The problem of depoliticization of the Russian army in the crisis of the 1990s.

Volgin Evgeny Igorevich ORCID: 0000-0002-9690-448X PhD in Politics Associate Professor, Department of the History of Social Movements and Political Parties, Lomonosov Moscow State University 119192, Russia, Moscow, Lomonosovsky ave., 27/4, office 415 plytony@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction

The formation of Russian statehood in the 1990s was accompanied by a deep transformational crisis associated with the liquidation of the former super-militarized system. Russia inherited about 80% of the military potential of the USSR and only 60% of the economy of the former state. In order to meet modern requirements and fit into a new economic paradigm, the Russian Armed Forces (hereinafter referred to as the Armed Forces) needed optimization and modernization (in the period from 1992 to 1999, the army decreased from 2.8 million to 1.2 million people). However, problems related to the deplorable state of the Russian economy were added to the difficulties of the transition period, which resulted in a catastrophic underfunding of the army, which turned into one of the most acute social problems ^{[1, pp. 9, 45, 61, 67]}. The purpose of this article is to consider the problem of depoliticization of the Armed Forces, which were in an extremely difficult situation, based on the integrated use of various sources, which threatened serious challenges to the Russian statehood in the conditions of the permanent crisis of the 1990s. Historical, sociological, formal legal, institutional and systemic approaches are used as research methods.

Depoliticization of the Russian Army: Political and right-wing aspects

The main normative legal acts of the Russian Federation, which limited the political rights of military personnel and prohibited political associations from working in the army, were adopted during the years of the "August republic" (1991-1993). On August 22, 1991, the day after the coup failed, Boris Yeltsin, who had previously assumed the powers of commander of the Armed Forces of the USSR on the territory of Russia, signed a decree "On the termination of the activities of military-political bodies and organizational structures of political parties in the Armed Forces of the USSR on the territory of the RSFSR" ^{[2, p. 112]} (Decree of the President of the RSFSR dated August 22, 1991 "On the termination of the activities of military-political bodies and organizational structures of political parties in the Armed Forces of the USSR on the territory of the RSFSR" // President of Russia [Electronic resource] URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/131 , accessed: 08/15/2022). On August 24, Mikhail Gorbachev, returning to his presidential duties, signed a similar decree (Decree of the President of the USSR dated August 24, 1991 UP-2462 "On the termination of the activities of political parties and political movements in the Armed Forces of the USSR and law enforcement agencies and the State apparatus" // Vedomosti of the USSR. 1991. No. 35. St. 1026). Later, the President of the USSR confirmed the decision of the President of Russia to abolish military-political bodies in the army, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB of the USSR (Decree of the President of the USSR dated August 29, 1991 "On the abolition of military-political bodies in the Armed Forces of the USSR, the troops of the USSR State Security Committee, the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR and the railway troops" // Vedomosti USSR. 1991. No. 36. St. 1061). However, the decrees of the Union President from now on only formalized the political will of the Russian leader, while Gorbachev himself was rapidly losing the remnants of his authority among the military, who, after signing the Belovezhskaya Agreements, did not heed the requests of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to assist in preserving the USSR ^{[3, pp. 415-416]}. On May 7, 1992, Boris Yeltsin signed a Decree "On the creation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation", where he proclaimed himself Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and declared the control of military structures to the highest state authorities, and not to party authorities (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated May 7, 1992 "On the creation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation" // President of Russia [Electronic resource] URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/1279 , date of appeal: 08/16/2022). On May 18, 1992, the President, who had previously served as Minister of Defense, appointed Lieutenant General P.S. Grachev to this position (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated May 18, 1992 "On the Minister defense of the Russian Federation" // Garant [electronic resource] URL: https://base .garant.ru/6314847 /, date of access: 08/16/2022). The new minister declared his readiness to strictly pursue a course towards further depoliticization of the army ^{[4, pp. 12-19]}. At the same time, the Russian legislator, realizing that the country was entering a zone of political turbulence, tried to protect military personnel from the influence of party and political institutions as much as possible.

Thus, the Law of the Russian Federation of September 24, 1992 "On Defense" prohibited the creation and activity of public associations pursuing political goals in the Armed Forces. It was not allowed to conduct any political (including pre-election) campaigning on the territory of military units (the Law of the Russian Federation of September 24, 1992 "On Defense". Ed. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 2288 dated December 24, 1993 // Contour Norm [electronic resource] URL: https://normativ.kontur.ru/document?moduleId=1&documentId=5538 , accessed: 08/16/2022). On January 22, 1993, the Law of the Russian Federation "On the Status of Military Personnel" was adopted, allowing military personnel to be members of public associations that do not pursue political goals and participate in their activities only during off-duty hours (Law of the Russian Federation No. 4338-I of January 22, 1993 "On the status of military personnel" // Vedomosti RF. 1993. No. 6. Article 188). The military's lack of the right to strike was specifically stipulated. Thus, the most rigid model of institutional and personnel departisation was envisaged for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. This approach did not contradict the norms of international law and was typical for the armies of a number of states, including former socialist countries. However, if the right of military personnel to unite was significantly curtailed, then "people in uniform" could exercise their voting rights (as in the Soviet years) in full and without any restrictions.

"People in uniform": an opposition resource or an army of apolitical?

The abolition of military-political bodies in the Armed Forces led to the emergence of a certain ideological vacuum, which, in conditions of political instability, the newly emerged parties and movements sought to fill. This was most typical for the structures of the "irreconcilable opposition", as well as nationalist associations. However, there is practically no data showing the depth of penetration of certain political institutions into the army environment (at least in open sources). On the other hand, the party members themselves tended to exaggerate the degree of influence of their associations in the army environment. After the defeat of the "irreconcilable opposition" in October 1993, the activities of some parties and movements that tried to flirt with the military to the greatest extent (RCPR, FTS, RNE) were suspended, and their leaders were arrested. Opposition parties that emerged or strengthened after 1993 (Communist Party, LDPR, etc.) They interacted with army structures in one way or another, especially during election campaigns. However, as representatives of the "systemic opposition", these associations tried to act within the framework of the law.

The data of sociological research testified to the well-known distrust of the military towards various kinds of party and political figures and their programs. A 1992 survey showed that about 50% of soldiers and officers did not trust the party leaders ^{[5, p. 65]}. According to a poll conducted in 1994 by the F. Ebert Foundation (FRG) among more than 600 generals and senior officers, opposition leaders (G. A. Zyuganov and V. V. Zhirinovsky) did not arouse much enthusiasm among the military (Eggert K. Army for Strong Power // Izvestia. 1994. October 22). Another survey conducted from December 1992 to March 1993 among generals, officers, warrant officers, conscripts and contract servicemen, as well as students of higher military educational institutions, demonstrated that even among cadets as the most politicized part of the military electorate, only 12% expressed commitment to parties and movements (T.Skorobogatko If there's a war tomorrow… // Moscow news. 1994. January 9-16).

In the first half of 1994, military sociologists again interviewed the personnel of the army and Navy units and found that almost all categories of military personnel are politically indifferent. No more than 7-8 % of respondents shared the programs of specific parties (the Army through the eyes of the army // Moscow news. 1994. September 4-11). On the other hand, one should not think that party leaders were not quoted among the military at all, otherwise after 1993 the high command would not have been satisfied with the emergency in units and formations before the next elections ^{[6, pp. 705-720]}. But the protest vote of "people in uniform" in the first post-Soviet years was caused not so much by ideological considerations as by an attempt to draw the attention of the country's top leadership to the catastrophic state of the Armed Forces.  

All-Army Officers' Meeting: is the army getting out of control?

After the fall of communism, on the wave of continuous democratization, officer meetings began to spontaneously arise in units and formations. The well-known democracy of these structures was emphasized by the fact that any officer, and not necessarily a commander, could become the chairman of the meeting. But as the situation of the military deteriorated, officer meetings began to turn into politicized clubs (Tsygichko V. What kind of army do we need? // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 1994. April 13). The apotheosis of the spontaneous democratization of the Armed Forces was the holding of the All-Army Officer Assembly on January 17, 1992 in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses, which was attended by 5,000 delegates elected from officer assemblies of all types and branches of the armed forces. The officers, meeting Boris Yeltsin's speech with "stomping and whistling", branded the "conspiracy of the three presidents", demanding the restoration of the Soviet Union with unified armed forces ^{[1, pp. 20-21]}. It seemed as if a powerful force was emerging on the political scene, capable of changing the course of history. However, Yeltsin managed to turn the situation around. Calling on the officers to maintain civilian calm, the President said that Russia "will stand to the death for a unified armed forces" (at that time there was still a strong illusion that the CIS would be able to maintain a unified army under a unified command). The Supreme Commander also promised to solve the social problems of officers and their family members.

As a result, the participants of the Meeting adopted a rather moderate statement calling on the servicemen who found themselves in the ranks of their national armies "not to succumb to provocations", as well as "remain faithful to the military oath until all issues are resolved legally." At the same time, the military stressed that they do not seek to interfere in politics and resolve the issue of power in independent states (Russia today. Political portrait in documents: Issue 2. 1991-1992. Answer. ed. Koval B.I. M., 1993. pp. 87-88). Thus, satisfied with the promises of the Russian leader, the officer corps refused to participate in "big politics" in the post-Soviet space. Nevertheless, for the leadership of the Russian Federation, such a massive military event was a signal of the need to ensure Moscow's strict control over a huge part of the Soviet Army that Russia inherited ^{[1, pp. 20-21]}. It is not surprising that subsequently the role of officers' meetings was leveled and subordinated to the command.

The problem of maintaining the loyalty of the Armed Forces in the context of the political crisis of 1993

The real "moment of truth" for the Russian army was the events of October 3-4, 1993. It was the intervention of the military that managed to turn the situation in favor of the President. At the same time, Boris Yeltsin's victory was by no means guaranteed, because the scales could swing in the other direction at any moment. Thus, the board of the Ministry of Defense, which met on the night of October 3 to 4, 1993, hesitated about the possibility of using the army in the well-known "constitutional dispute". Columns of armored vehicles, which moved very slowly from the places of permanent deployment to the capital, "slowed down" at the MKAD ^{[2, p. 212]}. The military, remembering August 1991, tried to buy time in the hope that the politicians would somehow come to an agreement. And only Yeltsin's personal appearance at that night meeting of the Board of the Ministry of Defense at Znamenka became the last argument for the generals ^{[7, p. 203]}. Subsequently, the President admitted that the army command showed slowness in those days and until the last moment he had no confidence in the highest generals (Zhirinovsky – supreme commander-in-chief? // New Daily Newspaper 1994. January 12).

And although Boris Yeltsin managed to maintain control over the Armed Forces, the presidential side learned the "lessons of October 93" well. In order to avoid any fluctuations in the troops in the event of another aggravation of the situation, the presidential entourage took appropriate measures. So, in the near Moscow region, rings of elite units were created, the command of which was carried out by generals who had a personal interview with the head of the Security Service of the President of the Russian Federation A.V. Korzhakov for loyalty to the Commander-in-Chief (Korotchenko I. Does the army trust the president? // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 1995. June 21). At the same time, the FSB was tasked with studying the political sentiments of officers of the central office of the Ministry of Defense and acquiring reliable sources of information there (Korotchenko I. Reliable Control // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 1995. April 18; Korotchenko I. Law enforcement agencies and politics // An independent newspaper. 1995. December 22). The situation in the troops was specially monitored by the FSB Military Counterintelligence Directorate, with which, according to some reports, over 50 thousand military personnel of all official categories collaborated on a secret basis (although the number of this service itself did not exceed 6 thousand people). Thus, the agents of the UNHCR FSB penetrated the Armed Forces (Korotchenko I. Yeltsin's resignation is a strategic goal of the Rokhlin movement // An independent newspaper. 1997. September 23rd). All these steps indicated that the President was no longer willing to entrust his fate to the generals.

GLAVPUR died… Long live the GUVR!

After the failure of the August coup, the primary task of the supreme army command was the speedy implementation of the decrees of the "two presidents" on the departisation of the Armed Forces. A special commission on the abolition of military-political bodies was established in the USSR Ministry of Defense, headed by the former deputy head of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army, Colonel-General D. A. Volkogonov ^{[8, p. 127; 10, p. 283-286]}. In addition to the structures of the CPSU, the Main Military-Political Directorate of the Armed Forces of the USSR was subject to abolition ^{[9, p. 93]}. instead, the Committee of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR for work with personnel was established ^{[10, p. 54]}. In connection with the deportation, about 300 political generals were subject to early dismissal from the army ^{[5, p. 67]}. In accordance with the order of the Minister of Defense of the USSR, the position of assistant commander for work with personnel was introduced in units and formations from November 1, 1991. Then all the above-mentioned measures related to the depoliticization and departisation of the Armed Forces found full support and understanding in the army (Order of the Minister of Defense of the USSR dated October 22, 1991 "On new structures for working with personnel in the company – battalion – regiment – brigade link" // System GARANT [electronic resource] URL: http://ivo.garant.ru/#/document/70749710/paragraph/7:0 , accessed: 08/22/2022, limited access).

At the same time, with the liquidation of political workers, the moral and political situation in the army deteriorated sharply, and irregular relations acquired the most ugly character ^{[11, p. 155]}. The system of personnel training for educational army structures turned out to be disorganized ^[12]. In 1994, the Main Directorate of Educational Work (GUVR) appeared, which was headed by Lieutenant General S. M. Zdorikov ^{[10, p. 54]}, (Cherkasov A. Politorganov Syndrome // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 1996. November 28). The new structure radically differed from the previous political administration both numerically (the composition of the GUVR did not exceed two hundred employees, while the GLAVPUR numbered 564 people) and functionally. "We are not engaged in brainwashing, but ... we form the confidence of people in military uniforms that the cause they serve is necessary for Russia," Zdorikov said (Blotsky O. Lieutenant General Sergei Zdorikov: "I will vote for Yeltsin..." // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 1996. April 25). His deputy, Major General A. Cherkasov, in turn, noted with regret that the hostility and suspicion that took place in the Soviet army towards political organizations "by default" spread to new structures. Even at the household level, the deputy commanders for educational work were called nothing else than deputy politicians. The leadership of the Department of Internal Affairs was very annoyed that the command continued to set old tasks for the new unit and at the same time asked, "how about political organizations, for everything," and the officers-educators had the lowest tariff rates. Often, commanders simply did not know what to do with educational institutions, did not know how to use their capabilities in modern conditions, or even were simply afraid of them (Cherkasov A. Politorganov Syndrome // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 1996. November 28).

On the other hand, it cannot be said that the GUVR was an absolutely apolitical structure in the army. The Main Directorate of Educational Work, among other duties, was engaged in military-political sociology, which in the 1990s could hardly please the high command. So, on the eve of the 1995 parliamentary elections, opinion polls showed that opposition associations enjoy the greatest support among the military, and the "party of power" can only claim fifth place (Army Motives // Moscow News. 1995. November 12-19). After such forecasts, S. M. Zdorikov, according to media reports, flew into a rage, and his speech consisted exclusively of "untranslatable idiomatic expressions" (Morozov V. The results of the elections in the army, apparently, were falsified // Novaya Daily Gazeta. 1995. December 26).

The army is on the verge of a social explosion

After the re-election of Boris Yeltsin, whose presidential campaign required considerable expenses, the situation with the financing of the Armed Forces deteriorated sharply. By October 1996, the amount of arrears in the payment of salaries to officers and workers of the military-industrial complex amounted to 25 trillion rubles. In connection with the financial disaster, Defense Ministry analysts noted an unprecedented surge in protest activity by desperate servicemen and their family members. Often, the accumulated resentment was expressed in the failure of officers to fulfill their official duties, the sale of weapons and military property, the blocking of military airfields and strategic routes by their wives, the unauthorized seizure of apartments, hunger strikes, the spread of anonymous threats and even suicides (in the 1990s, up to 500 officers were "shot" a year - almost an entire battalion) (Vasiltsov S., Obukhov S. If the military follows the miners?// Soviet Russia. 1998. July 16; Zhilin A. A view from Russia: Troops on the verge of mutiny // Moscow news. 1996. September 8-15; Baranets D. The Army of the Hungry // Moskovskie novosti. 1996. September 15-22). Against this background, the media often relayed rather alarming prospects: "It is enough to find only one resolute commander who will raise his regiment on alert and move to Moscow to hold a protest against the impoverished existence — and further events will acquire an unpredictable character for the current regime" (Korotchenko I., Solovyov V. Rodionov on the crisis in the army // An independent newspaper. 1996. October 26).

Such warnings against the background of the extremely tense situation in the troops did not look like a figure of speech at all. If in 1992 only 10% of officers allowed the possibility of using force by the military when the authorities did not comply with their demands, then in 1995 this figure increased to 18% (Mukhin V., Solovyov S. Protest of employees of the armed forces of the Russian Federation and cultural figures // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 1996. October 1). In the autumn of 1996 (according to the Department of Internal Affairs), 25-30% of officers were psychologically ready to use force in order to obtain debts from the state for monetary maintenance ^{[13, pp. 32-33; 16, p. 24]}. On the other hand, these data should not be overestimated, because most of the officers, despite all the difficulties and hardships, still intended to adhere to legitimate forms of expressing discontent. Thus, the bulk of the military personnel, in case of violation of their rights, first of all intended to file complaints with higher management in accordance with the current statutes (in 1992 — 56%, in 1995 — 41%). Early retirement from the army was considered by 23-24%. Participation in the activities of organizations protecting the rights of military personnel was allowed from 21% (in 1992) to 19% (in 1995). Protest performances in the media were planned by 22-23% (Mukhin V., Solovyov S. Protest of employees of the armed forces of the Russian Federation and cultural figures // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 1996. October 1).

As of September 1, 1997, the total debt of the Ministry of Defense to personnel amounted to 37.4 trillion rubles. In military units located closer to the capital, by the end of June 1997, the money was paid at best for April — May. In remote garrisons, salary debts began to be paid only in March 1997 (Korbut A. Rokhlin appealed to the President and military personnel // An independent newspaper. 1997. June 25). The press reported with alarm about the increasing number of illegal protest actions by officers and their family members, which took place not only in remote garrisons, but also in the capital. So, in the spring of 1997, the military personnel of the military transport aviation regiment in the village. The Krechevitsy of the Novgorod region, who had not received monetary allowances since February 1997, went on hunger strike. At some military airfields, including those where strategic aviation was based (in Khurba — the Far East, in Shaikovka — the Kirov region, in Soltsy — the Novgorod region), there were attempts to block runways by the wives of military pilots. The above-mentioned incidents were resolved only after the command (fully or partially) satisfied the demands of the protesters (Korbut A. Tension in the troops is increasing // An independent newspaper. 1997. June 4; Korbut A. Rokhlin addressed the President and the military // An independent newspaper. 1997. June 25).

An extremely unpleasant incident occurred in March 1997 in the 21st Airborne Brigade stationed in Stavropol. Several officers of this unit that fought in Chechnya, due to the plight of their families, refused to leave for exercises in another region and issued an ultimatum to the command, in which they demanded to repay the arrears of monetary payments as soon as possible. Only after strong pressure from Moscow, as well as the efforts of military counterintelligence officers and the local FSB directorate, the conflict was extinguished. "This is just the beginning," said the officers of another, Tula Airborne division. It was reported that in order to neutralize possible performances of airborne troops on the eve of the All-Russian protest action, the authorities planned to use internal troops (about 250 thousand) (Surikov A. Airborne forces in anticipation of Colonel Pestel // Pravda Five. 1997. April 9; Korotchenko I. Demarche of airborne paratroopers // Nezavisimaya gazeta. 1997. March 25). The Law "On the Status of Military Personnel" was tightened, which specifically stipulated that military participation in strikes, as well as other termination of military service duties as a means of resolving disputed issues, is not allowed (Federal Law No. 76-FZ of May 27, 1998 "On the Status of Military Personnel" // NW RF. 1998. No 22. Article 2331).

At the same time, according to the head of the FSB Military Counterintelligence Department, Colonel General A. Molyakov, various political organizations have become more active in order to infiltrate military collectives in order to further try to use the army for their own purposes. First of all, it was about General L. Ya. Rokhlin. In June 1997, Lev Rokhlin, a hero of the Chechen war, commander of the 8th Guards Army Corps, made a resonant appeal to the President, in which he accused the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of "surrendering" his army ^[15]. The General proposed to hold officer meetings in each unit in order to work out legal requirements and send them to the President and the Government. Soon Rokhlin organized a "Movement in support of the army", the purpose of which was to remove Yeltsin from power by organizing mass protests, including with the participation of military personnel. However, according to A. Molyakov, whose subordinates closely "accompanied" all the activities of the rebellious general, military counterintelligence generally knows the situation in the army, as well as in other law enforcement agencies (Korotchenko I. Military counterintelligence will not allow an armed rebellion // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 1997. July 19th).

The "political phenomenon" of tankman I. Belyaev

The measures taken by the Government aimed at optimizing defense spending have not produced the expected results. By August 1998, the government's debt to law enforcement agencies amounted to 50 billion (denominated) rubles. Moreover, the lion's share of these funds (about 40 billion rubles) fell on the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (Solovyov V., Shaburkin A. The Russian Armed Forces are sitting without money again // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 1998. August 18; Karpenko V. Agitators rush to the barracks // Moskovskie novosti. 1998. September 27–October 4; Korbut A. Autumn activity of the troops // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 1998. September 2; Khokhlov A. Will tanks storm banks? // New news. 1998. September 10). Against the background of such a bleak picture, an incident occurred that was perceived almost as a prologue to an armed military action. On July 21, 1998, an officer of the Mulinsky garrison (Nizhny Novgorod region), Major Igor Belyaev, who passed Chechnya and had military awards, arbitrarily took a tank (T-80B) outside the military unit and made a march on it to the nearest village, where he symbolically parked his combat vehicle next to the pedestal of the Great Victory in the form of a tank T-34. The officer demanded to immediately pay off the arrears of money for three months.

It is noteworthy, but a similar incident occurred in the summer of 1995 at Uralvagonzavod, where a test driver with 20 years of experience, V. Tronin, driven to despair by chronic lack of money, broke through the factory gates, stole a new tank from the factory and rode it along the central avenue of Nizhny Tagil. And although in the case of Major Belyaev there was no damage to government property, and his tank had long been used as a tractor, and therefore had no ammunition, the officer himself, being on duty at the military equipment park, had a weapon with him. Major Belyaev's "tank picket" quickly turned into a spontaneous rally attended by at least 500 people. Citizens who had also not received a salary for months built improvised posters: "The people and the army are united!", "Give out our money!" The crowd surrounded the rebel tank, preventing the command from towing the "fugitive" back to the unit. Later, local television conducted a telephone survey, which showed that more than 80% of the thousand who called supported the action of tankman Belyaev (Konovalov A. Shakhray, Chernomyrdin and tankman Belyaev // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 1998. August 8; Korotchenko I. FSB in anticipation of personnel shocks // An independent newspaper. 1998. August 1; Dobrynina S. It's time for tester Tronin to drive out the tank again // NG-regions. 1998. No. 13; Usmanov I. Protesting tank // Soviet Russia. 1998. July 28; // Mukhin V. Tank went to a rally // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 1998. July 24).

The desperate act of Major I. Belyaev meant that the situation had reached the dangerous point where the army could leave the barracks without orders. And although the well-known action (like other, but less radical performances) was a gross violation of the law, the authorities did not dare to punish the violator, but preferred to act by persuasion, because she herself, having delayed legal payments for months, had long been acting outside the legal field. The left opposition understood this perfectly well when, in the autumn of 1998, before the next All-Russian protest action, it addressed the Minister of Defense I. D. Sergeev with a menacing warning: "Do not try not only to shoot, but even to withdraw tanks and armed soldiers against your people! Today is not 1993… And if there is even one shot..., the people will sweep away everyone, and you too" (Warning  // Soviet Russia. 1998. September 24).

The military coup in Russia in the 1990s: pro et contra

In connection with the above-described events, the question arose: will the Kremlin be able to count on the support of the army again if the protests become massively radical? Some observers were very skeptical. "In 1993, four tanks were found in Russia... to shoot down the White House. Now the army, which is fed with canned dog food, will not give the president a three–line rifle to prevent a "coup"," the press wrote in those days (T. Koshkareva, R. Narzikulov Boris Yeltsin admitted the existence of plans to seize power in Russia // An independent newspaper. 1998. July 11). In July 1998, a month and a half before the default, when it seemed that the situation in the country would soon reach a "boiling point", and the striking miners, who declared a "rail war" in their regions, reached Moscow and "besieged" the Government House (where they were "courted" by General Lev Rokhlin, promising support military), rumors appeared in the media about an allegedly impending anti-presidential coup (Agranovsky D. Lev Rokhlin with miners on the Gorbaty Bridge: "Your role is extremely important" // Soviet Russia. 1998. July 11; Is the Kremlin calm? // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 1998. July 8). However, Yeltsin disavowed such insinuations. "We have enough forces to stop any plans to seize power...", the President said on July 10, 1998 during a meeting with the heads of law enforcement agencies (this phrase was said after the mysterious murder of Lev Rokhlin) (T. Koshkareva, R. Narzikulov Boris Yeltsin acknowledged the existence of plans to seize power in Russia // An independent newspaper. 1998. July 11).

Indeed, despite the extremely difficult situation in the units and formations, the General Staff barely allowed the possibility of a large-scale military mutiny (Surikov A. The army will not follow the Communist Party // Pravda Five. 1997. February 27). A number of factors prevented this. Firstly, the head of state really had the strength and determination to prevent and, if necessary, suppress a riot in individual garrisons. Secondly, the spontaneous and scattered protests that took place in the army in the second half of the 1990s could hardly develop into a large-scale and coordinated armed rebellion, since there was no consolidating force among the military that encompassed the entire military organization ^{[16, p. 103]}. Thirdly, since the Decembrist uprising, political conspiracies by officers have not been part of Russian military traditions (even the August 1991 coup or the June 2023 uprising can hardly be called a purely military, i.e. an army mutiny). In the Soviet years, the Armed Forces were entirely subordinated to the party and political leadership, and the mentality of the military did not differ much from that of ordinary civil servants, whose tasks did not include organizing putschs ^{[17, p. 48]}.

In addition, the Russian military lacked its own political goals. Having seized power, but having no experience in public administration and not having a constructive anti-crisis program, the generals would inevitably have to turn to the "civilians" so despised by the army corporation (the same Lev Rokhlin was going to bet on Yuri Luzhkov as a potential presidential candidate). Finally, we must not forget that the accumulated discontent in the army was restrained by strict army discipline, as well as the responsibility of "people in uniform", who understood that the army, being the last stronghold of peace and security, had no right to unleash a civil war ^{[14, p. 19]}.

Curiously, the data of opinion polls, published, however, in the pro-communist media, indicated that the people were very supportive of the hypothetical performance of the military opposition as a whole. Thus, 18% said that soldiers and officers who took up arms against the then government deserve respect. Another 12% were ready to provide the rebels with all possible moral, material and political support, and 11% even expressed a desire to join the rebels. 27% of the respondents disapproved of the military mutiny, who at the same time would not condemn the soldiers and officers brought by the country's leadership to an extreme stage. And only 7% were ready to assist the authorities in neutralizing such an incident, and only 1% of the "ultra-loyalists" expressed a desire to voluntarily join the ranks of government troops. (Vasiltsov S., Obukhov S. If the military follows the miners? // Soviet Russia. 1998. July 16). Thus, more than 40% of the respondents were ready to support the military to one degree or another, who took up arms against the legitimate government, which, having such a volume of combustible material under it, had to act extremely cautiously.

Operation Successor: the military-political factor

Of course, the crisis of the Russian Armed Forces largely influenced the decision Yeltsin's choice of successor. As the press wrote in those days: "Only a politician who the army believes can prevent a civil war in the country. The army is waiting for more than money today. First of all, she is waiting for the leader" (Khokhlov A. Will the tanks storm the banks? // New news. 1998. September 10). It was on July 25, 1998, in an extremely turbulent domestic political situation, that Yeltsin put Vladimir Putin at the head of the FSB. Of course, this personnel decision could have been a coincidence, but exactly a year later, on August 9, 1999, when Basayev and Khattab's militants invaded Dagestan, the President named Putin his successor, eventually handing over to him the reins of military and political leadership of the counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya. There was considerable risk behind these decisions, because it was unclear how the army, exhausted by endless problems and military reform, would perceive Yeltsin's nominee. However, these fears proved to be in vain.

Thus, in the midst of the military campaign, when the fighting from liberated Dagestan had already been moved deep into Chechnya, some influential circles, expressing concern about the sudden successes of the Russian army, talked about the need to "slow down" the offensive of federal forces. However, in early November 1999 during the meeting of the prime Minister with the command of the united group, V. A. Shamanov, one of the most determined generals in the "North Caucasian direction", said that he was ready to go with Putin to the end and even promised to "tear off his shoulder straps" if the Kremlin gave the order to suspend hostilities (Bovt G. How to weave a conspiracy against the Prime Minister // Today. 1999. November 10; Odnokolenko O. The generals of the prime minister will not surrender // Today. 1999. November 13).

This phrase, said in the presence of the head of the Presidential Administration, A. S. Voloshin, meant: all attempts to stop the operation in Chechnya (and at the same time to change the successor) are unlikely to be understood by the 100,000—strong army group fighting in Chechnya. This was confirmed by the results of voting in the 1999 elections, when Putin's "Unity" received twice as many votes among soldiers and officers as the Communist Party (even the Communists were forced to admit this fact with regret) ^{[18, p. 186]}, (Kutuzov V. The army is attacking the government // Soviet Russia. 2000. January 13). Of course, the fact that the army finally believed the authorities was the merit not only of Putin alone, but also of his predecessors. Thus, the anti-crisis cabinet of E. M. Primakov managed not only to get rid of the vicious practice of non-payments, but also to increase the defense budget by almost 12 billion rubles (Federal Law of the Russian Federation dated February 22, 1999 No. 36-FZ "On the Federal Budget for 1999" // Federal Law of the Russian Federation. 1999. No. 9. St. 1093). When the first signs of economic growth appeared in 1999, the stabilization course was continued by the Government of S.V. Stepashina. Thus, at the end of the 1990s, each prime minister solved his specific tasks, gradually pulling the country and the army out of the depths of the protracted crisis

Conclusion

After the fall of the one-party communist regime, the Russian legislator, in order to protect military personnel from the influence of competing parties and, at the same time, to prevent the dominance of any alternative political force in the army, provided for institutional and personnel departisation in the Armed Forces. However, in the new conditions, this strategy has largely lost its relevance, since the newly formed parties did not possess even a hundredth share of the power and influence that the CPSU had. In addition, after 1991, opinion polls recorded the apolitical nature of the military, tired of years of pressure from political organizations. The politicization of officers' meetings, which spontaneously arose in the army in the first post-Soviet years in the wake of the general democratization of public life, was eventually leveled by the command. As for the parliamentary parties, their leaders, although they claimed the votes of the military electorate, did not actively attempt to illegally enter the army environment.

The "Soviet-Russian" army in the 1990s, like other vestiges of the former system (the super-monopolized economy, the Soviet government), needed serious reform. However, in the conditions of a severe transformational crisis, the government lacked funds even for the basic maintenance of a significant military contingent and an exaggerated military-industrial complex, not to mention to implement military reform, the essence of which was largely reduced to the reduction of the Armed Forces. In this situation, hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers, as well as their family members, were busy with the problem of survival. In the second half of the 1990s, against the background of chronic underfunding in the army, there were cases of spontaneous protest by career officers. However, these actions were spontaneous and scattered in nature, and therefore did not pose a serious threat from the point of view of developing into a large-scale military rebellion. The high command, realizing that the situation was "on the verge", tried to act as correctly as possible, precisely satisfying the legitimate demands of desperate servicemen. Among other factors that restrained the riot in units and formations, one can name the military's lack of independent political thinking and a constructive program, strict army discipline, as well as the regime's availability of sufficient funds to preempt a large-scale protest.  

Nevertheless, in the event of a prolonged absence of positive dynamics in the field of military construction or a further deterioration of the already difficult situation, any action could be expected from the military (however, as well as from representatives of other social categories). In the late 1990s, after a long decline, the first signs of strengthening Russian statehood and the revival of the Armed Forces emerged. These tendencies were sensitively caught by the "man with a gun", exhausted by the "five-year plans" of liberal reforms, but now, after all the temptations that the communists and Zhirinovites promised, he regained faith in the state, which personified the "party of power".