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Law and Politics
Reference:
Lu X., Seltser D.G.
How to control an official? Personnel supervision in China (political aspect)
// Law and Politics.
2024. ¹ 7.
P. 67-81.
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0706.2024.7.71364 EDN: NSLSWI URL: https://en.nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=71364
How to control an official? Personnel supervision in China (political aspect)
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0706.2024.7.71364EDN: NSLSWIReceived: 24-07-2024Published: 31-07-2024Abstract: The purpose of the article is to determine the place of party supervision in the general course of political control of managerial personnel in the People's Republic of China. In the system of political control of personnel (selection, recruiting, upbringing, education, training, retraining, encouragement, punishment), supervision is the main political function of ensuring the quality and loyalty of a party and state official. The study is based on a wide range of documents of the CPC Central Committee and its supervisory bodies. As a result of the analysis, the authors find the origins of the Chinese surveillance scheme in the control systems “from above” (Yu Shi) and “from below” (Denwengu), but tend to talk about them more as archetypes, philosophy and political tasks of the top management class of the PRC. The authors see the substantial basis of supervision in a set of utilitarian forms of strategic and everyday attention to the work ethic, moral character and political dedication of an official. The authors' conclusions can be expressed as follows: party supervision is above the law; internal party control extends to all spheres of the life of the state and society; the “self-revolution of the party” presupposes its consistent significant improvement. Under Xi Jinping, there have been three major changes in China's surveillance system. Firstly, they are standardized: a) public discourse with the formation of an atmosphere of absolute intolerance to violations in society; b) internal documents of the CPC, extremely harsh against officials; c) legislation that prevents corruption. Secondly, the lifelong responsibility of an official for violations and crimes committed in the course of public service has been introduced (the statute of limitations has been abolished). Thirdly, the policy on corruption has been clarified – an extensive and multi-stage early warning system has been created. Keywords: supervision, control, personnel processes, personnel policy, China, the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping, fight against corruption, responsibility, democracyThis article is automatically translated. Introduction How to control an official? The established path in many countries is through elected democracy. Its advantage is that elections provide a mechanism for the departure (turnover) of officials. However, such a scenario has drawbacks: if a politician's inability to govern leads to stagnation, he cannot be removed immediately. How to reduce the "cost of trial and error" is the question facing every large country where the cost of error is especially high. China is a big country. What is the path of personnel replacement chosen there? How does the state control its own official? How does it "insure" him from rebirth – moral and political? How does HR supervision work? These and other questions are answered by the authors of the article.
Review of scientific literature The proposed article provides a brief overview of the Chinese segment of historiography. People inside the system write about supervision, which is why they know all the control meanings and procedures in detail. Reflections from the outside are more journalistic and largely superficial in nature. Supervision in literature and political practice refers to "supervision of CPC members" – not legislative supervision, but internal party supervision. The standards of legislative oversight, including in criminal law, are noticeably lower than party standards. For example, the law does not prohibit civil servants from having mistresses, but for an employee of the state apparatus – a member of the CPC – this is unacceptable, because he is subject to party discipline, which implies strict party supervision. Due to its special – fundamental – importance for the country's political system, supervision has traditionally been discussed primarily by the leaders (top officials) and collective bodies of the CPC. The first persons, in fact, are also the main historiographers of the phenomenon. In the world scientific tradition, it is necessary to refer the statements of state leaders to sources. This is not the case in China: the country's leaders are the first historiographers of party procedures. The statements of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin on supervision are collected in one book [9]. The normative position on supervision is Xi Jinping's book "Excerpts from speeches on the observance and improvement of the system of party and state supervision" [5]. In fact, this is an anthology of President Xi's position on oversight. The book consists of more than 130 documents, including his reports, speeches, instructions and directives from November 15, 2012 to November 11, 2021. (10 topics, 371 paragraphs). Articles by China's leading experts on personnel supervision Zhang Lin [11], Liu Shu [8], Cai Yuqing [10], Wang Duanzi [1], Gong Chunxia and Zeng Xiang [3], Ding Yun and Ren Guizhen [4] have been published in top journals and contain the full range of expert assessments of the system control. What questions do the authors raise? Is supervision effective and what can contribute to its effectiveness? The authors agree that efficiency is a conditional concept. It depends on the degree of perfection of the supervision system, accuracy, legality, institutionalization and regularity, as well as on the effects of its integration with technology. At the same time, the internal nature of supervision emanating from the party itself is an important factor in its effectiveness. Does oversight fight corruption? It certainly plays an important role, but for more effective suppression of corruption, it requires improvement of the mechanism, innovation of its means and the joint participation of all sectors of society. In which direction should supervision be improved? In the direction of clarifying its criteria, increasing the efficiency of political supervision, the accuracy of analysis, improving standards, clarifying the subject of responsibility. Scientists are now talking about strengthening internal party supervision. On May 5, 2015, Secretary General Xi Jinping made an important speech at the 12th meeting of the Central Steering Group for Comprehensive Deepening of Reforms, where he proposed the concept of self-revolution: "How to break out of the historical cyclical rule and chaos, the CPC has always thought and researched this. After a hundred years of struggle ...our party gave the answer, which is the constant promotion of samoregulacji party" (关于党的自我革命的重要思想,阐明了三个重大问题 // 共产党员网 [An important thought about the self-revolution of the party clarifies three main issues // The network of the Communist Party. URL:https://www.12371.cn/2024/01/13/ARTI1705122295118918.html]). He introduced the concept of "self-revolution in a new era". Self–revolution is the internal attitude and actions of the party in the fight against formalism, bureaucracy, and corruption in its ranks. The concept considers internal party supervision differently, emphasizing its importance for the purification of the party. Sources The sources of the article were collections of documents of the Central Committee of the CPC (. 中共中央文件选集(第1册). 北京: 人民出版社, 2013: 676 [Central archives, Office of document of the Communist party of China. Selected documents of the Central Committee of the Communist party of China vol. 1. Beijing: People, 2013. 676 S.]), the reports of the secretaries of the Central Committee (Jiang Zemin (江泽民在中国共产党第十五次全国代表大会上的报告 // 共产党员网 [Jiang Zemin's report at the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China // The network of the Communist Party. URL:https://fuwu.12371.cn/2012/09/27/ARTI1348726215537612.html]) and XI Jinping (习近平:决胜全面建成小康社会 夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利–在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [XI Jinping: the conquest of the great victory of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era by building of the welfare state – a report to the 19th Congress of the CPC // Website of the Central people's Government of people's Republic of China. URL:http://www.gov.cn/zhuanti/2017-10/27/content_5234876.html])), resolution (中共中央关于党的百年奋斗重大成就和历史经验的决议 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on the main achievements and historical experience of the centennial struggle of the party // Website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2021-11/16/content_5651269.html]), solutions (关于加强党的监察机关的决定 // 中国共产党新闻资料库 [The decision to strengthen the party supervision bodies // The news database of the Communist Party of China. URL:http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0904/c75234-22804679.html]), communiqué (中国共产党第十九届中央委员会第四次全体会议公报 // 共产党员网 [Communique of the Fourth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China // The network of the Communist Party. URL:https://www.12371.cn/2019/10/31/ARTI1572515554956816.shtml ], "The Charter of the Communist Party of China (中国程程))" (中国程程程 // 中国新新新库库库 [The Charter of the Communist Party of China // The news database of the Communist Party of China. URL:http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0904/c75234-22804679.html]), "Rule of the Communist party of China on inspection work (中国共产党巡视工作条例)" (中国共产党巡视工作条例 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [Rules of the Communist Party of China on inspection work // Website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/202402/content_6932866.html ], legislative acts ("The Constitution of the People's Republic of China" // The Constitution of the People's Republic of China [Constitution of the People's Republic of China // Website of the National People's Congress. URL:http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/npc/zt/qt/gjxfz/2014-12/03/content_1888093.html]), "law on the supervision of the people's Republic of China (中华人民共和国监察法)" (中华人民共和国监察法 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [the law on the supervision of the people's Republic of China // the Website of the Central people's government of people's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-03/26/content_5277463.html])), essays summarizing Supervisory practices (全面推进依法行政实施纲要 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [An essay on the implementation of administration in accordance with the law // Website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2004/content_70309.html]), (建立健全教育、制度、监督并重的惩治和预防腐败体系实施纲要 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [An essay on the implementation of the system of punishment and prevention of corruption // Website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/zwhd/2006-02/06/content_179119.html])), statistical reports about punishment (新华社十八届中央纪律检查委员会向中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会的工作报告 // 中华人民共和国中央政府网站 [Xinhua News Agency. Report on the work of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection for the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China // Website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/zhuanti/2017-10/29/content_5235228.html]).
The origins of control: supervision "from above" (Yu Shi) vs supervision "from below" (Denwengu) The modern Chinese surveillance system has its roots in the ancient Chinese system. In the pre-Qin period, the emperor, vassals, Dafu and county magistrates had secretaries "Yu Shi (head of the censor)". During the Qin Dynasty, China created a centralized state and established "Jian Jun Yu Shi (监郡御史)" in 36 counties across the country, creating a system of supervision from the center to the local level. Thus, Yu Shi became an official position of a supervisory nature, responsible for overseeing the officials of the court. The Han Dynasty inherited the system of supervision from the Qin Dynasty, and Emperor Hui issued the "Nine Articles on Yu Shi (监御史九条)", which became the first supervisory law in Chinese history. During this period, Yu Shi's powers were expanded, and in addition to overseeing officials, they were responsible for their certification and local court proceedings. The Tang Dynasty expanded the powers of the supervisory authority and Yu Shi, while the central link of the supervisory authority, Yu Shi Tai (御史台), was given the right to oversee trials throughout the country. The Tang Dynasty established a system of advisers (谏官) to oversee the emperor's actions and government policy. During the Song Dynasty, due to Yu Shi's greater power and in order for them to have more experience in politics, it was established that Yu Shi could not be persons who had not served two terms as county magistrates. To gather public opinion, the Song Dynasty simultaneously created the Deng Wen Gu Institute, which was responsible for receiving appeals, complaints, petitions and proposals on public policy from the people, allowing them to bypass officials at all levels and contact the central government directly. During the Ming Dynasty, the supervision system was gradually improved, and during this period, the Yu Shi were appointed directly by the emperor, were distinguished by low rank, but great power, and in addition to exercising supervisory powers, they also had the right to judge major cases. As a result, the Ming Dynasty was very strict about the selection of Yu Shi, and when they committed crimes, they were punished more severely than ordinary officials. During the Qing Dynasty, China's industry and trade flourished, so Yu Shi was established in some important industries, for example, Xun Yan Yu Shi (巡盐御史), whose duties included collecting taxes on salt and overseeing salt merchants. Thus, Yu Shi "from above" and Deng Wengu "from below" formed the control system of ancient China, actively involved in the supervision and deterrence of officials, and had a profound impact on the entire Chinese surveillance system.
Supervision in 1949-2012: movement towards a unified system of party-state supervision Since 1949, the surveillance system in China has been created in the model of "internal party supervision". After the formation of new China, the CPC Central Committee adopted a "Decision to establish disciplinary inspection committees of the Central Committee and all levels." It was formed Zhu De and was responsible for "...the test of disciplinary violations, acceptance, consideration and decision or cancellation of penalties and strengthening the disciplinary education, and implementation of party-political judgments and orders" (中央档案馆,中共中央文献研究室.中共中央文件选集(第1册).2013: 72 [Central Archive, Document Management Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Selected documents of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Vol. 1. Beijing: The People, 2013. p. 72]. In 1950 The Politburo of the Central Committee approved the "Rules of Procedure of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection", which established the composition of the commission, the procedure for reviewing cases, the system of meetings, reports and workshops. Disciplinary inspection committees were set up at the central level for the party, government, military bodies and organizations (the Committee for Editing Documents of the CPC Central Committee. Selected works of Zhu De. Beijing: Narod, 1983. p. 279]). By February 1952 nationwide committees were formed by the disciplinary inspection military and local party committees at all levels above the County regiment (中央档案馆,中共中央文献研究室.中共中央文件选集(第8册).2013: 54 [Central Archive, Document Management Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Selected documents of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Vol. 8. Beijing: The People, 2013. p. 54]). This marked the establishment of a surveillance system within the ruling CPC. In March 1955 The Central Committee decided to create a "Supervision Committee" instead of the former "Discipline Inspection Committee", expanding its supervisory powers to include not only investigation and consideration of cases, but also supervision of compliance with the law by party organizations, members and cadres of the party. In September 1962, at the tenth plenum of the Central Committee of the Party of the eighth convocation, a "Decision was made to strengthen the organs of party supervision." After the beginning of the "cultural revolution", in April 1969, the Ninth Party Congress adopted amendments to the Party Charter, which abolished many provisions of the original charter concerning party discipline and abolished the Control Committee. The system of internal party supervision was completely abolished. In December 1978, the 3rd Plenum of the CPC Central Committee of the eleventh convocation re-established the party's Disciplinary Inspection Commission and disciplinary inspection bodies in the Central Government and ministries, commissions and bureaus of the State Council. In September 1982, 90% of the party committees at the county level and above established disciplinary inspection bodies. In September 1983, in accordance with Article 91 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, the Audit Office of the People's Republic of China was established to audit and control the financial income and expenses of all departments of the State Council, local people's governments and their departments. In 1987, at the suggestion of the State Council and on the recommendation of the National People's Congress, the Ministry of Supervision of the People's Republic of China was recreated, which resumed administrative supervision. The control model has changed from "intraparty supervision" to "intraparty supervision + administrative supervision". In 1992, due to the duplication of supervisory functions, the party disciplinary bodies and the bodies of state administrative supervision were merged. In December 1997 the report of the 15th Congress of the party was made basic statement on the management system and the mechanism of the anti-corruption: "the Committee of the party will implement a unified leadership, the party and government will work together, the Commission for discipline inspection will organize and coordinate departments to perform their duties, and we rely on the support and participation of the masses in strong suppression of corruption" (江泽民在中国共产党第十五次全国代表大会上的报告 // 共产党员网 [Jiang Zemin's report at the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China // The network of the Communist Party. URL:https://fuwu.12371.cn/2012/09/27/ARTI1348726215537612.html (date of access: 09/25/2022)]). In March 2004 The State Council issued the "Basic Provisions for the implementation of Comprehensive Assistance to Governance in accordance with the Law", stressing that great importance should be attached to the supervision of the press and public opinion, and that issues reflected in the media should be thoroughly investigated, verified and resolved in a timely manner ([An essay on the implementation of administration in accordance with the law // Website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2004/content_70309.html]). In January 2005 The CPC Central Committee issued the "Basic provisions for the implementation of the system of punishment and prevention of corruption with equal emphasis on education, system and supervision", which calls for the creation of reliable working mechanism of receiving communications from the public about violations of discipline and law, as well as for timely resolution of problems (建立健全教育、制度、监督并重的惩治和预防腐败体系实施纲要 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [An outline of the implementation of the system of punishment and prevention of corruption, in which equal attention is paid to education, institutions and supervision // Website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/zwhd/2006-02/06/content_179119.html]). So, a unified system of party-state supervision was formed in China. Supervision since 2013: From "beating tigers and flies" to "cumulative surveillance power" In January 2013, held its second plenary session of the 18th Central Commission for discipline inspection, where XI uttered the famous slogan of the anti-corruption campaign "Beat and tigers and flies" (习近平在十八届中央纪委二次全会上发表重要讲话 // 中国共产党新闻网 [XI Jinping delivers important speech at the second plenary session of the Central Commission for discipline inspection of the 18th convocation // The Chinese Communist Party News Network. URL:http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0122/c64094-20289660.html ]) – to combat abuses by officials at all levels, regardless of the person. In the 5 years after the 18th Congress, an average of 842 people were punished daily in China, 140 people were punished for violating the rules of the "eight points", 32 people were convicted and imprisoned. On average, 7 officials in the central office were fired every month, and 148 at the department and bureau levels, 1,050 at the county level were disciplined [6]. The rules of the "eight points" of December 4, 2012 on the conduct of officials and holding official events. These are Xi Jinping's demands for party discipline: such as banning officials from drinking alcohol during working hours, behaving immodestly, and living beyond their means. Since 2013, the "eight points" rules have been introduced. After the style requirements of Chinese Communists, who were not allowed to have privileges, became popular in Chinese society, it was decided to expose officials through the media. For example, one provincial official got on the Internet because he was wearing a very expensive watch. Subsequently, the Discipline Inspection Commission found out about his corruption schemes, and the court sentenced him to 14 years in prison for involvement in corruption and possession of assets of unknown origin [Yang Dachai was sentenced to 14 years in prison // Internet version of the People's Daily. URL:http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/0830/c1001-22745708.html]). This principle of equality of all made it possible to establish the authority of the system. On this basis, in August 2015 The CPC Central Committee has published the "Regulations on the Inspection Work of the Communist Party of China", summarizing and institutionalizing the practice of anti-corruption work ([Rules of the Communist Party of China on inspection work // Website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/202402/content_6932866.html]. In October 2017 XI Jinping first proposed the "improvement of the system of supervision of the party and state" in the report of the 19th Congress of the CPC "to Build a surveillance system with a single party command, comprehensive scope, authority and performance, and to connect the internal supervision of the party with the supervision of public authorities, democratic oversight, judicial supervision, the supervision of the masses and the supervision of public opinion, to strengthen the collective power of supervision" (习近平:决胜全面建成小康社会 夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利–在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [XI Jinping: The conquest of the great victory of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era by building of the welfare state – a report to the 19th Congress of the CPC // Website of the Central people's Government of people's Republic of China. URL:http://www.gov.cn/zhuanti/2017-10/27/content_5234876.html (date of access: 30.09.2022)]). In November 2021, the sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the nineteenth convocation adopted a "Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on major achievements and the historical experience of a century of struggle of the party" (中共中央关于党的百年奋斗重大成就和历史经验的决议 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on the main achievements and historical experience of the centennial struggle of the party // Website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2021-11/16/content_5651269.html]). The need to improve the system of control of the party and the state, the establishment, regulation and restraint of power, supervision of power in accordance with discipline and the law was once again emphasized. The system of supervision of the party and the state has become one of the main themes of public administration under Xi Jinping – his political line.
Xi Jinping's Line Under Xi Jinping, there have been three major changes in China's surveillance system. 1. The legislation is standardized. 2. Lifetime liability has been introduced. 3. The policy on corruption has been clarified. Standards of requirements Supervision is a general term for the supervision and discipline systems established by the CPC. It consists of the internal supervision of the party and various supervisory bodies [7]. As stated by XI Jinping at the 19th Congress, this system includes 6 forms of supervision: internal oversight of the party, the supervision of public authorities, democratic oversight, judicial review, oversight of the masses and the supervision of public opinion (习近平:决胜全面建成小康社会 夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利–在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [XI Jinping: the conquest of the great victory of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era by building of the welfare state — a report to the 19th Congress of the CPC // Website of the Central people's Government of people's Republic of China. URL:http://www.gov.cn/zhuanti/2017-10/27/content_5234876.html]). The internal supervision of the party is the supervision carried out within it. Supervision of State bodies is the supervision of all officials exercising State power. In the "Law on the supervision of the people's Republic of China" is clearly spelled out 6 categories of objects supervision (中华人民共和国监察法 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [the law on the supervision of the people's Republic of China // the Website of the Central people's government of people's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-03/26/content_5277463.html ]), including not only government officials, but also some employees of state-owned enterprises, budgetary institutions and grassroots self-government organizations. Democratic oversight means external political oversight of the CPC's activities by the NPC (People's Political Consultative Council of China) through the presentation of opinions, criticism and suggestions. Judicial supervision is carried out by State judicial bodies – people's courts and prosecutor's offices – over State administrative bodies in accordance with the Constitution and laws. The objects of supervision are various government agencies and their employees, including the judicial system itself. Mass supervision is the supervision of the exercise of State power by party and state administrative bodies and their employees by citizens and self–government in accordance with the rights granted by the Constitution and other laws. Public opinion supervision is the supervision of the exercise of administrative power by party and government bodies and their employees by the media. Online surveillance zones are being created on the official websites of the discipline supervision and control bodies. They have become the main way to monitor the network. For example, the website of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection teaches the masses to submit "key information". What is meant by key information? According to the website of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the State Supervision Commission, it is best if the application letter contains specific information: time, place, work, main episodes, the name of the person being claimed, his position and working unit. As far as possible, indicate the location of evidence and the presence of witnesses. Applicants can leave their own name, address, age, contact phone number and address so that the relevant departments can contact them in a timely manner and conduct an inspection. The Wuhan Commission for Discipline Inspection received a message about Zhang Huojing, former Vice-chairman of the Political Consultative Conference of Xinzhou District, Wuhan City, Hubei Province. He repeatedly traveled to Macau to gamble. The Municipal Disciplinary Inspection Commission immediately checked the immigration records: he visited Macau 17 times a year. On July 21, 2014, he was sentenced to nine years in prison for misappropriation of public funds (The Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection: Message, do it to be effective! // News Van I. URL:https://www.163.com/dy/article/F0GAEIQF05455BAL.html (date of access: 03.10.2022)]). Today, tip-off messages via the Internet are quite common in China, the keywords "real estate", "luxury car", "high expenses", "gambling", "mistress" make "everyone's supervision" a reality. Table 1. The system of supervision of the party and the state
Lifelong responsibility In China, there was a common example of corruption – the "phenomenon of 59-year-olds." Some officials, when they were close to retirement, found an opportunity to "hit the jackpot." A number of regulations have been adopted to combat this type of corruption. The key decision is the lifelong responsibility of an official. The movement in this direction began in the first year of Xi's presidency. Table 2. The system of lifelong responsibility
In addition, supervision of dismissed and retired employees has been strengthened. In 2013 The Central organization Department issued the "Opinions on further regulation of the activity leading cadres of party and government positions in enterprises in combination" (关于进–步规范党政领导干部在企业兼职(任职)问题的意见 // 共产党员网 [Opinions on the further regulation of the issue of the employment of senior personnel of the party and the government of positions at part-time enterprises // The network of the Communist Party. URL:https://news.12371.cn/2013/12/11/ARTI1386764247969196.shtml]). In 2017 The Central organization Department and four Department issued the "Opinions on the regulation of the practice of public servants after leaving public office" (关于进–步规范党政领导干部在企业兼职(任职)问题的意见 // 人民网 [Opinions on the regulation of the practice of civil servants after leaving public office // The online version of the People's Daily. URL:http://dangjian.people.com.cn/GB/136058/427510/428084/428612/428618/index.html]). It is stipulated that retired former civil servants who were previously members of the governing bodies of all levels, as well as other civil servants holding positions at the county level or higher, should not accept appointments from enterprises, intermediaries or other commercial organizations in the field and field of activity falling under the jurisdiction of their former positions, for three years years after retirement from public office/retirement, and should not personally engage in profit-making activities directly related to the business falling under the jurisdiction of their former positions. Other civil servants should not accept appointments from enterprises, intermediaries or organizations directly related to their previous employment, or engage in activities directly related to their previous work, for two years after resigning from public office/retirement." These decisions have gone down in history as an obstacle to the corruption of the revolving doors. Systemic prevention In January 2020, the fourth plenary session of the 19th Central Commission for discipline inspection, XI Jinping, has offered "...to ensure that officials do not dare, can not and have no desire to engage in corruption" (不敢腐、不能腐、不想腐) (习近平在十九届中央纪委四次全会上发表重要讲话 // 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站 [XI Jinping delivers important speech at the fourth plenary session of the 19th Central Commission for discipline inspection // Website of the Central people's Government of people's Republic of China. URL:https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-01/13/content_5468732.html]). In China, corrupt officials have been subjected to extremely severe punishment since ancient times: waterboarding, castration, lumbar slashing, body tearing, quartering, and execution with "a thousand incisions." The method of execution varied from era to era, but the goal was to cause the victim a slow and extremely painful death. Zhu Yuanzhang, the founder of the Ming Dynasty, even invented a "skinning system" in which corrupt officials were skinned, filled with hay and placed in front of their offices as a warning to their successors. The principle of "cannot engage in corruption" refers to the creation of a reliable oversight system. The authors carefully examined the documents issued by the Central Organizational Department from 2012 to 2021, including 24 documents in the category "education and training", which is 23.5% of the total number of documents. Training in China is similar to the training of doctors and scientists, as it is a step-by-step promotion. Cadres go from passing the civil service exam to becoming a senior official, just as a graduate student goes from associate professor to professor, and huge social resources are spent on training each senior official. From the point of view of caring for talents, the fight against corruption cannot simply kill corrupt officials. Instead, an early warning system has been created to detect minor corrupt actions of officials in time, which is also a kind of talent protection. Based on this concept and with the spread of digital government in China, a new trend in preventing corruption is combining anti-corruption with big data technology. Many regions in China have started the practice of fighting corruption using big data. Scientists have provided many research results based on these practices. Although there are still debates on these issues, such as the choice of indicators, the subject of supervision, legislation, the direction of development of the monitoring platform using big data has been determined, and the workflow looks like this. The first step is to create a database of personnel, then various indicators to monitor and assess the risk of corruption, and finally, appropriate measures are taken. Taking as an example a risk assessment system for leading personnel based on big data, Guo Yun and Yang Xiaokui presented the necessary indicators (Table 3) [2]. Table 3. Indicators for assessing the risk of dishonesty
They also developed an early warning model response mechanism for management supervision based on a score assessment of indicators (table 4). Table 4. Mechanism of managerial personnel supervision and early warning
Conclusion After the founding of the country in 1949, the supervision system in China was mainly based on the "internal supervision of the party" model. In April 1969, under the influence of the "cultural revolution", the supervision of the party was completely abolished. It was only in 1982 that the disciplinary inspection bodies were mostly reinstated in the party committees from the county level and above. In 1987, the Ministry of Supervision of the People's Republic of China was restored, and the model changed from "internal supervision of the party" to "internal supervision of the party + administrative supervision". In December 1997, at the 15th CPC Congress, the working mechanism for combating corruption was reviewed anew and the system of supervision of the party and the state was formed. Subsequently, decisions were made to complement the main supervisory bodies in the supervision system of the party and the state. In general, in 1949-2012, the development of China's supervisory system was characterized by the diversification of supervisory subjects – from one subject at the beginning of the country's foundation, two subjects during the period of reforms and openness, to many subjects during the period of deepening reforms and openness. Under Xi Jinping, China's surveillance system has been reformed in three main areas. Firstly, the legislation on the system of supervision of the party and the state was clarified, the use of relevant terms was standardized, the subject, object and forms of supervision were clarified. Secondly, a system of lifelong accountability was established based on the principle of "term of office is limited, but responsibility is not". Thirdly, a new model of supervision "education + punishment + prevention" was introduced, especially in the field of corruption prevention, with an emphasis on the use of new technologies, big data, which made it possible for "everyone to exercise supervision (supervision of everyone)". The article was written in the days of the 3rd Plenum of the CPC Central Committee of the 20th convocation, held 15-18 July 2024 July 18, he was made the "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist party of China on further comprehensive deepening of reform and the promotion of modernization in the Chinese style" (中共中央关于进–步全面深化改革 推进中国式现代化的决定 // 共产党员网 [The decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on further comprehensive deepening of reforms and promotion of Chinese modernization // The network of the Communist Party. URL:https://www.12371.cn/2024/07/21/ARTI1721551217863166.shtml]). The document consists of 60 sections, of which the 59th is devoted to supervision. It seems to us that the main focus here is on three topics: 1. combating collusion between business and government; 2. combating the practice of privilege; 3. arresting corrupt officials fleeing to foreign countries. In this, we see a logical continuation of Xi Jinping's line to promote the political control of a Chinese official. References
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