Heidegger and Plato's idea of the Good

Gaginskii Aleksei Mikhailovich ORCID: 0000-0001-9412-9064 PhD in Philosophy Senior Researcher, Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences 109240, Russia, Moscow, Goncharnaya str., 12/1, office 412 algaginsky@gmail.com Other publications by this author

Introduction

Heidegger's attitude towards Plato was very ambiguous (see: ^[1],[2]). On the one hand, it is well known that the late Heidegger criticized Plato and all European metaphysics, which was and remains Platonism: "Throughout the history of philosophy, Plato's thought in modified forms remains guiding. Metaphysics is platonism. Nietzsche designates his philosophy as inverted Platonism" ^{[3, p. 71]}. On the other hand, the early Heidegger clearly presents an attempt to master the shining heights of Platonism: the question of the meaning of being needs a perspective from which a definite answer can be highlighted — and Heidegger borrows this perspective from Plato. Just as the good endows existence with being and truth, so the understanding of being is possible from time, because it is temporality that is the condition for understanding being, it highlights its meaning. T. Sheehan, a well-known and very thorough Heidegger scholar, in his final work argues that the central problematic of Heidegger's philosophy is primarily related to this optics, because the main for the German philosopher, it was not at all a question of being, as is usually believed, but rather a question of understanding being, i.e., the question of the point from which being becomes comprehensible at all. Moreover, Sheehan believes that most Heidegger researchers do not take into account this fundamental circumstance, and therefore suggests changing the paradigm that dominates Heidegger studies: "First of all, Heidegger's philosophy was not directed at Sein at all. Rather, he was looking for das Woher des Seins, "from where" of being, "that from which and through which being happens" ^{[4, p. 9]}. More precisely, Heidegger's position is as follows:

"The question of being, however, can also imply: the essence of being itself is what is being (not existing). This is the question (die Frage) that must first be posed in connection with the leading question and how the question should become tangible in its necessity. It seeks the essence of being itself — that from where and through what it is present as being (das von woher und wodurch es als das Sein west); this question is the main question (die Grundfrage), to which the former leading question must be returned" ^{[5, p. 82]}.

And it is precisely this optics that Heidegger in the 20s clearly connects with Plato and his doctrine of the good. What kind of optics is this anyway? Why is it necessary? Heidegger says so:

"We understand existence only to the extent that we throw it at being; moreover, being itself must be understood in some way, i.e., being, in turn, must pounce on something. <...> If the existing (Dasein) in itself contains an understanding of being (Seinsverst?ndnis), and temporality makes possible the existing in its being arrangement (Seinsverfassung), then temporality must also be a condition for the possibility of understanding being and, at the same time, sketching being for time (des Entwurfs des Seins auf die Zeit). The question is whether time is actually the very thing that being itself attacks, whether time is the very thing from which we understand something like being. <...> Being pounces on something from where it becomes understandable, although not substantive" ^{[6, pp. 396-398]}.

In order for being to become more distinct, so that it can be somehow understood, it is necessary to see it "from the outside", go "beyond" being, step as if outside: understanding is sketching (das Verstehen ein Entwerfen ist) ^{[6, p. 396]}, therefore, being is understood only when it's pouncing on something. And if Plato's being "pounces" on the good, or on the one, then for Heidegger, time is such a condition. However, on this basis, it cannot be said that time is earlier in relation to being, just as it was in Neoplatonism, where the one was thought of as preceding being, because the latter is something secondary and somewhat defective compared to the original. Rather, being and time should be understood in their interrelationship, for being is time, says Heidegger: das Sein... ist die Zeit ^{[7, p. 442]}. Nevertheless, they are not identical and are quite distinguishable, since being is determined by time, it attacks time, from which only what is called being as such becomes clear.

This train of thought is critical to the entire project of fundamental ontology is directly related to the philosophy of Plato, who first managed to climb so high to become , to see things from the outside, i.e. in the light of transcendent ideas benefits ^{[8, c. 504e–509d]}. And although Heidegger considers it necessary to "prevent a fatal misunderstanding" ^{[9, p. 372]} and clarify his position by distinguishing it from that held by Plato, he still bluntly says that he remains within the framework of Platonism (although Heidegger distinguishes his Platonism from the platonism of the barbarians (Platonismus der Barbaren), see: ^{[10, pp. 42-43]}). Only after the turn, Heidegger will strive to free himself from this fatal problem of all European metaphysics, but in the 20s this is not yet the case.

"Our task is not only to move from being to its being, but also, if we ask about the condition of the possibility of understanding being as such, to ask even beyond being (noch ?ber das Sein hinaus) about what it itself attacks as being (woraufhin es selbst als Sein entworfen ist). <...> We have seen from different sides that the question of being in general is simply no longer explicitly posed, but that it everywhere requires its own formulation. When we put it anew, we understand at the same time that philosophy in its cardinal question has not progressed further than what it was with Plato, and that as a result its deep longing is not so much about moving further, that is, to get away from itself, as about to come to myself. <...> Lengthy proofs are not needed to make it clear how directly we, trying to go beyond being to the light (?ber das Sein hinauszugehen zu dem Licht), from which and in which it itself enters the lumen of understanding, are moving into the field of Plato's main problem" ^{[9, pp. 374-375, with ed.]}.

This is the desired perspective: time is the light in which being is comprehended. Therefore, when Heidegger says that throughout "the entire history of philosophy, Plato's thought in modified forms remains guiding" ^{[3, p. 71]}, it is likely that he includes himself in this story. This makes clear the constant struggle that Heidegger is waging with Plato. However, this rapprochement between Heidegger and Plato remains only formal from the outside. So, although in the 20s Heidegger perceives any attempt by philosophy to move beyond Plato as a departure from itself (which he himself has not yet decided on, it will happen in the 30s), nevertheless, even then the German philosopher was quite critical of Plato in particular and ancient ontology in general. Figuratively speaking, Heidegger climbs to a mountain peak where Socrates and Glaucon are talking, from where there is a beautiful view of the whole area, the dazzling sun and everything that it illuminates, however, Meister aus Deutschland wants to stay there alone ... Heidegger borrows an angle, takes into account the point of view, but his accents are placed differently, which in as a result, it leads to the rejection of this perspective. Therefore, before the turn, the task was not at all to overcome Plato and all metaphysics, but to rise to his height, to try to see the horizon through his eyes. And although the very question of being was awakened by Aristotle, or rather by his interpretation, which Heidegger found in F.'s dissertation. Brentano. As Heidegger recalled years later: "From some hints in philosophical journals, I learned that Husserl's way of thinking was determined by Franz Brentano. His dissertation “On the Ambiguity of existence according to Aristotle” (1862) from 1907 was a staff and rod (Stab und Stecken) in my first clumsy attempts to penetrate philosophy. I was vaguely touched by the reflection: if existence affects in many meanings, then what is the leading basic meaning? (Wenn das Seiende in mannigfacher Bedeutung gesagt wird, welches ist dann die leitende Grundbedeutung?) What is called being? (Was hei?t Sein?)» ^{[11, c. 93]}. However, the way of thinking on this issue was prompted by what Plato and his doctrine of the good, which , on the other side sudeste. F. Volpi, for example, speaks about the synthesis of Aristotelian ambiguity and Platonic uniqueness in early Heidegger: ^{[12, pp. 14-19, 30, 47]}.

One methodological point needs to be made here. The fact that Heidegger had a "difficult relationship" with Neoplatonism has been noted repeatedly. Starting at least from the observations of V. Bayerwaltes, it is well known that Heidegger often ignores the doctrine of the one and the related problems, and if he speaks out, it is not quite definite or not quite correct (e.g..: ^{[13],[14],[15]}). However, Neoplatonic criticism of Heidegger proceeds from the presumption of trust in the letter of the Greek texts, as a result of which it is mainly philological, not philosophical in nature. Encountering statements that at first glance do not agree with Heidegger's interpretation, researchers interpret them as evidence refuting the views of the German philosopher. But as once said Dam about his colleague: ... ("Longinus philologist... but in no way a philosopher" ^{[16, c. 14]}). Perhaps this is how Heidegger could have responded to Neoplatonic criticism. In this regard, I once presented an attempt to deconstruct genology based on the need to take into account the ontological difference when it comes to the one or the good ^{[17, pp. 51-117]}. Nevertheless, it is written does not mean that Heidegger should believe on the word and its interpretation true.

So, two extremes that should be avoided can be formulated as follows: (1) metaphysics leads to the oblivion of being, because it has always been reduced to being and was not thought of at all in the history of philosophy, (2) the one/good before not only being, but also being in its difference from being. The first position belongs to Heidegger and is expressed in his existential history, the second researchers associate, if not with Plato, then at least with Plotinus and Proclus. However, both points of view are highly questionable, although for different reasons. And since I have already had to consider the second position, this article will focus only on the first one. More precisely, the focus will be on Heidegger's identification of the idea of the good with the demiurge, which becomes clear in the context of the reduction of the ancient understanding of being to fabrication, which the German philosopher carried out back in the early 20s.

The idea of the good and the demiurge

Throughout his philosophical career, Heidegger repeatedly touched on the problem of , but rarely delved into its discussion — often this topic is simply embedded in the movement of thought of the German philosopher to confirm his own views. This is especially characteristic of late mentions, when Heidegger revises his views of the 10s and 20s and develops the concept of existential history, so that by the end of the 30s it turns out that philosophy still needs to "move on, i.e. get away from itself", get out of the field of "Plato's main problem"for in the idea of goodness and its transcendence lies the oblivion of existence and the destruction of truth. In the late 30s, Heidegger would write like this:

"To some extent, value thinking was already predestined in as the highest "idea" and thus the nihilism of metaphysics was solved. as the essence of things; — ( as ), however . The essence (Seiendheit) has shifted under the doer-fit (das Tauglichmachende), and yet is again comprehended as . Unsatisfactory reading in “the essence of reason” — in the actual destruction of . <...> Metaphysics is (cf. already as ) the destruction of ; but thus the destruction of the distinction of things and of existence in its basicity; and in this lies: the abandonment of being and mere oblivion of being (die Seinsverlassenheit des Seienden und die Vergessenheit des Seins). The destruction of "distinctiveness", whereas it itself is already an ambiguous beginning of the possibility of an existential question and the basis of (destruction in favor of existence)" ^{[19, p. 41, 55]}.

First of all, a couple of explanations. 1) This and other texts in this spirit do not allow us to agree with the interpretation of A. Serafin, who tries to draw an analogy between and non-ethical , because Heidegger explicitly states that the idea of good destroys truth (see: ^[20]). Nevertheless, we have yet to return to this topic below. 2) On the "unsatisfactory reading of in "On the essence of the foundation": ^{[18, pp. 114-115]}. We are talking about the fact that in 1929, when Heidegger was writing this article, he still thought it possible to talk about the good as a transcendent being: "Transcendence is clearly expressed in Plato's " ^{[18, c. 114]}. However, Heidegger then revised his position, and therefore subsequently adds a note to this sentence: "No! Here-being (Da-sein) is not at all clear and not recognized. also not transcendence, and as " ^{[18, c. 114]}.

It is clear that such reflections no longer really imply an interest in Plato's thought, which is perceived rather as a passed stage. As mentioned above, in the 30s Heidegger reconsidered his attitude towards Plato and came to the conclusion that the destruction of truth was already hidden in the idea of goodness - "in the actual destruction of ". However, in the 20s his position was completely different, because Heidegger accepts Plato's point of view: adopting optics, rethinking the idea of the good and replacing it with temporality, he does not abandon this perspective as a whole, linking it with the very essence of philosophy, including his own. As R. Petkovshek noted: "In a brief commentary on Plato's allegory of the sun, Heidegger clearly showed that the existential reinterpretation of Plato's idea of the good is the basis of his existential analytics" ^{[21, p. 45]}. In this sense, the philosophy of early Heidegger is still Platonism, which he would later persistently overcome. In particular, it reproduces the classical locus:

"What sunlight is for sensory vision, then , the idea of goodness, is for scientific thought and especially for philosophical cognition. <...> That which highlights the knowledge of being (positive science) and the knowledge of being (philosophical knowledge), as a revelation, lies beyond being. Only if we stand in this light do we know what exists, we understand being. The understanding of being is rooted in the outline of a . Thus Plato is confronted with something that he calls “rising beyond the limits of being (?ber das Sein hinausragend)”. And this something performs the function of light, illumination for any identification of existence, or here — illumination for understanding of being itself" ^{[9, pp. 375-377, ed.]}.

In Neoplatonism, a similar function was performed by the one, which was thought of as identical to the good, because everything that exists is a greater or lesser degree of unity, a greater or lesser measure of good, whereas what is not involved in unity/good is unknowable and does not exist at all, and therefore even being is comprehended only in the light of the idea of good, or in within the framework of one degree or another of unity, because the one and the good are identical. In the future, in patristic and medieval philosophy, the one/good will be identified with God. As Gregory the Theologian says: "The Sun in the sensual is the same as God in the mental, said one of our non-believers. It enlightens the eye, like God the mind, and is most beautiful in the visible, like God in the intelligible" ^{[22, or. 28.30.1–3],[22, or. 40.5.3–5]}. Cf.: "... what is good in the intelligible area ( v ) in relation to the mind and intelligible, then in the region of the visible Sun in relation to vision and the visible" ^{[8, p. 508b-c]}. Subsequently, this interpretation became so generally accepted that it was through it that researchers of the XIX century considered not only patristic or medieval philosophical theology, but also Plato's philosophy began to be interpreted in the light of this interpretation. In particular, E. Zeller in his classic work on ancient philosophy writes:

"...according to Resp. VI, 508th, VII, 517th, the idea of the good is the cause of all perfection, of all being and knowledge; it coincides with the good (Phileb. 22 C) the divine mind, and in the very place that ideas usually occupy, we find in Philebus (23 C and sl., 26 E and sl., 28 C and sl.) the “reason” from which all order and reason in the world originate. <...> Thus, the good as the absolute basis of all existence coincides for him with the deity, who in Timaeus (28 C, 37 A) is characterized by the same features as the good, and in Philebus (22 C...) is identified with the divine mind" ^{[23, pp. 137-139]}, (see also: ^{[24, 172-173, 183]}).

Heidegger was well aware of this interpretation (in the course "Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy", read in 1926, Heidegger indicates the research literature on which he relies and which he recommends to students, including the studies of E. Zeller, V. Windelband and others, see: ^{[25, p. 16]}) and therefore by no means it is no coincidence that he reproduces it — at that time it could not cause any complaints. At the same time, Heidegger complements this interpretation with a very characteristic detail, which gave him the opportunity to confirm that being was thought of by Plato within the framework of fabrication, i.e. it corresponds to the general characteristic of ancient ontology, which the German philosopher developed in the summer course of 1922 and later developed in the course "Basic Problems of Phenomenology" (more details: ^[26]). In accordance with this, he writes:

"We do not go into the difficulties of Platonic interpretation here, we do not go into the proof of the relationship of the idea of good with what we have analyzed earlier, speaking about the ancient intelligibility of being (das antike Seinsverst?ndnis), its origin from manufacture (Ursprung aus dem Herstellen). It looks as if our thesis that ancient philosophy interprets being in the horizon of manufacture (im Horizont des Herstellens) in the broadest sense of the word has nothing to do with what Plato fixes as a condition for the possibility of understanding being. Our interpretation of ancient ontology and its guiding thread seems arbitrary. What can the idea of good have in common with manufacturing? We won't get into that, we'll spread the word just what there is nothing like , the manufacturer itself (der Hersteller schlechthin). It already allows you to see how associated with , , , in the broadest sense" ^{[9, c. 379, as amended.]}.

Despite the fact that only a hint is given here, for Heidegger this is a fundamental circumstance. It is within the framework of this interpretation that he examines the entire ancient and medieval ontology. However, it is possible to interpret being as manufactured in Plato only with the help of a rather skilful hermeneutics, including the identification of the idea of the good with the demiurge. And although this is a very common interpretation in the past, nevertheless there are no sufficient grounds for it (as will be discussed below).

Whatever it was, Heidegger's hint is quite understandable. Firstly, following the standard interpretation of Zeller, Heidegger confirms the identity of the idea of the good and the demiurge, which is extremely important for his concept of ontotheology, and therefore for understanding metaphysics, i.e., existential history as a whole. Second, Heidegger thus further substantiates his interpretation of the ancient understanding of being as izgotovlennoe, because associated with , and , der Hersteller — with das Herstellen, the Creator with the created. This means that the idea of the good and the demiurge were interpreted by Plato within the framework of such an understanding of being, which was read from the manufacture and determined by the nature of the producing behavior (das herstellende Verhalten) of man. Hence the following thesis of Heidegger follows:

"Everything that is not God needs to be manufactured in the broadest sense and maintained. Manufacturing for the available-at-hand (Herstellung zu Vorhandenem) and for the non-manufacturing (Herstellungsunbed?rftigkeit) constitute the horizon within which “being” is understood. Every being that is not God is an ens creatum" ^{[112, p. 123]}.

This is how Heidegger's history of metaphysics closes in on itself, forming the framework of ontology: Plato opens up a perspective from which being itself becomes understandable, but he does not hold on to this height, because in any case the demiurge is only a higher being that obscures being and prevents its understanding. (Apophatic theology and related problems, which were familiar to Heidegger through the example of Plotinus and Meister Eckhart, are put out of brackets and essentially play no role in existential history and ontotheology. On Eckhart's connection with Neoplatonism, Apophaticism and, accordingly, with Plato: ^[27]). Therefore, Heidegger wants to expel Plato from these shining peaks, he intends to stay here in proud solitude. Identifying the idea of the good with the demiurge, Heidegger makes it clear that Plato does not actually extends beyond izgotovlennoe, outside of being, i.e. , but remains in the field of things. How will the late Heidegger write:

"Wonder if anyone on how inextricably () is related to the Even in the most distant fromtalibanii (Absprung) this Absolutum, through which we want to push God to the philosophy remains defined as through , through and — just as sure as eternity in the sense of nunc stans-time how nunc fluens" ^{[28, c. 74]}.

This is a very important and very characteristic remark for Heidegger. Back in the 20s, the philosopher came to the conclusion that eternity in philosophy is thought of in an illegal way. So, if Plato defines time as a mobile image of eternity (... ) ^{[29, p. 37d]}, which implies the secondary nature of time in relation to eternity, then in fact the logic here is the opposite: we derive the idea of eternity from our understanding of time. Therefore, we can say that eternity is a fixed image of time, eternity is a frozen, stopped time. Heidegger believes that eternity is "a simple derivative of being-in-time" ^{[30, p. 140]}. This can be seen from the famous definition of eternity, which Thomas attributes to Boethius (although it does not occur in the latter): nunc fluens facit tempus, nunc stans facit aeternitatum — the transitory present produces time, the abiding present produces eternity ^{[31, C. I,Q.10,a.2,a.1]}. The same logic is present, according to Heidegger, in , which is thought through , i.e. through and : transcendence sudeste thought it was from sudeste. So there is no legitimate way to talk about transcendence in a platonic, i.e. metaphysical, sense. Every transcendence, , is understood through immanence, worldliness: epikeinicity is derived from epitadicity ( — on this side, the opposite of — on the other side), and not vice versa. And I must admit that this is a very strong thesis.

Therefore, transcendence is being emptied, but it is still possible to appropriate the vacated space opened by Plato, which Heidegger successfully does. As noted above, Heidegger replaces the idea of goodness with the concept of temporality, in the light of which being is comprehended. As R. Petkovshek writes: "According to Heidegger, epekeina refers to the most intrinsic existential structure of the existing (Seinsstruktur des Daseins), which manifests itself as self-care (Selbstsorge). And self-care, according to Heidegger, presupposes temporality as an initial transcendence, occupying in fundamental ontology the place that the idea of good had in (neo) Platonic ontology. Almost verbatim, Heidegger twice paraphrases the famous allegory of the sun from the “State” and its Neoplatonic interpretation to describe the role of temporality as “the superiority of the source (?bermacht der Quelle)"in a hierarchical, phenomenological chronology" ^{[21, p. 61]}.

Thus, following in the footsteps of his great predecessors, Heidegger commits a new "parricide" and takes revenge for "our father Parmenides" ^{[32, p. 241d]}. It would seem that this article could be finished, but Heidegger's motives are still completely unclear. It is necessary to take a closer look, on what basis does he identify the idea of the good with the demiurge?

Generally speaking, the concept of das Hergestelltsein, i.e. the interpretation of being as manufactured, is very similar to anachronism, which owes its origin both to Heidegger's Christian education and to the vision of the world that has prevailed since the era of the industrial Revolution. Suffice it to say that before and outside the spread of the biblical paradigm of creation (through Philo of Alexandria and the entire era of patristics), it is very difficult to reduce the understanding of being to fabrication. Moreover, not only a person of early or classical antiquity, but also some medieval monk could hardly say about "house and yard, forest, field, sun, light and heat" that these are Erzugnisse der Natur - products of nature, as if it were some kind of factory (A. G. Chernyakov did not accidentally translate this inaccurately, as "what nature constantly gives" ^{[9, p. 143]}). When Heidegger first begins to interpret ancient genesis in the context of fabrication, i.e. in 1922, one should not forget that he had a seminary and a theological faculty, sincere youthful faith, from which he gradually departed, as well as a fascination with Luther ^{[33, pp. 172-210]}, therefore it is likely that such a background It leaves an imprint on his early interpretations of Aristotle, on whom he involuntarily projected Christian creationism and through whom he began to consider the entire ancient ontology.

Nevertheless, it is well known that Aristotle's cosmology does not presuppose the idea of creation or productiveness, but asserts the doctrine of the eternity of the world, which naturally caused certain difficulties in medieval culture (see: ^[34]). The prime mover does not create the world and does not manufacture anything, but only actualizes, moves from time to time. There is nothing new in the sublunary world, from the point of view of Aristotle, there is no evolution, all forms are purposefully ordered. And contrary to Heidegger, it is not the possible that takes precedence, but the actual. (As J. Milbank noted, the priority of the possible over the real, postulated from Duns Scotus to Heidegger, is very problematic for traditional and earlier Christian ontology, since it presupposes a different understanding of being. Moreover, it is a mistake to consider ancient philosophy and patristic thought from this position. See: ^{[35, pp. 45-55]}). It is a small and cozy world, although for a modern person it may be quite cramped and boring. As there is a certain order in the house, so universal harmony characterizes the entire cosmos, which was not created by any of the gods. Early Christians were clearly aware of how much their creationism differed from Hellenic eternalism. Clement of Alexandria, describing the errors of the Hellenes, quotes Heraclitus:

"This space is the same for all, not created, no one of gods or of men ( the ), but it has always been, is and will be eternally living fire (' ), measures flashing and measures dying" ^{[36, 22B 30],[37, V. 104.2]}.

It is noteworthy that Heidegger ignores this circumstance. See: ^[38]. He several times mentions a fragment B 30 ^{[38, c. 119, 132, 210]}, but does not discuss what it means the , in terms of his thesis about the existence of izgotovlennoe, which he again plays ^{[38, c. 444 continue]}.

In this cosmology, there is no creation of the world, there is no manufacture, as there was none in the metaphysics of Parmenides: the Greeks hardly realized themselves as producing beings. It is believed that the idea of the divine demiurge first appears only in Plato in the late dialogue "Timaeus", while it is almost not clarified — researchers have broken many copies trying to understand who it is in general and how it is related to the idea of good. It is very noteworthy that the figure of the demiurge does not appear at an early stage, when Plato's ontology was being formed, but at a later stage, i.e. it simply could not determine the understanding of being that had already developed by that time and was rather an expression of this understanding itself. Therefore, the identification of the demiurge with the good and through this interpretation of being in the horizon of production looks extremely doubtful: the demiurge is not for Plato a condition for the possibility of understanding being.

Apparently, for the first time the identification of the demiurge and the one /good appears in the school of Plato, and under the influence of Aristotle. It is the theology of Aristotle, and not the texts of Plato, that actually sets the entire structure of Heidegger's interpretation, from which the concept of ontotheology and, in general, the interpretation of all Western metaphysics are born. Following the established tradition, Heidegger transfers the views of the early and middle Platonists to Plato himself. As noted by J. Dillon: "Unlike Speusippus, Xenocrates identifies the Monad with the Mind... It can be assumed that he came to such views under the influence of Aristotle's criticism of Speusippus. Whatever it was, the idea of a self-contemplating divine Mind became from then until the time of Plotinus the dominant concept of official Platonism" ^{[39, p. 36]}. This concept in middle Platonism is complemented by a clarification: divine thinking cannot be empty, its subject must be eternal and unchangeable ideas, which are the essence of its thoughts. (It is usually believed that such an interpretation belongs to Antiochus of Ascalon, but there are reasons to doubt this ^{[40, pp. 62-63, 32]}; on the other hand, J. Dillon believes that it can already go back to Xenocrates, which seems quite likely ^{[41, p. 94]}, in more detail ^[42]). This is nothing more than an attempt to harmonize Plato and Aristotle, as a result of which the identification of the good and the demiurge arises in Platonism.

However, not all Greeks shared this teaching, because gods and the divine were usually thought of as something secondary to the primary elements. For example, Anaximenes "said that the beginning is the boundless air, from which comes both the becoming, and the become, and the future, and even the gods and the divine ( )…» ^{[36, 13A7]}. Therefore, the gods are secondary to the universal principle, which in this case is the air. This way of understanding the divine remained close not only folk religion, telling about theogonical processes, i.e. the origin of the gods from a certain source, but found its continuation in atomism, for which the gods , — albeit with difficulty, but indestructible, because they are composed of atoms and void, as all things. In other words, only atoms and emptiness are eternal, but the gods are complex, folded, so there was a time when they did not exist, which means that someday they may disappear, because they can disintegrate into the atoms of which they are composed. In Neoplatonism, the divine is secondary to the one/good, since the hypostasis of the mind is something more complex than the one, it is at least dual, since it contains the Aristotelian concept of self-thinking thinking. Therefore, Proclus said that the demiurge cannot be identified with the good, and all those who do this are "simply ridiculous (), because the good () and the good (? ) are not the same: the first is not felt, it is in itself, the highest of all, and the second is he is good because he participates in the first" ^{[43, II.359.22-28]}. It should be borne in mind that Proclus distinguishes between the first god and the demiurge, so the good can be called god, but not demiurge. Cf.: ^{[44, § 113]}.

Therefore, it must be taken into account that for the Greeks the identification of the good and the demiurge was not at all obvious, therefore the demiurgic principle of being for many of them was completely unacceptable, which means that Heidegger's concept of das Hergestelltsein does not characterize ancient ontology as a whole. Nevertheless, middle Platonism did have a significant impact on patristics, and through it on the medieval and all subsequent Christian tradition up to Zeller and Heidegger.

However, in the German-language literature of the 19th century, the question of the identity of the good and the demiurge was solved in different ways. As R. Ferber notes, if G. Bonitz and K. Stumpf identified the good and the deity, then K. F. Hermann defended the opposite point of view (see: ^{[45, pp. 118-119, Anm. 11]}; Ferber refers to the following works: ^{[46],[47],[48],[49]} Here, Ferber adds about the identification of God and the good: "However, this statement is historically erroneous, since the idea of the good is not identical with God, as Plato represents him in the image of the Demiurge (already in R. 507c7–8)"). And if in the XIX and the first half of the XX centuries. researchers mainly believed that the idea of the good is identical to the demiurge, then in the second half of the XX century. the situation is changing and many scientists today talk about the inadmissibility of such identification (^{[50, pp. 193-195],[51, pp. 179-183],[52, pp. 71-72],[53, p. 95],[54, c. 112],[55],[56, c. 175]}). As T. Y. Borodai noted: "If it were possible to prove that the Demiurge belongs to an "idea", that is, to the realm of intelligible being, a systematic and clear presentation of the Timaeus would not be difficult. But Platonic texts rebel against such an identification, and therefore neither Proclus nor most modern commentators accepted it" ^{[57, p. 50]}.

Based on the above, it can be concluded that there are serious reasons to doubt that Plato identified the idea of the good and the demiurge (nevertheless, modern researchers also speak in favor of identification, for example: ^[58]), which means it is doubtful that he perceived being within the framework of fabrication. Heidegger's interpretation is unconvincing from the point of view of the history of philosophy. And even if this identity could still be established, there is no reason to believe that this later teaching somehow influenced the formation of Plato's early ontology, much less defined it at its very foundation. And it would be absolutely incredible to extend this interpretation to the pre-Socratics, i.e. to generalize about the ancient understanding of being and reduce it to fabrication.

The idea of goodness and being

The idea of the good was not clearly clear to Heidegger himself either — he did not immediately come to the most acceptable interpretation. The fact is that the ontological status of the good can be understood in various ways: it can be understood as existing or as beyond being, but also as being in itself. Thus, Heidegger interprets the idea of the good as existing in the summer course of 1926 "Basic concepts of ancient Philosophy", which will be discussed below; he points out its transcendence to being in the course of 1927 "Basic problems of Phenomenology" ^{[6, pp. 396-398]}, as mentioned above; however, he never seriously it does not mean that it can be interpreted as being, although this is the most adequate interpretation of the idea of good (for more information: ^[17]).

On what basis does Heidegger interpret the good as something that exists? On the grounds that it represents a moral idea and in this sense cannot be on the other side of being. And if the late Heidegger says that the idea of good should not be thought of as good in the Christian-moralistic sense, because in "the Greek understanding and in Plato, means suitable, something that is good for something and that itself can make something else suitable" ^{[59, T. 2, c. 197]}, then in the 20s the philosopher does not yet think the good in Greek, wondering how the ethical dimension arises in ontology:

"They are and . How do they move from the principles and basic definitions of existence, from ideas as existential structures to the idea of the logical to the ethical (aus dem Logischen ins Ethische), from being to the due (vom Sein zum Sollen)? o and " ^{[25, p. 140]}.

Heidegger discusses this issue in the 1926 summer course "Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy", where he also offers a "possible solution" to this difficulty. The idea of the good is interpreted here in the context of giving value, it is itself understood as a value and due in connection with ethical topics. At this stage, Heidegger sees this as the main problem of Plato's thought, which could not stand at the height of pure ontology. The idea of the good within the framework of such an interpretation at least falls under the need to dissect it with the help of Hume's guillotine (although it cannot be said that the principle of separation of being and due does not require clarification: ^[60],[61]). Nevertheless, this approach was quite natural for ancient philosophy, and it was the same for Plato: "So why is the Good ethically good? <...> The answer does not need to look far: ethics for the ancients should be part of nature. In other words, the study of ethics was closely related to the study of nature. <...> If modern philosophers tend to think that it is impossible to deduce what is due from what exists, then the ancients, on the contrary, often begin their moralizing with arguments about human nature" ^{[62, pp. 132-133]}. However, the question of how good is good, i.e. how good is ethically good, requires special consideration. However, this point of view is well established among antiquarians. D. V. Bugai expresses himself in a similar way: "For Plato, unlike many of his contemporaries and many philosophers of Modern times, there is no fundamental difference between the physical and the moral. On the contrary, one of the main motives of all his philosophical activity was the desire to show that morality is in the nature of things, and that the physical in the true sense of the word is just moral" ^{[63, p. 303]}. However, from the point of view of Heidegger, who in this period still follows the New European tradition, this approach turns out to be very problematic, because it indicates that Plato replaces being with being, because the moral intrudes into the ontological.

Since this is extremely important for the purposes of this study, I will consider two rather large and very representative fragments from the course "Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy" so that one can understand the philosopher's train of thought. It should be noted, however, that this course of lectures is based on the students' notes, which are often very fragmentary and not completely understandable, so the style of the text leaves much to be desired.

So, having raised the question of the transition from the logical to the ethical, from the existent to the due, Heidegger continues to think about what Plato wanted to say, as well as why he said it.

"Being, that is, being-being (das Seiende-Sein), is something that is understood simply for its own sake and it is the only thing that can be understood in this way. For its own sake, the limit (das Ende) of all understanding. When I say “for my own sake” (umwillen seiner selbst), it is still a kind of statement about him: limit, , . Naively ontic: something even higher than being itself, while it still remains the same. However, upon careful consideration: not a statement about being, but a distance from it, just not to itself, but back, from understanding it relative to what it is for, and not in itself. So “being” how the principle turns out to be a derivative characteristic. We are talking about the existence of the existing (das Sein des Daseins), about the soul itself. What it is about is being, for the sake of what this being is, “being". Being, to whose being belongs the understanding of being. Understanding of Being: the ability of being (Seink?nnen), which is aimed at being. In Greek: that to which everything goes, for the sake of which, as it exists, it is good (selbst als Seiendes, Gutes). Being is , the “goal", . It becomes because being is understood as being (Sein verstanden wird als Seiendes), a certain essential property, a good (eine seiende Eigenschaft, das Gute). More is said about the soul than the good can bear in its meaning. It is necessary to return the ontological statement to its limits. Cognition, contemplation is an action, an aspiration to. , , all contemplation already exists, and it is primarily connected with light. It completes the understanding of being. Being through , “seen", being through , "for what”, "purpose”. The idea of the good is genuine being and being (das eigentliche Sein und Seiende). <...> Being means, first of all, presence (Anwesenheit). In addition, it is “for what”, for what, , , "fitness”. It separates itself and as , respectively, is equated to . Contributing (Beitr? glichkeit) is not itself understood ontologically, but is placed next to being, since being itself narrows down to a pure state, the naked presence of a thing (puren Bestand, nackte Dinganwesenheit). At the same time, the thing, however, has “something else” (“noch” umzu), value, based on the incomplete design of being (unzureichenden Fassung des Seins). <...> Being is different from being. Its own way of perception: , and this possibility belongs to the existing (Dasein) understanding of being. Being in . : . : , . : , “with", “together". The Central problem — the main problem: — — " ^{[25, c. 140-142]}.

Since this is a very rich fragment, it is useful to fix a few points, although everything is important here. Nevertheless, it should be said:

1. Naively ontic: that which is considered higher than being itself, still remains something involved in being.

2. Therefore, we are not talking about being at all, but about the understanding of being, which belongs to the existing (soul).

3. Being becomes because in fact it is thought of as being, because goodness is only a certain property, i.e. being is replaced by being, being is given out as something higher than being.

4. Being is twofold: it means presence and fitness, while as presence being narrows down to a pure state, the bare presence of a thing, and as fitness it overgrows with value.

Here it is worth paying attention to the fact that Heidegger himself interprets existence extremely broadly, and his being turns out to be simply boundless ^{[111, p. 12-13]}. Therefore, the narrowing of being to a bare presence turns out to be problematic, because it should be understood as a given, as openness ^[64]. But even more problematic for him is the doubling of being, when fitness is layered on the presence, which is then transformed into value, i.e. when Plato interprets being in the light of goodness, utility, .

The fact that concepts such as , , appear in the text suggests that Heidegger does not change himself and reads Plato through Aristotle. This was repeatedly pointed out by H.G. Gadamer, noting that Aristotle's criticism of the doctrine of the good had a tremendous influence on Heidegger: "Aristotle suddenly became surprisingly relevant. Heidegger preferred ethics, rhetoric, in short, those disciplines of the Aristotelian curriculum that he clearly separated from the fundamental issue of theoretical philosophy. First of all, it seemed to him that the criticism of the idea of the good, this supreme principle of Plato's teaching, met here corresponded to his own task — the task of comprehending temporal-historical existence, as well as the criticism of transcendental philosophy. His interpretation of phronesis as ^{[65, p. 440b]}, i.e. another way of knowing, was a kind of confirmation of his theoretical and existential interests. This was reflected in the understanding of theoretical philosophy, i.e. metaphysics, because in those years, as Heidegger liked to say, he still saw the “famous analogy” not quite adequately and was not confident in himself. This was the element in Aristotelian metaphysics from which he could challenge any systematic derivation of all values from a single principle, whether it was Husserl's transcendental Ego or Plato's idea of the good" ^{[66, p. 179]} (regarding : ^{[67, p. 112-139]}). Since Heidegger understands Plato through his existential analytics ^{[21, p. 45]}, he considers the idea of the good through the question of the existence of the existing (das Sein des Daseins), i.e. within the framework of the question of the soul itself (Seele selbst). (Cf.: "In addition, Aristotelian criticism of Plato's idea of the good of the young Heidegger was able to surprisingly strengthen his “existential” critique of the transcendental concepts of subject and object. Just as the good is not the highest object or principle, but is differentiated in a variety of ways of meeting it, so “being” is present in everything that is, even if in the end there is some kind of eminent being that guarantees every presence. This was a question about being as such, which Aristotle tried to answer, and with him Heidegger" ^{[68, p. 198]}). And since existential analytics is largely conditioned by the interpretation of Aristotle, the idea of the good is interpreted in the sense of practical and ethical issues: Heidegger devoted the summer semester of 1924 to the course "Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy", in which he constantly turned to discussing the topic of the good. In particular, Heidegger dwells separately on the Aristotelian criticism of Plato's idea of the good. See: ^{[69, pp. 305-310]}).

So, if Plato says that all things are comprehended in the light of the good ideas, the latter is conceived metaphysically, that Aristotle rejects this approach, believing it impossible to bring a variety of benefits to one source, because the benefit may not be something common ( ) ^{[70, c. 1096a10 continue]}. Aristotle pre-defines the good as "something everyone longs ( )" ^{[70, p. 1094а3]}, but since there is no common good corresponding to one idea ( ) ^{[70, c. 1096b27]}, philosopher turns to figuring out what is good for man. In this regard, he considers the goal that you can strive for: "So, if there's a purpose for all practices ( ), it is a practical good ( )", and if such objectives are more and more benefits ^{[70, c. 1097a22–25]}. In other words, if the good in Plato acts primarily as a principle of existence and knowledge, that Aristotle thought of it practically and ethically, i.e., Dasein, of the soul, where in the text of Heidegger occurs and the triad: — — (cf: ^{[69, c. 306-308]}).

Apparently, Heidegger simply could not consider being and, consequently, the idea of the good as something unified, since, following Aristotle, he built the logic of fundamental ontology in such a way that it does not allow understanding the origin as a certain unity. Here is how A. B. Patkul writes about this: "In ontology, using the Heidegger example, unlike previous experiments in the interpretation of time, for example, in Kant or Husserl, a substantial difficulty is found — the impossibility of detecting a universal scheme that would allow schematizing all other schemes. In other words, phenomenologically, a species that would make all other particular species visible turns out to be meaningfully unattainable. And this is one of the fundamental differences in the Heideggerian way, that is, from ecstatic horizontality and transcendence, understood temporality from the Platonic idea of good, which is functionally so close to it (and therefore from the Hegelian absolute idea)" ^{[110, p. 444]}.

Of course, Plato also speaks of such a good, "which every soul strives for and does everything for it ( )" ^{[8, p. 505d-e]}, however, there is a fundamental difference here: the soul strives for the good not because it is morally right, but for the reason that that it justifies every action in advance, including moral action. This is the essence of Plato's philosophy in general, who constantly wonders what the meaning of a concept is, for example, what is the essence of the sacred, what is God divine, etc.

"You have often heard that the idea of the good, the great knowledge (? ) through it and justice, and so used becomes useful ( ). Perhaps you knew even now that I was going to say this, and besides, we don't know her well enough" ^{[8, p. 505a]}.

Plato emphasizes that he constantly talks about this, i.e. this is the essence of his philosophy: through the idea of goodness, justice and other things of this kind become suitable and useful. This means that the good is thought of as something that determines the nature of justice, and therefore it precedes morality: justice is useless if we do not know what good it does, what its good is. In other words, it's still pure ontology, since it's about how morality works. Here it is appropriate to recall the gospel image: "If the salt loses its power, then how will you make it salty? It is no longer good for anything, except to throw it out to be trampled on by people" (Matthew 5:13); "Salt is a good thing; but if salt loses its power, how can it be corrected? It is no good in the ground or in manure, they throw it out" (Luke 14:34-35). In other words, Plato is interested in what makes salt salty, what makes it salty. Why be fair? Why is justice fair? What is the significance of justice? How is it better than injustice? Practical ethics usually does not raise such questions. Moreover, she does not even raise the question of what is good, because she is concerned with how to achieve it. Although this strategy, from the point of view of Plato (or Socrates), is the most questionable, because we must clearly understand what we are striving for. Therefore, the problem of good and evil goes beyond practical issues and belongs rather to the field of meta-ethics, which includes metaphysics ^{[71, p. 168]}. Therefore, in "Euthyphron" the question is posed, "is the sacred ( ) loved by the gods because it is sacred, or is it sacred because the gods love it? (? ;)» ^{[72, c. 10a]}. This means that Plato is not interested in the sacred as a given, but he wants to understand what the essence of the sacred is, why the sacred is sacred, what is its salt. In the Phaedra, Plato says that the philosopher's mind is turned to what the divinity of God is (o ) ^{[73, p. 249c]} - the philosopher wants to understand what the essence of the divine is. Speaking generally: what is the essence of all things? But this is not a subject of ethics, but a subject of ontology. Every time Plato tries to find some general principles, but it is only in the "State" that he rises so high that he manages to reveal the source of this materiality, that is, what gives existence its essence. Every idea acquires its significance and materiality through something else and almost incomprehensible. In the "State" it is figuratively called the Sun and the idea of good:

"That which endows the known with truth and gives strength to the knower, you consider the idea of good. Being the cause of knowledge and truth like the mind of cognition, so no matter how beautiful these things (), knowledge and truth ( ), you'd be right, if it deems the benefit of the more beautiful () than they are. Just as it is correct there to consider light and vision as sun-like, but it is wrong to recognize them as the Sun, so here it is correct to consider knowledge and truth as good-looking (), and it is wrong to recognize any of them as good. However, it is even more necessary to honor the possession of the good ( )" ^{[8, pp. 508e-509a]}.

It is wonderful to learn something wise and important, for example, beauty, sacred, divine, just, but if this knowledge does not benefit, but only harm, then one may wonder whether it is necessary at all? Why is the idea of goodness more beautiful than knowledge and truth? Because it is more primordial, because people would have died long ago, striving for the truth, if the truth did not bring good, if it were not suitable and useful. And since all people are naturally eager for knowledge ( ), as Aristotle says ^{[74, c. 980a22]}, then how is it possible existence of mankind, if knowledge is useless? Therefore, the good here does not act as a moral concept, but as an ontological principle. Plato discovers that truth is not just correctness, contrary to Heidegger, because one might ask, what do we care about correctness at all? (It is important to note that Heidegger himself subsequently rejected Plato's interpretation of truth as only correctness: ^{[3, p. 87]}; in a conversation with J. In 1975, Heidegger confirmed that his conclusions in the work "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" were no longer consistent — nicht mehr haltbar ^{[75, p. 186]}). Like justice, correctness is important not in itself, but only because it is useful, it is good for us, because for the erring, for example, for the lost in the forest, the right direction is an opportunity to survive; however, the right road to the swamp is death. The good is more beautiful than truth and knowledge, not because it acts as a moral principle, but because it justifies, "makes salty" both truth and knowledge. That is why Plato says that even being from the good — it preserves, keeps from destruction, the good acts as an ontological principle.

From this point of view, it is interesting to look at the following Nietzsche's aphorism: "Truth is that kind of error without which a certain kind of living beings could not live. The value for life is the last foundation" ^{[76, p. 285, § 493]}. In the light of what has been said above, Nietzsche does not express anything extraordinary, but remains quite in line with Platonic thought, which here intersects with evolutionary epistemology: the value of life decides, but decides not because truth is a kind of delusion, but because a person, surviving for thousands of years in a hostile world, acquires a certain the knowledge of life, without which he would have perished, i.e. the human cognitive apparatus was historically formed in such a way that his mistakes led to premature death and, therefore, were not preserved. Plato saw how intentionality functions, in the light of which it acts.

I repeat, later Heidegger himself will say that Plato's idea of the good cannot be thought of as good in a moralistic sense, because it means suitable ^{[59, T. 2, p. 197]}. Therefore, the content of criticism changes in the future: "The essence (Seiendheit) has shifted under the doer-fit (das Tauglichmachende)" ^{[19, p. 41]}. This means that the transcendent good, or making-fit, surpasses essence, according to Heidegger, beingness is understood in the light of fitness. This interpretation is based on a famous saying of Plato:

"Consider knowable and not only learned from the presence of the good, but the Genesis and sudest given to them from him, although the benefit is not sudeste, and even on the other side sudeste, surpassing her seniority and power ( , ' , , ' )" ^{[8, c. 509b]}.

However, this fragment cannot be considered in isolation from the entire text or understood in the interpretation of the Neoplatonists. As M. Baltes showed, a more correct interpretation of Plato's statements about the good in the "State" forces us to admit that it is not so much something beyond being, but rather being itself, per se; and here it is important that all Platonists before Plotinus understood the good in this way, not about any transcendence There was no question of existence ^[77]. This point of view is shared by other researchers: ^{[78],[79],[80],[81]}. However, another interpretation is widespread in Platonic studies, according to which the good is above being. See: ^[45]. This interpretation can be difficult if one does not distinguish between being and being, which is outlined in Plato. Therefore, Heidegger's thesis that essence shifts under the doer-fit needs to be clarified and clarified. But in this case, it is necessary to pay attention not to how Heidegger changes his criticism over time, but to the fact that in the 20s, under the influence of Aristotle and the philosophy of values, he pays attention primarily to the morality of the good and through this builds his criticism of Plato. As H.-G. Gadamer noted: "Plato was perceived by Heidegger in a critical light from the very beginning, since Heidegger adopted and fruitfully transformed the Aristotelian criticism of the idea of the good, paying special attention to the Aristotelian concept of analogy" ^{[82, p. 82]}. Heidegger sees the idea of the good as a moral principle, although it would be more correct to say that the good as an ontological principle precedes the ethical one, justifying justice and so on.

The fact is that in Plato and in earlier Greek thought, the good did not have clear ethical connotations, they were understood as something derivative, as Heidegger himself would later say ^{[20, pp. 215-218]}. See also: ^{[83, pp. 10-14]}. As Lax and Most note, the adjective "usually means "personal", "useful", not necessarily having the moral connotation that is given to this term in English, just as kakos (, "bad", "evil") often has the meaning of "destructive"" ^{[84, c. 220]}. On this basis, A. Serafin suggests generally reconsidering the idea of good and understanding it by analogy with truth: good comes into oblivion just as non-concealment turns into correctness, therefore, if the good is cleared of moral connotations that were not originally peculiar to it, the idea of good will become analogous to truth as non-concealment. Serafin believes that this point of view is quite applicable to Heidegger's philosophy ^{[20, pp. 218-232]}. (However, Heidegger's attitude to ethical issues should be taken into account here in general: "Although the conceptual pair of authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) and inauthenticity (Unigentlichkeit), which structures the composition and the entire analysis of Sein und Zeit, resembles Plato's ethically oriented metaphysics, Heidegger repeatedly defended himself against readers' suspicions that his existential ontology also contains the contours of ethics. He even showed slight contempt for the discipline called "ethics"..." ^{[85, p. 258]}). And although Serafin's interpretation seems doubtful to me within the framework of later existential history, nevertheless this approach is confirmed by texts of the early period: "It turns out that just as broke up into verum and certum, so undergoes a characteristic process of disintegration up to the present time, when it is defined as a value" ^{[86, c. 276]}.

This also coincides with how H.-G. Gadamer proposes to consider the good of Plato: "Heidegger, as is known, saw in Plato's teaching on eidos the first step towards the transformation of truth as non-concealment into proportionality and correctness of statements. Later, he himself said that it was understood too one-sidedly. <...> I would like to put the question differently: did Plato himself ask about what goes beyond this assumption, and asked from the very beginning, and not only because of certain complications and difficulties inherent in the assumption of ideas, and did he not try, at least in the idea of the good, to comprehend this sphere of non-concealment? In my opinion, some points of his teaching confirm this assumption. After all, the idea of the good also does not fit into the scheme of the Aristotelian criticism of separateness, and in fact it is easy to show that the Aristotelian criticism of the idea of the good can only be entered into the context of the general criticism of ideas with great stretch and with a fair amount of caution: in fact, criticism of the idea of the good is possible only from a practical point of view. From a theoretical point of view, this problem remains unresolved, because these are not just random equivocations that make it possible to call all the variety of things "good" — they are backed by the key Aristotelian problem analogia entis" ^{[87, pp. 100-102]}. It follows from Gadamer's words that Heidegger's interpretation begins to move in the wrong direction over time.

Treating the idea of the good as a goal, Heidegger understands the Genesis of Plato as ", "target", ", which is the substitution of the existence of higher things: "It is because being understood as being a kind of real property, the benefit" ^{[25, c. 140-141]}. This means that something from the outside is attached to being, in addition to the pure state and naked presence, some additional property is assumed, an essential property that cannot be beyond being. Therefore, in the idea of good, being and due, presence and suitability are combined, i.e., a certain property is also added to the essence, ""more" to what, value." This "to what" arises from the fact that the good is seen from the point of view of the first person, i.e. it is considered by the soul. This orientation creates value. The following fragment explains this point:

"Question: how can play a fundamental role in clarifying existence? So in Plato's late dialogue Timaeus, as well as in Aristotle. Possible solution: cognition is a kind of soul, an action. Every action is aimed at something that needs to be done. Existence is what makes me take the path of knowledge. Being is characterized as that for which I know: the relation of being to the goal for which it exists. It is naively perceived as existing and as . Since cognition is perceived as an action, being should be characterized as . This “for what's sake” is perceived as higher than being. But this is no longer a characteristic of being as such, but in relation to cognition. is not a purely ontological definition. The relation of being and value. Values as such are a fiction. The establishment of values is a misunderstanding of the Greek formulation of the question. The “significance” (Gelten) of values is a modern invention (Lotze). This concept should be reduced to . If the analysis of remains purely thematic, then the transition to should be avoided. Treating being as с misunderstands being. It is no coincidence that Plato's problem subsequently disappears in its original function. Plato nevertheless did not hold back on a purely ontological formulation of the question, but re-mixed it with the being of nature and explained existence in relation to its being through creation (with the help of the demiurge). Falling from the height of the “Sophist". Aristotle tries to keep the height of the ontological problem" ^{[25, pp. 283-284]}.

There is no need to dwell on the question of the chronology of Plato's dialogues and some inconsistencies with Heidegger's statements. As in many of his texts, Heidegger states the weakness and inconsistency of Plato, whose height Aristotle is trying to hold. The following provisions are key to Heidegger's interpretation:

1. Cognition is a kind of soul, an action.

2. Being is characterized as , "for the sake of which" is mistakenly perceived as higher than being.

3. Being is characterized as that for which I know: the relation of being to the goal for which it exists.

4.     This is not a characteristic of being, but of knowledge.

The movement of the soul carried out in cognition means that cognition is perceived as an action, and being is characterized as , because every action is directed towards the good. At the same time, Heidegger believes that "Plato still did not hold on to a purely ontological formulation of the question, but re-mixed it with the being of nature and explained existence in relation to its being through creation (with the help of the demiurge)." As you can see, Heidegger does not limit himself to the "State", but also attracts the "Sophist" and "Timaeus" to form a general idea of Plato's position. How justified is this? In itself, this is rather doubtful, since in each of the mentioned dialogues Plato pursued quite specific and different goals, and therefore the language and formulation of questions in them are significantly different. Thus, Plato in The Sophist talks quite a lot about being, but there is neither the idea of goodness nor the figure of the divine demiurge. Is it possible to mix these discourses? Hardly. Nevertheless, Plato's general position can still be clarified somehow, because these dialogues have the same author.

Indeed, being in the Sophist is understood in connection with action and movement, but this decision cannot be called final and, most interestingly, it cannot be argued that Plato shared it. However, Heidegger is interested in this very moment, because through it he easily passes to Aristotle and his existential analytics. Plato writes:

"I say it is having on the nature of any ability () influence ( ) to something else or suffer the slightest from the most insignificant, or even only once, it all truly is ( ). In this regard, I give a definition: being ( ) is nothing but an ability (). <...> Do you think that to know or to be known is an action or a suffering ( ? ), or both? <...> If cognition is to act in some way ( ), then cognition must correspond to suffering. Sudeste same ( ), the cognitive knowledge, according to this argument, as far as is known, so moving through preterivanja ( ), which, as we say, would be resting" ^{[88, p. 247d–248e]}.

In his interpretation of the idea of the good, Heidegger implies this reflection. The important thing here is that in these arguments of Plato there is no purpose, no good, no demiurge. Being in the Sophist is understood in a significantly different way and outside of the problems that are being developed in the State, but since Heidegger had taught a large course on the Sophist two years earlier, it is quite natural that he used the remaining developments (especially in connection with action and demiurgy: ^{[89, pp. 463-486]}). Nevertheless, we must agree that the corpus of Plato's texts can be considered as a single whole.

Plato defines cognition as a kind of movement of the soul, and also understands existence as a force, or opportunity, or ability. Moreover, it is the being ( ), and not being ( ). Heidegger probably believes that Plato's being and being are not different, so he says "being, that is, being-being (das Seiende-Sein)", being is "naively perceived as being and as ". However, Plato's position in this regard is more refined. He did not really make a consistent distinction between the concepts of being, being and essence, but in his dialectic of the one and the many, he just lays the foundation for such a distinction. Since I have already written about this, in this case I will only briefly summarize the most important points in Plato's thought ^{[17, pp. 63-81, 81-117]}.

In the dialogue "Parmenides" Plato developed the dialectic of the one and the many, which reflects the ontological interrelationships. As is known, the "second hypothesis" begins with the thesis about the existence of the one: "if the one is ..." ^{[32, p. 142b]}. Plato argues that follows from this claim and concludes that "very unified, fragmented sushistew/estate ( ) is a huge and boundless set ( ) <...> the one in itself, divided by being ( ), must necessarily be many" ^{[32, p. 144e]}. What is important here is that the one can be divided by being only if the latter is a set, i.e., for Plato, being is a set of entities, which is why the one is divided into an infinite set. However, this is only the lower level of being, there is still an upper one:

"Genesis/sudeste (? ) is divided between a multitude of things ( ) and not missing anything from existence ( )... How, indeed, could being/essence (o) be separated from anything of existence ( )? – Nothing. Therefore, it is fragmented to the smallest, largest, and any other things (), it's all divided, and parts of life/sudeste (... ) infinite many" ^{[32, c. 144b]}.

As mentioned above, at the theoretical level, Plato does not distinguish between being and sudest, so the term in this case means not an entity in the usual sense of the word, as here, first, is used as a synonym and, secondly, unites all things in General finally, because the essence for Plato, there is something simple and indivisible, whereas in this case he talks about . In view of this, they must be understood here as being, i.e. as being and being, or as the unity of being.

Further, from the expression "o is divided among the multitude of " it follows that Plato nevertheless felt the difference between them, resembling an ontological differentiation: being is divided among the multitude of beings. We are talking about the most common kind ( ?, ), covering all types ( , ), the juxtaposition of single and multiple . Plato interprets the concept of being within the framework of the dialectic of the one and the many, as a result of which being for him is a collection of beings, but at the same time, taken as a whole, it represents unity, therefore it unites the same way as the one unites many, or as a genus — species. Taken in the aspect of its unity is nothing other than the idea of being ( ) ^{[88, c. 254a]} or higher genus, per se.

Of course, there is not yet the precision of concepts that can be found in a more mature ontology, Plato remains within the framework of the dialectic of one and many, genera and species. However, it follows from this that Plato did not need the figure of the demiurge at all to explain being as such, that he presented the difference between being and beings, although it was not developed in due measure and with the necessary clarity. Nevertheless, this found its continuation in Neoplatonism, on the basis of which, as noted in the Introduction, Heidegger's philosophy is criticized from the point of view of genology. See comparison of Heidegger's ontology and Plotinus' genology: ^[90]. See also classical studies by P. Ado: ^{[91],[92],[93]}. Thus, Plato's concept of being is not at all as naive as Heidegger believed. Plato did not need to understand existence from the point of view of goodness or comprehend it within the framework of the movement of the soul. These are just completely different discourses.

The situation with Heidegger's interpretation of the idea of the good is complicated by the fact that he offers different interpretations in different texts. So, if in the 20s he connects the good with morality and understands it as an essential, some essential property, then in the 30s he may well interpret it in the sense of transcendence to being, i.e. as Nothing. Here is an interesting example:

"This is, perhaps, the decisive thought in all of Plato's work, in which Plato speaks about the good. Good — on the other side of life (jenseits des Seins), so... = Nothing (formally speaking). This means that if we ask about the good, as we ask about something good, then we will not find it, we will always come across Nothing. The good cannot be found at all among being and being. It requires us to ask in a different way. - not only on the other side of being, but otherworldly just in relation to being and truth (), namely as that which endows (erm?chtigt) both with what they are. In dignity, and in , and in power, the good surpasses everything else; the good itself is still power, the power of endowment (Macht des Erm?chtigens). The good is the supreme power, since it gives strength (erm?chtigt) and , which, in turn, is already the most powerful" ^{[94, pp. 199-200]}.

Here Heidegger interprets the good in a completely different way than in the lectures of the 20s. He no longer calls it an essential property, but points out its transcendence, that it is impenetrable, because it is Nothing. This is a more subtle and profound interpretation of Plato, although mediated by Nietzsche's philosophy. The only difficulty here is that Heidegger was actively included in the political agenda in 1933/34, following the spirit of the time, he proposes an interpretation of the good as power and strength (die Macht), which corresponds to the interests of Heidegger of that time and is associated with his attention to Nietzsche's philosophy. However, this is a "demonic reading" of Plato (given the context!) It does not correspond to Greek problems, i.e. Heidegger does not think in Greek, and his approaches to Plato are constantly changing. A. Glukhov notes important details in Heidegger's approach and changes in his views. See: ^{[95, pp. 429-453]}. However, I am not inclined to hypercriticism, which is distinguished by the famous work of E. Fai, who suggests forgetting about Heidegger as a philosopher altogether ^[96]. In my opinion, the positions of M. Buber and V. Frankl, who did not disdain to communicate with Heidegger after the war, are more adequate and representative in this matter.

So, it is useful to correlate this interpretation of the good of the 30s with an earlier one, when Heidegger understands Plato's being as a good: "Treating being as mistakenly understands being," says Heidegger: das Ansprechen des Seins als mi?versteht das Sein ^{[25, p. 284]}, or so: "Disclosure being as a good misunderstands being." But is this really the case?

First, Plato did not intend to equate them, giving the benefit for Genesis or Genesis for good because he wanted to separate them, distinguishing their meanings, whence arises . Moreover, "on the other side" does not mean hierarchically before and without, rather just outside, something else.

Secondly, the existence and benefit of explicitly correlated, between them there is no identity, but Plato says that the knowable is known , thanks to the presence of good (- — being in the welfare); the Genesis and essence ' takes, present in poznajemo thanks to the good (- — being of the good) ^{[8, c. 509b]}. This game of prefixes with the verb is hardly accidental in this passage. On the one hand, the good is not the essence, they are different, on the other hand, where the good is, there is also being, since being and essence are given to the knowable precisely from the good. How can the good itself endow the knowable with something other than itself, i.e., being? This is possible only if goodness and beingness are identical in some respect, because the good, by its very goodness, and not by anything else, endows the knowable with being. And if being is from the good, then everything that belongs to being belongs to the good. The benefit gives the known existence and essence, and only in this sense is (likely that in this fragment is hendiadys ^{[98, c. 69],[99, c. 174, n. 40]}). Wed: "...things and the good in the field of ideas is not only balanced, but it is necessary that it is so. In other words, it is necessary that every idea is a being and every idea is a good; further, if, as we believe, somewhere - out of necessity — we find a good, we find a being, and wherever — out of necessity — we find a being, we find a good, then the desire to identify their really going to be strong. <...> The good extends as far as the being, and vice versa, without exception, turning to the topos of ideas. Nevertheless, the idea of the good is not an entity, it is before, thus surpassing it in dignity and power. Although what exists is given precisely by the good" ^{[97, p. 293]}.

And here the question arises, how wrong is the disclosure of being as a good? Is it wrong at all...?

Conclusion

It is time to summarize the results of this protracted article. As Heidegger understood Plato's and his teachings about the good? It is impossible to answer this question unequivocally, since Heidegger approached this question from different sides and interpreted this most important position of the Greek thinker in different ways. Nevertheless, Heidegger's main remarks can be reduced to two: (1) the good was thought of by Plato as something moral and therefore mixed with what exists, (2) the good subordinates the being, brings it under fitness. At the same time, Heidegger considered the very transcendence of the good as something fundamental for the whole of European philosophy in general and for Plato himself in particular. Heidegger says: "what we are looking for, there are . For Plato, this is a condition for the possibility of all knowledge" ^{[9, p. 379]}. And although not all modern researchers are ready to agree with this interpretation, nevertheless, from a philosophical point of view, it has grounds. The opposite point of view is expressed, for example, by D. V. Bugai, who believes that Plato does not need to look for any special doctrine about the good at all, and even more so to consider it within the framework of ontology ^{[63, pp. 286-304]}. Nevertheless, this bold interpretation is not supported by most scientists and the actual history of philosophy, i.e. the tradition of Platonism reception, and hence metaphysics in general, which is what Heidegger usually talks about. In turn, I believe that from the point of view of Platonic studies, such an interpretation looks more like a skeptical gesture than a desire to understand the great Plato. However, the statement that " is a condition for the possibility of all knowledge" still somewhat exaggerates the importance and place of the idea of good in the corpus of Plato's texts, Heidegger considers this problem as transcendental, which no longer fully corresponds to the correct formulation of the question.

In the future, Heidegger repeatedly returned to this problem, but each time he adhered to an already formed interpretation. So, he said that " as has, according to its measure for , nature and God , Ms.: Aristotle. The question of existence as such (in the sense of the leading question), ontology, is thus necessarily a theory" ^{[100, p. 273, ed.]}. This interpretation comes, of course, from the Aristotelian perspective, which affects how Heidegger understands Plato. Hence the identification of the idea of the good with the demiurge, as well as the interpretation of being as a fabrication. Here is a typical example:

"So can be defined only as something that henceforth notes sudeste (die Seiendheit) as such in its relation to man (), as , fit (das Taugliche), justifying all sorts of fitnessand, therefore, as a condition of "life", and yet its nature. Thus, a step has been taken towards “value”, to “meaning”, to “ideal". The leading question about existence as such is already at its boundary and at the same time at the place where it rolls back and no longer comprehends essence so initially, but values (be-wertet) in such a way that the evaluation itself is given out as the highest" ^{[100, p. 272, with ed.]}.

This approach can be considered normative for the late Heidegger, in various modifications it is found in various texts of the German philosopher. In light of the above, this passage should not cause any difficulties. But it is interesting that later Heidegger himself gives a hint that this interpretation of Plato is wrong. If this interpretation is based on the convergence of creation and demiurgy, or the idea of the good and the demiurge, which is related to Heidegger's interpretation of the entire ancient ontology (again, I will refer to my article: ^[26]), then the distinction between good and creation significantly limits Heidegger's interpretation. More precisely, it forces you to simply abandon it.

In 1962, Heidegger participated in a seminar after his report "Time and Being" (the report itself: ^[101]; discussion: ^[102]). Among other things, a remark that is fundamentally important for this study was voiced here. The participants discussed Heidegger's position regarding the interpretation of ancient ontology. But before giving this fragment, it is necessary to clarify something.

In German, das Anwesen means not so much presence, as it is sometimes translated ^{[103, p. 205, 207]}, as an estate, a manor, in which this concept coincides with the Greek o. Nevertheless, A. P. Shurbelev explains his understanding of this word in the following way: "Anwesen is presence (understood as the arrival, arrival of being in the uncovered, as if the incessant arrival of this essence in its dynamics). Anwesenheit is presence (in a more static sense compared to the dynamism of Anwesen)" ^{[59, vol. 2, pp. 440-441]}. Unfortunately, the translator does not explain where this dynamism comes from. Dictionaries don't talk about it. This cannot be deduced from Heidegger's texts themselves (or it must be further justified). Therefore, there are reasons not to trust this interpretation. But the fact that this understanding misses the connection with the Greek o, i.e. with the estate and manor, in my opinion, is an omission. In addition, this connection casts doubt on this dynamism. Therefore, the phrase das Anwesen des Anwesenden cannot simply be translated as "the presence of the present", but one should take into account the meaning of ownership, which is present in Anwesen and o, which was important for Heidegger. On the other hand, Heidegger explicitly contrasts Anwesen and Abwesen as presence and absence. Cf.: "How the first self—abandonment grasps and gets bogged down in what it reveals (being - presence (Anwesenheit) — perception — gaze). ... Prioritize: uniqueness and unity of presence (An-wesen) ... The absence (Ab-wesen) remains rejected; this questioning will not cope with it under the domination and superiority of the presence (An-wesen)" ^{[104, p. 95]}. It is very difficult to translate all this into Russian, but since o is essence, I decided to translate Anwesen literally, i.e. as inherent, in order to at least somehow retain the necessary semantics. However, it may well be that this can be conveyed in a better way. So, the recording of the seminar records the following:

"The inherent presence (Das Anwesen des Anwesenden) — i.e., the permission to be present: present (das Anwesenlassen: das Anwesende) — is interpreted by Aristotle as . Later reinterpreted as creatio, along with great simplicity, this leads to the assumption (Setzung), as which there is a transcendental consciousness of objects. This shows that the main feature of allowing oneself to be present in metaphysics is the work (das Hervorbringen) in its many images. In contrast, [the participants of the seminar] argued that although in his [Plato's] later works — primarily in the “Laws” — the poietische character of v appears more and more clearly, the defining relationship that exists between inherent and present (zwischen Anwesen und Anwesendem), in Plato it is not understood as . In all there is only , stay (das Beisein) in all, without having to ensure that best fit the meaning politicheskogo in relation to the present. And this indicates that Plato's determinant remains ill-conceived. After all, nowhere has he worked out what this genuine is, nowhere is it explicitly said that performs in relation to . This gap is not eliminated by the fact that Plato seeks to grasp the connection of inherent with the present (den Bezug des Anwesens zum Anwesenden) in the metaphor of light, i.e. not as , deed, etc., but as light, although there is undoubtedly an affinity for Heidegger in this. Indeed, according to Heidegger, the permission of presence is an out-in-the-open (ein ins-Offene-Bringen), although in the paragraph under consideration it implies a neutral one, and also is and should be open to all modes of action, the constitution, etc. Thus, the Greek “light and phenomenon (das Licht und das Scheinen)” has now become explicit. However, it remains to ask the question: what does this metaphorical hint of light want to say, but cannot yet say" ^{[102, pp. 55-56]}.

Here it is important to pay attention to the fact that it is in Aristotle that permission to be present is interpreted as , from which creatio and Setzung then arise, but in Plato this defining relationship is understood significantly differently, not as , but as light. Heidegger agrees with these amendments, which were proposed by the participants of the seminar. However, this means that the metaphor of light, representing the opposition of in this context, does not allow linking the idea of goodness with demiurgy. This means that Heidegger's entire interpretation of ancient ontology is in question, since it is associated with fabrication, improvisability, i.e. with . Heidegger imposes his interpretation on Plato, but from a historical and philosophical point of view this is clearly wrong.

Hence the misinterpretation of creatio in Christian ontology. Indeed, despite the pronounced creationism of the Christian tradition, it is very doubtful that it defined the understanding of being, since it was formed in early ancient culture, i.e. much earlier than the idea of creation from nothing. Heidegger deduces the basic characteristic of medieval ontology: "The being of being consists in its creation (Geschaffensein) By God (omne ens est ens creatum)" ^{[59, T. 2, p. 115]}. However, there is no such statement in Latin databases (apparently, it was invented by Heidegger himself). A few similar phrases, of course, can be found in medieval treatises, but to assert on this basis that the entire patristic and medieval ontology was determined by such an understanding is a great exaggeration. Within the framework of the Christian tradition, since God is completely free, he might not have created the world (see on this occasion: ^[106],[107]), this means that the idea of creation, despite all its fundamental importance, does not determine either the nature of God, unlike the demiurge, or the being being. To put it in scholastic language, creation is contingent, i.e. not necessary, and therefore being in Christian philosophy is perceived not as a fabrication (Hergestelltsein), but as a free gift, a pure manifestation of love. As a result, for example, Maxim the Confessor calls God ? — the giver, or giver of being ^{[108, p. 1073c]}. The thinkers of the patristic era sought to avoid even the slightest hint of the need for creation, and even more so to transfer it into an inner life, which is why Gregory the Theologian criticizes Plotinus, who wrote about a certain outpouring of goodness: "Let us not introduce involuntary generation and something like a natural and uncontrollable selection, which is least appropriate in assumptions about the Deity" ^{[22, or. 29.2.13–24]} (more on this: ^[109]). In short, reducing the understanding of being to creation (Geschaffensein) contradicts dogmatics, i.e. the self-understanding of Christianity. And this casts doubt on the interpretation of the history of metaphysics as ontology. But this is a topic for another article.