The OSCE system of peaceful settlement of disputes: international legal issues

Ahmadov Etibar Mazahir oghlu ORCID: 0000-0002-1893-793X Ahmadov Etibar Mazahir oghlu. Postgraduate student of the Department of International Public Law of Baku State University AZ1073, Azerbaijan, Baku, Latif Imanov str., 16 etibar.ahmedov23@mail.ru

Introduction

Due to the increasing political tension in Europe, there is an increasing interest in the activities of the Organization for Security and Co–operation in Europe (hereinafter - the OSCE), whose fundamental goal is to counter armed conflicts and any threats to international peace and security in the pan-European space.

In comparison with other European organizations, the OSCE is unique due to the fact that its participating states are all members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization, which ceased to exist in July 1991, as well as all post-Soviet countries ^{[1, p. 267]}.

The process of forming the European dispute settlement system began in 1973, when Switzerland proposed the creation of pan-European bodies for the peaceful settlement of disputes, presenting a draft Agreement on the European System for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, also known as the "Bindschedler Project". The provisions of the draft were imbued with the tradition of Swiss diplomacy, in which issues of peaceful settlement of conflicts occupy a special place, which follows from Switzerland's commitment to neutrality ^{[2, p. 5]}.

The Bindschedler project was strongly supported, mainly by neutral and non-aligned countries, due to the benefits of the provisions of the project to protect their interests. The countries of the eastern and Western blocs considered the obligations arising from the provisions of the draft too burdensome and fundamentally contrary to their political interests. For socialist countries, direct negotiations were the main means of resolving disputes, so the participation of a third party or submission to any mandatory procedure was incompatible with the position of these countries. For capitalist countries, the Bindschedler project was unacceptable due to the fact that they preferred the policy of force to protect national interests, therefore they were very skeptical about some kind of mandatory system of peaceful settlement of disputes ^{[2, pp. 8-9]}.

Although the Swiss initiative was not adopted due to the strictness and strict regulation of the provisions on the peaceful settlement of disputes, however, it is the starting point of the process of forming the European system of peaceful settlement of disputes. The foundation of this system was laid by special meetings of experts, the most productive of which were meetings in La Valletta in 1991 and in Geneva in 1992 ^{[3, p. 149]}.

Further development and improvement of the system of peaceful settlement of disputes was carried out at meetings of OSCE Participating States at different levels: a) at weekly meetings of the OSCE Permanent Council at the level of representatives of OSCE participating States; b) at annual meetings of the OSCE Ministerial Council at the level of Foreign Ministers; c) at periodic meetings of heads of State and Government (summits).

Due to the multiple changes made to the OSCE structure, it is quite common to find references in the scientific literature to the names of bodies that were renamed or liquidated by the relevant decisions of the higher-level decision-making bodies of the OSCE. In order to avoid confusion in the study of the OSCE system of peaceful settlement of disputes, let us consider the dynamics of the development of the main OSCE bodies and institutions, whose activities play an important role in this area:

– According to the provisions of the Final Act of 1975, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was established as a permanent forum for political negotiations and cooperation;

– On the basis of the Paris Charter of 1990, the following were established: the CSCE Council, the Committee of Senior Officials (CSDL), the Secretariat, the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC is part of the Secretariat structure), the CPC Advisory Committee, the Bureau for Free Elections;

– Following the Prague Meeting in 1992, the Bureau for Free Elections was renamed the Bureau for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) (Prague Document on the Further Development of CSCE Institutions and Structures, Chapter III, paragraph 9);

– At the CSCE Summit in Helsinki in 1992, the CSCE was officially proclaimed a regional agreement within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Declaration of the Helsinki Summit, paragraph 25);

– The Helsinki Decisions of 1992 established the post of High Commissioner for National Minorities (Helsinki Decisions, chapter II, paragraph 1) and the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSB) (Helsinki Decisions, Chapter V, paragraph 9);

– As a result of the Stockholm Meeting in 1992, the post of OSCE Secretary General was established (not to be confused with the post of Secretary General of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly);

– As a result of the Rome Meeting of 1993, the CSCE Standing Committee was established (Decisions of the Rome Meeting of the Council, Chapter VII, paragraph 3) and it was decided to dissolve the CPC Advisory Committee, whose powers were transferred to the Standing Committee and the FSB (Decisions of the Rome Meeting of the Council, Chapter VII, paragraph 7.2.);

– Following the Budapest Meeting in 1994: a) the CSCE was reorganized into the OSCE; b) The CSCE Council was renamed the OSCE Ministerial Council; c) The Committee of Senior Officials (CSDL) was renamed the Governing Council; d) the Standing Committee was renamed the Permanent Council (Budapest Decisions 1994, Chapter I, paragraphs 1, 16-18);

– By the decision of the OSCE Council of Ministers No. 4/06 of June 26, 2006, the Governing Council was abolished, and all its functions and tasks, with the exception of some concerning the functioning of the OSCE Economic Forum, were transferred to the Permanent Council.

Even with the adoption of the Final Act of 1975, the CSCE participating States assumed the obligation to resolve disputes exclusively by peaceful means, but concrete measures to implement the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes were provided for by the Vienna Meeting held from November 1986 to January 1989. As Professor J. Merrills notes, such progress in the late 1980s was facilitated by the cessation of confrontation between the West and the East, which was the main factor constraining development on a significant range of issues ^{[1, p. 75]}.

As a result of the cessation of the confrontation between the socialist and capitalist camps and the subsequent collapse of the USSR, which led to intense interethnic conflicts in the post-Soviet space, the priority areas of the OSCE's activities were the peaceful settlement of conflicts and the implementation of democratic values stipulated by the Paris Charter of 1990 ^{[4, p. 347]}.

1. The Valletta mechanism

In order to supplement the existing instruments of peaceful settlement of disputes within the CSCE, the Final Document of the Vienna Meeting of 1989 provided for the creation of a "generally acceptable method of peaceful settlement of disputes". The CSCE participating States decided to supplement the list of peaceful means with a new means of dispute resolution, which provided for the mandatory involvement of a third party to settle certain categories of disputes. In order to establish a specific list of such categories and create appropriate procedures and mechanisms for their settlement, the 1989 Outcome Document also provided for a Meeting of Experts on these issues to be held in Valletta from January 15 to February 8, 1991.

Based on the Report of the Valletta Meeting in 1991, a new dispute settlement procedure within the OSCE was introduced – the CSCE Dispute Settlement Mechanism.

Among the main disadvantages of the Valletta mechanism , Yu . A . Yasnosokirsky singled out the following:

– the residual nature of the Valletta Mechanism, since this mechanism has no retroactive effect in relation to disputes whose settlement procedure was agreed upon in advance between the parties, and is not used to resolve international disputes that were previously dealt with or are currently being considered under other procedures;

– a rather narrow scope of the Mechanism. The Final Document of the Vienna Meeting of 1989 provided that during the Expert Meeting in Valletta in 1991, specific categories of disputes to which the Valletta Mechanism would apply would be identified, but the 1991 Report indicated only the categories of disputes to which this mechanism does not apply, these are: a) disputes concerning territorial integrity or national b) disputes concerning the right to sovereignty over a land territory or competing claims to jurisdiction over other areas (maritime and airspace).

The exclusion of these categories of disputes from the scope of the Valletta Mechanism is indeed a significant limitation of the operation of this procedure, since the above-mentioned categories of disputes constitute the bulk of international disputes that pose a threat to international peace and security. Moreover, in order to exclude the use of the Valletta Mechanism or to terminate its use after the dispute settlement process has already begun, it is enough for one of the parties to the dispute to "consider" that this dispute belongs to the above categories without the need to substantiate their arguments in a strictly prescribed manner;

– excessive complexity of the creation of the Valletta mechanism, which is not justified by the nature of this mechanism due to the presence of a lot of opportunities to terminate its activities ^{[5, pp. 195-196]}.

The consideration of disputes under the Valletta Mechanism is carried out in two stages: 1) creation of a mechanism by the parties to the dispute, followed by the selection of one or more persons from the general list of candidates who develop comments or advice on the procedure for the peaceful settlement of the dispute; 2) members of the mechanism provide comments or advice on the merits of the dispute. During the entire period of consideration of the dispute, the parties, by mutual agreement, may endow the mechanism with additional functions for establishing facts, organizing expert actions, and others.

It should be noted that in order to launch the OSCE Dispute Settlement Mechanism, a request from one of the parties to the dispute is sufficient, which is why other parties cannot evade the procedure. However, the comments or advice of the Mechanism are not binding on the parties to the dispute. These properties of the Valletta procedure allow us to describe it as reconciliation with elements of mediation, and if there is a corresponding agreement between the parties, also a survey ^{[1, pp. 75-76]}.

2. The Court of Conciliation and Arbitration

The Stockholm Meeting of 1992 is considered to be a fundamental event in the formation of the modern system of peaceful settlement of OSCE disputes, as a result of which this system was supplemented with three new elements, which finally formed the four-element system of peaceful settlement of OSCE disputes, consisting of: 1) The CSCE Dispute Settlement Mechanism; 2) the CSCE Conciliation and Arbitration Convention; 3) the CSCE Reconciliation Commission; 4) the Provisions on Directive Reconciliation ^{[3, p. 149]}.

The creation of the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration was preceded by intensive discussions within the CSCE. Considerable efforts have been made in this direction by France, which has put forward a project on the establishment of a Conciliation and Arbitration Tribunal, also known as the "Badinter project". The key point of the project was the need to create a permanent body in the OSCE area that would carry out the most flexible conflict resolution through reconciliation and arbitration.

The direct implementation of the French initiative began in February 1992, when R. Badinter instructed a group of twelve experts to develop a draft Convention, which was submitted for discussion at the Review Conference in Helsinki on May 11-22, 1992. However, it was not possible to reach consensus during the Conference. Thus, some States, in particular the United States, Great Britain and Turkey, made a reservation regarding the mandatory nature of the provisions of the draft, while others even spoke out against the establishment of new OSCE bodies. In addition, in order to prevent the adoption of the draft Convention, the United Kingdom and the United States proposed alternative projects, respectively, an optional reconciliation procedure and a directive reconciliation procedure ^{[6, p. 143]}.

The participants of the Helsinki Meeting in 1992 highly appreciated the work done to strengthen the Valletta Mechanism and to create new three dispute settlement procedures, which we mentioned above. In order to achieve the most expeditious and quick results, it was decided to convene a meeting in Geneva in October 1992, the results of which were submitted for approval at the meeting of the CSCE Council in Stockholm in December 1992.

So, one of the documents adopted as a result of the Stockholm meeting in 1992 is the Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration. Unlike other OSCE documents, which, according to paragraph 3 of Chapter II of the OSCE Rules of Procedure (were adopted by the Decision of the Council of Ministers No. 1/06) They are, as a rule, politically binding, the provisions of the Convention are legally binding.

Some politicians and international lawyers have expressed the opinion that the legally binding nature of the Convention could damage the entire system of obligations of OSCE participating States, which is politically binding, by replacing the delicate and flexible OSCE procedures with rigid legal mechanisms and instruments. Another feature of the Convention is the absence of a generally binding character for all OSCE participating States and its applicability only to the States parties to the Convention ^{[7, p. 44]}.

Such documents, in our opinion, can contribute to political particularism and decentralization within the OSCE, which, in turn, will lead to the impossibility of developing a unified political course on many modern problems.

Among the main negative aspects of the Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration , Y. A. Yasnosokirsky singled out the following:

– the subsidiary nature of the Conciliation and Arbitration Court in relation to other procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes, whereby neither the conciliation commission nor the arbitration tribunal can consider the dispute if the dispute is already being considered under another procedure or judicial body;

– Absence of political and legal consequences of the provisions of the Convention. Conciliation and arbitration procedures are initiated on the basis of an ad hoc agreement or unilaterally (if there are preliminary mutual statements). Arbitral awards are generally binding, while proposals of the conciliation commission are not binding on the parties to the dispute.

– the absence of permanent bodies of the Court, in connection with which its structure resembles the structure of the PCA. A conciliation commission or arbitration tribunal is established for each specific dispute and ceases its work upon completion of the relevant procedure. Thus, the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration is just a list of world mediators and arbitrators. 

– The Court of Conciliation and Arbitration is not a full-fledged OSCE body, since the jurisdiction of the Court is not mandatory for all OSCE participating States, but only for those that are parties to the Convention.

However, despite some shortcomings of the Convention, its provisions, in comparison with the Valletta procedure, do contain a number of advantages, in particular, the conciliation procedure within the Court is characterized by a broader scope of jurisdiction and the mandatory nature of the procedure ^{[6, pp. 144-145]}.

In comparison with the Valletta mechanism, when considering a dispute by a conciliation commission within the framework of the Conciliation and Arbitration Court, the parties to the dispute do not have the opportunity to exclude any categories of disputes, which is a rather progressive feature of such commissions ^{[8, p. 352]}.

The arbitral tribunal makes decisions on the basis of international law or ex aequo et bono. The decisions of the Tribunal are binding. The Arbitration Tribunal also has the authority to conduct a survey to establish the facts that are necessary to make the most appropriate decision ^{[9, p. 185]}. In the absence of consensus when making decisions by the Tribunal, its members are given the opportunity to express their disagreement or to present a dissenting opinion on the dispute under consideration (Final Document of the Stockholm Meeting of 1992, Annex 2, Article 31.1.).

Unlike other elements of the peaceful settlement system, which provide for a political commitment for all OSCE participating States, the provisions of the Convention are binding only for its participating States ^{[1, p. 267]}.

It should also be noted that conciliation and arbitration procedures within the Court can be applied to multilateral disputes, including with the participation of other OSCE participating States that are not parties to the Convention, provided that at least one party to the dispute is a party to the Convention (Final Document of the Stockholm Meeting of 1992, Annex 2, Articles 20.2 and 26.1.).

Thus, in order to ensure maximum efficiency of the Court, its founders established a link between the States Parties to the Convention and other OSCE participating States through the possibility of considering disputes with such a mixed range of potential parties to the dispute. This allows other OSCE participating States, even before ratification and accession to the Convention, to gain practical experience with its conciliation and arbitration procedures ^{[8, p. 353]}.

3. Reconciliation Commission

As mentioned above, two initiatives were put forward at the Conference in May 1992: 1) optional reconciliation procedure (Great Britain); 2) directive reconciliation procedure (USA). Both proposals were approved at the Stockholm Meeting in December 1992, by virtue of which, respectively, two documents were adopted: the Regulations on the CSCE Reconciliation Commission and the Regulations on Directive Reconciliation.

The purpose of the establishment of the Reconciliation Commission was to introduce a conciliation procedure into the CSCE peace settlement system, which, unlike the Valletta mechanism, will offer the parties to the dispute a more simplified dispute settlement procedure. The close relationship of the Reconciliation Commission with the Valletta Mechanism can be traced in the order of formation of the composition of the Commission, namely, the peace mediators included in its composition are appointed by the parties to the dispute from the so-called "Valletta List" (Final Document of the Stockholm Meeting of 1992, Annex 3, section V).

However, critically assessing the functioning of the Commission, it can be stated that the reconciliation procedure proposed by the Commission is almost identical to the Valletta procedure, since: firstly, the Reconciliation Commission is not a permanent OSCE body; secondly, the implementation of the conciliation procedure is not binding due to the fact that the procedure is applied only on the basis of agreements between the parties or in the presence of preliminary mutual statements; thirdly, the Commission's proposals are not binding on the parties, however, unlike the Valletta procedure, the parties can at any time make a statement recognizing the binding conditions of reconciliation proposed by the Commission, both in general and in relation to a specific dispute ^{[6, pp. 145-146]}.

It should be particularly noted that the Commission's procedure cannot be applied to multilateral disputes (Final Document of the Stockholm Meeting of 1992, Annex 3, section I). This limitation is a step backwards compared to the Valletta Mechanism, which was applicable to the settlement of multilateral disputes (Report of the Valletta Meeting of 1991, Provisions of the CSCE Procedure for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, section IV).

4. Directive reconciliation procedure

Regarding directive reconciliation, first of all, we note that this procedure does not provide for the creation of a new body or mechanism for dispute settlement, but only empowers the OSCE Council of Ministers and the Permanent Council (after the liquidation of the CSDL/RS, its respective powers were transferred to the OSCE Permanent Council) to instruct any two OSCE participating States to apply to the Commission reconciliation for the peaceful settlement of the dispute, which they failed to resolve within a reasonable time. If the parties to the dispute are parties to the Conciliation and Arbitration Convention, the aforementioned bodies may also oblige the parties to apply to the Conciliation and Arbitration Court.

The decision-making procedure based on the Provisions on Directive Reconciliation is carried out without the participation of foreign Ministers or representatives of OSCE participating States that are parties to the dispute, which is why this procedure is often characterized as "consensus minus two".

When implementing this procedure, the powers of the Council of Ministers or the OSCE Permanent Council are limited to the following cases: a) when considering a dispute under other mechanisms; b) when implementing a peaceful settlement outside the OSCE, including through direct negotiations; c) if the parties "consider" that the dispute belongs to the following categories: disputes concerning the territorial integrity or national defense of the participating States and disputes concerning the right to sovereignty over land territory or competing claims to jurisdiction over other areas (these categories are identical to the exception categories provided for by the Valletta Procedure).

Thus, it can be concluded that the directive reconciliation procedure, as well as the optional reconciliation procedure (Reconciliation Commission), is not mandatory and does not apply to multilateral disputes ^{[6, p. 146]}.

5. The reasons for the ineffectiveness of the OSCE system of peaceful settlement of disputes

The official handbook of the OSCE in 2011 states that none of the four elements of the system of peaceful settlement of disputes has been applied in practice, which is a rather deplorable indicator ^{[10, pp. 30-32]}.

Among the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the OSCE's system of peaceful settlement of disputes are the following:

– despite the existence of a well-developed system of peaceful settlement of disputes within the OSCE, the complexity and complexity of its procedures is a significant obstacle to the use of these procedures by OSCE participating States;

– the absence of binding decisions taken within the framework of the relevant procedures, or too narrow jurisdiction of mechanisms or bodies, due to the possibility of withdrawal by the parties to the dispute of a fairly wide range of disputes from consideration, which are the sources of most major armed conflicts that have occurred over the past decades.

However, the international doctrine also expressed opinions on the expediency of excluding certain categories of disputes from consideration in the relevant mechanisms within the OSCE, explaining that, in practice, a dispute cannot be settled without the consent of all parties to the dispute, even if the legal issues of the dispute can be easily resolved. Therefore, the flexible nature of the procedures and the exclusion of certain disputes only increase the chances of the OSCE participating States using these methods to settle their disputes. However, in our opinion, such arguments do not seem quite correct;

– the impossibility of applying the procedures of the OSCE peace settlement system to resolve intra-State disputes, which constitute the bulk of disputes taking place in the OSCE area ^{[7, pp. 46-47]}.

The exclusion of domestic disputes from the scope of the system of peaceful settlement of disputes, in our opinion, is the main reason for the non-use of elements of this system in practice. However, such a feature of the system can be said to indirectly go back to the provisions of the UN Charter on the peaceful settlement of disputes, according to which these provisions apply exclusively to interstate disputes. In addition, Article 34.1 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice clearly states that this judicial body considers exclusively interstate disputes.

Given that one of the parties to most modern conflicts are nations and peoples fighting for independence, the concept of "international dispute" in international practice should be expanded. Despite the fact that in international practice only nations and peoples who are in colonial dependence and fighting for the creation of their independent state are recognized as subjects of international law, numerous modern international conflicts, for example, in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Kosovo, etc., are somehow connected with nations and peoples who are not under colonial dependence. Therefore, giving them at least the opportunity to be a party to an international dispute in the peaceful settlement procedures within the framework of the UN, OSCE and other organizations is an extreme necessity in the modern era of international relations ^{[11, p. 63]}. Thus, in our opinion, the list of potential parties to the dispute that can act in the process of peaceful settlement should be expanded by such quasi-subjects of international law as nations and peoples that are not in colonial dependence, and partially recognized and unrecognized States created by them, as well as militias that control a significant part of the territory of a certain State. In addition, armed non-State actors, for example, in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, etc., are the de facto authorities with whom the OSCE willy-nilly interacts ^{[12, p. 10]}.

In its recommendation, the OSCE Group of Eminent Persons proposed to recognize at the official level the OSCE's ability to interact with individuals and bodies whose status is disputed, but the interests of OSCE participating States should also be taken into account ^{[13, p. 13]}.

Thus, only by giving the above-mentioned quasi-entities the opportunity to act as parties to a dispute, it is possible to literally revive the "dormant" dispute settlement provisions provided for in the four elements of the OSCE peaceful dispute settlement system. None of the elements of this system has been used, in particular, to resolve the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, which found its resolution by military means in 2020. The question is not that the appeal to these elements would certainly lead to the settlement of this conflict, but in the maximum use of the OSCE potential in this area, formed thanks to thanks to the long-term efforts of leading international experts and leading politicians.

Professor J. Merrills quite rightly notes that the reason for not using such carefully developed reconciliation procedures is not the need to create new mechanisms, but the unwillingness of the conflicting parties to use the existing mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes in the most appropriate way ^{[1, p. 78]}.

6. OSCE Mediation

In addition to the implementation of reconciliation, arbitration and examination within the OSCE, this organization also acts as a mediator for the settlement of modern international and intra-State conflicts. For example, the OSCE carried out mediation activities to resolve the following conflicts:

– To resolve the interethnic conflict between Macedonians and Albanian separatists in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in 2001.;

– Since 2008, along with the UN and the EU, the OSCE has been one of the co-chairs of the International Geneva Discussions, which discuss ways to resolve conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In July 2023, the 58th round of the MZHD took place, and the next 59th round will take place in December 2023. ^[14];

– to settle the interethnic conflict between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan in 2010.;

– Since 2014, she has acted as a mediator in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) on the settlement of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, whose work was discontinued in 2022.;

– for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict within the framework of the Minsk Group, which in 2022 ^[15], after thirty years of activity, ceased to exist;

– currently, for about twenty years he has been one of the mediators in the negotiations in the "5+2" format on the settlement of the Transnistrian "frozen" conflict ^{[16, p. 263]}.

7. OSCE peacekeeping activities

Along with dispute settlement activities within the OSCE, peacekeeping operations are of no small importance, the functioning of which is described in detail in paragraphs 17-51 of Chapter III of the Helsinki Decisions of 1992. We will highlight the main provisions regarding the functioning of OSCE peacekeeping operations:

– they can be carried out both in relation to international and intra-state conflicts of OSCE participating states. Such operations do not replace the political process of peaceful settlement of disputes, but only serve as an additional means to strengthen the results of the process of peaceful settlement of disputes by promoting the preservation of peace and eliminating any potential causes that could lead to the resumption of conflict relations.;

– may not provide for coercive measures;

– to carry out operations, the consent of all directly interested parties is required. Subject to the consent of the parties, the request for an operation is sent through the Chairman to the OSCE Permanent Council;

– consist of civilian and/or military personnel;

– can be carried out in various forms, in particular, in the form of observer missions, monitoring missions, etc.;

– may provide for various actions: monitoring the withdrawal of troops, support in maintaining law and order, providing humanitarian and medical assistance, etc.;

– The general management and control of operations is carried out by the OSCE Permanent Council;

– the operational command at the site of the operation is carried out by the head of the mission;

– the main conditions for the start of the operation are the establishment of a reliable and long-term ceasefire and the provision of guarantees for the safety of mission personnel.

It should also be noted that the overall management of the OSCE activities, including peacekeeping, is carried out by the OSCE Chairman, who is the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the state in which the last meeting of the OSCE Council of Ministers took place ^{[17, p. 317]}.

As an example of peacekeeping operations conducted within the framework of the OSCE, we can cite:

– The OSCE mission in Yugoslavia in order to create favorable conditions for dialogue between the population of Vojvodina, Sanjak and Kosovo with the relevant authorities of the country;

– Missions to Bosnia and Herzegovina, carried out in accordance with the 1995 Dayton Agreement, to monitor elections, to assist in the establishment of the Bosnian Commission on Human Rights and to hold discussions on arms control measures and confidence- and security-building measures; 

– as well as missions in Macedonia, Tajikistan, Estonia, Georgia, Chechnya, Moldova and Ukraine ^{[18, pp. 1033-1034]}.

As noted by Ambassador F. Tanner, of all the OSCE missions, only the Control Mission in Kosovo and the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine resembled military-type peacekeeping operations, due to the fact that these civilian observation missions began functioning under relatively calm conditions, but subsequently found themselves in a high-risk zone ^{[19, p. 3]}.

Conclusion

Thus, almost all peaceful means of dispute resolution reflected in Article 33 of the UN Charter are available within the OSCE. Despite the existence of a Court of Conciliation and Arbitration within the OSCE, the work of this judicial body is limited to the arbitration procedure and today there is still no body within the OSCE that carries out judicial proceedings as a legal means for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Therefore, in order to achieve maximum completeness of the legal development of the existing OSCE system of peaceful settlement of disputes, in our opinion, the list of available peaceful means of dispute resolution within the OSCE should be supplemented by the creation of a single full-fledged OSCE judicial body like the International Court of Justice, which will conduct judicial proceedings for dispute settlement and make advisory decisions at the request of the Council of Ministers or the OSCE Permanent Council opinions on various legal issues.

Currently, within the OSCE, there is an insufficiently high level of information support for citizens of OSCE participating States, which, in our opinion, is an important factor that creates favorable conditions for the transformation of international and domestic disputes into armed conflicts.

In order to provide information to people in the OSCE area, it has long been necessary to create an official OSCE television channel available in all OSCE participating States, the main topics of which should be: a) an international legal assessment of the claims of the parties to a tense political situation, dispute or armed conflict; b) an overview of the peace process and the procedures applied for the peaceful settlement of the conflict; c) review of the powers of the relevant peacekeeping operations; etc.

Proper information provision in the world of round-the-clock news is practically necessary. Thus, during the implementation of the SMM in Ukraine, all parties to the conflict accused the OSCE of bias and the organization became a target in the information war. This could have serious consequences, in particular, for the safety of mission personnel. Therefore, peacekeeping operations should consider public information as an element of state policy, and OSCE decision-making bodies should pay due attention to information policy throughout the OSCE area ^{[12, p. 9]}.

The decline of the OSCE's political influence began in the late 1990s after the unsuccessful efforts of the OSCE to peacefully resolve the conflict in Kosovo, as a result of which the positions of NATO and the EU strengthened in the pan-European space. Some legal scholars identified among the reasons for the weakness of the OSCE: political lack of will, the lack of the ability to compel peace, as well as the principle of consensus ^{[4, p. 347]}.

These reasons are directly related to the OSCE's ability to resolve conflicts peacefully. So, firstly, over the past twenty years, the OSCE has not shown proper determination in ensuring that the parties to conflicts exhaust all peaceful means of dispute resolution available within the organization.

Secondly, the absence of a special military contingent or the OSCE gendarmerie to promptly respond to changes in the situation in the "hot spots" due to non-compliance by one or all parties to the conflict with the ceasefire regime is a significant limitation in the OSCE activities. The creation of the OSCE armed forces to enforce peace, in our opinion, would contribute to the growth of the OSCE's authority and the revival of this organization in a new and more perfect form. However, the process of creating such forces requires a highly competent approach due to the risk of turning OSCE missions into another target for both sides. Nevertheless, it is not at all necessary for OSCE missions to be of a military nature in order to be shelled by the parties to the conflict. Thus, during the implementation of the SMM in Ukraine, whose personnel consisted exclusively of civilian unarmed persons, OSCE vehicles were shelled by the armed forces of the conflicting parties. In addition to ensuring the safety of peacekeeping personnel, the presence of a special OSCE gendarmerie could also ensure proper border management, the necessary security conditions for refugees and migrants, etc. ^{[12, pp. 10-11]}.

Thirdly, according to paragraph 2 of Chapter II of the OSCE Rules of Procedure, decision-making by all OSCE decision-making bodies, starting with Meetings of Heads of State and Government, ending with the Permanent Council, is carried out on the basis of consensus, which means the adoption of a decision unanimously without "any objection from one or another participating State." Decision-making solely on the basis of consensus, in fact, is a significant obstacle to the successful development of all areas of activity within the OSCE. Considering the fact that the OSCE participating States as of 2023 are 57 states from three continents: North America, Europe and Asia ^[20], consensus-based decisions on the application of necessary measures on all complex political issues within the OSCE's competence, including conflict resolution, is quite difficult a task.

The principle of consensus, in our opinion, could be replaced by a decision based on a qualified majority of at least two-thirds of the votes of the participating States, since too high a decrease in the number of necessary votes for decision-making (50% or lower) within the OSCE may lead to a violation of the rights of groups of participating States that constitute a minority that will exclude the objectivity of the OSCE decision-making mechanism.

Considering all that has been said, it can be argued that today the OSCE system of peaceful settlement of disputes is not sufficiently productive. A long period of non-use of the elements of this system causes doubt and skepticism about its procedures and excludes the possibility of referring to its elements in the future. Therefore, in the course of the study, we identified the reasons for the inefficiency of this system and suggested ways to eliminate them, through the implementation of which, in our opinion, it will be possible to revive the OSCE system of peaceful settlement of disputes. By virtue of which, in particular, it will be possible to use the four elements of this system to resolve protracted conflicts, such as in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, etc.

To date, only seven OSCE summits have been held: 1) in Helsinki in 1975; 2) in Paris in 1990; 3) in Helsinki in 1992; 4) in Budapest in 1994; 5) in Lisbon in 1996; 6) in Istanbul in 1999; 7) in Astana in 2010. At the moment, the last meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the OSCE participating States remains the meeting in Astana, held on December 1-2, 2010, at which the OSCE participating States reaffirmed their responsibility to each other and to their citizens for respecting the values, principles and obligations enshrined in the Final Act of 1975 and the Charter of Paris In 1990, the Heads of State and Government stated that the provisions of these fundamental OSCE documents should continue to serve as a guideline in the relations of States in the OSCE area, as well as in their relations with all people on their territory in the XXI century. However, after the Astana summit, a whole host of events took place in the pan-European space that radically changed the perception of security in the space "from Vancouver to Vladivostok". 

In 2025, the 50th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 is scheduled. Although meetings of the Council of Ministers are held annually within the OSCE, however, in our opinion, a meeting at the level of heads of State and Government of OSCE participating states should be held by this anniversary to discuss and summarize the OSCE activities, starting from activities in the field of the human dimension, ending with activities in the military-political field, including in the field of peaceful settlement of modern conflicts. There is a rather extensive range of issues on the agenda, the resolution of which requires a high degree of political will of the heads of State and Government.

Used international legal documents

– Helsinki Final Act of August 1, 1975 // OSCE official website. URL: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/0/c/39505_1.pdf (accessed: 08/26/2023)

– The Charter of Paris for a New Europe of November 21, 1990 // URL: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/3/4/39520.pdf (accessed: 08/26/2023)

– Final Document of the second meeting of the CSCE Council of Ministers in Prague, January 30-31, 1992 // URL: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/a/b/40274.pdf (accessed: 08/26/2023)

– The CSCE Helsinki Document "The Challenge of the Time of Change" dated July 10, 1992 // URL: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/0/39534.pdf (accessed: 08/26/2023)

– Final Document of the third meeting of the CSCE Council of Ministers in Stockholm, December 14-15, 1992 // OSCE official website. URL: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/e/8/40346.pdf (accessed: 08/26/2023)

– Final Document of the fourth meeting of the CSCE Council of Ministers in Rome, November 30 - December 1, 1993 // URL: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/a/6/40405.pdf (accessed: 08/26/2023)

– Budapest Document "On the way to genuine partnership in a new era" dated December 6, 1994 // URL: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/a/39558.pdf (accessed: 08/26/2023)

– Decision of the OSCE Council of Ministers No. 4/06 on the OSCE Governing Council of June 26, 2006. Document MC.DEC/4/06 // URL: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/f/22773.pdf (accessed: 08/26/2023)

– Final document of the third meeting, Vienna, November 4, 1986 - January 19, 1989 // URL: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/9/1/40885.pdf (accessed: 08/26/2023)

– Report of the CSCE Expert Meeting on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in Valletta, February 8, 1991 // URL: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/1/30119.pdf (accessed: 08/26/2023)

– OSCE Ministerial Council Decision No. 1/06 of November 1, 2006, OSCE Rules of Procedure. MC.DOC document/1/06 // URL: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/4/22780.pdf (accessed: 30.08.2023)

– Astana Anniversary Declaration "On the way to a Security community" dated December 3, 2010 // URL: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/d/8/74990.pdf (accessed: 08/26/2023)