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Magadeev I.E. On the problem of adaptation of military to technical changes: a tank and its’ place in French war thought in 1920th

Abstract: this article deals with question of military innovations and mechanisms of military elites adaptation to technical changes. Based on the new for the Russian historiography sources and a wide range of literature, on example of France in 1920th the author reveals base factors that influenced the adaptation of military to a new means of war – a tank, offers a basic scheme of how military adapts to new technical realities, compares French tank doctrine of 1920th to the German “blitzkrieg”.


Keywords:

history, history of mechanism, military doctrine, tank, mechanized war, strategic mobility, factor of military organization, “blitzkrieg”, adaptation to technical changes, sociocultural factor


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