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International Law and International Organizations
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Pimenova O.I. Regulatory prerogatives of the European Union: question of judicial and political control of their realization

Abstract: This article presents the analysis of subsidiarity as the principle containing the dual – political and legal nature. Thus, special attention is given to the questions of judicial and political control over compliance with the principle of subsidiarity in EU legislative activity regarding the questions that are not referred to as of its explicit competence, and primarily, the topic its joint competence with the member-states. In the first part of the article, the author analyzed the practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the case on violation of the principle of subsidiarity by the supranational institutions. In the second part, the author examines the practice of application of the principle of subsidiarity in the EU legislative process within the framework of the so-called subsidiary control mechanism and its procedures of the “yellow” and “orange” cards, initiated by the EU member-states national parliaments. The scientific novelty consists in the position that the principle of subsidiarity is being viewed in the context of EU legislative activity not only from the perspective of political means aimed at protection of the national legislative prerogatives, but also from the perspective of legal limitation of realization of the supranational regulatory prerogatives, possessing jurisdictional power. The article assesses the efficiency of the work of subsidiarity as political (through the subsidiary control mechanism), as well as legal (through the court case hearing) principle. The author expresses an opinion on possibility of implementation of the principle of subsidiarity as the principle that limits the realization of supranational regulatory prerogative in Russia, where the problem of excessiveness activeness of the federal legislator in regulation of the questions of joint competence does not lose its relevance since 2000’s.


Keywords:

yellow card, subsidiarity control mechanism, national parliaments, regulatory prerogatives, shared competence, subsidiarity principle, European Union, Court of Justice of the European Union, Russian Federation, cooperative federalism


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References
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