Economic instruments of the EU's political influence in Central Asia

Serbina Anna Stepanovna PhD in History Associate Professor; Department of World Economy, International Relations and Law; Novosibirsk State University of Economics and Management 630099, Russia, Novosibirsk region, Novosibirsk, Kamenskaya str., 52/1, office 205 serbina.anna@mail.ru

The crisis of the modern system of international relations, as well as events taking place at the global and regional levels, have a serious impact on the concept and practice of the foreign policy of the Central Asian countries. Being small and medium-sized regional powers, they pursue a fairly flexible foreign policy, which is reflected in their foreign policy concepts, where multi-vector, pragmatism and openness are fixed as the main priorities. The Central Asia (CA) region retains its geopolitical importance both as a source of resources, as a transit region, and as a volume sales market. The uniqueness of the current situation in the region lies in the fact that in addition to the "big three" represented by Russia, China and the United States, the EU, Turkey, Iran, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea and others are trying to spread their influence in the region.

In the context of growing competition for the region, the Central Asian countries have so far managed to maintain equidistance from the leading players, maneuvering on their interests, although a certain selectivity is already visible, this applies to both partners and the projects they offer. Thus, in the concept of Kazakhstan's foreign policy for the 2020-2030s (clause 4.2.), the term allied relations is used with respect to relations with Russia, with respect to China - comprehensive strategic partnership, the United States — expanded strategic partnership, the EU — expanded partnership and cooperation ^[1]. It is unlikely that the leadership of Kazakhstan will be able to clearly explain the difference between a comprehensive and expanded strategic partnership, this only indicates a certain hierarchy in the relationship.

In the foreign policy documents of the Central Asian countries, the EU occupies an honorable fourth place after the "big three" countries. Given the asymmetry of relations between the EU and Central Asian countries, domestic studies tend to analyze Brussels' policy towards the region. In this article, the relations between the EU and the Central Asian states are considered through the prism of the latter's foreign policy priorities. If issues in the field of maintaining international peace and security are paramount for European officials, primarily in the context of the Afghan problem, then the political elites of the Central Asian states act in the logic of national, mainly economic interests.

Considering the economic block of priorities of the Central Asian countries in the context of their relations with the EU, it is worth, first of all, talking about trade. The countries of the region are interested in increasing the volume of trade, primarily exports of domestic products and expanding its geography. The EU is already the largest trading partner for the region (30% of the total trade volume of the region ^{[2, p. 3]}), the positive dynamics of trade turnover growth has been maintained over the past two decades. Kazakhstan is the leader in trade with the EU (85% of the region's exports), this indicator is achieved mainly through oil exports. However, Uzbekistan is the leader in terms of the growth rate of trade turnover with Europe. According to the statistics agency under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, trade turnover with the EU increased from 3834.9 to 19498.9 million dollars in the period 2000-2022.^[3] Of course, the positive dynamics of trade turnover growth does not solve existing problems. In general, trade turnover with the EU remains low compared to other players, exports to the EU are mainly represented by raw materials, primarily crude oil, as well as gas, uranium, metals and cotton, and finally, it is not possible to cover the foreign trade deficit. The growing attention to the region from China, Russia, Turkey and other countries further weakens the EU's economic position in Central Asian countries. In addition, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan need to find a balance point between Eurasian integration and cooperation with the EU.

Joining the Universal System of Preferences (GSP), developed by UNCTAD back in 1968 specifically for developing countries, opens up certain prospects for the countries of Central Asia. The European Union has its own preferential treatment, according to which developing countries are granted preferential customs tariff rates for certain categories of goods. Kyrgyzstan (2016) and Uzbekistan (2021) are beneficiaries of the EU Special System of Preferences for Sustainable development and Effective governance (GSP+), which can contribute to the growth of their exports and attract additional investments to these countries. Kyrgyzstan, as a member of the GSP+ system, has received the right to supply canned products, nuts and dried fruits, textiles, clothing, tobacco products and more to Europe at zero tariff rates. However, there are still quite a lot of obstacles on the way for Kyrgyz goods to the European market, in particular, logistical problems, the need to standardize products, the unpreparedness of exporters themselves, etc. Thus, the potential for expanding trade and economic cooperation between the countries of Central Asia and the EU remains largely untapped, especially in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In this regard, the roadmap for deepening ties between the EU and Central Asia, signed on October 23, 2023 within the framework of the 19th EU-Central Asia Ministerial Meeting, notes the need to develop and support comprehensive programs to develop the skills and potential of Central Asian exporters to work in the EU market, to create a network in accordance with the requirements of the European Union modern laboratories, standardization and certification centers in the region ^{[4, p. 3]}.

In addition to partially implemented preferences, the GSP+ status also implies responsibility, in particular, to comply with a number of international conventions in the field of human rights protection, the environment and good governance. In particular, the above-mentioned Roadmap emphasizes that it is necessary to maintain the rule of law and effective governance in Central Asia not only through appropriate programs, but also through the GSP+ system in the participating countries ^{[4, p. 2]}. The question is to what extent Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and in the future Tajikistan, are ready to fulfill these requirements according to environmental and democratic standards. In order not to delve deeply into the topic of management methods in the European Union, let us turn to the opinion of the head of the Center for Political Integration of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences L. O. Babynina, who believes that Brussels implements a policy of so-called "hard" and "soft" Europeanization. "Strict Europeanization is manifested in the development of rules, norms and procedures by supranational institutions and their subsequent adoption by EU countries through the implementation of EU law into national legislative systems" ^{[5, p. 6]}. Accordingly, with regard to the countries of Central Asia as non-EU members, Brussels can only pursue a policy of "soft" Europeanization, which implies adopting a style of behavior, values, the opportunity to cooperate with the EU, and borrowing successful experience. In this context, two questions remain open, firstly, how far beyond Europe can Europeanization spread? According to the European approach, the countries of Central Asia belong to the fourth Europeanization zone. And secondly, to what extent is this influence from the European Union really "soft" when an expanded partnership is offered in exchange for the implementation of certain norms. After the adoption of the EU Strategy for Central Asia in 2019 Brussels has made it clear that the volume of relations with a particular country in the region will depend on their success in carrying out democratic reforms, modernization and economic liberalization.

The next lever of the so-called "soft" pressure on the countries of the region from the European Union is based on their need for external assistance. Despite some progress in the socio-economic development of the Central Asian States after their independence, they are increasing the volume of assistance they attract. The exception here is Kazakhstan, which, after the adoption in 2014 of the law "On Official Development Assistance" (hereinafter ODA), became more self-reliant thanks to the activities of the Kazakhstan International Development Agency. Currently, Kazakhstan is the only state in the region that acts as both a recipient and a donor of ODA, primarily for its neighbors (639.4 thousand US dollars in 2019) ^[6]. Turkmenistan is also purposefully reducing the already small amount of aid received through ODA, in recent years Ashgabat has focused on paying off previous loans and rejecting new ones. The volume and structure of assistance received by the Central Asian countries is presented in more detail in the table below.

Table 1. Volume and structure of ODA for Central Asian countries in 2021^[7]

According to the OECD, Uzbekistan, not Kazakhstan, is the leader in terms of net ODA attracted, which is due to internal political changes in the country after Shavkat Mirziyoyev came to power and the start of the implementation of the Action Strategy for the Further Development of the Republic of Uzbekistan in 2017. This Strategy, among other things, provides for "the development and liberalization of the economy aimed at further strengthening macroeconomic stability and maintaining high economic growth rates, increasing its competitiveness, modernizing and intensively developing agriculture, continuing institutional and structural reforms to reduce the state's presence in the economy, further strengthening the protection of rights and the priority role of private property, stimulating the development of small businesses business and private entrepreneurship, integrated and balanced socio-economic development of regions, districts and cities, active attraction of foreign investment in economic sectors and regions of the country by improving the investment climate" ^[8].

Such liberalization is reflected in the structure of the ODA received by Uzbekistan. In addition to the traditional sectors where aid is directed, such as health, education and other social services, over $300 million was spent on the development of Uzbekistan's economic infrastructure in 2021, and more than $150 million was allocated to the manufacturing sector. For comparison, in the same year, Kazakhstan received only $ 3.5 million for the development of production. ^[9]

EU institutions, with the exception of Kazakhstan, are in the top 6 in the ranking of ODA donors for Central Asia. Assistance from Brussels to the countries of the region, whether within the framework of the European Union's Technical Assistance Program to the CIS countries and Mongolia (the TACIS program operated until 2007), or already within the framework of development cooperation, was directly or indirectly linked to the need for neoliberal reforms. As the main investment and trade partner of the countries of the region, the EU considers itself an important standard-setter for them, as well as a partner in implementing internal reforms.

The EU's Multi-year Indicative Program for 2021-2027, developed specifically for Kazakhstan, states that cooperation will mainly focus on two priority areas: sustainable economic growth and the rule of law. Brussels plans to allocate 16 million euros to Kazakhstan and get the following result: an opportunity to promote EU policies and interests in these sectors, including actions to combat climate change, diversify the economy and facilitate access to finance and markets for the local and European private sector, strengthen the existing legal framework and institutions to ensure respect human rights, including labor rights, the fight against corruption, inequality, including gender inequality, the development of a more business- and investment-friendly legal environment, for example, through e-governance and digitalization ^{[10, p. 4-5]}.

Development assistance to Kyrgyzstan within the framework of the EU's Multi-year Indicative Program in 2014-2020 amounted to 174 million euros and mainly affected three sectors: the rule of law, education and integrated rural development ^[11]. The Program for 2021-2027 focuses on the digitalization of the economy and the introduction of "green" technologies. The planned assistance is tentatively calculated for the period 2021-2024 and is segmented, unlike the program for Kazakhstan (management and digital transformation — 7 million euros; human development - 35 million euros; "green" and sustainable economy – 18 million euros) The estimated allocations for 2025-2027, as well as possible changes to other significant elements of the Multi-Year Indicative Program, will depend on the EU decision. This decision should be preceded by a review of the implementation of the program for the period 2021-2024 in dialogue with the authorities and other stakeholders of Kyrgyzstan ^{[12, p. 19]}.

The EU applies a similar approach to Uzbekistan. Thus, 168 million euros allocated within the framework of the EU Multi-Year Indicative Program 2014-2020 for Uzbekistan went mainly to rural development, including the implementation of projects on sustainable water resources management and irrigation, horticulture, animal husbandry, vocational training and local administrative reform. Within the framework of the current seven—year program, the planned assistance is tentatively calculated for the period 2021-2024 and is also segmented (democratic governance and digital transformation — 13 million euros; inclusive, digital and "green" growth — 30.4 million euros; development of a smart and environmentally friendly agro-food sector - 27 million euros.) ^{[13, p. 15-16]} Uzbekistan will receive 3.6 million euros in advance for the support of human rights alone, 3.4 million euros for the development of civil society ^[14].

To support reforms in education, health and sustainable rural development in Tajikistan in 2014-2020. The EU has allocated 231 million euros ^[15]. Among all the Central Asian countries, Tajikistan will receive the most allocations for the period 2021-2024 — 91 million euros. Of these, 27 million euros will be allocated to the development of an inclusive green and digital economy, 22.75 million euros for human development and 39.13 million euros for natural resource management, efficiency and sustainability ^{[16, p. 22]}.

Turkmenistan's status as an above-average income country determines the mechanism of its cooperation with the EU. The small amount of aid in the amount of 18 million euros is not clearly segmented and focuses mainly on two sectors where EU support will have the potential for transformational impact. First, these are the green aspects of the economy. Secondly, the development of trade, improvement of the business climate with an emphasis on agriculture and rural development ^{[17, p. 6]}.

In general, the EU's multi-year indicative program for Central Asian countries for the period from 2021 to 2027 assumes a lower amount of funding compared to the previous period. The EU is promoting its agenda — the "green" economy, digitalization, and human development. In order to improve the effectiveness of the implementation of the program for Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, funding will be allocated in two stages and the final amount of assistance will depend on the results achieved in the period from 2021-2024. There is a review of the policy of allocating assistance to the countries of the region, which took place on the basis of the results of the implementation of the previous EU strategy.

Although the Central Asian countries, including through assistance from EU institutions, have made some progress in economic development, according to Brussels, the human rights situation as a whole is not improving. The Expanded Partnership Agreements that have entered into force indicate the readiness of the Central Asian countries to commit themselves to comprehensive cooperation with the EU, including on the issue of human rights. It is worth recognizing that there is a growing recognition in the Governments of Central Asian States that economic development and political stability cannot be achieved at the expense of progress in political reforms, democracy and the rule of law, but the situation cannot be fundamentally reversed. The interest of the Central Asian countries in strengthening the European vector of foreign policy mainly concerns receiving economic dividends from Brussels, while there is no need to talk about a serious transformation of their political systems yet. Thus, on July 13, 2023, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the harsh persecution of the media and freedom of speech in Kyrgyzstan. It notes that the situation with democratic standards and human rights in the country has deteriorated significantly recently. According to the world Press Freedom Index published by the international non-governmental organization Reporters Without Borders, in 2023 Kyrgyzstan lost 50 positions and took 122nd place out of 180 countries. Let us recall only a number of events that contributed to this. In 2022, it was decided to close the US government-funded Radio Azattyk for reporting on the conflict on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border (the decision was overturned by the Bishkek City Court on July 12, 2023). On February 1, 2022, a criminal case was initiated against the publication Kaktus.media, which was defended by the British non-governmental organization Amnesty International the case under Article 407 (propaganda of war) of the Criminal Code of Kyrgyzstan for reprinting an article from the Tajik information portal Asia Plus (terminated due to lack of corpus delicti on March 31, 2022). On November 23, 2022, by decision of the Bishkek City Court, journalist Bolot Temirov was deported to Russia for forgery of a military ID and manufacture of drugs without a marketing purpose and the director of Next TV, Taalaibek Duishenbiev, was convicted of covering Russia's military operations in Ukraine.

The European Parliament has called on the authorities of the Kyrgyz Republic and members of Parliament to withdraw the controversial law on "false information", as well as to review draft laws on "foreign representatives", "media" and "protection of children from harmful information", i.e. the so-called "law on LGBTI propaganda", which, according to Brussels, does not comply Kyrgyzstan's international obligations. The European Parliament insists that the Kyrgyz authorities immediately release all arbitrarily detained human rights defenders, media workers and journalists and drop all charges against them. In particular, if charges are not dropped against B. Temirov, T. Duishenbiev, G. Dzhurabayeva, K. Sooronkulova, R. Karasartova and A. Sasykbayeva, he recommended that the European Commission review the terms of the GSP+ system for the country, taking into account Kyrgyzstan's obligations under international conventions ^[18].

Thus, the political elites of the countries of the region, verbally supporting the political ideals of Europeans, in practice adhere to traditional management methods, trying to find a compromise between different groups of influence. Political blackmail makes the EU's policy in the region ineffective and strengthens the positions of non-regional players, primarily China and Russia.

The new EU strategy "Global Gate", adopted on December 1, 2021, is also intended to promote European values in Central Asia. At the same time, the appearance of this strategy actually confirmed that Brussels intends to participate more actively in the "Big Game 2.0" in Central Asia. Many analysts and experts have already dubbed the Global Gateway project, which involves investing in infrastructure projects and establishing economic partnerships based on certain principles, as a geopolitical alternative to the Chinese Belt and Road initiative. Although it would be more correct to use the term not alternative, but the reaction of the European Union to the Chinese initiative. However, not all authors share this point of view. Thus, domestic researchers N.Y. Sopilko and D.A. Potapov draw attention to the fact that from an economic point of view, the creation of such trans-regional megaprojects as the Belt and Road, the Global Gate, etc. It is an objective necessity, given the ongoing transformation of economic ties and modern challenges that require coordinated actions by countries ^{[19, p. 101]}.

But how competitive is the European project compared to the Chinese initiative? Perhaps, the EU has already lost to China at the starting positions, since it has started practical implementation of projects within the framework of the Global Gateway strategy only since 2023, while China has been actively promoting its interests in Africa, Asia and other regions for ten years. Beijing can already summarize the interim results of the implementation of the Belt and Road initiative: over 200 bilateral memoranda have been signed with 152 countries and 32 international organizations. Major infrastructure projects have already been implemented, including the Jakarta-Bandung high—speed railway (Indonesia), the Budapest—Belgrade railway (Hungary—Serbia), the China-Laos railway, the Addis Ababa—Djibouti railway (Ethiopia— Djibouti), the Mombasa—Nairobi railway (Kenya), etc.

According to the European Commission, in 2023, 90 key projects in the digital, energy and transport sectors were launched through the Global Gateway, mainly in those countries and regions where China's influence is great. More than half of the EU's projects, as well as China, are planned to be implemented in African countries.

The volume of investments invested can also be considered as a competitive advantage. According to the investment activity report for 2022, under the Belt and Road initiative, the total volume of Chinese investments amounted to $ 962 billion, about $ 573 billion was invested in the form of construction contracts and $389 billion. in the form of non-financial investments ^{[20, p.5]}. According to the European Commission, it is planned to accumulate over 300 billion rubles in the framework of the Global Gate strategy for the period from 2021 to 2027. euro of public and private investments. The Central Asian region accounted for about $370 billion under the Belt and Road Initiative, and Brussels proposes to invest about $40 billion in the development of technology and infrastructure in the region. euro. Moreover, if China relies only on its own funds, then the main "Global Gateway" is a team approach. According to the press release of the European Commission dated December 1, 2021, about 135 billion The euro will be allocated within the framework of the specially created Global Europe Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, which combines ten previously existing external financing instruments, as well as the European Development Fund. About 18 billion more. Euros will be allocated in the form of grants from the EU budget and another 145 billion. euros will be attracted from European financial institutions and banks. In general, it can be concluded that at present the EU's financial capabilities are not comparable with those of China, although in the medium term the volume of their investments will become commensurate, since China has already revised its investment policy, making it less massive, but more effective.

According to Brussels, the European transregional megaproject has one significant advantage. The European Union offers partner countries connections, not dependence. Critics often refer to the Belt and Road project as "debt trap diplomacy." China promotes its geopolitical and economic interests at the expense of its partners, who are often unable to repay borrowed funds on time or at all, while standards of the environment, good governance and transparency are allegedly ignored. The Western expert community is actively promoting anti-Chinese propaganda, in particular, the example of Sri Lanka is not infrequently cited, where the transfer of the deep-water port of Hambantota to China for long-term lease to repay debts led to a serious transformation of the geopolitics of South Asia ^{[21, p.126]}. Instead of loans, the EU offers investment grants that will be aimed at developing regional cooperation, effective governance and civil society, water resources management, energy efficiency and other tasks.

The only thing in which the EU, in our opinion, has succeeded compared to China is in promoting its "soft power", primarily the EU's regulatory power. It was only in the early 2000s that China began to actively resort to "soft power" tools to strengthen its international influence. In Chinese studies of this period, the term "discursive power" appears, which was based on some elements of M. Foucault's theory of discourse. In practice, China, by promoting its "discursive power", seeks to convey its point of view to the elites and the population, participating in various international organizations to have more influence on the formation of the agenda, to spread its values.

Chinese researchers consider the discursive hegemony of the West to be the main obstacle to the further implementation of the Belt and Road initiative, which forms an unfriendly attitude towards the initiative and China as a whole ^{[22, p.56]}. In this regard, since 2017 Beijing is beginning to position the Belt and Road not only as a trans-regional logistics megaproject, but also as a "path of civilization", trying through public diplomacy to influence international public opinion and form an objective understanding of the values of Chinese culture among foreigners.

Western publications are dominated by the position that the EU has been, is and always will be a normative force in world politics. By the way, this is also relevant to the development policy discussed above. ^{[23, p.142]} The Union of 27 States sees its collective goal and legitimacy in foreign policy. This special "external role" is expressed in the discourse of universal ethics, which defines the EU as a "force for good" and a "peacemaker in the world" ^{[23, p.26]}. Thus, the EU, being an "ideal" actor, spreads universal principles and norms that relate to economic cooperation. Thus, the EU Commissioner for International Partnership, Jutta Urpilainen, in her interview with Foreign Policy, stated that our investments (author's note: within the framework of the Global Gate project) reflect European social and environmental standards ^[24].

In general, the Global Gate is a geopolitical project of the EU based on values. Despite all the shortcomings, this is one of the most promising geopolitical initiatives of the EU in recent decades and its full potential has not yet been realized. Success or lack of success will also affect the credibility of the EU.

The main geopolitical task of implementing the Global Gateway strategy in Central Asia is to reduce the dependence of the countries of the region on Russia. The EU has launched a number of projects in the region, traditionally considered to be the sphere of Russia's interests and influence. In addition, the sanctions imposed against Russia in the context of its conduct in Ukraine force the Central Asian states to pursue a cautious policy towards Russia, which is considered in Europe as a chance to expand their influence ^{[25, p.6]}.

In November 2022, the "Conference on EU-Central Asia Relations: Global Gateway" was held in Samarkand (Uzbekistan). Following the conference, Josep Borrel, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, stressed that "the existing transport and other links are not sufficiently developed. The Central Asian countries do not have wide access to European and world markets, as they are dependent on Russia's transport networks" ^[26].

In this regard, in order to connect Europe and Asia, the EU intends to develop existing and create new multimodal transport corridors between the EU and Central Asia. Thanks to the Rail Baltica infrastructure project, the Baltic countries will fully switch to the standard European gauge by 2030. The events in Ukraine have set the EU the task of developing North-South transport corridors in Eastern Europe, which are crucial for land communication with Central Asia.

In order to improve communication between the Baltic and Black Seas, the European Commission has already started preparing a feasibility study for extending the Rail Baltica line through Poland towards Ukraine and Moldova. In addition, investments are planned to be directed to the creation of a stable and safe port infrastructure and ferry services between Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia, as well as between Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Of course, this is a long-term task that requires harmonization in logistics and customs procedures of these states. A number of European researchers see a certain perspective in combining the Global Gateway projects in Central Asia with the Three Seas Initiative, which also aims to develop ties in the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas region with a special focus on transport, energy and digital communications, which will increase the effectiveness of the implementation of both initiatives ^{[25, p.24]}.

A certain contribution to the development of relations between the countries of Central Asia, bypassing Russia from the position of Brussels, could be made by the construction project of a new China—Kyrgyzstan—Uzbekistan railway line, allowing access to Europe through Turkmenistan, Iran and Turkey, as well as the construction project of the Trans-Afghan railway connecting Uzbekistan and Pakistan through Afghanistan. The first project is more interesting to the EU, but it has been frozen due to disagreements about the share of financing. The second project is more interesting for the countries of Central Asia, as it involves the creation of short routes to the seaports of Pakistan. The implementation of this project may be hampered by the political situation in Afghanistan. July 18, 2023 Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan have signed a joint protocol on the construction of the Trans-Afghan railway, which they plan to complete by the end of 2027. This project is likely to be of less practical importance to the EU, as Afghanistan has invited Russia and Kazakhstan to participate in it, and the Afghan government has stated that the new railway will have a wide gauge. Uzbekistan, in turn, supports the development of broader trans-Caspian multimodal relations and the attraction of capital from European companies in the development of the highway.

Currently, most of the freight traffic from East to West still passes through Russia or the Southern route through the Suez Canal. The EU considers the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route to be an alternative option for existing routes, the launch of which was launched within the framework of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) conducted a study on sustainable transport links between Central Asia and Europe, which was funded by the European Commission. It aimed to identify the most sustainable transport links between the economies of Central Asia and the expanded Trans-European transport network in order to further propose actions for their development, including real investments in infrastructure and the necessary enabling environment. The interim results of this study presented in the summer of 2023 turned out to be disappointing. In 2021, 1.5 million containers were transported through the Northern Corridor, while the maximum capacity of the Trans-Caspian Corridor is no more than 120 thousand containers. If the Trans-Caspian route is preferred, then the existing infrastructure of the Caspian Sea can become a real bottleneck. According to EBRD estimates, it is necessary to invest about 3.5 billion in the modernization of infrastructure in the Caspian Sea. euro. The most stable option from the EBRD's point of view is a route through Kazakhstan (compared to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) to its ports on the Caspian Sea. Moreover, competition with neighbors will stimulate Kazakhstan to improve the quality of commercial services provided and improve the efficiency of border management ^[27].

All of the above proves that intermodal communication between Europe and Central Asia bypassing Russia is difficult and expensive, given the existing infrastructure gaps, as well as the many countries whose territories need to be crossed, and disagreements in the interests of the companies involved. It will not be possible to completely exclude Russia from this process, if the Middle Corridor wants to become a viable transport alternative, it must offer a predictable and reliable environment for all parties involved. In this regard, certain expectations are associated with the decision to hold the EU-Central Asia Investment Forum on Sustainable Transport corridors in January 2024, which will discuss specific proposals to strengthen transport links between the two regions, based on the results of the EU-EBRD study. It is obvious that the EU intends to encourage the development of transport links through the Trans-Caspian Corridor and support intraregional communication projects in Central Asia aimed at bringing the transport network of the region in line with the approach of the Trans-European Transport Network, where applicable.

During the aforementioned conference, two flagship Global Gateway initiatives for Central Asia were launched. First, it is the initiative on water resources, energy and climate change, which includes infrastructure projects in the field of water supply, sanitation, waste management and hydropower, including co-financing of the Rogun HPP in Tajikistan.

200 million euros will be allocated from the EU budget for the implementation of this initiative, another 500 million euros will be provided by EU member states (Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia) and financial institutions (EIB, EBRD). The main focus will be on the development of an integrated regional energy market, the management of transboundary water resources and the inclusion of climate change issues in the regional policy dialogue on water, energy and the environment. The technical assistance provided by the EU will help Central Asian countries manage their limited water and energy resources more efficiently, while balancing upstream hydroelectric power generation needs and downstream agricultural water needs. This initiative will support the reform of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, the transformation of national policy dialogues on integrated water resources management in Central Asia and the study of innovative solutions to improve water and energy links^[28].

The implementation of the investment component of the initiative will depend on the EU's ability to attract investment from the private sector, for which many projects in the region are highly risky. With regard to the integrated water and energy resources management component, the successful formation and functioning of the Central Asian regional electricity market and the mechanism for regional transboundary water management will depend on reforms of the water and energy sector at the national level. For example, the EU's support for the reform of Tajikistan's energy sector is aimed at addressing the problems of high grid losses of electricity, high levels of uncollected payments, an unfavorable regulatory framework for private investment and limited opportunities for cross-border electricity trade.

The EU, represented by the European Investment Bank, is financing 15% of the construction of the Rogun HPP, which will require another 5 billion to be fully completed. euro. According to Brussels, the EU's participation in this project, which will change the dynamics of electricity production throughout Central Asia, will help the countries of the region reduce dependence on Russian energy carriers and will become part of the EU's response to the Chinese initiative. Josep Borrel, evaluating this project, stressed that Tajikistan preferred a high-quality EU offer to a cheap Chinese one ^[29].

Currently, the Rogun HPP completion project is being implemented by the Italian company Webuild (Salini Impregilo until 2020) on the basis of a 2016 framework agreement worth $3.9 billion with the state-owned company JSC Rogun HPP, which coordinates this project. Of the six hydroelectric units with a total capacity of 3,600 MW, two have already been commissioned in 2018 and 2019, respectively. The expected completion date of the project is 2033. However, funds are insufficient, funds from international financial institutions are being attracted.

The construction of the Sebzor HPP in Tajikistan also appears as a priority within the framework of the EU initiative on water, energy and climate change. The project is being implemented jointly with Germany in order to provide residents of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region and neighboring Afghanistan with clean and affordable energy, and create new jobs in the region. On August 2, 2019, an agreement on financial cooperation was signed between the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, according to which Germany provided a grant of 17 million euros for the construction of the Sebzor HPP. July 22, 2020 Tajikistan has signed an agreement with the German Development Bank on the allocation of an EU grant for the Sebzor project in the amount of 18.6 million euros. Additional funds for the feasibility study and construction of power transmission lines and switchgears were allocated by Switzerland and the World Bank. In 2022, an additional financing agreement was signed with Germany in the amount of 17.4 million euros, thus, the total financing of the project approached 53 million euros. It is planned to launch a hydroelectric power plant with a capacity of 11 MW in 2026.

Hydrogen technologies are one of the central themes of the energy transition in the EU. Green hydrogen is currently more expensive than fossil fuels, but according to World Bank forecasts, by 2030 it will become competitive compared to natural gas. It can become a key tool in decarbonizing sectors that are difficult to reduce emissions, such as the steel industry and chemicals production. The EU plans to import 10 million tons of green hydrogen per year by 2030.^[30] As part of the Global Gateway strategy in Central Asia, a green hydrogen production project in Kazakhstan received support.

In 2021, the government of Kazakhstan and the German-Swedish environmentally friendly technologies group Svevind Energy Group signed an agreement on the construction of a "green" hydrogen production enterprise in the Mangystau region (the region meets all the necessary requirements - a wind rose, not used in agriculture, access to water, export potential of the region). The cost of the project, which is designed for the next 25 years, is estimated at $40-50 billion.

The planned solar (30%) and wind farm (70%) will generate 40 GW of electricity to produce 2 million tons of hydrogen or 11 million tons of ammonia per year. The problem of instability of energy production from renewable energy sources will be solved due to the optimal location of future wind farms. All energy will be supplied to the production of green hydrogen, the first volumes are planned to be released in 2030, with full output to design capacity in 2032 ^{[31, p.8]}

The Government of Kazakhstan hopes that a whole cluster of industrial enterprises will be created around the built wind farm. The investor plans to create a fully autonomous infrastructure for the transmission of energy through its own high-voltage power lines. In addition to renewable energy facilities, a high-voltage power line, a plant for the production of hydrogen itself, water treatment and desalination facilities, all the necessary infrastructure will be created.

Within the framework of this project, about 1,800 permanent jobs will be created, of which 90% will be available to the local population. However, it is already clear that there will be a personnel shortage, therefore, seven German technical universities have begun cooperation with Kazakh universities since 2023 to train power engineers, geologists, surveyors, engineers and other specialists, including within the framework of double degree programs. In particular, in Aktau, within the framework of the Kazakh-German Institute of Sustainable Engineering established on the basis of the Caspian University of Technology and Engineering named after Sh. Yesenov, in the 2023-2024 academic year, training in two bachelor's degree programs was started: "Energy and Environmental Engineering" of the Hamburg Technical University and "Logistics" of the Technical University of Wildau.

According to Hyrasia one, a subsidiary of Svevind Energy Group, Kazakhstan has the right to participate in the financing and operation of the project in the amount of 25% of the total share of the project, it is not yet assumed. Given this fact and the investor's plans to create an autonomous infrastructure, it can be assumed that Brussels is interested in the monopoly implementation of this project, since the hydrogen produced here would provide 20% of the needs of the European market. Moreover, Kazakhstan is not interested in decarbonizing its own economy, but in the export potential of this project, especially considering that Kazakhstan is located between the two largest hydrogen markets – the EU and China (45% of global needs).

Hyrasia one is negotiating with co-investors, customers and suppliers of installations, thereby laying the foundation for the subsequent marketing of green hydrogen. During the Global Gate Forum, held on October 25-26, 2023 in Brussels, Hyrasia One and Semurg Invest, the owner and operator of the multifunctional Sarzha marine terminal in the port of Kuryk in the Mangystau region of Kazakhstan, signed a Memorandum of Cooperation on the supply of green hydrogen and ammonia through the port of Kuryk ^[32]. Other transport routes, including combined routes, are also possible and are under consideration.

The example of the Rogun and Sebzor HPPs, as well as the green hydrogen production project in Kazakhstan, once again proves that within the framework of the EU Global Gate initiative, a kind of branding of current projects in the Central Asian region, implemented by major European companies, is taking place. In order to successfully develop the Global Gateway brand, Brussels needs to think about the real content of this initiative and the conditions for attracting the necessary private investment.

The second initiative of the Global Gateway for Central Asia was the Digital Communications Initiative. Central Asia is a landlocked region located far from the main fiber-optic lines running underwater. This makes it difficult to provide broadband, especially in mountainous countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. As a result, the region faces a number of challenges, including the cost, quality and speed of the Internet, especially in rural areas, low levels of digital skills and digital leadership, and underdeveloped digital infrastructure.

According to the estimates of the Global Gateway strategy, Internet traffic in the region will increase sixfold by 2030. Today's networks will not be suitable for data traffic in the near future. Digital highways, data centers and other infrastructure will need to be expanded and upgraded not only to improve connectivity, but even to meet current needs, given the growing use of digital services and the increase in the volume of data generated.

The Digital Communications Initiative will expand the access of enterprises and citizens of Central Asia, even in remote areas, to secure Internet through reliable satellite communications. Data processing centers will be located in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The EU will provide both technical assistance in the field of governance in sectors such as telecommunications reform, cybersecurity and personal data protection, applying standards developed in the EU and accumulated experience, and will invest at least 40 million euros in infrastructure, with the additional participation of EU member States (Estonia, Latvia, Finland) and international financial institutions institutions (EIB, EBRD) ^[28]. Through digital diplomacy, Brussels also intends to integrate Central Asia into programs and initiatives developed for the EU. The Digital Communications Initiative in Central Asia was the first practical experience of the implementation of the Center for Digital Technologies for Development (D4D) project in the Asia-Pacific region.

All these measures will help to mitigate the digital divide in the region and create positive effects for the economy as a whole. World Bank research shows that a 10% increase in broadband connectivity can add at least 1% to economic growth, while a 1% increase in Internet connections corresponds to 4.3% export growth ^[33].

Although the potential of satellite communications is still great, fiber optic cables will remain popular. In this regard, the EU is already working with an eye to the East. Within the framework of the Black Sea Energy project, which is part of the Global Gate initiative, in addition to an underwater cable for electricity transmission, it is planned to lay a fiber-optic cable that will connect Hungary, Romania, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Currently, the Italian consulting company CESI is working on a feasibility study for this project. In turn, within the framework of the Digital Silk Road project as part of the Belt and Road initiative, Azerbaijan is actively promoting the construction of a fiber-optic communication line along the bottom of the Caspian Sea. In particular, the laying of communication lines along the Azerbaijan—Kazakhstan route was launched in 2019, and an agreement with Turkmenistan was signed in 2020. This example clearly demonstrates that the EU's Global Gateway strategy and the PRC's Belt and Road initiative, devoid of geopolitical meanings, may well complement each other. And here it is worth agreeing with the position of M.G. Nosov, who believes that the EU's concern about the impact of the Belt and Road initiative on global politics is primarily related to China's attempts to strengthen its ties with the CEE countries, as well as with the countries of the Balkan Peninsula and the Caucasus, which are either candidates for EU membership, or members of the Eastern Partnership^{[34, pp.20-21]}.

According to Brussels, the formation of a multi-variant digital corridor between Europe and Asia using both terrestrial and underwater fiber-optic cables will allow Central Asian countries to diversify access to the Internet and bypass Russia in terms of global digital networks.

On October 25-26, 2023, the first Global Gate Forum was held in Brussels, within the framework of which certain results of the implementation of the strategy were summed up and prospects for its development were determined. On the sidelines of the forum, several agreements were reached regarding the Central Asian region, mainly related to global trade issues. In particular, the EU and Uzbekistan have agreed to start work on a memorandum of understanding in the field of critical raw materials. By 2030, the demand for rare earth metals for wind turbines is expected to grow 4.5 times. The demand for lithium, a key battery element in electric vehicles and devices, is estimated by the European Commission to increase 11-fold by 2030 and 57-fold by 2050. Uzbekistan, with resources such as silver, titanium, lithium, copper, uranium, etc., will become part of the supply chain to the EU of critically important and strategic raw materials, which is the most important condition for an effective transition to a "green" economy. In this area, the EU is once again forced to compete with China, which currently controls a significant part of the extraction and processing of critically important and strategic raw materials, especially magnesium and rare earth metals.

The EU will allocate 6 million euros to support the Government of Turkmenistan in joining the WTO and integrating the country into the global trade system. This project will be implemented by the UNCTAD International Trade Center, which has been providing comprehensive support to Turkmenistan since 2020, aimed at increasing transparency of cross-border regulation, expanding the capabilities of Turkmen enterprises, in particular women entrepreneurs, compliance with trade formalities and standards, within the framework of the EU-funded Ready4Trade Central Asia project. As for Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the focus has shifted to projects in the field of education and digital infrastructure. Speaking at the forum, Minister of Digital Development of Kyrgyzstan N. Kutnaeva reported on the successful results of the introduction of broadband communications within the framework of the five-year Digital CASA project launched in 2018, as well as on the 100% level of implementation of the EU budget support program in the field of digitalization.

In general, we see the desire of the Central Asian countries to continue to develop cooperation in many areas, now much depends on the EU bureaucracy. At the initial stage of implementation, the EU's Global Gateway strategy faced a major obstacle – financing. By the end of 2021, the EU budget for the period up to 2027 had already been formed and partially spent. Consequently, many initiatives, in fact, are projects already being implemented by the largest European companies, "repackaged" under the Global Gate brand. The EU strives to implement strategic projects with the participation of as many key partners as possible, despite limited financial resources. To become a real alternative to the Chinese Belt and Road initiative, the Global Gateway strategy should become a key component of the agenda of the next European Commission, which will be formed in 2024, and take a central place in the next multi-year indicative program of the EU, starting in 2028. Uncertainty remains about the financing of projects announced in 2024.

Equally important is the question of whether the Global Gateway is primarily a development-oriented strategy or a geopolitical project. At the first forum in 2023, there was a clear focus on geopolitics and access to resources. Interestingly, for the countries of Central Asia, both the European Global Gateway strategy and the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative are, first of all, a development tool, both strategies complement each other and there is no need to choose.

Of course, for the Central Asian countries, the EU is a source of technological and social innovation, investment, and an attractive way for the elites, as far as living standards are concerned. However, the influence of the European Union on the countries of Central Asia remains extremely weak. Using economic instruments of political pressure, Brussels has achieved targeted results that vary depending on the country. Even to Kazakhstan, which is most oriented towards the West among the countries of the region, Brussels has complaints about the implementation of economic and political reforms. The weakness of the EU's position is due to ignorance of local specifics, a region-wide approach that is implemented through institutionalized dialogues, as well as the multi-vector foreign policies of the Central Asian states, which has recently been filled with new meanings, namely pragmatism. The countries and regions are ready to participate in those projects that meet their national interests. Such selectivity is reinforced by the approaches of Moscow and Beijing in the region. In some cases, the Central Asian countries are fundamentally not ready to strengthen cooperation with the EU, directly or indirectly expressing distrust of Brussels. Given the difference in the capabilities and interests of the countries of the region, the EU should take a more individual approach.