Trust and the Russian Orthodox Church: the dependence of dynamics on the socio-political context and the problem of accurate measurement

Baikov Mikhail Denisovich ORCID: 0000-0003-0365-4635 Student, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Saint Tikhon's Orthodox University of the Humanities 127051, Russia, Moscow, lane. Likhov, 6, room 420 baykoff.mixaif@mail.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction

The problem of public trust has been of interest to sociologists for many decades. The consensus view of trust is its understanding as an element of social life, without which the successful functioning of society, people's recognition of political institutions, the legitimacy of the government itself and, in general, public safety and order are impossible ^[1].

Trust is interpreted as "the expectation that members of a given community will behave normally and honestly, showing a willingness to help each other in accordance with generally accepted norms" ^[2]. Simply put, trust permeates everyday culture, providing a space of stability and comfort, confidence that having left home in the morning, we will return in the evening without experiencing any problems in public transport, at work, in a store or a movie theater. The phenomenon of trust is studied from different angles: from the perspective of gender studies ^[3], from the perspective of visionary trends in the field of high technology ^[4], from the perspective of the factor of political life and legal regulation ^{[5] [6]}, as well as through the study of economic influence ^{[7] [8]}.

It is not surprising that in Russia trust occupies an important niche in sociological surveys of large sociological organizations (WCIOM, FOM, Levada-Center*). More often the attention of the media and their audience is tied to the observation of the dynamics of trust in political actors: the president, the government, the chambers of parliament or institutions of regional power - the results of such measurements are discussed almost every month ^[9]. However, the surveys themselves cover the problem of trust more broadly, being interested in trust in law enforcement agencies, courts, media, business and religious organizations.

In this paper we will examine the trust of the Russian Orthodox Church on the part of Russian society. Our goal is to understand the dynamics of trust in the Russian Orthodox Church and, if possible, to identify the events that influence these changes.

1. Foreign and domestic studies of trust

Francis Fukuyama was one of the first sociologists of the twentieth century to become thoroughly interested in the problem of trust in society ^[10]. His book "Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity" (1995) ^[11] characterizes trust as a necessary component for economic growth and stability of society.

Trust, according to Fukuyama, is a key characteristic of a developed human society, manifested both at the individual level and at the social level (trust in public institutions and the state as a whole). It is trust that determines progress; the success of society does not depend on market principles or adherence to tradition, but on one element of culture that is pervasive - the level of trust that exists in society.

Fukuyama explores the relationship between trust and institutions, arguing that trust is both a product of good institutions and a necessary condition for their success. He also explores the influence of culture on trust, suggesting that certain cultural factors can either increase or decrease the level of trust in a society.

Fukuyama classifies societies according to the prevalence of trust in modern structures: he classifies "trust-based" liberal democracies (USA, Germany, Japan) as a group with a high level of trust, while traditionalist countries (China, Mexico), European "lightweights" (France, Italy), as well as the countries of Eastern Europe and the former USSR as societies with a low level of trust.

Economic progress, in Fukuyama's view, is a kind of "reward" to society for internal harmony, the lack of which prevents economic prosperity. This harmony can be found only in the process of social evolution, which does not allow "jumping" through its individual stages ("from feudalism to communism"). As applied to the countries of the former USSR, this means that they have a long way to go - a new system of values of public behavior should be formed in the post-Soviet space ^[2].

Polish sociologist Piotr Sztompka in his book "Trust - the basis of society" (2007) ^[11] in a sense continues the view of trust as a socio-cultural variable of perception of reality that holds society together. He argues that trust is the key to building and maintaining a stable, functioning society.

The author also divides societies according to the level of trust:

In countries with a high level of trust (Norway, Sweden, Holland, Japan, USA, Germany) people act based on the principle: "the other is trustworthy until it turns out that he is a cheat". In countries with a low level of trust (Brazil, Nigeria, Italy, France, Russia and, unfortunately, recently Poland) understand this principle vice versa: "everyone is a potential criminal, cheat, bribe taker, agent, until he proves to us that he is a decent person" ^{[1, p. 20]}.

Stompka explores various forms of trust, from interpersonal relationships to global networks, from trust in the state to science. He also explores the challenges to trust posed by factors of globalization, inequality and cultural diversity, and considers how societies can work to build and maintain trust in the face of these challenges. While recognizing that there is a crisis of trust ^[12], Sztompka notes the existence of new horizons and prospects for its development, and of course argues that trust is the foundation of society.

Turning to domestic studies, let us look at the article by Lev Gudkov, Director of the Analytical Center of Yuri Levada* (in 2006-2021) "Trust in Russia: meaning, functions, structure" ^[13]. In the article, L. Gudkov characterizes the Russian sociological field and the development of society as a whole on the basis of indicators and dynamics of trust. He points out the hereditary character of legitimization of some social and political institutions, which was perceived from the Soviet structures and which from this, based on nostalgia, receive solid figures of trust (FSB, prosecutor's office, courts, government in general), and shows a strong distrust of new structures in Russian society - business, civil organizations, etc.

Trust is defined in the article as "a social mechanism that characterizes the effectiveness or significance of various institutions of society, and the ability to distinguish the boundaries of their action - as one of the evidences of capacity or socialization of individuals" [13 p. 41]. The definition is also given:

... "trust" as a social interaction focused on a high probability (chances) that the actions of partners (and they can be not only individuals, but also social groups or institutions) will proceed in accordance with the order expected by the subject of action, based on mutual moral or value obligations, coercion, customs, traditions, social conventions, ideological beliefs, material interests, generally accepted or imputed to all members of the community anthropological ideas ^{[13, p. 20]}.

Of particular interest for our work is the part of the article devoted to the consideration of the institution of the Church ^{[13, p. 34]}. L. Gudkov, based on the Levada Center polls*, states:

1. Before 2007, trust in the Russian Orthodox Church was significantly higher among the less educated part of the population (44-45%).

2. Highly educated and elderly people are rather wary of the Church.

3. maximum positive attitude to the Church in rural areas and small towns.

L. Gudkov explains the relatively high level of trust in the polls^[1]  by the fact that the society back in the Yeltsin era gave the ROC a credit of trust to replenish the lost traditions and moral guidelines ^{[13, p. 34]}.

Then L. Gudkov, in my opinion, makes a very categorical statement. He writes that the ROC has not seriously tried to take any practical steps towards the replenishment of values, "realizing the absurdity and unrealism of such goals". He writes about the lack of intellectual, educational and cultural resources to interpret the "old traditions" in the context of the challenges of the time. The Russian Orthodox Church, according to L. Gudkov, has limited itself to "imposing on society the available ritual and dogmatic surrogates of religious understanding of life problems" ^{[13, p. 34]}.

Using the power resource of the state, the ROC became a monopolist in the market of religious services. This allowed it to claim an appropriate institutional role and receive privileges and benefits associated with occupying high social positions and receiving associated privileges from the state.

Next, the radical idea is voiced that the Russian Orthodox Church has successfully become an exponent of state policy in the formation of a new post-Soviet morality, has become "the only authority in matters of representing "Russian civilization", the guardian and exponent of national traditions" ^{[13, p. 32]}, and also speaks of a "weak and disoriented population" ready to follow fundamentalist, "less educated than the average population", priests.

Wishing to move on to other works, let us nevertheless point out some personal doubts about L. Gudkov's position. We agree with the opinion about the institutional side of the ROC's life - indeed, in its public positions and actions we see elements of a structure loyal to the state, responsible, in the logic of state bureaucrats, for maintaining "spirituality" and promoting traditional values, as well as an "image-maker" for politicians (as evidenced, for example, by the presence of officials at Christmas and Easter services as guests of honor). 

However, it also seems to us that beyond a hierarchically organized organization with its own survival policy, the ROC includes parish communities, which are certainly not political subjects, and yet they are often the ones by which the lives of the majority of parishioners are confined and by which it seems that Russians who call themselves Orthodox should judge the Church.

The respondent answering the questions about trust in the Russian Orthodox Church is obviously focused on his personal experience of interaction with this institution, and therefore judges it not so much as a "department of spiritual propaganda of the government" (metaphorical understanding of L. Gudkov's opinion), but as a place where he put candles, ordered a funeral service and consecrated kulichi. In the case of his involvement in church life ^[14] - as a place where he received support and engaged in socially useful activities, finding a community of like-minded people and solidarizing with the group supporting him ^[15].

Leaving the rest of the opinion for the conclusion of this work, let us note the general complexity of trust measurement. There is no universal methodology for measuring trust in public authorities and public institutions. Given the multifaceted nature of the phenomenon of trust, it is impossible to consider it only from one side, with the help of only one indicator. Trust is a set of assessments of various processes taking place in society in the socio-economic sphere, politics, which is formed by the population's satisfaction with the activities of the authorities in the performance of assigned functions ^[16].

Е. N. Cherintsyna in her article "Political trust: how to measure it?" identifies four approaches:

1. Measurement using socio-economic criteria. That is, with the help of methodologies based on objective economic, specifically expressed indicators. Such methodologies include: the ratio of economic actors to money, indicators of tax discipline, an index of the moral state of society, an index of corruption, material well-being, etc.

2. Sociological measurement by means of surveys (straightforward questioning).

3. Determining the level of trust through the degree of development of civic activity and political participation. That is, through participation in elections, political actions, work of public organizations, volunteering and public control, even organization of TPS.

According to O.V. Kersanov, the tendency of CBT development is as follows: the lower the level of trust in society, the higher the level of formalization of relations between people. Thus, institutional trust directly correlates with the development of TPSG: the presence of horizontal ties, communication with the authorities, self-identification of citizens as neighbors ^[17].

4. Measurement through indirect indicators indicating the level of trust. Such as: competence, efficiency of the authorities, level of socio-economic development of the region, level and quality of life of the population, openness and transparency.

In short, trust can be evidenced both by its direct measurement through sociological surveys and by analyzing various indices and indirect indicators related to the space of trust relations. If these approaches are valid for measuring trust in the authorities, then we believe that trust in the Church can also be measured by other means than by sociological surveys. For example, to take into account the indicators of attendance of festive services, consecration of kulich, the number of weddings and even the level of religiosity.

Concluding this review section, let us pay attention to the work "Trust of believers in church and public authorities as a basis for self-realization of the individual in civil society" by O. V. Orlova ^[18]. The article asserts the decline in the level of trust in the Church for the following reasons:

1. The Church often manipulates believers in the interests of the church hierarchy.

2. Observance of religious canons in modern society is not an indicator of virtue and socially approved behavior.

3. The use of religion in the interests of the ruling elite.

4. Growing conflict between different religions, each of which claims to be true and exclusive. And other ^{[18, p. 20]}.

In general, the article asserts the political role of the Russian Orthodox Church and its use in order to ensure state policy in the sphere of spirituality. However, it is noted that this positioning of the Russian Orthodox Church reduces the level of trust, which could be much higher if the Church was engaged in social and charitable service, instead of certain political statements.

Here again, we want to emphasize that there is no fundamental difference in the image of the Church in society. At the moment, we are conducting in-depth interviews on the topic of trust, and already now we can safely say about the rather obvious difference in the consciousness of an ordinary person between the world of spiritual life and the world of the "church on television". All respondents divided the Church into a community of believers and a social institution with its own management apparatus and earthly goals.

2. Sociological surveys on trust in the ROC

Having completed the literature review in the previous section, let us turn to the analysis of sociological surveys. We will consider the surveys of the Public Opinion Foundation, the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Research and the Levada Center*.

2.1. Public Opinion Foundation:

We took the poll "Attitude to the ROC and the patriarch: assessment of the influence of the ROC on the public and political life of the country" on April 19, 2022 ^[19]. FOMnibus, a weekly all-Russian apartment poll, was conducted on April 8-10, 2022.

Representative survey of the population aged 18 and older. The survey involved 1,500 respondents - residents of 104 urban and rural settlements in 53 constituent entities of the Russian Federation. Face-to-face interviews were conducted at the place of residence of respondents. The statistical error does not exceed 3.6%.

There were 7 questions about the Russian Orthodox Church and the patriarch, our interest is satisfied by the question "Do you trust or do not trust the Russian Orthodox Church?". The answers "I trust", "I do not trust", "I find it difficult to answer" are provided.

The results also include results from similar surveys for 2014, 2015, 2017, 2019 and 2020. In 2015 and 2017, measurements were conducted twice and average values are given:

Table 1. Do you trust or not trust the ROC?

Source: Attitude to the ROC and the patriarch // FOM. April 19, 2022.

It should also be noted that the population over 60 years of age (78% of the group trusts) and the population of cities with less than 50 thousand people (76% of the group trusts) trust the ROC the most. Most of all do not trust the residents of Moscow (27% of the group do not trust), while the lowest level of trust exists in cities with a population of one million people (58% of the group trust).

We can note that according to the FOM survey, trust in the ROC tended to increase in the year of the return of Crimea. During the COVID-19 pandemic, trust decreased. In 2022, amid the need for spiritual unity during the SWO, trust increased by 13 percentage points relative to 2020.

Note also that trust in the patriarch declined sharply in 2020, with 39% expressing trust, down from 54% on Feb. 3, 2019.

2.2. The All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center:

We consider the results of surveys presented in the report of the Director General of the VCIOM Foundation K. Abramov "Trust in Public Institutions" ^[20].

The WCIOM-Satellite survey sample: 1600 respondents, represents the adult population of the Russian Federation (18+) by gender, age, level of education and type of settlement. The sample is stratified two-basis random, based on the full telephone list of telephone numbers (fixed and mobile) involved in the territory of the Russian Federation. The margin of error is 2.5%.

Formalized telephone interview in which the interviewer asks questions and records responses. Coverage of at least 80 regions, 500 cities and towns, 100 villages. Control: listening to at least 10% of interviews; control of interview duration.

The uniqueness of VCIOM polls is their use of the wording of the question "Do you generally approve or disapprove of the activity of...?". As we can see, there is no trust here, but some kind of approval. Based on WCIOM's own analysis, they equate these concepts, although, of course, there are some differences between them. For example, in polls on political rating, approval is the more winning formulation, because it implies "frontal" frankness and actually a test of loyalty (to approve of the president's activity is a socially preferable answer; to trust the president at the same time is not at all necessary). Approval, in essence, is reduced to specific political actions, while trust reflects a general emotional attitude.

However, if for state institutions the question about approval puts the respondent in a deadlock of political loyalty, the same question about the Russian Orthodox Church gives the right to count on an honest answer, approximately equal to the question about trust. That's what VCIOM believes, and that's what we will believe as well. Although the polls still show high results relative to the FOM data considered.

So, the question "Do you generally approve or disapprove of the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church?" from 2012 received the following results:

Table 2. Results of the VCIOM survey.

Once again, it is worth noting the growth of indicators in 2014, after the Crimean spring, as well as the decline during the COVID-19 pandemic. Of course, we should not speak about the unconditional influence of external processes on the dynamics of the rating. However, a pattern can still be seen behind this connection.

We would also like to point out that the Russian Orthodox Church ranks second in the rating, after the Russian army. In 2012 and 2013, the Russian Orthodox Church was in first place in the rating of public institutions (giving way to the president in the global rating of public and political institutions).

2.3. Levada Center*:

We took the 2017 "Institutional Trust" survey ^[21] and the 2022 survey "Trust in Public Institutions" ^[22].

The survey "Institutional Trust" was conducted on September 15-19, 2017 on a representative all-Russian sample of urban and rural population among 1,600 people aged 18 years and older, in 137 settlements in 48 regions of the country. The survey is conducted at the respondent's home using the method of personal interview. The distribution of answers is given as a percentage of the total number of respondents together with the data of previous surveys. The statistical error for a sample of 1600 people (with a probability of 0.95) does not exceed:

1.        3.4% for rates close to 50%.

2.        2.9% for rates close to 25% / 75%.

3.        2.0% for indicators close to 10% / 90%.

4.        1.5% for indicators close to 5% / 95%.

The question that respondents answer about trust is: "To what extent do you think ... are trustworthy?" The respondent could give only one answer: "Quite deserving", "Not quite deserving", "Not at all deserving", "Difficult to answer".

The results of trust in the Church, religious organizations received the following distribution:

Table 3: Institutional trust // ANO Levada Center*, October 20, 2017.

The index of trust in social institutions was calculated as the difference between "Quite deserves" and "Not at all deserves" - 1/2 of "Not quite deserves"; the higher the value, the higher the level of trust:

Table 4. Index of trust in social institutions // ANO Levada-Center*, October 20, 2017.

In the survey, the Church and religious organizations are ranked 4th in institutional trust.

The survey "Trust in Public Institutions" was conducted on August 25-31, 2022 on a representative all-Russian sample of urban and rural population of 1612 people aged 18 years and older in 137 settlements, 50 subjects of the Russian Federation. The research is conducted at the respondent's home by personal interview method.

Distribution of answers is given as a percentage of the total number of respondents together with the data of previous surveys. The statistical error for a sample of 1600 people (with a probability of 0.95) does not exceed:

1.        3.4% for rates close to 50%.

2.        2.9% for rates close to 25% / 75%.

3.        2.0% for indicators close to 10% / 90%.

4.        1.5% for indicators close to 5% / 95%.

The question that respondents answer about trust is: "To what extent do you think ... are trustworthy?" "Quite deserving", "Not quite deserving", "Not at all deserving", "Difficult to answer".

The tables show data from similar surveys since 1997, each year a question was asked about trust in the Church and religious organizations.

The results of the surveys are presented in the graph we have collected, reflecting the percentage of those who answered "Quite deserving":

Picture 1. Percentage of respondents who answered "Quite deserving" to the question about ­trust in the Church and religious organizations

Source: Trust in public institutions // ANO Levada-Center*, September 20, 2022.

We see an increase in trust in the Church in 2010, 2015 and 2022. The first increase is likely due to the election of Patriarch Kirill to the patriarchal throne, who is engaged in productive media activity and epitomizes change in church life.

We note a significant increase in confidence by 11 p.p. in 2022 compared to 2021 and reaching the confidence level of 2014-2015. Trust in 2022 is probably closely related to the ongoing Special Military Operation.

In general, we can assume the existence of the influence of political events on the trust in religious organizations. To some extent, this confirms the words of L. Gudkov in the 2012 article we reviewed about the ROC as part of state policy. But still, in our opinion, this still does not reflect the underlying motives for high trust. The SWO, apart from the emerging patriotic feelings in hearts, could also increase the level of anxiety about the future and about their relatives, which led to turning to religious organizations for consolation.

Also, the trust in the ROC may be caused not so much by the patriarch's speeches, to whom the statements required by the socio-political situation primarily belong, but also by the social service of the Church and its actions aimed at active support of the Russian military and various humanitarian projects.

3. Results of survey analysis

3.1 Conclusions on sociological services:

1. Levada-Center* conducts trust in public and political institutions annually. Churches and religious organizations since 1997.

2. WCIOM conducts surveys of approval, not trust. This affects the final results, however, the dynamics correlate with other polls.

3. Published results of FOM polls are of the greatest interest, as they contain a common database, and also the site publishes the results of trust in different socio-demographic groups, in different localities.

4. FOM and Levada-Center* use face-to-face and door-to-door canvassing (random sampling).

5. WCIOM uses the method of formalized telephone interview. The sample is random, from a database of numbers registered in the Russian Federation.

We assume that due to the use of a different method of sociological survey, VCIOM receives slightly inflated figures.

Despite the difference in the values of the level of trust in the Church in different sociological surveys, we can see some similarities, at least in the dynamics regarding the most significant events of socio-political life.

We present the general results of the polls conducted by FOM, WCIOM and Levada-Center* in the form of the following figure, despite the fact that Levada-Center has been conducting polls since 1997, in the diagram we have taken the results from 2009, considering the year of Patriarch Kirill's enthronement a new milestone in the history of the Russian Orthodox Church:

Picture 2. Summary results of church trust by three sociological services.

3.2 Conclusions from the surveys:

1. We see points of growth and decline of the ROC rating:

- growth: 2010 (after the enthronement of Patriarch Kirill), 2014-2015 (return of Crimea), 2022 (SWO).

- fall: 2013 (Pussy Riot case, law on insulting the feelings of believers), 2016 (Sokolovsky case), 2020-2021 (COVID-19 pandemic).

2. According to our assumption, the Church's trust is related to its participation in the socio-political life of the state and statements or activities around these events.

3. The research methodology does not pay attention to the individual characteristics of respondents and their religiosity. This is assessed by us as a shortcoming that affects the reality of the interpreted results.

Summarizing the results

Concluding the article, let us emphasize again that trust is an important factor for the stability and prosperity of society. Various factors, such as economic condition, quality of governance, social integration, and various indices (corruption, moral condition), can influence the level of public trust.

A higher level of trust can lead to better economic productivity, a high level of participation in the decision-making process, and a high level of happiness among residents ^[23]. On the other hand, low levels of trust can lead to social inequality, conflicts, instability, and can hinder the functioning of all spheres of public life, particularly the political process and democratic procedures ^[24]. Improving the level of public trust can not only improve the quality of life in society, but can also contribute to economic growth and strengthen civic solidarity at the level of moral perception ^[25].

Trust in the Church and religious organizations is also of great importance. In Russia, it remains at a fairly high level, with trust in the Church ranking 2nd to 4th in the overall rating of social institutions. The conclusions about the trust in the Russian Orthodox Church according to opinion polls and points of growth and decline in the rating due to various events were presented on the last pages of the previous section, and now they do not need to be duplicated.

Returning to our skepticism about Lev Gudkov's words about the role and place of the Russian Orthodox Church in Russian society, we would like to note an unaccounted-for problem in the study of trust in the Russian Orthodox Church - ignoring the religiosity of respondents and their involvement in church life. In our opinion, there is a significant difference between a person's trust in the Church as one of the platforms for state policy and as a place where a person receives comfort and personal joy, being in Eucharistic communion with other members of the Church. It is possible to establish such a distinction and the connection between trust and religiosity only through in-depth interviews. Work on this is already underway, in particular in studies of the relationship between religiosity and politics ^[26]. We hope to soon present new results of this work.

* иностранный агент / ANO "Yuri Levada Analytical Center" was included in the register of non-profit organizations performing the functions of a "foreign agent" by the decision of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation dated September 5, 2016.

^[1] The ROC was ranked third in the polls after the President and the Prime Minister. Provided that during the last Levada Center* surveys used in the article Dmitry Medvedev was President and Vladimir Putin was Prime Minister.