The system of measures to ensure and strengthen the defense capability of the coast of the North-Western Caucasus on the eve of the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878.

Khodorov Oleg Igorevich ORCID: 0009-0004-9298-0380 Khodorov Oleg Igorevich 354003, Russia, Krasnodar Territory, Sochi, 22/2 Vishneva str., sq. 23 oleg-khodorov@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

In his previous works, the author highlighted the state of communication routes, communications, management features and population structure of the Black Sea District on the eve of the war of 1877-1878, the issue of mobilization of troops in the context of diplomatic negotiations, the military actions themselves and other aspects ^{[31; 32; 33; 34; 35; 36; 37]}. In recent years, the works of such authors as V.N. Zhelobov, K.V. Taran and others have also been published ^{[16; 29; 30]}. However, the topic of preparation for the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878 in the local borders of the coast of the Northwestern Caucasus has not yet become the subject of scientific research.

During the work on the article, documents from the funds of the Russian State Military Historical Archive (RGVIA), the State Archive of the Krasnodar Territory (GAKK) and the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI) were used. From the published sources, it should be noted the journalism of witnesses of the era and events of A.V. Vereshchagin and N.M. Mogilevtsev ^{[6; 7; 8; 21]}; valuable information has been preserved in the issues of the journal "Marine Collection" ^[15], the newspaper "Kavkaz" ^[24], the yearbook "Commemorative Book of the Kuban region" ^[22]. 1-2 issues of the Naval Campaign magazine for 2011 were important for reconstruction ^{[23; 38]}; they contain data on the ship composition of both the Russian and Turkish fleets during the war of 1877-1878. Pre-revolutionary reference publications and comprehensive works written on the basis of documents of the Ministry of War, some of which were published in appendices to the volumes of these publications, also became valuable sources. ^{[19; 20; 27; 28]}.

* * *

After the mobilization measures were completed, some of the Kuban Cossack units were sent to serve in the Balkans, Transcaucasia and Dagestan in order to suppress the performances of local highlanders.

The 2nd Kuban Cossack Regiment, the 1st and 2nd hundreds of the 7th Plastun Foot Battalion, half of the 1st and 2nd Kuban squadrons of His Imperial Majesty's Own Convoy took part in the Balkan Theater of operations. Part of the Kuban convoys of the 1st squadron was left in St. Petersburg to protect the royal family ^{[16, pp. 70-71; 18, p. 40]}.

The 1st foot Plastun battalion, 1st, 2nd and 5th cavalry batteries of the Kuban Cossack Army, Kuban, Yeisk, Uman, Caucasian, Poltava were sent to the Transcaucasian Territory to conduct military operations, and after the first stage of mobilization, the 2nd Yekaterinodar, 2nd Taman, 2nd Khopersky, 2nd Yeisk, 2nd Uman mounted Cossack regiments; the 2nd Labinsk Mounted Cossack Regiment was sent to the city of Sukhum ^{[19, pp. 172-181, 186-195]}.

Labinsky, Khopersky, the 4th Cavalry Artillery battery, and later, after the opening of hostilities, the 2nd Caucasian Mounted Cossack Regiment and the 12th foot Plastun battalion were sent to Dagestan ^{[16, p. 71]}.

In total, at the beginning of the war, 14 mounted Cossack regiments, one foot plastun battalion and four cavalry artillery batteries took part in the Caucasian-Asian theater of operations. The rest of the troops were left within the Kuban region and the Black Sea District to carry out cordon duty, ensure internal order and defend the coast.

By the time of the declaration of war, by April 12, 1877, the composition and location of the troops of the Black Sea District were as follows:

– The 1st Caucasian Line Battalion occupied the Velyaminovsky department (Tuapse, Dzhubga, Vulanka, Olginsky and posts: Mikhailovsky, Lazarevsky, Golovinsky and Makopsinsky);

– The 2nd Caucasian Line Battalion occupied the Sochi department (Sochi, Vardane and Kuban posts);

– The 3rd Foot Plastun battalion also occupied the Sochi department (Adler, Pilenkovo and Tsandripsh post);

– The 6th Foot Plastun battalion occupied the Novorossiysk department (Novorossiysk, Gelendzhik, Beregovoye, Kabardinka and Praskoveevka);

– 1/2 part of the Novorossiysk local team was in Novorossiysk;

– The 6th hundred of the Taman Cavalry Regiment occupied the coastal cordons from Anapa to Beregovaya;

– The 4th hundred of the Yekaterinodar Cavalry Regiment was located on the coastal cordons from the Coast to the Shepsi River.;

– The 6th hundred of the Urup Cavalry Regiment occupied the coastal cordons between the Shepsi river and the Tsandripsh post;

– the mountain cavalry hundred of the Black Sea District was in the Sochi department and was waiting for further orders.

In total, there were 4 battalions, part of the local team, a mountain hundred and 4 hundred cavalry of the Kuban Cossack army on the territory of the Black Sea district. The combat strength of the located units was 3,904 units, of which 3,418 infantry, 486 horsemen ^{[17, pp. 170-171; 19, pp. 194-197]}. His chief, Colonel of the General Staff Bebut Martirosovich Shelkovnikov, was responsible for the defense of the district ^{[4, p. 323]}.

The reserve of troops located in the Black Sea district was the military forces stationed in the Kuban region, headed by the ataman Nikolai Nikolaevich Karmalin. Their composition and location by April 12, 1877 were as follows:

– The 2nd foot Plastun battalion; part of it was located in the village of Khamyshki, Maikop district, the second part - in the village of Elisavetpol, Zakubansky district;

– 4th Foot Plastun battalion – in Maykop and in Konstantinovskaya village of Maykop district;

– 5th Foot Plastun battalion – in the villages of Krymskaya and Neberdzhayskaya of Temryuk district;

– 3rd and 4th hundreds of the 7th foot Plastun battalion, Yekaterinodar local battalion – in Yekaterinodar, Yekaterinodar county;

– local teams: Batalpashinskaya – in Batalpashinsk of Batalpashinsky district, Armavir – in the village of Kavkazskaya of the Caucasian district, Maikop - in Maikop of the Maykop district, Elisavetpolskaya – in Elisavetpolsky of the Zakubansky district, Velyaminovskaya – in the village of Labinskaya of the Maykop district, Ust–Labinskaya - in the village of Ust-Labinskaya of Yekaterinodar district, Temryukskaya – in Temryuk, Temryuk district, Tamanskaya – in the village of Tamanskaya, Temryuk district, Kushchevskaya - in the village of Kushchevskaya, Yeisk, Yeisk, Yeisk, Konstantinovskaya – in Konstantinovskaya, Maykop district, half of the Novorossiysk local team – in the Crimean Temryuk district;

– 5 hundred Taman cavalry regiment – at cordon posts between the village of Thamakhinskaya in Zakubansky district and Ekterinodar in Yekaterinodar district;

– 5 hundred of the Yekaterinodar Cossack regiment – on the cordon between the river Already and Psekups of the Zakubansky district;

– 5 hundred of the Urup Cossack regiment – at posts between the Kurdzhips river and the Khodz of the Maikop district;

– 2nd Poltava Cavalry Regiment – in the Crimean Temryuk district and Labinsk Maykop district;

– 2nd Caucasian Cavalry Regiment – in Yekaterinodar, Pashkovskaya and Ust-Labinsk districts of Yekaterinodar;

– 2nd Urup Cavalry Regiment – in Maykop, Khan's and Belorechenskaya villages of Maykop county;

– The 3rd cavalry battery of the Kuban Cossack Army with eight guns - in Maykop; after the start of the war, one 4–gun division will be sent to the Gostagaevskaya fortress of the Temryuk region; the second division will be sent to the Smolensk fortress of the Zakubansky district;

– a hundred Kuban permanent militia occupied various points of the region for internal service.

In total, there were 4 and a half battalions, 11 and a half local teams, 34 mounted hundreds and guns of a mounted battery in the Kuban region. The combat strength of the located units was 8,508 units, of which 4,666 infantry, 3,834 horsemen, 8 guns ^{[17, pp. 171-172; 19, pp. 196-199]}.

As a result, the total combat strength of the Northwestern Caucasus troops without the Sukhumi detachment was 12,412 units, of which 8,084 infantry, 4,320 horsemen and 8 guns.

By April 12, 1877, the neighboring Sukhumi detachment under the command of Major General P.P. Kravchenko included:

– 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 162nd Akhaltsikhe Infantry Regiment;

– 3rd and 4th Caucasian Line Battalions;

– 2nd Labinsk Cavalry Regiment and its partisan foot team;

– Sukhumi Cavalry Irregular Regiment;

– 4-gun division of the 6th mountain battery of the 20th Artillery Brigade.

The main forces of this detachment were based in Sukhum, the rest were located along the coastline of the Black Sea. There were also hundreds of Sukhumi zemstvo guards on the territory of Abkhazia. The combat strength of the located units was 4,820 units, of which 3,420 infantry, 1,396 horsemen, 4 guns ^{[19, pp. 190-195]}.

After the start of the war, the troops of the Black Sea detachment were strengthened: the 5th foot Plastun battalion was transferred from the Crimean and Neberdzhaevskaya st-ts to Anapa, the 2nd and 3rd hundreds of the 2nd Poltava Cavalry Regiment, having marched from the Crimean on April 13, were sent to strengthen Novorossiysk and the Durso Valley, the 3rd and the 4th hundreds of the 7th foot Plastun battalion were sent from Yekaterinodar to Novorossiysk; upon arrival they were to go under the command of the commander of the 6th foot Plastun battalion ^{[20, pp. 310-311; 25, L. 19; 26, L. 170]}.

The completion of the second stage of mobilization made it possible to replenish the reserves of the Kuban region. The reinforcement of troops by April 20, 1877 in the Kuban region looked as follows:

Temryuk county:

– The 11th foot Plastun battalion was located in Gostagaevskaya;

– 12th foot Plastun battalion – in the village of Abinskaya;

– 1st hundred of the Khopersko-Kuban Cavalry Regiment – in Gostagaevskaya;

– Tamansko-Poltava Cavalry regiment – in Gostagaevskaya;

– Uman-Yeisk Cavalry Regiment – in the Crimean;

– Temryuk Mountain cavalry hundred – in Tamanskaya;

– 4-gun division of the 5th battery of the 20th Artillery Brigade – in Abinskaya.

Maikop county:

– 2 hundreds of the 8th foot Plastun battalion – in the village of Giaginskaya;

– 10th Foot Plastun battalion – in the village of Zassovskaya;

– Labinsk-Urupsky cavalry regiment – in Labinsk (1/2 hundred of this regiment was on a business trip in Stavropol province);

– The 4-gun division of the 6th mountain battery of the 20th Artillery Brigade is in Maykop.

Yekaterinodar county:

– 2 hundreds of the 8th foot Plastun battalion – in Ust-Labinskaya;

– 2 hundreds of the Caucasian-Yekaterinodar regiment – in Ust-Labinskaya, 4 hundreds – in Yekaterinodar;

– 4-gun division of the 5th battery of the 20th Artillery Brigade – in Yekaterinodar.

Batalpashinsky district:

– 4 hundreds of the 9th foot Plastun battalion – in Batalpashinsk;

– 5 hundred of the Khopersko-Kuban cavalry regiment – in the village of Calm ^{[25, l. 27-28]}.

After the completion of the second stage of mobilization, the combat strength of the troops of the Kuban region increased by about 4,000 horsemen of five regiments and 2,500 foot Cossacks of five plastun battalions, to the formed mountain hundreds of Temryuk and Kuban-Gorsky cavalry irregular regiment. As a result, the number of defense forces of the Black Sea District and the Kuban region in total increased by almost half and amounted to about 18,000-20,000 people, of which about half were cavalry, in addition, the guns of the 5th and 6th batteries of the 20th Artillery Brigade were located in the North-West Caucasus command.

It is worth mentioning one petition by B.M. Shelkovnikov, which undoubtedly played a positive role in the defense of the coast. He asked not to change the hundreds of mounted regiments of the Kuban Cossack army, which occupied cordon posts in the Black Sea district. B.M. Shelkovnikov wrote to N.N. Karmalin the following: "Every year in the month of May, they are replaced by other regular ones, currently, in view of the opening of hostilities, I purposely decided not to replace hundreds of the 6th Taman, 4th Yekaterinodar and 6th Urup regiments, who during the year of cordon service on the Black Sea coast got used to the climate and got acquainted with the landscape and fords of mountain rivers, they have learned the knack, they are trained in the use of Berdan rifles, and therefore during military operations these hundreds will undoubtedly be more useful than newcomers, who will need time to get used to the skills: weapons, terrain and climate. I humbly ask for hundreds of changes this year" ^{[10, l. 8]}.

It should also be said that before the start of the war, all the Cossack posts located in the Black Sea district were planned to be repaired and find an opportunity to reduce their number, and the task was also to transfer the posts to the civil department. For these needs, 950 rubles were allocated to the head of the district. It should be noted that the mentioned transfer took place only after the end of the war, in 1879, and their repair will be completed a year later, in 1880. The most important Cossack cordon posts in the defense were Makopsinsky, Lazarevsky, Golovinsky, Dakhovsky (Sochi), Adler and Tsandripsh; all of them were located along the coast of the Sochi Department of Guardianship ^{[9, L. 3, 8-11, 13, 37]}.

By order of B.M. Shelkovnikov, in the Black Sea district, military units formed during the first stage of mobilization occupied government premises and free apartments; in those places where they were not enough, private buildings were hired ^{[26, L. 14-15]}.

A great achievement was that the military headquarters managed to provide the lower ranks of the formed cavalry regiments with the latest Berdan-2 Cossack rifles, and the sergeants and trumpeters with Smith revolvers & Wesson; each Cossack was given 40 rounds for a rifle and 36 rounds for a revolver. However, the latest weapons still got along with the morally and technically outdated ones. For example, some regiments were armed with outdated six-line Tanner rifles, loaded from the muzzle. As for the Plastun battalions, they were equipped with guns of the Carley system, released to the army in 1872-1874 ^{[16, p. 67; 19, p. 60]}.

In accordance with the order on troops and management, from December 1876, individual military units began military exercises; at the time of the exercises, the main attention had to be paid to training in the peculiarities of the guard and intelligence service; also, close attention should be paid to familiarizing the Cossacks with berdanki; 15 additional cartridges per rifle were allocated for shooting exercises. For this purpose, training teams and hundreds of schools were established in the regiments, regimental workshops were also formed; classes were conducted systematically. There were frequent reviews of weapons and materiel produced by various persons on the orders of N.N. Karmalin.

In his report dated December 3, 1876, the head of the 6th hundred of the Urup cavalry regiment asked B.M. Shelkovnikov to send him cartridges for practical shooting, since he had only one set of live ammunition, which he could not use for practice shooting ^{[26, L. 27-27 vol.]}. Unfortunately, the Russian command unlike the Turkish, they tried to save ammunition, which could not but affect the general shooting training. For example, one of the leading generals of that time, M.I. Dragomirov, literally a month and a half before the start of hostilities, demanded in an order: "People should be reminded more often about saving cartridges ... For an intelligent and not dazed person, thirty cartridges are enough if they are released only when it is probably possible to get in" ^{[16, p. 59]}.

To prepare people for the conditions of hiking and in order to load horses, every hundred at least once a week, regardless of any weather, passed from 12 to 15 versts, accompanying such military training by surveying the terrain, choosing positions and bivouacs ^{[21, p. 5]}.

All activities and preparations for the conduct of hostilities were carried out with maximum secrecy. To this end, the military headquarters of the Kuban Cossack Army transmitted to all units the order of the Minister of War dated December 24, 1876, which emphasized: "... that none of the employees in the troops, in military departments and institutions should at all report to newspapers and in no other way disseminate any information about military orders, movements, works, This order should not be publicly announced in the order, but should be communicated by each commander personally to his closest subordinates" ^{[5, p. 142]}.

To provide the troops with food, an order was issued on the delivery of provisions from the Velyaminovsky warehouse to Adler, Lazarevskoye, Golovinskoye, Mikhailovskoye, Olginsky, from Novorossiysk to Dzhugba, Vulanka and Gelendzhik ^{[26, L. 15]}.

However, despite a sufficient amount of time, by the beginning of the war Tuapse and Sochi were left almost without food, as the chartered Rostov sailing ships did not have time to sail to their destinations due to bad weather. For this reason, after the outbreak of the war, products began to be delivered by dry route from the Kuban region to Tuapse, and from there they were transported by sea to Sochi, while exclusively by state-owned rowing vessels. Until July 1877, in total, more than 12,200 quarters of flour with the proportion of cereals were transported to Sochi in this way, not counting the property of troops, villagers of the Sochi department, other various cargoes, as well as the wounded and sick. According to preliminary calculations, the food should have been enough until the beginning of August 1877 ^{[11, l. 46; 15, pp. 71-72]}. In general, shipping by sea became possible due to the ignorance of the Turkish navy about this enterprise. If the Ottomans had noticed these ships, they would not have ignored them; then the transportation of provisions to Sochi by sea would certainly have been interrupted, after which its garrison would have been relocated to Tuapse, since it was almost impossible to carry out overland cargo delivery to Sochi due to the absolute impassability. In fact, the Turks could easily interrupt this communication by putting even a small steamer near the posad, not to mention an ironclad. In accordance with the decision taken during the procurement of provisions, the Tuapse infirmary was moved to the village of Elisavetopolsky due to the threat of possible military operations ^{[11, l. 41]}.

In preparation for the war in the autumn of 1876, separate detachments were formed from the troops of the Sukhumi Military Department and the Black Sea District, subordinate to the chiefs of these territories. P.P. Kravchenko was responsible for the defense of Abkhazia; he was given the rights of the division chief. In accordance with the order for the Black Sea District, all troops, field and local, who were within its borders and who could be sent there, had to obey B.M. Shelkovnikov as a brigade commander. Anapa came under the protection of the head of the Kuban region, N.N. Karmalin. In order to protect it, as well as protect the coast of Temryuk county, a cordon line was established, which stretched from Anapa to Taman and was divided into two sections. The first is from the beginning of the Tuzla spit to the salt lakes and further to the Bugaz cordon; the second is from this last point to Anapa. In the first section, according to the command, it was necessary to maintain five to six posts with reserves in Taman; and in the second - to limit ourselves to a smaller number of posts; communication between them had to be maintained by traveling reserves from Blagoveshchenskaya village, Vityazevo village and Gostagaevskaya. At the same time, it was necessary to send detours during the day to places where the territory was not viewed by sentries from posts and where the posts were not observed by neighboring ones. At night, for faster transmission of news about the appearance of enemy ships and for the production of a general alarm on the line, the site chiefs were obliged to arrange signal signs by setting up points with straw for ignition at night, for example, on Zelensky Mountain and in other places ^{[11, l. 6 vol. -7]}.

The commander of the hundred located in Taman was appointed head of the first section, and the commander of the hundred that set up posts in Blagoveshchenskaya and Vityazevo was appointed head of the second section.

To establish communication between hundreds in Taman and Gostagaevskaya, a flying mail was organized through the village of Vyshestebliyevsky. In all villages and settlements, there were three stanitsas in constant readiness, which were to be issued to couriers sent by the heads of the cordon and sections with particularly important reports. With the opening of hostilities, the service of these hundreds at the cordon consisted of a guard (intelligence) service, so that no part of the coastal strip where approaches from small vessels are possible would remain unobserved. Another purpose of the hundreds was to destroy the landed Turkish troops or to restrain their advance, while it was necessary to act behind enemy lines and threaten their escape routes to the ships. In case of landing of significant forces, retreating, in no case could the enemy parties be lost sight of, while it was necessary to try to inflict possible damage on them ^{[11, l. 7-7 vol.]}.

Three hundred of the 2nd Poltava Cavalry Regiment were assigned to occupy the cordon, one of them was in Taman with less than a hundred mountaineers of the Grivenno-Cherkess and Suvorov st-ts, the other in Gostagaevskaya, and the third in Vyshesteblievsky. Colonel Pavel Ivanovich Golub, commander of the Taman-Poltava cavalry regiment located in Akhtanizovskaya village, the assembly point of the mentioned unit, was appointed head of the cordon line ^{[11, l. 9-10, 24]}.

When enemy ships appeared, it was necessary to send notifications from the posts simultaneously with messages to the reserves and to the nearest settlements ^{[11, L. 7 vol.]}.

If necessary, P.I. Golub was given the right to manage local teams located in Taman and Temryuk ^{[11, L. 10]}. You can find out what the local teams were like from the report of the district chief. At the time of the outbreak of the war, the Temryuk local team included 2 chief officers, 8 non-commissioned officers, 2 musicians, 2 non-combatant, 2 orderlies and 134 privates, of which 46 were recruits who had not completed combat training ^{[11, L. 15, 17]}. According to the estimates of the command, the recruits needed to be trained for another month to instill in them the knowledge of a young fighter. The team went out on guard every day for 11-12 people in three queues; according to the regulations, 36 people were on guard ^{[11, L. 15, 18]}. Recruits were not put on duty, one non-commissioned officer, one corporal participated in it, the rest were privates. In addition to the guard, the team held posts in Temryuk. There were three posts: one on the lower side of the city, one on the west side and one, at night, on the north side. At night, there were also detours of the city in groups of 3 privates ^{[11, L. 15, 17, 18]}.

Naval forces were to play a crucial role in the defense of the coast of the Northwestern Caucasus. Under the terms of the signed Paris Peace Treaty, Russia and Turkey were allowed to have only 10 steam ships on the Black Sea, of which 6 military vessels with a length of no more than 50 meters and the largest displacement of 800 tons, as well as 4 steamships with a displacement of no more than 200 tons. For this reason, instead of the Black Sea Fleet destroyed during the Crimean War, a flotilla was formed. Taking into account the restrictions imposed, its composition immediately after the end of the war was determined to be 6 screw corvettes, 9 transports and 4 wheeled steamships ^{[38, p. 2]}. It should be noted that the terms of the Paris Agreement, which limit the size of the Black Sea Flotilla, have been strictly observed by Russia for a decade and a half. However, the political situation by the end of the 60s of the XIX century allowed Russia to cancel this paragraph. On October 1, 1871, the Black Sea Fleet was revived again instead of the flotilla. However, having received the legal opportunity to develop it without any restrictions, the maritime department, due to insufficient budget, was able to build only two popovki - Novgorod (2,491 tons, 7 knots) and Vice Admiral Popov (3,066 tons, 8 knots) ^{[14, p. 18]}, combat value which already looked very doubtful at that time. At the same time, the construction of the wooden imperial yacht Livadia was completed in Nikolaev and the iron schooner Ingul was assembled. In addition to the ships built in 1873-1875, all remaining corvettes were repaired and re-equipped with rifled artillery. The largest steamer of the Black Sea Fleet "Elborus" was also overhauled.

In total, by the autumn of 1876, the Black Sea Fleet consisted of:

– "popovki" "Vice Admiral Popov" and "Novgorod";

– screw corvettes "Memory of Mercury", "Lioness", "Falcon" and "Warrior";

– wheeled yachts "Livadia" and "Ericlick";

– screw schooners "Kazbek", "Abin", "Bombory", "Kelasura", "Souk-Su", "Novorossiysk", "Pittsunda", "Psezuape", "Redut-Kale", "Tuabse", "Salgir", "Don" and "Ingul";

– the large steamer "Elborus";

– smaller steamships Inkerman, Prut, Taman, Sulin and Turk ^{[38, p. 2]}.

In the process of preparing for the war, due to the shortage of ship personnel, the maritime department had to purchase 12 small tugboats from the Russian Shipping and Trade Society to strengthen the protection of the main Black Sea ports. By the middle of the spring of 1877, all the preparations for their modernization were completed. These steamships were named active defense steamships; in October 1876, 50 thousand rubles were allocated for their training, armament and manning of teams ^{[14, p. 17]}. The greatest combat capabilities among them were possessed by the steamer "Grand Duke Konstantin" under the command of Lieutenant Stepan Osipovich Makarov. The steamer's armament consisted of pole and towed mines; in the summer of 1877, the steamer was armed with Whitehead torpedoes ^{[14, p. 18]}. The purpose of the active defense steamships was to disrupt enemy communications, inflict possible actual damage and harm to Turkish ships, and seize commercial ships carrying cargo to supply the Ottoman Army.

In addition to the ships of the Black Sea Fleet, vessels of the Black Sea Coastal Rowing Flotilla served on the coast of the Caucasus. The Ministry of War spent 70,000 rubles annually from its budget on their maintenance. At the time of the war, the rowing flotilla consisted of 31 feluccas, 9 longboats and 3 kocherms ^{[6, pp. 6, 8, 32]}.

To assess the military capabilities of the mentioned boats, we will give a brief description of them. Of all the vessels, the kocherma was the largest – a sailing vessel lifting from 1000 to 1500 pounds of cargo, it was used not only as a transport, but could also carry a guard service ^{[6, p. 6]}. The Turks used kocherms to transport soldiers during their amphibious operations.

Longboats could lift from 700 to 1000 pounds of weight; these sailing vessels were mainly used for cargo transportation, their crews consisted of 6 sailors and 1 skipper.

Felucca fishing boats, which usually served to transport passengers, could lift from 200 to 400 pounds of cargo, their crews consisted of 4 sailors and 1 skipper ^{[6, p. 6; 7, p. 37]}.

A.V. Vereshchagin, who traveled around the Black Sea District in 1873, wrote the following about the flotilla: "In 1870, on the skippers and sailors of the coastal flotilla, I saw most of the red yarmulkes with tassels; people with these signs were Turks. ... Now it is completely different: the skippers and sailors are either from the villagers, or from the Cossacks of the former Shapsug coastal battalion, now also from the villagers of the Velyaminovsky department of guardianship; they are already accustomed to the sea, agile and dexterous" ^{[8, p. 58]}.

The replacement of Turkish subjects on the ships of the rowing flotilla with local villagers and Cossacks undoubtedly had a positive significance, especially in light of the Balkan crisis that began in 1875 and the subsequent military clash with Turkey. However, the flotilla had no military significance, in addition to transporting supplies, forage and military cargo, since even all the forces of the Black Sea Fleet were unable to openly resist the Turkish battleships.

To clarify, we will provide data on the Turkish naval forces, which by the beginning of the Russian-Turkish war included the Black Sea Fleet, the Mediterranean Fleet, the Bosphorus and Danube Squadrons, the Ottoman Danube Steamship Company and other vessels. There were a total of 92 units, of which 5 armored frigates and 10 armored corvettes should be distinguished – these were large battleships armed with modern large-caliber artillery ^{[23, p. 2-3]}. For example, Turkey had two newest casemated vessels with a displacement of 9140 tons with a 12-inch armor thickness in the middle of the waterline, armed with 12 10-inch caliber guns in the casemate and three 7-inch caliber guns on the upper deck. For comparison, England had five ships of this type, Russia had one – the Peter the Great in the Baltic ^{[13, p. 4]}. Russia did not have the opportunity to oppose even one equivalent combat unit to the Turkish battleships. The Turkish forces also included 7 river armored ships, 4 battleships, 8 frigates, 12 corvettes, 15 seaworthy gunboats, 12 avizos, 4 yachts and 15 armed steamships and transports. The number of personnel of the Ottoman naval forces reached 15,640 people ^{[23, p. 2-3]}.

The Turkish Black Sea Fleet was headed by Admiral Bozdjaadali Hassan Husny Pasha, the Black Sea squadron of battleships was headed by Vice Admiral Mustafa Pasha, and the Black Sea squadron of wooden ships was headed by Vice Admiral Ahmet Pasha ^{[23, p. 3]}.

The tasks of the Turkish fleet in the Caucasus direction were to protect its communications in the Black Sea, block Russian ports, prevent the transfer of troops and military cargo, act against coastal points of the Caucasian coast, bombarding them, participate in amphibious operations, deliver weapons and military supplies to the rebellious mountain tribes.

England took part in the preparation of the Turkish naval forces for the war; it is known that since September 1876 the ships of the Turkish Black Sea Fleet, assembled in Buyukdere Bay, were engaged in combat training under the guidance of British instructors ^{[23, p. 2-3]}.

In order to organize a more effective defense of the Black Sea coast due to the inequality of naval forces, the Russian command, primarily in the person of the chief commander of the Black Sea Fleet and ports Nikolai Andreevich Arkas, emphasized the installation of minefields in the waters of key ports such as Kerch, Ochakov, Odessa and Sevastopol, appointing coastal defense chiefs in each port ^{[14, p. 17]}. At the end of October 1876, 9 steamships and the necessary number of rowing vessels were fully ready to work with floating mines; by the beginning of the war, barriers had been installed. In order to prevent their destruction by the enemy at night, electric lighting devices were installed in all these ports. There were 3 of them in Odessa, 2 in Ochakov, 1 in Sevastopol and 2 in Kerch ^{[27, pp. 41, 43]}. In addition to the minefields, the defense of the Black Sea ports was carried out by coastal batteries, troops of the 7th and 10th army corps. On the coast of the Northwestern Caucasus, mines were installed only in the waters of Novorossiysk. Work in Tsemesskaya Bay will begin from the moment of the declaration of war and will be completed only by June 1, 1877 ^{[20, p. 320]}.

On the eve of the war, the command, having received news of the estimated time of the outbreak of war, sent out the latest instructions and instructions to the troops. On April 5, 1877, B.M. Shelkovnikov ordered that military units immediately occupy all points according to their deployment, asked them to pay special attention to the combat service of the Cossacks and the militia, to carefully monitor the accuracy of the coast guard patrols, and also to use the militia together with the Cossacks ^{[26, L. 131, 136]}.

On April 11, a telegram was received in Novorossiysk from Maykop stating that after the declaration of war, Turkey intends to land Circassian parties on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus at points: at the former Golovinsky fortification, at the mouths of the Shah, Psezuapse, Makopse, Dzhugba ^{[26, l. 160]}.

In accordance with the received news, B.M. Shelkovnikov issued an order and urgently sent it to the heads of military units occupying points along the seashore:

"1. Everyone has to take care of bringing the seashore in their locations to the best possible defensive position, for which, first of all, they will prepare trenches along the shore for shooters one yard deep with discarded earth on the outside.

2. To arrange trenches on the way from the sea to settlements in the most convenient places, using various kinds of natural obstacles to form several defensive positions on the way of retreat.

3. Each chief defends the point entrusted to him for protection to the last extreme. The landing of the enemy on the shore should not be allowed in any case.

4. If one of the commanding officers finds out about the attack on a neighbor in the defense of the region, he rushes to his aid, trying to suddenly appear and resolutely go to the flank, if the enemy finally landed to overturn him into the sea.

5. ….

6. Strictly observe that the Cossacks, who were sent by courier with important reports, passed instructions or envelopes and notes to neighboring posts as quickly as possible" ^{[26, l. 159-159 vol.]}.

Even before the start of the war, at a meeting held in Tiflis on the defense of the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus, B.M. Shelkovnikov, the commanders of the Caucasian Military District, in the presence of the governor, came to the conclusion that such an extreme measure as eviction of the population in the event of a landing of Turkish forces should be avoided; the Grand Duke believed that the troops in the Black Sea District were quite It is enough for the confrontation of those forces that are likely to be sent there by the Turkish side ^{[25, L. 29]}.

In reality, from the first days of the war, local residents of the northwestern part of the Black Sea coast began to leave coastal settlements and cities on their own. Residents of Novorossiysk and Anapa were evicted to Gostagaevskaya and Krymskaya, overflowing them; the treasury and prisoners were transported to Krymskaya, and the family of Colonel B.M. Shelkovnikov was resettled there ^{[11, l. 13-13 vol.]}.

Later, an order was received to evict residents of Anapa and Blagoveshchenskaya st.c., as well as the village of Vityazevsky. Residents of Anapa were transferred to Raevskaya St., Blagoveshchenskaya and Vityazevsky St. - to Gostagaevskaya. All possible assistance was provided to the migrants ^{[11, L. 14]}.

Residents of the villages who could assist in the defense of the coast remained in their places of residence and received weapons. Tamanskaya, Blagoveshchenskaya, Rayevskaya, Anapa and Vityazevskoye villages were armed.

The Temryuk district chief expressed the opinion that in a difficult situation, in a state of deteriorating circumstances, in order to assist the troops, it is also possible to arm the Shapsug and Abinsk villages ^{[11, l. 58 vol.]}.

Since the beginning of the war, no decision was made to evict residents of the southeastern part of the Black Sea District, although before the declaration of martial law, residents repeatedly requested permission to evict from the department to safe places and asked the treasury for funds to export more valuable property, but they were advised to calm down and continue farming. It is also worth noting the fact that the landlords managed to leave their estates on their own, and the merchants took out their goods even during the publication of the mobilization of troops ^[24].

Only in early May, due to the danger threatening the border of the Black Sea District, where Abkhazians could penetrate by mountain trails, B.M. Shelkovnikov, after receiving news of the landing of Turks in Gudauta, ordered the withdrawal of the border population to Sochi ^{[20, p. 311]}.

With the outbreak of hostilities, the trustee of the Novorossiysk department, N.E. Nikiforaki, was appointed head of the troops located in the area of his department, with the exception of the troops located in Novorossiysk, remaining under the direct supervision of B.M. Shelkovnikov; in case of his absence in Novorossiysk, the command of the troops passed to N.E. Nikiforaki ^{[26, l. 162]}. On April 20, 1877, the commander-in-chief of the Caucasian Army, Grand Duke Mikhail, in a letter addressed to N.N. Karmalin, ordered, in accordance with military circumstances, to entrust him with the general leadership and troops of the Black Sea District with the granting of the rights of a corps commander. The commander-in-chief also wrote about the need to transfer parts of the Kuban troops located near the border of the Black Sea District to B.M. Shelkovnikov in order to establish a more effective defense of the coast ^{[12, l. 1]}. The most punished ataman was allowed to form the marching headquarters of the commander of the Kuban District and the Black Sea District with a staff of one chief officer for assignments the commander, the chief of staff, two senior adjutants, one squad quartermaster, four clerks. 30 rubles per month were allocated for the expenses of the office of the headquarters ^{[12, l. 7, 13-13 vol.]}. On May 12, 1877, the chief of the military staff of the Kuban Cossack Army, Major General Witold Vikentievich Gurchin, was appointed chief of staff, esaul Vasily Konstantinovich Lysenko was appointed an officer for assignments, senior aides-de-camp were foremen Grigory Fedorovich Sotnikov and Isidor Ivanovich Berezhny ^{[22, p. 68]}, they were listed as senior adjutants of the military staff ^{[12, l. 16]}.

At the beginning of the war, on April 19, 1877, the customs institutions of the Black and Azov Seas were ordered not to arrest Turkish vessels; they were given the right to complete trade operations and sail from Russian ports within eight days ^{[1, l. 5-5 vol.]}. Later, Russian military vessels received permission to detain Turkish commercial vessels. It was only necessary to arrest the crews, confiscate and preserve the ship's papers [14. p. 19].

As a result of the outbreak of war, Emperor Alexander II approved the rules of action for military and civilians in relation to Turkish subjects, as well as persons from other states:

"1. Turkish subjects are allowed to continue their stay and peaceful pursuits within the Empire during the war, under the protection of applicable laws.

2. With regard to Turkish merchant ships caught by the declaration of war in Russian ports and harbors, the right is confirmed, on the basis of which they were allowed to freely go to sea, for a period of time sufficient to load goods that do not constitute military contraband.

3. Subjects of neutral states may freely continue trade relations with Russian ports and cities, subject to compliance with the laws of the Empire and the principles of international law.

4. The military authorities are obliged to take all measures to ensure the freedom of legitimate trade of neutrals, as far as it is allowed by the conditions of hostilities. ..." ^{[28, p. 244]}.

Within the framework of the designated maritime trade, it was prohibited to transport military contraband on neutral ships, which included the following items: any hand-held and artillery weapons, both assembled and unassembled, any types of firearms and supplies, items for explosions, devices for artillery, engineering and military convoys, items of military equipment and uniforms, etc. others . – all items directly intended for war. These items found on neutral ships could be confiscated if they were heading to Turkish ports; the exception was items necessary for self-service of the vessel. The transportation of troops, dispatches and letters, and the supply of military vessels to the enemy were also considered military smuggling ^{[28, p. 245]}.

Certain rules consisting of 4 points were in force for neutral ships to visit Russian ports protected by minefields:

1. The incoming vessel must stop outside the minefield, where Russian officers with commands will go to meet it and take control of the vessel for entry into the port, having previously made sure that the ship's papers are in good order.

2. The skipper of the vessel gives a subscription both for himself personally and for the crew and passengers that they will not be on deck during the ship's departure to the port and will not monitor the ship's course through windows or portholes.

3. The same must be done when withdrawing commercial vessels from the port, the wire is carried out by a Russian officer with a team and takes subscriptions according to the second paragraph.

4. In the event of the appearance of military cruisers at points from where it is possible to monitor the exit and entry of ships, the Russian side will demand their removal at a sufficient distance and time necessary for the entry or withdrawal of ships, and until this requirement is fulfilled, no foreign vessel will be allowed in and out of the port ^{[3, L. 8]}.

These rules were printed in Russian, French, German, English and Italian ^{[3, l. 1-1 vol.]}.

In early May 1877, Turkey will inform foreign powers about the blockade of the entire Black Sea coast. The blockade declared by them will come into force on the 5th. The Turks tried to prevent commercial vessels from entering Russian ports. Ships passing through the Strait of Constantinople into the Black Sea had to provide the captain of the port in Anatoliy-Kavak with a firman for passage through the straits. Any vessels were detained for violating this order. In fact, the blockade of the Black Sea coast throughout the war was extremely weak. For example, sailing along the Caucasian coasts, near Sochi and Tuapse, was possible not only in the last days of August, when there were no Turks on the Sukhumi coast at all, but also during the hottest time of the war. At the same time, sailing was possible not only for steamships, but even for simple coasters of the Black Sea Rowing flotilla ^{[15, pp. 71-72]}.

At the height of the military campaign on November 4, 1877, a ban on free trade with Russian ports of ships flying neutral flags followed ^{[2, L. 28]}. In the future, trade was fully resumed from the moment of the armistice in February 1878, earlier, on January 25, the ban on the export of grain and all other food products from Russian ports, as well as sheepskin, hides and products made from them, which followed on the occasion of the outbreak of hostilities, was lifted ^{[2, l. 39; 3, l. 29]}.

Summarizing the above, we note that by the beginning of the declaration of war, the Russian command was able to take a number of measures aimed at strengthening the defense capability of the coast of the Northwestern Caucasus:

1. To organize, after the completion of the conscription activities of the first stage of mobilization, classes in combat and fire training. The latter were extremely important due to the fact that some of the troops had new weapons that they had not previously encountered; another part needed to improve the accuracy of shooting using obsolete weapons. However, the command's focus on saving ammunition when practicing shooting was one of the main drawbacks of the period of preparation for the war.

2. Distribute the troops formed during the second stage of mobilization in places of convenient logistics routes. It should be noted that the preparation of these units took place already in wartime conditions.

3. Appoint those responsible for the defense of the Kuban region and the Black Sea District.

4. Create the Anapa cordon line, which ran from Anapa to Taman, including the entire coast of the peninsula.

5. To install minefields in the water area of the city of Novorossiysk; the mines were delivered late, only by June 1, 1877, more than a month and a half after the outbreak of hostilities. And given the fact of the complete superiority of the Turkish naval forces at sea, this could have tragic consequences due to the complete insecurity of Novorossiysk and other places on the coast of the Caucasus.

6. To draw up and send instructions to the troops dispersed along the coast line by the day of the outbreak of hostilities; rules for the acceptance of foreign merchant ships in Russian ports were also drawn up and replicated in foreign languages.

It is also necessary to say about the importance of the decision on the irremovability of hundreds of cavalry stationed at posts along the coast of the Black Sea District; the Cossacks got used to the difficult coastal climate, did not get sick en masse, were generally well acquainted with the terrain and its features, which significantly increased the effectiveness of their use in wartime.

Taking into account the described measures, Adler and the space closest to the border of the Sukhumi military department could be considered the weakest part of the defense. The Sukhumi detachment was responsible for the defense of the territory of Abkhazia, the total number of troops of which exceeded the composition of the combat force of the Black Sea District by less than 1,000 people. However, given the ethnic and confessional characteristics and the number of the population of Abkhazia, the allocated number of troops to protect it was completely insufficient.