Changing the balance of power in the South Caucasus in the 2020s.

Gorozhanin Ivan Aleksandrovich Student; Department of History and Theory of International Relations; Nizhny Novgorod State University named after N.I. Lobachevsky 603000, Russia, Nizhny Novgorod region, Nizhny Novgorod, Ulyanova str., 2 mr.gorozhanin2001@mail.ru Ionov Dmitriy Dmitrievich ORCID: 0009-0008-8598-0189 Student; Department of Political Science; Nizhny Novgorod State University named after N.I. Lobachevsky Documentologist; Institute of International Relations and World History of N.I. Lobachaevsky National Research University 603000, Russia, Nizhny Novgorod region, Nizhny Novgorod, Ulyanova str., 2 dmitriy.ionov@unn.ru Other publications by this author

Perepelkin Kirill Alekseevich ORCID: 0009-0008-3103-7814 Student; Department of Modern and Contemporary History; National Research Nizhny Novgorod State University named after N.I. Lobachevsky 603000, Russia, Nizhny Novgorod region, Nizhny Novgorod, Ulyanova str., 2 kirill.perepelkin@unn.ru

Introduction

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the countries that gained independence only had to take their place in the system of international relations. The South Caucasus, which has long been a battlefield of major regional powers, has once again found itself at a bifurcation point. In recent years, the balance of power in this region has undergone significant changes, due to both internal and external factors. The entrenched contradictions and the desire of various countries to influence the regional situation have created new threats to stability and security. The problem of how the adaptation of regional States to new challenges and changes in the balance of power affects the security and stability of the entire region remains unresolved. In the context of increasing globalization and rapid changes in international politics, it is important to understand how possible scenarios for the development of the situation can affect the future of the South Caucasus, as well as the broader security context in Europe and Asia.

In this regard, the relevance of studying this topic is manifested in the need to understand the underlying causes of these transformations, as well as in analyzing their consequences for regional and international relations. The novelty of this work lies in an integrated approach to the study of changes in the political, economic and military-strategic spheres that are taking place in the South Caucasus. The emphasis is also placed on the transformation of the roles of not only key players such as Russia, Turkey and Iran, but also the influence of the EU, the United States and Israel in the context of modern geopolitical realities.

Objects and methods of research

The object of the study is the processes of changing the balance of power in the South Caucasus. The subject of the study is the factors influencing these changes, such as the geopolitical interests of states, internal conflicts and the socio-economic development of the countries of the region. The purpose of this study is to formulate forecasts of future changes and development of the balance of power in the South Caucasus in the medium term. The research is based on a systematic approach. The study considers the South Caucasus as a complex and interconnected system in which political, economic and social factors influence the balance of power. This allows us to take into account the diversity of participants and their interactions. When studying media materials, official documents and scientific publications, the content analysis method was used to identify key trends and changes in the political situation in the region.

Georgia

Georgia, located at the junction of Europe and Asia, plays a key role in the processes taking place in the region. Its advantageous strategic location, as well as proximity to major regional centers of power such as Russia, Turkey, and in recent years Iran, have predetermined Tbilisi's role in shaping the balance of power in the South Caucasus in the 21st century. The disintegration processes in the post–Soviet space, caused by the rupture of once unified logistics chains, have turned Georgia into a zone of geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West for control of trade and transport routes connecting East and West, primarily from the Caspian region.

Since gaining independence, Georgia has begun to pursue a pro-Western policy, focusing on Brussels and Washington. For this reason, in 1999, the country became part of a new model of regional cooperation, an alternative to Russian integrative projects in the post–Soviet space – the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development - GUAM ^[46]. At the same time, Georgia's pro-Western orientation was largely determined by its intentions to regain control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, supported by Russia ^[25].

The situation in the South Caucasus has been undergoing significant changes since 2022 due to the events taking place in the region. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over control of the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as changes in Russia's regional policy, had a significant impact on Georgia's position and policy in this context. The start of Russia's special military operation in Ukraine in February 2022 radically changed the geopolitical landscape of the region. Georgia, which perceives Russia as a threat, has repeatedly stressed from the first days of the conflict its support for Ukraine and its readiness to strengthen ties with the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance, considering them as guarantors of its security and sovereignty.

Changes in the regional balance of power allowed Tbilisi to accelerate the process of European integration, as a result of which, on December 14, 2023, the Council of the European Union granted Georgia the status of an official candidate for EU membership ^[33].

A special place in Georgia's foreign economic activity is occupied by its relations with Turkey, which is the largest trading partner, and Azerbaijan, which, like Georgia, are interested in creating alternative routes for transporting goods through the territory of the South Caucasus bypassing Russia. Tbilisi is actively involved in energy projects, which makes it an important transit corridor for European energy resources. The launch of such major infrastructure projects as the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline, the South Caucasus gas pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi–Kars railway gave a powerful impetus to regional integration ^[26]. During the trilateral meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey, held on March 15, 2024 in Baku, the representative of the Georgian side, Ilya Darchiashvili, stressed that "... The role of these three countries in the transportation of energy resources from Asia to Europe is especially important" ^[34]. And although relations with Turkey remain a priority for Georgia, they have a number of unresolved problems, such as Turkey's dissatisfaction with Georgia's attitude towards the Meskhetian Turks or the growth of Turkish influence in Adjara.

In order to strengthen its defense capability, Georgia has been conducting joint military exercises with the United States since 2011, which have been conducted under the auspices of NATO since 2015. Due to the aggravation of the international situation, since 2022, these exercises are aimed at "increasing the compatibility of the forces of Georgia, the United States, regional partners and allied countries to ensure the stability and security of the Black Sea region" ^[43].

However, the Georgian leadership is striving to pursue a balanced foreign policy, strengthening ties with the West, but at the same time not severing economic and political contacts with Moscow. For example, Georgia, despite the position of President Salome Zurabishvili, refused to impose anti-Russian sanctions. Later, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze justified this by saying that the imposition of sanctions would negatively affect the national interests of the country, at the same time adding that Georgia prevents the circumvention of anti-Russian sanctions on its territory ^[37]. Despite the political distance, Georgia's economic relations with Russia remain. The Ukrainian crisis has also had an impact on the Georgian economy, which underscores the need to balance interests between the West and Russia.

A statement by the political council of the ruling Georgian Dream party, which discusses the criminal role of the previous government in the August 2008 war and the need to investigate these crimes, aroused some interest. The statement stated that "in order to establish long-term peace and stability in Georgia, it is extremely important that a public legal process be conducted and the public once and for all find out who committed the gravest treacherous crime against the country and the people of Georgia" ^[1]. In light of these events, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, speaking at the 79th session of the UN General Assembly, stated that Georgia hopes to "restore bridges" with Abkhazia and South Ossetia ^[38].

The refusal to join the Western sanctions war against Russia, as well as Georgia's unwillingness to interfere in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and open a second front in the Caucasus, led to pressure on the Georgian leadership from the United States.

The internal political struggle between the ruling party and the opposition imposes certain restrictions on Georgia's foreign policy. The Georgian Dream party is facing criticism for ineffective actions in ensuring the independence and security of the country. Internal revelations and protests against external interference can increase political polarization. Social discontent in Georgia caused by economic difficulties and political uncertainty, in particular the adoption by the country's parliament of the law "On Transparency of Foreign Influence" ^[35], which was nicknamed the "Russian law" among the opposition for its similarity to the Russian law "On Control over the activities of persons under foreign Influence" and the law "On family values and the protection of minors", resulted in protests outside the parliament building against the preliminary results of the parliamentary elections, in which the ruling Georgian Dream party won 53.92% of the vote.

In response to the violent crackdown on protesters, the United States began a complete review of bilateral American-Georgian cooperation, during which the Noble Partner military exercises were postponed indefinitely ^[29]. In June 2024, the United States imposed sanctions against Georgia, which included law enforcement officers, members of the Georgian Dream Party and members of parliament ^[42]. And already on October 17, 2024, following the results of the EU summit in Brussels, the long-awaited process of Georgia's de facto accession to the EU was stopped ^[39].

Thus, Georgia is currently in a difficult geopolitical situation, trying to maintain a balance between Russia and the West. Tbilisi seeks to use changes in the regional balance of power to strengthen its position, but is forced to take into account economic interests and domestic political factors. Georgia's key task is to prevent destabilization within the country and preserve its sovereignty in the face of growing geopolitical tensions in the South Caucasus.

Internal political disagreements between the president and the government, internal pressure from the opposition and external pressure exerted by the United States may subsequently affect the foreign policy vector of development and further development of Russian-Georgian relations, contributing to a political dialogue between the two countries.

Armenia

Another state in the South Caucasus, whose policy has undergone significant changes in recent years, is Armenia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was Moscow's traditional ally in the region. Such a policy was explained by difficult relations with neighbors, primarily Turkey and Azerbaijan. Russia was the only state that could provide some guarantees of protection. The allied relations were also conditioned by close cultural and economic ties, in which the Armenian diaspora in Russia played a major role.

Armenia is the only country in the region that is a member of the CSTO and the EAEU structures. Currently, the 102nd Russian military base in Gyumri and units of the FSB border guard service on the Armenian-Turkish border are stationed in Armenia. In connection with the events in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020, about 2,000 Russian peacekeepers were stationed there, which were completely withdrawn in the summer of 2024. Russia's main efforts are focused on opposing the collective West within the framework of its own, in connection with which the US policy in the South Caucasus has intensified. The American side sees the current situation as an opportunity to weaken Russia's influence in Armenia. The development of Armenian-American military cooperation is a threat to the strategic level of relations with Russia. The special interest of the United States in Armenia is also explained by an internal political factor – the powerful Armenian lobby.

Cooperation between Armenia and NATO actually began immediately after the collapse of the USSR ^[32]. The relations between Armenia and NATO developed less actively compared to Georgia, but they increased qualitatively and quantitatively over time. This is especially noticeable after the start of its.

The number of high-level meetings between representatives of Armenia and NATO has increased to 15 in 2.5 years after the start of the Joint Operation, whereas previously their number was about 3-4 per year ^[32]. These statistics do not indicate a qualitative change in relations between Armenia and NATO, especially about the possible inclusion of Armenia in NATO, but the expansion of contacts indicates a partial reorientation of foreign policy in the field of security. Frequent meetings contribute to the establishment of contacts and the inclusion of Armenia in the sphere of interests of NATO, primarily the United States.

As for Armenia's participation in military exercises conducted by the North Atlantic Alliance, it is fragmentary. One of the last exercises was held in September 2023 on the territory of Armenia, which indicates an increase in the level of relations. At the same time, Armenia refused to participate in the CSTO exercises. This castling demonstrates a partial reorientation of the external course in the military sphere. These maneuvers are designed to contribute to "improving the level of coherence of units participating in international peacekeeping missions", "sharing best practices in the field of management and tactical communication" ^[44]. Obviously, such actions cannot radically change the situation, but the politicization of this process in the context of tension in the South Caucasus and Russia's special military operation is an indicator of a change in Armenia's foreign policy.

Since the start of the CBO, US officials have been talking about closer cooperation with NATO. In 2022, the Alliance's special representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, H. Kolomina, called Armenia a "potential partner of NATO." In June 2023, former Senator and Governor S. Brownback proposed recognizing Armenia as the main non-NATO ally of the United States. Despite the fact that at the moment these words are statements that have no real basis, they create a certain tone in the information space, influencing public opinion and political circles. In this regard, Prime Minister Pashinyan's words that dependence on the CSTO and Russia is a strategic mistake are of particular interest, which makes it necessary to diversify foreign policy ties, including with the EU and the United States.

In particular, the statement of the Secretary of the Security Council of Armenia Armen Grigoryan should be mentioned: "There is no hope for the CSTO anymore" ^[40]. It is worth noting that Grigoryan held a meeting at the CIA headquarters in Langley on September 30, 2023. However, Pashinyan called the meeting of the CSTO Council effective. This indicates a split in positions within Armenia, but at the same time, steps towards increasing military cooperation with the United States are noticeable, whereas, despite the obvious dependence of Armenia on the Russian Federation in the field of economy and security, there are no positive practical actions with regard to Russia.

On January 18-19, 2024, Javier Colomina, Special Representative of the NATO Secretary General for the Caucasus and Central Asia, visited Armenia. In March, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg visited all three states of the South Caucasus. The high-level visit testifies to the interest of the leadership of the North Atlantic Alliance in Armenia, Stoltenberg noted Armenia's commitment to democratic values ^[24].

This position of the United States towards Armenia is not new, as several NATO documents over the previous years used similar formulations: commitment to "its support for the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova" ^{[4, 5, 14, 15]}. Such a composition of countries has always been mentioned, which indicates the proximity of their position in US foreign policy.

In connection with the events of September 2023 around Nagorno-Karabakh, a delegation from the United States headed by N. Pelosi promptly visited Armenia. This fact itself testifies to the special attention of the United States to the events in the South Caucasus. Statements were made about support for Armenia's democracy and assistance in the field of security, but no practical steps have been taken at the moment. Military support for Armenia may lead to discontent not only with Azerbaijan, but more importantly, with Turkey and Russia.

Probably, such actions were related to an attempt by the United States to increase its authority in the region and reduce Russia's influence in Armenia ^[48]. Nancy Pelosi, on behalf of the United States, criticized Azerbaijan's "deadly attacks" against Armenia, that is, she took a unilateral position. In the Armenian political community, as well as in wide circles of the population, this statement could not fail to find recognition, which increased Washington's authority in their eyes compared to Moscow, which did not make critical statements.

Over the past decade, relations between the United States and Armenia have been developing in the field of biological threat prevention, and relevant agreements have been signed. Only in 2022, against the background of the Russian Federation's military activities in Ukraine, when the Russian Ministry of Defense released data confirming the presence of military biological laboratories in Ukraine, it was proposed to amend the agreement between Washington and Yerevan so that the Armenian side would not be obliged to provide any state with samples of pathogens ^[45]. On the other hand, in January 2023, a meeting of the Armenia-USA Biological Threat Reduction Program was held, the results of which were agreements on the creation of a "Regional center for Microbial Resources" ^[22]. After the start of its work, the Armenian leadership at first did not seek to develop relations with the United States in the field of biological research, but recently this strategy has been changing ^[7]. Armenia also cooperates with the United States on the Program of Security Cooperation on Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, within the framework of which Armenian specialists visit Kansas.

Thus, the task of the United States is to weaken Russia's influence in the region by deforming Russian-Armenian friendly relations. Despite a slight cooling of relations between the United States and Armenia immediately after the start of the CBO, cooperation only increased in 2023. The United States, despite significant restrictions, has built a multi-format system of security relations with Armenia. First of all, this affects the field of military education, peacekeeping missions, disaster response, as well as cooperation on bioweapons.

At the same time, Yerevan's desire to balance its relations with Moscow with cooperation with other great powers has not disappeared. In view of this, it is impossible to talk about the termination of military-political cooperation between Armenia and the United States after the Second Karabakh War. The United States will play on the Armenian-Russian contradictions related to Moscow's insufficient assistance to Yerevan due to its own, positioning itself as an alternative security provider, while not offering any clear alternatives. Dependence on Russia in the field of security and economy hinders the development of relations with the United States and does not pose a threat to the deployment of the Russian military in Armenia in the short term.

However, in the medium term, the deterioration of Russian-Armenian relations in the military and defense sphere is highly likely to happen. Each time, the criticality of statements by Armenian officials, mainly N. Pashinyan, towards Russia is only growing, and this applies not only to the military sphere. The practical implementation of steps aimed at diversifying foreign policy ties by reducing the role of Russia and increasing the role of the EU, the United States and NATO is currently at a low level.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan is currently the leading country in the South Caucasus region. Historically located at the intersection of various civilizations, cultures and religions, Azerbaijan, through whose territory new communication, transport and energy corridors in the Eurasian region pass, in fact, economically connects West and East, North and South ^[11]. These conditions, combined with the fact that Azerbaijan has now gained the image of a reliable partner in the field of energy security, with which not only neighboring countries, but also a number of European states trade, create a favorable basis for an effective and purposeful foreign policy that meets the interests of the Azerbaijani state ^[10].

In our opinion, Baku is quite consistent in its foreign policy, but ambiguous. Thus, one of the main priorities is the establishment of peace and stability at the regional level, which is why Azerbaijani diplomacy attaches great importance to mutual economic, trade and political relations and adopts the principles of geopolitical balance and neutrality ^[11]. In this case, Azerbaijan's primary task is to maintain de facto neutrality in the region by not joining various alliances, such as the CSTO or NATO. Instead, Baku focuses on pragmatic cooperation with both the West and the East, that is, Azerbaijan simultaneously increases the volume of gas and oil supplies to Europe ^[18], applies for BRICS membership ^[27], and actively works on the implementation of the North–South International Transport Corridor (ITC) project, the purpose of which is to reduce the time and cost of cargo transportation from Russia to India ^[19].

Baku also does not forget about cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance and its members within the framework of the Partnership for Peace program ^[31]. Specific examples of the implementation of this policy direction are military exercises where foreign Western specialists take part, the latter took place in 2023 ^[22].

Azerbaijan continues to adhere to the policy of balance and neutrality in many important issues even after the events in Ukraine in 2022, so at the session "The Role of Azerbaijan in new geopolitical conditions" held on September 6, 2024 at the international forum Chernobbio, President I. Aliyev stated that on the one hand, Azerbaijan strongly supports the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and all countries On the other hand, it has not been and will not be part of the anti-Russian sanctions campaign ^[28]. Thus, we see that Baku takes a position of neutrality, because it does not want to spoil relations with Ukraine and the supporting countries, nor deprive itself of profitable cooperation with the Russian Federation, which, in view of the development of relations in various sectors of the economy, has a powerful potential for further strategic partnership ^[23]. In addition, this policy corresponds to the "Non-Aligned Movement", which, although somewhat weakened after the end of the Cold War, continues to exist ^[17]. Joint meetings are held within the framework of the Non-Aligned Movement, and the recent chairman of the organization (2019-2024) was President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev.

However, Azerbaijan often departs from its neutrality, especially when it concerns its national interests. Thus, on June 15, 2021, Azerbaijan signed the "Shusha Declaration" with Turkey, which reflected various issues of mutually beneficial cooperation, including military cooperation ^[46]. One of the reasons for this step, in our opinion, was Azerbaijan's need for more significant support from Ankara, because after the war in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020, many Western countries are quite wary of Azerbaijan ^[7], choosing the path of increasing diplomatic pressure on Armenia and Azerbaijan in order to conclude a peace treaty as soon as possible ^[2]. It was not possible to seek support from other countries, since if Baku turned to Iran, Baku would have to abandon cooperation with NATO and the EU, and in this case Tehran would have to lose such a strategic partner as Armenia ^[20]. In addition, by choosing Iran, Baku would lose dynamically developing relations with Israel. In our opinion, cooperation with Tel Aviv is too valuable for Baku, since at the present stage it covers various spheres. For example, Azerbaijan provides about 40% of Israel's oil needs, while Israel, for its part, supplies modern weapons to Azerbaijan. So, in March 2024, the government of Baku signed an agreement with Israel Aerospace Industries for the purchase of Barak MX air defense systems ^[3]. To deepen bilateral cooperation, the Azerbaijani embassy was opened in Tel Aviv in March 2023.

In the case of Russia, the situation would, in our opinion, repeat itself in the same way as with Iran, because it is not profitable for Moscow to take one side or the other in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, and Baku would also have to risk cooperation with NATO. It is precisely because of the above-mentioned reasons that Azerbaijan chose Ankara, thanks to whose support Baku has recently shown good results in all public spheres, which made it possible to conduct a successful military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. Its result was, as stated in the government of Baku, "the restoration of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Azerbaijan" ^[28].

The success of the Azerbaijani operation marked not only geographical changes on the political map of the region, but also changes in the balance of power. Thus, the Turkish Republic, which is seriously involved in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict on the side of Azerbaijan, has significantly improved its position ^[8]. At the same time, the operation in Nagorno-Karabakh jeopardized its strategic relations with the United States, because after the restoration of territorial integrity, American criticism of Baku only intensified, while the first proposals for the imposition of sanctions appeared. In addition, US presidential candidate Kamala Harris openly supported Armenia in order to get the votes of the Armenian Diaspora ^[30]. Azerbaijan responds to the possible rupture of relations and the imposition of sanctions by sharply criticizing the United States on the one hand, and on the other hand by rapprochement with such international associations as BRICS and SCO, thereby supporting the emerging multipolar world.

Thus, at the present stage, Azerbaijan, on the one hand, continues to adhere to the policy of maintaining neutrality and balance of power in the region in many issues by concluding various mutually beneficial agreements and not joining military-political blocs, and on the other hand, when it comes to national interests, Baku is ready to subject the balance of power to serious changes. Thus, by restoring its territorial integrity largely thanks to the help of the Turkish Republic, Azerbaijan has allowed Ankara to significantly improve its position in the South Caucasus. In the future, it becomes clear that the further development of Azerbaijani-Turkish relations in various fields will only strengthen Turkey's position in the region.

Conclusion

Summarizing all of the above, we can note the multidirectional vectors of development of countries that were previously part of one state. The beginning of a Special military operation marked a crisis in the system of international relations, within which some shifts were outlined. Georgia, which in recent decades has been an outpost of the West in the South Caucasus, seeks to balance its foreign policy by establishing relations with Russia and exclude the influence of external actors. Armenia's actions are also dictated by the desire to diversify foreign policy ties, but the build-up of US military cooperation and criticism of the CSTO are risky in the medium term. The situation of Azerbaijan has improved in recent years, in particular, gaining control over Nagorno-Karabakh, strengthened Baku's position.

Speaking about the development of the situation in the South Caucasus in the medium term, three scenarios can be identified that relate to changes in the political structures of Armenia and Georgia. Regarding Azerbaijan, it is impossible to single out several scenarios, since its foreign and domestic policy is characterized by relative stability aimed at diversifying economic ties and participating in economic projects, but the development of Azerbaijani-Turkish relations in the field of politics, culture and security will remain a priority. After gaining control over Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku may seek to gain control of the Zanzegur corridor, but a military solution to this problem is unlikely due to the potential intervention of Russia and Iran, and therefore the most likely option is political pressure on Yerevan from both Baku and Ankara.

According to the first scenario, the influence of Western countries, in particular the United States, France and the United Kingdom, will increase if Pashinyan remains in power after 2026 in Armenia and the opposition party comes to power in Georgia. External influence will also cause changes in the internal structure of these states, which will lead to liberalization of domestic policy, but at the same time cause destabilization on the external circuit associated with the discontent of Moscow and Tehran.

The second scenario reflects the preservation of the status quo in the region, which will be expressed in internal instability in Armenia and Georgia, which will manifest itself in the struggle between political forces regarding the foreign policy course, which in this case has a direct impact on economic and therefore social development.

The third scenario reflects a situation in which the Georgian Dream party will remain in power, and opposition parties will win the parliamentary elections in Armenia, as a result of which the states of the region will pursue a sovereign policy aimed at protecting their own economic interests by maintaining and developing trade relations with Russia.