Kolyukh V.V. Dualism of the executive government: constitutional prerequisites and means of limitation

Abstract: This article reveals the essence and highlights the various types of dualism of the government as a constitutional distribution of functions and authority between two highest branches of government. Based on the analysis of the specificity of the presidential, parliamentary, and semi-presidential form of republican government the author underlines the constitutional prerequisites of dualism of the executive branch: absence of definition of the head of executive branch in the constitution, and endowment of the president with significant authority. This work accentuates the possible constitutional means of overcoming or limiting dualism of the executive branch: declaration of the president as the head of the executive branch with authority over the government (presidential system); institution of countersignature of acts of president by the prime minister and the cabinet of ministers responsible for their execution (parliamentary system); institution of political responsibility of the government before president with the ability to dismiss the prime minister by the presidential order and the institution of countersignature (semi-presidential system). The author concludes that dualism of executive branch, same as constitutional distribution of authority between president and the government, contradicts the centralized character of this authority and can cause disputes and conflict between the president and the government (prime minister), negatively affection the efficiency of government administration.

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