Political Messianism as the Basis of the Russian Imperial Myth

Tselykovskiy Aleksey Andreevich ORCID: 0000-0002-2442-5463 PhD in Philosophy Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Lipetsk State Technical University 398055, Russia, Lipetsk region, Lipetsk, Moskovskaya str., 30 alts1085@mail.ru

The FZRW-2023-0005 project was implemented at the Lipetsk State Technical University based on the results of the selection of research projects in the field of socio-political sciences conducted by the EISI, the Ministry of Higher Education and Science of the Russian Federation and the Russian Academy of Sciences

Introduction

The attention to the problem of political mythology from the side of humanitarian knowledge is largely due not so much to theoretical interest as to the established socio-political practice. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the abandonment of an established system of value orientations. As a result, the new Russian state has been in a state of choosing the path of further development for three decades, and the search for new spiritual and value foundations remains one of the most important tasks to this day. The policy of adopting Western political values has been replaced by the desire to find their own development model. Thus, the issue of the factors determining socio-political practice is more relevant than ever. In this regard, the phenomenon of modern political myth, which is an effective tool for managing socio-political practice and the formation of historical consciousness, attracts research interest.

The specifics of archaic mythology

To understand the specifics and properties of modern mythology, it is necessary to turn to the properties of archaic mythology. In archaic societies, mythology was an integral system of cognition and understanding of reality. Its main functions include the accumulation, conceptualization and translation of socio-cultural experience, as well as the formation of stereotypes of social behavior.

At the same time, mythology, as a worldview system, had specific properties. The reason for this lies in the peculiarities of mythological thinking. Primitive mythological thinking was characterized by a high level of syncretism of emotional-affective and cognitive components, which was expressed in a strong emotional coloring, the absence of a clear subject-object distinction, and the inability to formulate general abstract concepts. In particular, E.M. Meletinsky noted on this occasion: "The diffuseness of primitive thinking manifested itself in the indistinct separation of subject and object, material and ideal (i.e., object and sign, thing and word, being and its name), thing and its attributes, singular and multiple, static and dynamic, spatial and temporal relations" ^{[1, p. 165]}. Due to this, the procedure of systematization and conceptualization of experience in the myth took place in a rather complicated way. For example, I.M. Dyakonov defined myth as "a way of mass and stable expression of the worldview and worldview of a person who has not yet created an apparatus of abstract generalizing concepts and a corresponding technique of logical reasoning" ^{[2, p. 9]}. This does not mean that archaic man was incapable of systematization and thought exclusively in particular categories. This property of the myth led to the fact that the result of understanding the facts of the surrounding reality was not a specific concept, but a multi-valued visual and sensual image. I.M. Dyakonov characterized this feature of mythological thinking as follows: "Incapable of abstract generalization, it is forced to transmit generalizations through tropes…Since emotions are fundamentally impossible to convey (verbally or figuratively) by generalizing them in abstract concepts, then it remains for myth–making (and later art) to convey generalizations associatively through a separate one. But this "separate" is not a single one, but an image with an unlimited number of possible emotional associations" ^{[2, p. 38]}.

Thus, the result of generalization and comprehension of experience by mythological thinking was not an abstract idea, but a multi-valued image. It follows that in the structure of the mythological plot there are stable semantic components – archetypes, which, on the one hand, combine and generalize the accumulated experience, that is, they are the result of knowledge of the surrounding world, and, on the other hand, they themselves become paradigms of social behavior.

In the context of the problem under study, the term "archetype" will be used in the interpretation of the mythologist M. Eliade, who considered myth as a universal model for any manifestations of human creative activity.  According to the researcher, the myth "always has to do with "creation": the myth tells how something came into the world or how certain forms of behavior, institutions or work skills arose; that is why the myth forms a paradigm for all significant acts of human behavior" ^{[3, p. 28]}. Exploring various archaic myths, M. Eliade came to the conclusion that the main function of the myth is to form exemplary schemes of creative activity and social behavior of a person.

M. Eliade paid special attention to the so-called cosmogonic myths that tell about the creation of the world and man. With all the variety of these myths, their plot basis is the same: the transformation of the original Chaos into Space by the demiurge deity. Chaos is understood as unformed and unorganized matter. The cosmos, in turn, is characterized as an ordered and harmonious state of the world, as matter that has taken a complete form. The narrative of structuring unformed Chaos into an ordered Cosmos contains the most important mythological archetype of the center or world axis. To mythological thinking, space appears to be heterogeneous, divided into two areas: the sacred center (the world axis – "axis mundi") and the periphery (hostile territory).  According to A.V. Podosinov, "a person always perceives the world around him relative to himself, believing himself to be at the center of the universe; he is the starting point for any action, any measurement, any attempt to define, structure and measure space. The egocentric position of man as a biological being then extends to broader communities of people – family, community, village, city, region, country, space. All this applies to modern man, but it was even more relevant for an archaic man with his mythopoeic consciousness, which sacralizes the concept of the Center" ^{[4, p. 38]}.

It should be noted that awareness of one's own uniqueness and identity is almost impossible without contrasting the center of the periphery. The mythological archetypes of the center (Cosmos) and the periphery (Chaos) are realized in the structure of political myth in the form of a dyad of "friends and strangers". As T.V. Evgenieva notes, "for identification with the community perceived as "we", the image of "them", enemies and ill-wishers is essential... The most important feature of political mythology, built on the principle of "we are them", is the perception of moral norms and prescriptions only in relation to us. "They" are not an object of morality, as if they are outside the sphere regulated by it" ^{[5, p. 26]}.

In many mythological plots, the cosmogony was followed by the era of a wonderful happy time, characterized by the presence of supernatural beings in the world, all kinds of abundance and even the immortality of the first people. Mythological representations of this kind represent the archetype of the golden age.

The key element of the cosmogonic myth is the figure of the creator deity or cultural hero. According to E.M. Meletinsky, "the acts of primordial creation correspond in archaic mythologies to the heroes who lived and acted in mythical times, who can be called the first ancestors-demiurgists – cultural heroes. The concepts of these three categories are intertwined, or rather, syncretically undivided. In this complex, the basic principle is the ancestral ancestral, phratrial, tribal. The latter can sometimes be thought of as universal, since tribal boundaries in the minds of members of a primitive community coincide with universal ones. The first ancestor-demiurge – cultural hero, in fact, models the primitive community as a whole, identified with "real people" ^{[1, p. 178]}. Thus, the archetype of the cultural hero in the mythological plot is embodied in the form of a demiug – the creator of the Universe, the organizer and organizer of the world. Also, this archetype can be represented as the founder of a particular ancestral community or the human race as a whole.

The specifics of modern mythology

As an integral system of worldview, mythology is being destroyed in the process of rationalization of public consciousness. However, rationalized mythology, having undergone various transformations, nevertheless remained a significant component of social reality. This is evidenced, in particular, by the phenomenon of modern mythology. The process of rationalization of mythological thinking can be represented as a transition from the direct perception of the mythological archetype to its symbolic interpretation. However, having turned into a symbol, the myth remained a significant social phenomenon.

Thus, the process of rationalization of mythology led to the desacralization and symbolization of its content. Despite the fact that mythology as an integral system ceased to exist, mythological archetypes expressed in symbolic form retained their social significance, generating unconscious associations and programming certain social behavior of the subject. It is in a symbolic form that mythology exists in modern culture. The archetype fixed in the myth (the program of social behavior) is no longer directly revealed, it appears as a symbol.

The concept of a symbol reveals the mechanism of functioning of the modern political myth. The symbol, as a way of transmitting information, presupposes polysemy, which necessarily implies different contexts of interpretation. According to S.S. Averintsev, the concept of a symbol is revealed through the concepts of an image and a sign that are similar in meaning. The author says that "a symbol is an image taken in the aspect of its signification, and that it is a sign endowed with all the organicity of the myth and the inexhaustible ambiguity of the image" ^{[6, pp. 388-387]}. The sign is an unambiguous, non-interpretable message, which cannot be said about the symbol. The nature of the symbol lies in the polyphony of meanings and meanings. According to V.V. Ilyin's observation: "A symbol is a semantic reality, a sign is a signifier" ^{[7, p. 21]}. A significant difference also lies in the way the symbol and the sign are perceived. Intellectual effort is enough to read the sign, but the symbol requires emotional involvement.

The concept of "mythological archetype" is generally quite close to the concept of "symbol". The symbol translates meaning through an image that evokes an intellectual reaction and an emotional response. For mythological thinking, meaning is also concentrated in the form of a visual image – an archetype. The difference is that for mythological thinking, the archetype is an immediate reality. In this regard, the symbol is a tool with which the rationalistic consciousness can understand the depth of the mythological image, get used to it. As S.S. Averintsev noted, "the meaning of the symbol cannot be deciphered by a simple effort of the mind, one must "get used to" it. This is the fundamental difference between a symbol and an allegory: the meaning of the symbol does not exist as a kind of rational formula that can be "embedded" in the image and then extracted from the image" ^{[8, p. 156]}.

The archetype symbol is a mythological archetype rationalized and expressed in symbolic form, while retaining its paradigmatic meaning. Rational reflection makes it possible, using these archetypal symbols and interpreting them accordingly, to construct a political myth. Based on this, it can be concluded that modern myth-making is a process of reproducing rationalized archetypal symbols within the framework of an ideological system.

For example, implemented within the framework of political mythology, the symbol-archetype of the sacred center supports the collective's ideas about its own uniqueness and identity. In political myth, the symbol-archetype of the center is combined with a geographical object of important political or cultural significance – with the capital or another city that played an important role in the history of the nation, with religious and cult objects or with the country as a whole. Territorial expansion and expansion of the sphere of influence in this case is interpreted by political mythology as the fulfillment of a historical mission.

An equally significant archetype symbol reproduced by political mythology is the archetype symbol of the cultural hero. Power is personified in the image of a leader, so the symbol-archetype of the hero is perhaps the most sought-after and stable component of political discourse. According to N.G. Shcherbinina, "the most politically influential archetype is the Hero, who becomes a form for representing political leadership and power in any culture and at all times" ^{[9, p.]}. Undoubtedly, the symbol-archetype of the hero has a huge semantic range and in political discourse can be embodied in a variety of forms and images. In the structure of modern political myth, this archetype symbol can be interpreted as a ruler and legislator, the founder of the state.  In the minds of the masses, the leader acquires the features of a mythological hero, the well-being of the country and the nation is associated with his personality. From a politician, he turns into a sacred figure, into a savior and defender. Thus, the representation of a political leader in accordance with the symbol-archetype of the hero significantly increases his capabilities and powers.

The archetype of the golden age is transformed into various ideals of social structure and political organization, the archetype of the hero forms the basis of ideas about the ideal ruler, the archetype of the center – into ideas about significant cultural and historical (sacred) centers.

The structure of the political myth, therefore, can be represented as follows. The constitutive element of a political myth is mythological symbols-archetypes, thanks to which, firstly, the sacralization of political processes takes place, and secondly, the translation of values. In addition, the modern myth appeals to the unconscious layers of social consciousness, causing an emotional response and provoking certain behavior.

Mythological symbols-archetypes form stable political myths that determine political consciousness and reflect the view of a people or nation on its history and culture. They form a "meta-level" of political myth, that is, an idealized and mythologized view of the history of a nation or state. Political myths of this kind are not just political tools, they determine the specifics of the national political culture. The imperial political myth belongs to the meta-level of political myth.

The Imperial Myth and Political Messianism

Let's consider the main stages of the formation of the imperial political myth. Perhaps one of the most important factors that predetermined the specifics of the most stable national political myths was the adoption of Orthodoxy. As a socio-political factor, Orthodoxy has become the ideological basis of the young state, strengthening in particular the authority of the princely government. L.A. Andreeva writes about this: "The expansion and strengthening of Ancient Russia, which waged frequent wars, led to the isolation and rise of the military aristocratic elite led by the Grand Duke. The power of the Grand Duke of Kiev in the second half of the tenth century increasingly acquires autocratic features. The increased de facto military and economic power of the grand ducal government did not have an adequate ideological support in paganism, which did not contribute to the suggestion to members of society of a type of behavior based on direct religious motivation of subordination to princely power" ^{[10, p. 180]}. In Orthodox Christianity, the grand ducal power finds the necessary ideological and ideological support. The adoption of Orthodoxy brought into the national political culture a Christian understanding of the ruler as the vicar of God on earth, the defender of subjects and the source of laws.  

In addition, by adopting Orthodoxy, Russia distanced itself not only from the pagan and Muslim East, but also from the Catholic West. The trend towards isolation intensified with the conquest of Orthodox Byzantium by Muslim Turks. Russia remained virtually the only independent Orthodox state, which further strengthened in the national political consciousness the symbol-the archetype of the center, as well as cosmogonic symbols-the archetypes of Chaos and Space. Russia has become, in the full sense of the word, the center of the Orthodox faith. This is perhaps one of the most significant cultural and historical factors that have shaped the national political culture. In accordance with mythological archetypal symbols, Russia becomes a Cosmos – a sacred center sanctified by true values, traditions and laws, surrounded by hostile forces. Russia's goal and mission was to preserve this true spiritual heritage, to constantly contain the onslaught of the forces of Chaos.

Finally, Messianic ideas took shape in the form of the political myth "Moscow is the third Rome", which reflected both the growing political ambitions of the Russian state and the desire to strengthen its spiritual foundations. The political myth "Moscow is the third Rome" developed at the turn of the XV-XVI centuries during the formation of a single centralized Moscow state. Having made its religious choice in favor of Orthodoxy, Russia became closer to the Byzantine Empire. The feeling of spiritual connection with Orthodox Byzantium eventually developed into the idea of continuity. The collapse of the second Rome, Constantinople, allowed Moscow to declare itself the third Rome, that is, the heir of Byzantium.

In Philotheus' epistle, "Rome" was understood not as a military or political center, but as an "indestructible" spiritual kingdom that "remains motionless" in history. Such a view of the fall of Byzantium is a direct consequence of the betrayal of the Orthodox faith by the Greeks, which occurred after the conclusion of the Ferraro-Florentine Union. The second Rome – Constantinople changed the true faith and lost its status as the center of Orthodoxy, and then completely ceased to exist. The Moscow state, on the contrary, while remaining faithful to Orthodoxy, assumed a great spiritual mission. The consolidation of Messianism in the national political consciousness is associated with the formation of a centralized Russian state, as well as with the growth of its military and political power.

Among other signs of the emerging unified Russian state, one can name a strong despotic government and, accordingly, the centralization and bureaucratization of public administration. Unlimited monarchical power has been strengthened for a number of historical reasons. For example, Ilyin V.V., Akhiezer A.S. give the following comment on this matter: "The relief manifestation of absolutism in Russia was the hypertrophy of state (monarch) power. The reason for this was the objective logic of the folding of the national sovereign body. Militarily and politically restraining the colonization pressure of the West, economically with an inefficient low-productive agricultural culture dominated by three fields (the main area), subsections (forest strips of the north), perelog (steppes of the south) Russia conducted forced colonization of the south and east, providing frontiers, expanding the reproductive base" ^{[11, p. 165]}. Military needs, as well as the specifics of the economic organization of the emerging state, largely predetermined its political structure.

As already mentioned, the ideological support of the Moscow sovereign was the political myth of the third Rome. The Russian sovereign presented himself not only as an anointed of God, but also as a defender of the only correct creed. In addition, this political myth asserted the idea of the continuity of the Muscovite Kingdom and the two great empires of the past – the Roman and the Byzantine, which increased the political weight of the Grand Duke.  

The strengthening of the political influence of the Moscow Grand Duke was also facilitated by his marriage to the niece of the last Byzantine emperor Sophia Palaiologos. Byzantine influence can be traced in the adoption of Byzantine symbols and ceremonial. The double–headed eagle, one of the symbols of the Byzantine Empire, becomes the coat of arms of the Russian state. However, some researchers defend the point of view that the new state coat of arms – the double-headed eagle was borrowed by Moscow from the Habsburg Empire. Indeed, the new coat of arms appears on state seals during the period of active diplomatic contacts between the Moscow prince and the German emperor. During the same period, the Prince of Moscow began to "try on" the imperial title in diplomatic correspondence. For our topic, it is not so important that a new state symbolism has come from the East or from the West. Another thing is important: the obvious desire of the Moscow prince to stand on a par with the European monarchs.

The process of formation of a centralized state was accompanied by the appearance of various literary works, similar in content and ideological orientation. For example, "The Tale of the Novgorod White Hood" (XVI century.) and "The Legend of the City of Babylon" (XVI-XVII centuries.) spread the idea of spiritual and political continuity of Russia and Byzantium. The legend of the origin of the Rurikovich from the Roman emperor was set forth in the XVI century work "The Legend of the Princes of Vladimir". In addition to mentioning the relationship of the Moscow princes and the Roman Caesars, the "Legend" tells the legendary story of Prince Vladimir Vsevolodovich's military campaign against Byzantium and his receipt of royal regalia from the Byzantine emperor, in particular, the Monomakh cap. The "Legend" reflected the main political trends of the era – the desire to recognize the Moscow sovereign as equal in status to European monarchs and the approval of Moscow as the heir of Byzantium.

Another factor that had a key impact on the specifics of national political consciousness was the need to protect against external threats.  Constant military threats from both the West and the East have led to the need not only for a powerful army, but also for a strong political government that does not allow internal strife. The unlimited military and political power of the Moscow sovereign acted as a guarantee of internal well-being (protection from internal enemies) and tranquility on the borders of the state (deterrence of external enemies).

Thus, the imperial political myth is formed together with a single state, turning into its ideological support. Its main feature was the Messianic myth of a special historical path. In the national political culture, the imperial myth was embodied in the form of ideas of a powerful centralized state, strong leadership, external territorial expansion, etc. Formally, Russia became an empire only at the beginning of the XVIII century. However, the very idea of Russia as an empire was already taking shape during the reign of Ivan III.  

The eighteenth century, marked by the transformations of Peter the Great, became a new era in the history of the Russian state. Peter's reforms could not but affect the political culture. In particular, with the abolition of the patriarchate and the transformation of the Church into one of the components of the state machine, the idea of a "Third Rome" is secularized, which is no longer associated with the triumph of the Orthodox faith, but with the strengthening of the military and political power of the young empire. The abandonment of the old patriarchal "Moscow" culture and the transition to a European lifestyle was accompanied by the transfer of the capital from Moscow to St. Petersburg. In addition to purely practical purposes, Peter's decision had a symbolic implication. Abandoning the political mythology of "Moscow is the Third Rome" meant that Russia was no longer a special and unique country, it was becoming part of the European cultural space, one of the European powers.         

 Attention should be paid to the dual religious and political character of the mythology of "Moscow - the Third Rome". The religious mythology of the Third Rome, from the beginning of its appearance, was used to justify the growth of the military and political ambitions of the Moscow sovereigns. The dual nature of the mythology of the Third Rome, in particular, was pointed out by Y.M. Lotman and B.A. Uspensky. Analyzing the transformation of the myth "Moscow – the Third Rome" that occurred in the era of Peter the Great, researchers point to a shift in emphasis from the religious aspect of the myth, emphasizing spiritual continuity with Byzantium, to the political aspect, declaring a connection with imperial Rome. In their opinion, "two trends have merged in the idea of "Moscow – the third Rome" – religious and political. When highlighting the second point, the connection with the first Rome was emphasized, which entailed obscuring the first religious aspect and emphasizing the aspect of the state, "imperial"" ^{[12, p. 237]}.

 Having undergone desacralization, nevertheless, it retained its influence. The Messianic imperial myth, having separated from its religious basis, received a "secular" reading. Russia was still presented as a great country, but this greatness was understood not as a spiritual election, but as military and political superiority.

The October Revolution of 1917 revived Messianic expectations. Russian Russian Marxism was characterized by a purely religious eschatological vision of history. M. Sarkisyants, considering the connection of the Russian Orthodox tradition with revolutionary political mythology, argued that the revolutionary worldview had a deep and strong connection with mytho-religious traditions. He writes on this subject: "The Russian understanding of socialism was distinctly chiliastic in nature and was associated with ideas about the end of the world... For in Russia itself socialism was not considered as a means or an element of human practice; it was not considered a stage of social development; Russian adherents of socialism interpreted it as something final and absolute, as a solution the human destiny itself, as the establishment of the kingdom of God on earth"^{[13, p. 146]}. 

 Just as the Moscow Kingdom had a mission to preserve and protect Orthodoxy, so Soviet Russia had a mission to spread the new great communist doctrine. The Messianic elements of Marxist revolutionary teaching coincided with the Messianic expectations characteristic of Russian political culture. Therefore, the Bolshevik ideology based on Marxist philosophy was adopted by the national political consciousness and quickly took root in it. The Messianic mythology of the Third Rome was transformed into the idea of the Third International. From that moment on, Russia had a new national idea, a new great mission. Soviet Russia, as an apologist for Marxism, had to spread this new "true faith" during the world revolution and thereby fulfill its historical destiny. The state emblem of the Soviet Union with the globe depicted on it spoke eloquently about this great mission.

The central archetype symbol used by Soviet ideology and political mythology was the hero archetype symbol. In the early stages, this archetype symbol, in accordance with the Marxist tradition, was superimposed on an entire social class of proletarians. The proletariat, and then the working class, was declared the main driving force of history. But, with the victory of the October Revolution and the establishment of Soviet power, this archetype symbol began to be used to create images of leaders and, above all, V.I. Lenin.

The political isolation of the USSR in the initial period of its existence, the post-war confrontation with the United States, already in the rank of a superpower, actualized the symbol-archetype of the center, as well as the symbols-archetypes of Chaos and Space, making them also central elements of political myth-making.

These factors led to the fact that the imperial Messianic myth not only did not disappear after the events of 1917, but still remained an integral element of socio-political practice.

The collapse of the Soviet Union led to drastic changes. The almost simultaneous transition to a new form of political organization and the rejection of the usual value system led to the destabilization of social and political life. Nevertheless, despite the rejection of the state ideology, the new state needed ideological foundations. The decommunization of the political and ideological space of Russia led to the fact that the new political leadership turned to pre-revolutionary history. These processes are clearly visible on the example of state symbols. The imperial double-headed eagle became the state emblem. The Imperial tricolor was approved as the national flag, which was also used by the White Movement during the Civil War. M.I. Glinka's "Patriotic Song" was approved as the anthem of the new state.

That is, the new government tried in every possible way to dissociate itself from the Soviet legacy and establish a symbolic link with pre-revolutionary Russia. Cities, streets and squares began to return their historical pre-revolutionary names. The new government gradually returned the Church not only to public life, but also to public life. The political leadership of the new Russia sought to abandon the legacy of the Soviet era and establish symbolic continuity with pre-revolutionary Russia.

In the process of strengthening Russia's position in the international political arena, and then by confrontation with the countries of the West, the symbol-the archetype of the center was actualized in myth-making practice. With the steady increase in the role of the president in the political life of the country, the symbol-the archetype of the hero - has become actualized. Another political trend of the last decade has been the idea of a single great history of the Russian state.  As Russian researchers note in this regard: "The semantic core of the new official narrative has become the idea of great power projected over the entire "thousand-year history" of Russia. It is the state (regardless of changing borders and political regimes) that acts as a key value that binds the macropolitical community... The idea of a "millennial Russia" that has developed into a great state capable of gaining "strong positions in the world" has become the core of historical politics" ^{[15, p. 133]}. In such a situation, the revival of the imperial political myth seems quite likely.  

Conclusions

Based on all that has been said, a number of conclusions can be drawn. Modern mythology is a system of rationalized and symbolically expressed mythological archetypes that convey certain ideas and values and, thereby, program social behavior. Stable archetypal symbols reproduced in socio-political discourse are gradually becoming significant components of national political culture.

One of the most significant determinants of national political consciousness has become the imperial political myth. Having arisen during the formation of the centralized Russian state, the imperial myth became its ideological basis. Later, the imperial myth underwent various transformations, but was invariably present in socio-political practice. The external embodiment of the imperial myth is stable mythological symbols-archetypes expressed in the form of various political ideas (a single centralized state, a strong leader, external expansion, military-political dominance, spiritual superiority, etc.). The internal essential content of the imperial myth is Messianic political mythology.  Political messianism is a complex of political myths that defend the special position of a particular nation and assert that it has a unique historical mission.

It can be concluded that the imperial political myth acted as a constitutive element for the Russian statehood, becoming not only its ideological support, but also in many ways forming the most essential features of the national political culture.