was picked up live by N. T. Ryabov. According to him, the phones of the Central Election Commission are literally "splitting" from the protests of voters "against the violence of politicians." The head of the Central Election Commission said that criticism of the Constitution would be considered as the candidates using their official position. In late November, Ryabov made an address to voters on TV, in which he called the upcoming constitutional referendum "a unique event in the history of the country and the fate of the people." The head of the Central Election Commission expressed hope "that we will make the right choice in favor of the Constitution." However, after the speech, Nikolai Ilyich, remembering that his position presupposes some kind of political neutrality, asked the journalists: "Is it okay that I'm so... about the Constitution?.." (Zhuravlev P. Nikolai Ryabov is campaigning for the Constitution // Today. 1993. November 30; Lugovskaya A. The Central Election Commission and the Arbitration Court are trying to deal with "bad" agitators" // Izvestia. 1993. November 27; Rodin I. Repressive propaganda of the Constitution // Nezavisimaya gazeta. 1993. December 2; They are not allowed to criticize... but they do not give money either // Rossiyskaya gazeta. 1993. December 3).

On November 27, 1993, the day after Boris Yeltsin's meeting with representatives of electoral associations, the text of the "conciliatory" statement of the Central Election Commission and the Arbitration Information Court (a body created by presidential decree to resolve information and political conflicts) was published. It spoke about the inadmissibility of using election campaigning to spread appeals related to the violent seizure of power, changing the constitutional order, violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, propaganda of civil war, and incitement of national and religious discord. Any agitation involving calls to violate generally recognized norms of international law, including those related to Russia's relations with other countries, was declared unacceptable. The authorized bodies reminded the participants of the election race that they should focus on covering their programs, while criticism of opponents should not be the main content of their speeches. The appeal concluded with a vague phrase stating that in case of non-compliance with the established requirements, "measures will be taken to prevent illegal actions" (Statement of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation and the Arbitration Information Court of November 27, 1993 No. 92/001 // Rossiyskaya gazeta. 1993. November 27).

However, this fragile consensus was actually destroyed by the clumsy actions of the first Deputy Chairman of the Government, Chairman of the government Commission for the national vote on the draft Constitution, V. F. Shumeyko. On November 29, the first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers sent an appeal to the CEC demanding that the electoral lists of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Democratic Party of Russia, as the most vicious critics of the Constitution, be de-registered. Shumeyko's demarche provoked a violent protest from the leaders of almost all parties and blocs, including representatives of the "party of power." The application was not supported by the Arbitration Information Court. However, the Central Election Commission had the final say, where the Deputy Prime Minister sent his petition. N. T. Ryabov, who himself campaigned for the Constitution, found himself in a difficult situation. Nevertheless, the CEC rejected the statement of the First Deputy Prime Minister. The formal basis was Article 14 of the Regulations on Popular Voting under the Constitution, which provided for the right of citizens and public associations to freely campaign, including against the Basic Law. But, I think, a much more weighty argument was the danger that the exclusion of some parties could provoke a boycott of the elections by other associations, which would negatively affect the constitutional vote (and leave it without satisfaction // Nezavisimaya gazeta. 1993. December 3; Vainonen N. Immoral? Yes. But legally! // Russian news. 1993. December 3; the Central Election Commission confirmed the right to abuse the Constitution // Today. 1993. December 3; Yanaev E. Candidates for deputies condemned the actions of the Deputy Prime Minister // Kommersant. 1993. December 2).

At the same time, the Central Election Commission was forced to respond to calls from several heads of executive and representative authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, addressed to residents of their regions, not to participate in the constitutional vote. On December 8, 1993, the CEC issued a cautious statement in which it classified such appeals by high–ranking officials of the regional government solely as the personal position of individual voters, whereas every citizen "has the right to express his will independently, regardless of the opinion of anyone, including any official of the Russian Federation" ^{[17, p. 15]}.

The President's gratitude as a reason for suspicion

Despite the extremely ambiguous results of the December 12, 1993 vote for the Kremlin, the President was satisfied with the work of the Central Election Commission. The professionalism of the new CEC was evidenced by the fact that its decisions were challenged in the Supreme Court only six times, and none of the attempts were successful. In total, during the election campaign, the Central Election Commission received about 150 complaints and appeals, which were carefully considered. On December 20, 1993, the President signed a decree "On measures to improve the electoral system in the Russian Federation," according to which the CEC received the status of an organization operating on a permanent basis. The independent status of the Central Election Commission was confirmed, as well as the imperative nature of decisions taken within its competence. The unspent funds allocated for the elections remained at the disposal of the Central Election Commission. A separate line was provided in the federal budget for further financing of the CEC. As the immediate tasks, the Central Election Commission, together with the Ministry of Justice, was tasked with developing draft federal laws on referendums and elections to the State Duma. In order not to "let go" of the Central Election Commission too far, Boris Yeltsin determined the place of his permanent "residence" on the Old Square, not far from the Presidential Administration (the Central Election Commission is located in the complex of buildings of the former Central Committee of the CPSU, at 10 Ilyinka Street) (the Central Election Commission is forever // Izvestia. 1993. December 22; Award for a successful referendum // Nezavisimaya gazeta. 1993. December 22) ^{[12] [18, pp. 37-38] [16, p. 88] [5, p. 12]}.

Such large-scale electoral events as the constitutional reform and the first multiparty elections could not but raise doubts about the authenticity of the voting results. In May 1994, articles by a number of well-known publicists appeared in a number of media outlets (K. Lyubarsky, V. Vyzhutovich, M. Malyutin), who, based on the estimates of the expert group of A. Sobyanin (one of the authors of the electoral reform), claimed that 46% (49 million) took part in the vote, instead of the stated 54.8%. The piquancy of the situation was that by underestimating the turnout in the parliamentary elections, the opponents automatically disavowed the legitimacy of the constitutional referendum. In addition, a version was put forward that the Central Election Commission had concealed the results of voting on party lists by districts and cities, thereby distorting the picture of the elections in the federal district. N. T. Ryabov, refuting such accusations, argued that the opponents simply "forgot" about the 4.6 million votes cast for five electoral associations that did not overcome the electoral barrier. As for the electoral statistics for cities and districts, the Chairman of the CEC explained its absence by the absence of the commissions themselves at the appropriate territorial level. The Central Election Commission in its official statement, recalling that more than 50,000 observers monitored the elections, called such insinuations a manifestation of incompetence or a deliberate attempt to destabilize the situation in the country, Skorobogatko said. The Central Election Commission: not a step back // Moscow news. 1995. May 21-28) ^{[19, pp. 3, 6]}.

This story had some continuation. In July 1994, State Duma deputy A. Gordeev (KPRF) demanded the creation of a parliamentary commission to investigate reports of falsification of Duma elections and referendums. However, the deputies were extremely skeptical about the well-known initiative. Nevertheless, the chairman of the State Duma, I. P. Rybkin, eventually assigned this case to the head of the Committee on Public Associations and Religious Organizations, V. I. Zorkaltsev (KPRF). The Central Election Commission responded to his request that all election documents had been destroyed due to the expiration of the retention period. At the same time, the Communists themselves perceived Sobyanin's investigation as a provocation directed against the Duma. "The presidential side does not need this Duma, and they are doing everything to destroy it. We will not help them in this," said G. A. Zyuganov, making it clear that one should hardly expect sensational revelations from his colleagues in the faction (Kostyukov A. Provocation by negligence // General Weekly Newspaper. 1994. May 13-19; Zhirnov O. Democrat Sobyanin gave the Communists a chance // General Weekly Newspaper. 1994. June 3-9; T.S. The heart is not a stone // Moscow news. 1994. June 19-26; Zhirnov O. Did the moths reach for the fire? // General weekly newspaper. 1994. July 8-14).

It is hardly worth seeing in A. Sobyanin's revelations the "hand" of the presidential administration, eager to "strangle" the newborn parliament. It seems that neither Boris Yeltsin, who received "super-presidential" powers under the Constitution, nor the left-wing opposition, which was firmly established in the new Duma, wanted to stir up everything that formed the basis of their renewed legitimization. Rather, it was about a certain "group of enthusiastic democrats" who could not come to terms with the fact that the reform had disappointed their expectations. Therefore, it was easier for them to claim that the results of the vote were rigged locally in favor of the opposition, rather than accept the fact that the majority of voters did not support the pro-government associations.

Conclusion

The activities of the Central Election Commission were of strategic importance in the process of modernizing the electoral system of the Russian Federation. Considering that the reform itself was carried out in conditions of fierce opposition, when a number of socio-political associations did not recognize the upcoming elections, participation in the work of the Central Election Commission itself was a manifestation of a well-known loyalty to the presidential government and the adoption of new "rules of the game." Boris Yeltsin, although he formed the first composition of the Central Election Commission alone, nevertheless, He tried to take into account the opinion of the regions in which he saw support in the struggle against the Soviet government. The figure of the Chairman of the Central Election Commission was extremely important. In this regard, it can be said that N. T. Ryabov brilliantly fulfilled the mission assigned to him as the organizer of a fateful political campaign. Under his leadership, the Central Election Commission, having significantly improved its professional qualities, successfully mastered new competencies, such as working with electoral associations as collective participants in the electoral process, reshuffling single-member districts taking into account the guaranteed representation of each constituent entity of the Russian Federation, verifying electoral lists, interacting with international observers, financing electoral associations and controlling expenses. public funds allocated for the needs of the election campaign, the organization of election campaigning with the condition of guaranteed access to electronic media for political competitors, and the summing up of voting results.

It should be noted that the "constituent elections" themselves were conducted according to rather "reduced" requirements. The Central Election Commission "diplomatically" turned a blind eye to numerous violations, prioritizing the election of a new parliament as a necessary condition for overcoming the crisis of power. However, in the course of further federal election campaigns, the Central Election Commission acted much more harshly, sometimes removing even well-known parliamentary organizations from the elections for misconduct that was not taken into account during the "constituent elections". In this regard, the importance of the CEC chairman has increased dramatically: from a "technical" presidential appointee to an independent political figure.

The election campaign took place in an environment of still smoldering confrontation, which, one way or another, influenced the participants in the election race. Some made quite radical (even extremist) statements. In this situation, the Central Election Commission, as the supreme electoral arbitrator, had to extinguish tension in a timely manner by applying sanctions to violators. Given the fragility of the political consensus that had barely been established after the dramatic events of autumn 1993, the CEC and its chairman tried not to abuse their power, carefully steering the electoral process between the Scylla of the presidential dictatorship that temporarily prevailed after September 21, 1993, and the Charybdis of opposition radicalism that tried to disrupt the elections and the constitutional referendum. I must say that the Central Election Commission has successfully completed this task, for which it has been awarded the status of a kind of "ministry of elections", which is of exceptional importance in legitimizing the current public authority.