Methodology for analyzing the decision-making process in the political system according to the CACI method

Semenov Vitalii Andreevich ORCID: 0000-0002-5222-2196 PhD in Philosophy Assistant Professor; Department of International Relations, Medialogy, Political Science, and History; Saint Petersburg State University of Economics 191023, Russia, Saint Petersburg, Saint Petersburg, Sadovaya str., 21, room 271 semenov3786@mail.ru Other publications by this author

1. Introduction

1.1. Relevance of the scientific problem

            In the process of conducting applied country studies, for example, aimed at preparing materials for the development of strategies for the development of international cooperation, the problem of methodology for assessing the political system of the country in question often arises. At the same time, the specifics of such studies are often interdisciplinary in nature, and the customer is aimed at obtaining a result that does not fit well into the usual boundaries of the academic structure of scientific knowledge, and moreover, forming the structure of the research result for himself and his practical needs. One of the frequent variants of the expected result of the research process is the creation of departmental databases and country certificates covering a fairly wide range of issues. It is also worth noting that we consider as potential customers of such research not specialized structures, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has its own highly specialized think tanks, but rather departments of international cooperation of ministries of a different profile, as well as interested business structures, which are somewhat far from "high international politics". Unfortunately, the accumulated baggage of fundamental knowledge and the available methodology accumulated by various social sciences are poorly suited for solving a number of tasks that a customer can set for a researcher. Moreover, research tracks that are familiar within the framework of academic science may not fit into the organizational aspects of the research process and may not be effective in terms of spending research resources, or even not correspond to the professional abilities of some of the researchers involved (for example, due to organizational or technical inability to establish a highly specialized division of labor). As a result, we are faced with the problem of methodological "sagging" of a number of subsections in databases and country certificates: they either have to be left to a motley mass of researchers with different specializations, or presented in the form of a primitive set of easily filled indicators, the practical usefulness of which is minimal for the customer. One of these subsections is the analysis of the political system, and it is the development of the methodology of its implementation that this article will be devoted to. It is also necessary to focus attention on the aspect that the political system interests the potential customers we have identified above from the perspective of public administration issues. Actually, international cooperation itself at the level of international cooperation departments of non-core ministries is largely focused on the processes of merging their own and other public administration systems according to the case/vector of this cooperation. And the first question that the prospective customer has to solve is with whom exactly should this cooperation be developed? And, in particular, how difficult will it be to "push" a decision on cooperation through the political system "on the other side"? Such a statement of the question actualizes the consideration of the political system from the perspective of short political cycles (which, again, refers us more to the sphere of public administration than to pure political science or international relations). At the same time, it should be taken into account that formal aspects, including legal issues, are usually presented in separate blocks in the certificates and databases themselves (constitutional block, form of government, structure of territorial structure, membership in international governmental organizations, institutional structure of public administration, a brief overview of the regulatory framework for recruiting for key positions in executive bodies and legislative authorities, a superficial biographical analysis of official LPR (decision makers), a variety of highly specialized analytics on regulatory legal acts. However, all of the above components are presented separately, and do not give a general picture of decision-making processes, and do not take into account informal moments. Moreover, the volume of the material and the structure of the presentation of information themselves are a problem for forming a clear picture of the work of the political system from the perspective of decision-making processes. The lack of a methodology and adapted models suitable for these tasks determines the factor of scientific novelty and relevance of this study.

1.2. Purpose of the study

The purpose of this study is to develop a method of analyzing the political system, which would allow assessing the specific features of the decision-making process in this system. The method should meet the criterion of scalability, that is, provide flexibility in the structure of indicators, which will allow both a superficial assessment for country databases or references, and the possibility of increasing detail (by adding new indicators) to solve more specific scientific problems. Thus, we can identify three key scientific tasks: firstly, the revision of existing theoretical models of the political system and their adaptation to the stated criteria, secondly, the development of a method for analyzing the political decision-making process based on a theoretical model of the political system (the UACR Method), and thirdly, the allocation of a system of indicators by the method UACR to assess the features of the political decision-making process. To implement the main tasks within the framework of the study, it is also necessary to solve a number of side issues: describe in more detail the positioning of the researcher-practitioner and the customer factor, analyze established approaches to analyzing the political system, and give several examples of using the UACR method on practical material.

1.3. Object and subject of research

It should be noted that, although the starting point (a practical problem) was the conduct of country studies organized by customers working in the field of international cooperation, the object-subject area of this study is away from international relations, and lies in the disciplinary areas of political science and public administration.

The subject of the study is represented by the core of political decision-making, which is one of the subsystems of the political system. The object of the study is the political system of society.

The study examines the influence of the state of the political system according to the UACR method on the process of political decision-making within a small political cycle. The processes of medium and large political cycles in the perspective of the study are considered as a factor of conditions within the political system.

1.4. Research methodology

Firstly, to build models of the political system and the core of political decision-making, we relied on the synergetic paradigm and the method of circulation circuits ^{[1, pp. 46-57]}.

Secondly, we used the principle of abstract functionalism of T. Parsons ^{[2, p. 14]} to solve the problem of the "Shtompka paradox" ^{[3, p. 213]} (the impossibility of constructing static models of dynamic systems and processes) – that is, the allocation of not specific institutional elements, but functional niches.

Thirdly, when developing the UACR method, we used the determination chain method.

The starting point for the development of the model of the political system used in this study were the models of D. Easton ^{[4, pp. 630-642]} and G. Almond ^{[5, pp. 74-88]}.

2. Positioning of the researcher-practice

2.1. Specifics of the organization of applied research in Russia

The simplest "starting" solution on the part of the customer is an attempt to attract existing materials, references, and ratings. However, it should be noted that, although modern political sciences have accumulated a fairly extensive body of knowledge about the functioning of the political sphere, applied methodology is still not sufficiently developed, if compared, for example, with economic sciences. This is partly due to the smaller volume of actual research problems available for development and, accordingly, a smaller market for orders for applied research, and on the other hand, a greater variety of cases and fewer typical cases, which significantly reduces the effectiveness of using statistical methods relative to the same economic sciences. As a result, either rating studies are available to us ^[6], or complex academic projects in which there is time and intellectual resource for complex multi-paradigm research ^{[7, pp. 10-24]}, or expert assessments (for example, country studies on the political situation published by think tanks like Freedom House.

However, these options are not suitable for conducting applied research with the participation of "broad-profile experts" and in conditions of a large volume of processed material, lack of time and funds. It is also necessary to make an amendment to the general state of the expert sphere in Russia and the nature of the connection of experts to the system of Russian public administration. The bureaucratic system in Russia suffers from the phenomenon of "departmental feudalism", and in this form our bureaucratic system began to form back in the Soviet era. Thus, each "departmental fief" organizes an examination "for itself", on its own narrow resource base and with its own narrow departmental interests. Collective interdepartmental projects and the formation of "common use" resources are rare, and too dense interdepartmental interaction is not welcome, since it is fraught with leaks of internal information that can shake the position of the structure in interdepartmental competition. As a result, the characteristic features of the Russian expertise are parallel work on the same topics in conditions of a rather poor personnel and resource base. In turn, the poverty of the personnel base, a wide range of research tasks, and adherence to the principle of forming a controlled expert team prevent compliance with the principle of narrow specialization in the framework of a research project. And since an organizational solution to this kind of problem seems impossible in modern conditions, it can be partially stopped with the help of methodological developments, which was the purpose of this article.

2.2 Customer factor

The starting point in this case is the "customer factor": a corporate or state structure forced to invest in conducting an extensive (according to the nomenclature of countries) country studies. At the same time, this structure is most often not interested in direct interference in the political processes of another country (which, of course, would justify conducting more in-depth studies of foreign political systems), but the development of joint international cooperation projects and the integration of public administration systems dictate the need to understand the general logic of the local political situation. Moreover, it should be emphasized that it is the logical scheme that is of interest, and not just a reference on the operational political situation — this, again, is due to the nature of the limited allocation of funds for research projects. It is quite normal (from the point of view of Russia's bureaucratic structures) to organize three-year (on average) funding periods in the format of annual grants, and quite often the logic of a 20% reduction in allocated funds for the project with each subsequent iteration is practiced. After that, this research topic is considered "closed" for a period of about 5-10 years. Thus, operational information will have time to become outdated by the time it may be needed, and the content of expert teams on a permanent basis does not fit well into the neoconservative traditions of Russian public administration. It is also worth noting that the expected level of political science training of a potential consumer of research results is likely to be not high. Which, in turn, dictates such a condition as the simplicity and/or scalability of the method being developed. When implementing this condition, the result obtained during the study will meet the criterion of universalism (with respect to all the studied country cases) and have sufficient simplicity.             Again, from the point of view of the level of experts involved, there is also a need for a simple and understandable method, the development of which will not require significant time costs.             If we talk about the expected results, then typical technical tasks are usually based on the principle of "to have something". That is, the standard standard set of the "political block" includes: easily obtained information about the formal side of the institutional architecture (form of government, form of administrative structure, set of constitutional indicators), a brief operational summary of the main political events over the past 10 years, the results of the political struggle for the past and current electoral cycle, biographical information on key members of the government, and a certain number of indicators on political indicators from external rating studies. At the same time, within the framework of the designated set, any method of complex analysis is usually not used, the data is provided in the "as is" format, and analytical notes and comments are allowed exclusively in accordance with the structure of the terms of reference, that is, purely "on the spot". As a rule, this is due to the "uneven" quality of experts, while the management of research teams is usually afraid of getting "uneven" results, which can lead to overestimation of requirements during the acceptance process, and cause dissatisfaction with the customer. If we talk about the practical application of the research results, then the general logic of the political decision-making process within a specific political system is an open question. The listed set of typical elements of the terms of reference does not allow identifying the dominant political vectors, which means that, based on the information provided, it is quite difficult for the consumer of the results of scientific research to calculate purely political risks and highlight political opportunities.

3. Review of existing models and approaches to the description of the political decision-making process, the phenomenon of the political system, as well as the phenomena of regime dynamics and regime transit

3.1. Structure of the review

Before we can begin to consider the UACR method, it is necessary to review and evaluate existing models and approaches from the perspective of the tasks that the method we have developed is designed to solve. Within the framework of the review part, we have identified three vectors. Firstly, the vector of political decision–making - a review of existing methods and approaches makes it possible to justify the need to develop new methodological tools. This is due to the fact that the most well-known and widespread approaches consider the decision-making process separately and from the position of paradigmatic perspectives that are inconvenient for solving the tasks we have outlined. Secondly, the vector of the political system – a review of existing methods and approaches justifies both the choice of the model of D. Easton ^{[4, pp. 630-642]} and G. Almond ^{[5, pp. 74-88]} as a theoretical basis, and the need for their revision and subsequent modification. Thirdly, the vector of political regimes and regime transit. Despite the fact that this issue is theoretically presented quite extensively, and considered through the prism of many paradigms, most of the angles of consideration of regimes and regime transit are poorly adapted for their use when considering small political cycles. It is also worth noting the nature of the tasks set when considering the method we are developing.

3.2. Review of existing models and approaches to the issue of political decision-making

There are quite a large number of approaches to the issue of political decision-making. In general, they can be reduced to several paradigms: the strategic paradigm (political decisions are made by a specific actor with subjectivity in certain strategic conditions and with certain goals), the processor paradigm (political decision-making acts as one of the systemic processes in a complex socio-political mechanism) ^{[8, pp. 146-147],[9, p. 121],[4, p. 630-642],[5, p. 74-88]}, the discursive paradigm (in fact, the transfer of the concept of the "Overton window" to the political decision–making process is a visible adherence to mainstream political discourse to ensure the influx of stable public support) ^[10], as well as various options for their hybridization ^{[11, pp. 37-40]}. The strategic paradigm does not quite fit our goals, as a narrower tool. The main methodological problem of this group of approaches is that the starting point in their logic is a specific actor or actors. Even if we take approaches within the framework of game theory ^{[12, pp. 92-108]}, the basis of the game situation is still actors and their strategies under certain conditions, which does not provide us with the necessary paradigmatic perspective. For us, the greatest interest is the general "passability" of the political impulse, and not the strategic effectiveness of the functioning of individual actors in the political system. Nevertheless, the approaches of the strategic paradigm can be used within the framework of the UACR method for a more detailed study of the factor of actors and the factor of competition, but as a separate, pluggable as necessary, "modular tool". As for the discursive paradigm, its applicability is situational: the degree of dependence of the political system on the prevailing political discourses may vary, in addition, the discursive field has a limited capacity, and therefore the factor of the political agenda can certainly arise, but it must be borne in mind that the discourse is present in the information field of the whole society, that is, not directly in the political system, but in the social environment. As a result, the inclusion of discursive methods is possible, but, as with the methods within the strategic paradigm, as an additional methodological tool.

Thus, the paradigmatic basis of this study is precisely the processor paradigm, which, on the one hand, has sufficient versatility, and on the other hand, a huge scaling potential, especially when using the contour principle of an open dynamic system from synergetics in the modeling process. Also, the use of the principle of abstract functionalism allows to increase universality.

As for specific models of political decision-making, they differ in a certain narrowness, and should be used in a complex. Within the framework of an individual model of political decision-making, even if we take the motivational structure of the average representative of the political elite, we will face the problem of the multilayered nature of his motives: these may be "selfish" interests, departmental interests, or national interests. At the same time, if he is a public politician, then there will also be an "Overton Window" in his head, that is, the need to preserve his image face. To all of the above, an external factor can be added in the form of pressure from lobbyists, and an internal factor if this representative of the political elite is a carrier of some ideology or political worldview in another form. We should also not forget about the problem of correlation of professional culture and official role ^[13]. And such a picture already exists at the level of an individual politician. Within the framework of the departmental balance model (bureaucratic model) ^{[14, pp. 213-214]}, a political decision is the result of a departmental compromise (well, within the legislative branch of government, a coalition compromise ^{[15, pp. 173-177]}) based on the balance of forces. This model will be used by us within the framework of the UACR method to analyze the competition factor. The organizational model considers the process of political decision-making from the position of formalized contours of the interaction of political institutions (that is, how the decision-making process is presented within the framework of the regulatory system). The hybrid model of K. Eichen ^{[16, pp. 86-120]} essentially combines these two approaches (the bargaining stage, the implementation stage), but is rather idealized and is applicable exclusively within the framework of the departmental culture of interaction of the "space built on rules". It is also possible to distinguish various models of decision-making themselves (the rational choice model, the opportunistic behavior model ^[17], the community tragedy model ^[18], the garbage bank model and the escape from negotiations model ^{[19, pp. 103-111]}), but they again belong either to the actor or to the relational paradigm.

Summing up, it is worth noting that the processor paradigm, which is of maximum interest in the context of this study, is poorly represented within the existing approaches and models, and the approaches included in it do not provide sufficient complexity and universality. 

3.3. Review of existing models and theoretical approaches to the description of the phenomenon of the political system

Unfortunately, today it is difficult to find fundamental studies on political systems comparable to the works of such classics as G. Almond and D. Easton. In this regard, the most interesting for us is the model of the political system developed by G. Almond ^{[5, pp. 74-88]} as a detailing of D. Easton's "Black Box" ^{[4, pp. 630-642]}. These are classic fundamental developments based on models built on the principles of a synergetic circuit. It is worth noting that among domestic researchers, the trend towards the introduction of synergetic models for analyzing the processes taking place in the political system was quite popular, especially in the period of the noughties. However, one can also recall the works of Yu. A. Tikhomirov, who wrote about the "embedding" of political and legal contours into the general cycles of society development ^{[20, p. 17-18]}, V. I. Pantin, who tried to combine the change of political regimes with the macro processes of socio-historical development ^{[21, p. 13]}, the cyclical model of the development of the political system A.V. Loginova ^{[22, p. 11]}. However, the listed domestic authors are largely trapped in historical macro processes, and the synergetic paradigm is used more from the standpoint of evolutionism and cyclic-wave macro processes ^{[23, pp. 44-45]}. However, the concentration of attention on cyclic macro processes is also characteristic of domestic supporters of other paradigms exploring the problems of political systems: the concept of the "state-centric matrix" by E. N. Moshelkov ^{[24, pp. 30-35]}, the socio-cultural approach to the analysis of cycles of the political system by V. G. Schneider ^{[25, pp. 1-3]}. D. A. Chemshit's economic and institutional approach to the analysis of the political system stands apart ^{[26, pp. 443-450]}, however, he also tries to explain the peculiarities of the formation of the Russian model of the political system with a certain reliance on history. If we talk about foreign works, in contrast to domestic research, it is worth noting a greater bias in the practical plane and rather narrow questions concerning individual phenomena and phenomena. However, works of a more fundamental nature are aimed at revealing rather narrow aspects: an example is the theory of proactive systems of K. Voynea ^[27],[28], in which the author, relying on the classical theories of G. Almond and D. He tries to supplement them with a cybernetic approach, linking the phenomenon of the political system with socio-cultural factors and public expectations. It is also possible to note the models of a complex socio-political system by M. Marshall ^[29], one of the participants of the INSCR ^[6], which is a rather interesting variant of a combination of functional and institutional approaches. However, the disadvantage of this model for us is the factor of a single socio-political field and the allocation of functional poles within the model. The developments of M. Marshall are interesting for describing the subsystem of entry into the political system, but they are poorly suited for the study of decision-making processes. Thus, having analyzed a number of works by domestic and foreign researchers, we are forced to state their rather limited possibility of application within the framework of the tasks set in the work, which forces us to return to the works of the classics of the study of political systems – namely, to the models of D. Easton and G. Almond, which will be used as the basis for the development of a process model decision-making within the framework of the functioning of the political system in the format of short cycles, and long cycles, transformational processes, and macrodynamics within the framework of the tasks set will act as a systemic background.

3.4. Review of existing models and approaches to the description of political regimes and regime transit

One of the key factors of macrodynamics in the political system that determine the rules of the game and the principles of forming political decisions is the characteristic of the political regime. Its change during the transit process essentially reshapes the entire political system, which determines its significance. At the same time, a wide range of approaches to the consideration of this phenomenon should be noted. We can identify several paradigmatic perspectives that have the greatest weight.

Firstly, these are approaches within the framework of the institutional and legal paradigm. The French school and the French experience have made a significant contribution to the development of this direction. However, it is worth noting that many prominent French researchers were forced to follow the path of hybridization. Although the institutional-legal paradigm for M. Duverger ^[30], J. L. Kermont ^{[31, p. 12.]}, or M. Kreuzer ^[32] acted as a foundation, its methodological limitations prompted the need to supplement the picture of the formal channel of the political process with methods and approaches of political sociology, entering the space of informal relations. For example, M. Kreuzer was forced to supplement the institutional and legal approaches used as a basis with a factor of public satisfaction with their work in conditions of a decrease in the amount of resources available to the population, and thereby raising the issue of the need for regime transit. However, even such hybrid approaches demonstrate the limitations of the institutional and legal description of political regimes and their transit. The institutional and legal component describes a kind of "channel" within which the political process takes place. But whether this "channel" will be filled with real political content, whether this political content will spill out beyond its limits, whether the "channel" will remain an empty decoration – these moments will be outside the overview perspective of the institutional and legal paradigm.

Also, this paradigm is poorly suited for describing transit processes. For example, the transition from a democratic regime to an authoritarian one can occur from an institutional point of view rather covertly, especially if the political elite is interested in preserving the "democratic scenery". Of course, individual institutional and legal changes may indicate the vector of the regime's transit processes, but relatively enough.

Secondly, we can highlight the power paradigm, which shifts the focus of attention from the process of making political decisions to gaining access to the levers of political power. An example is F. 's approach . Schmitter and G. O'Donnell ^{[33, p. 73]}. At the same time, this approach is also hybrid, focusing on formal and informal channels for obtaining political power. However, from the point of view of our stated goals (orientation to a small political cycle), the practical usefulness of such approaches is relative: it is not directly related to the decision-making process itself, but to the formation of conditions in which this process takes place. From the point of view of regime transit, the power paradigm makes it possible to identify sufficiently effective external indicators in the form of deformation of the structure of recruiting channels of the political elite, thereby facilitating the identification of the regime and the fact of regime transit.

Thirdly, we can single out the symptomatic paradigm of distinguishing political regimes characteristic of comparative political science, especially for the so-called "ascending tradition" of research strategy. The identification and typologization of political regimes was carried out within the framework of an ascending strategy (from the particular to the general), and, most often, according to a limited number of external indicators (one or two), for example, on the scale of "freedom-unfreedom".  The Almond-Powell matrix ^{[34, p. 308]} is based on two criteria: functional differentiation and subsystem autonomy. Typology of J. Blondel's theory is based on the inclusion/exclusion of the real political participation of the masses and the degree of differentiation of the political elite ^[35]. V. Gelman's domestic typology ^{[36, p.168]} is based on the criteria of the prevailing type of institutions and the fact of the presence/absence of electoral competition. The problem of most regime typologies developed in the last century, on the one hand, follows from the methodology of comparative studies – the problem of "few cases (N), many variables", and on the other – in orientation to external "symptomatic" indicators. Therefore, regime typologies built on the basis of an ascending tradition, although they are of some academic interest, but their use for practical purposes is extremely difficult. It should also be borne in mind that the diagnosis of the political regime by several external symptoms is not able, for example, to take into account the impact of unique situations like anti-crisis measures. The same applies to the issue of transit – it is possible to identify the fact of a change in symptoms, but it is impossible to say with full confidence about a change in the mechanisms of functioning of the political system, and vice versa.

Fourth, we can also look at political regimes from the perspective of the processor paradigm. The problem is that such a perspective in the format of a serious fundamental research leaves the object-subject area of political science in the direction of social philosophy and requires the development of a comprehensive determinational model of society, which gives the whole complex of connections between social subsystems. By itself, a request for such a model is voiced, but its implementation requires the long-term work of a large, versatile scientific team from representatives of a wide range of different disciplines, or a talented researcher with a broad outlook who is able to carry out interdisciplinary synthesis alone, which is quite rare in modern conditions of the dominance of narrow specialization.

Nevertheless, despite all the indicated difficulties, in the format of the declared specifics of the application, it is the processor paradigm that is of maximum interest: the practical applicability of research results in the symptomatic paradigm is extremely doubtful due to the low number of parameters in the model, and the institutional-legal paradigm is not able to reflect the gap between objective reality and its reflection in the legal space, which is also a critical problem in the interpretation and practical use of studies of political regimes within this paradigm. And the power paradigm shifts the perspective to the average political cycles and political recruiting.

Applied directly to the transitology itself, several paradigms can also be identified that explain transit processes. Firstly, it is the development paradigm, which was developed by such researchers as S. Huntington ^[37], B. Moore ^[38], D. Rustow ^[39]. The ideas of artificial socio-political engineering through the construction of formal structures and institutions, and the reinforcement of this process by the introduction of socio-cultural norms, were characteristic of the real estate developers. Socio-political engineering was supposed to "push" the processes of political (and then economic and social) modernization, considered within the framework of linear West–centrism. Such an approach is difficult to call objective (because of the idealization of the "Western standard"), and attempts at political modernization of the "authoritarian periphery" in the second half of the last century as a whole failed. Proponents of the world-system approach would have noticed that in practice, the construction of conditions for regime transit towards Western democracy resulted in the formatting of political systems to "connect" countries undergoing the transit process to the contours of the Western economic world-system as a neocolonial periphery. That is, the ideals declared by the real estate developers, in fact, were transformed from a scientific explanation into an ideological justification of neocolonial processes, divorced from real practices. At the same time, the very theory of transit among the late developmentalists ^[33] is considered mainly in the context of a stadium transit to a democratic regime. At the same time, real estate developers focus mainly on the cultural and political prerequisites that trigger the change of the political regime, but at the same time pay little attention to the economic and political determination (more precisely, a strong economy is considered as a prerequisite for strengthening the democratic regime, but the mechanism of this determinational connection, for example, through the structure of the economic elite and the resulting work strategies with a political system, not represented). Transit itself is a chain: the formation of prerequisites (liberalization), institutional and regulatory transformation (democratization), and the final adjustment of society to the new regime (consolidation). This approach demonstrates the methodological problem of the "first approximation" – a superficial description of the overall process, while ignoring the driving forces of this process, the reasons for their interest in the success of its implementation. Based on the theories of democratization, the motive of political actors to decide to reboot the political system and launch it in a new mode of operation escapes.

The problems of the real estate developers and their inability to effectively explain the post-communist transit of the third wave of democratization gave rise to many attempts to fill the theoretical vacuum. In this regard, we can recall the developments of A. Przeworski ^{[40, p. 95-134 40]}. His elitist-procedural approach just tries to describe the transit processes in the format of relations between groups of elites, taking into account their interests. The disadvantage of this approach is that the "distribution of roles" has already been made between the elites and "interaction scenarios" have been prescribed in the process of transit implementation. And the transit itself is set according to the authoritarian–democratic vector. This approach was relatively successful in relation to the "third wave" of democratization in the logic of related situations in the process of the collapse of communist regimes. However, in modern conditions, the applicability of schemes of this kind is noticeably reduced. In particular, due to the violation of the role structure in the case of "election machines" that put the interests of their sponsors above the requests from the electorate.

Another problem that we can observe in the work of A. Przeworski is the lack of understanding of who can benefit from the establishment of a democratic regime in society, and who at the same time has the ability to establish it. Again, the very existence of independent political structures with an alternative political vision rests on the problem of providing a resource base, which leads us to four possible options: support from below (as a result, revolutionary organizations), support from outside (which requires a certain level of economic development to form a lobbying compromise), financing from outside (foreign agents that automatically transfers regime transit to the plane of neocolonialism), and from the state (which means administrative clans and poorly correlates to the processes of democratization). Thus, in his works, A. Pshevorsky misses the factor of necessary conditions for the formation of conventional political competition, and considers the desire for monopolization of power by authoritarian regimes as something pathological.

A big disadvantage of classical transitology is the tendency to linear perception of this process and idealization of the formation of a democratic regime as a kind of final stage of political modernization. However, the illusion of evolutionism was largely due to global international trends of block dynamics. The same "third wave" was the result of the gradual collapse of the socialist camp. As a result, a group of countries similar in many respects came under the influence of a common process, but transitologists perceived this process more in the "in vitro" format as a natural evolution towards a universal ideal than as a result of international processes (accounting for which was formally declared, but in fact was poorly represented in explanatory models), which, in turn, it means a methodological error known as the "Galton problem", namely, ignoring external causes that can create the illusion of evolutionism. Supporters of the procedural approach, in turn, although closer to what is happening "on earth", also consider transit through the prism of exclusively democratic transitions, unwittingly succumbing to the trap of evolutionism and idealization of democratic regimes.

In our opinion, it seems necessary to adhere to more objective and utilitarian positions on the issue of regimes and regime transit, leaving the dispute about what transit democratization is in practice to political philosophers. Perhaps this is really some form of socio-political evolution, or perhaps just the unification of the formats of lobbying circuits accompanying the process of economic globalization and stimulated by TNCs, as seen from the standpoint of the world-system approach. However, in the context of this study, both of these positions are too global and do not have a sufficient applied perspective.

Summing up, we can note the need for a slightly different view of the problem of political regimes and regime transit, which would be more universal in its attitude to different types of regimes, and would have a more pragmatic approach to the issue of regime transit.

4.1. Revision and adaptation of models of the political system of D. Easton and G. Almond

Above, we have given an overview of the main theories and models of the political system, and concluded that the greatest compliance with the goals and objectives of the study of the classical models of G. Almond and D. Easton.

It is worth noting that Almond offers several models of the political system with different levels of internal detail. Subsystems of entry and exit according to D. Easton ^{[41, p. 389-390]}, or, if we take one of G. Almond's models, the function of the process and the function of the political course, as well as G. Almond adds the one missing from D. Easton's function of the political course (in the future we will refer to it in the framework of this work as a subsystem for maintaining the political process) ^{[5, 74-88]}. The problem is that such a model has a pronounced functional character (and offers us a functional structure), which is of significant interest within the framework of political theory, but its applied significance is not so great. In addition, in Almond's version, there is a noticeable bias towards describing the transformation of political demands at the democratic "entrance" to the political system. However, the political decision-making process itself is not detailed in its model, and the corresponding subsystem (function) is not highlighted.

In addition, G. Almond singled out a subsystem for maintaining the process (a system function), which included such phenomena as recruiting the political elite. It is worth noting that Mr. Almond's position on this issue greatly simplifies the structure of the political system. The problem is that the same recruiting can simultaneously be also part of the subsystem of maintaining the process (system function), and the subsystem of the input (process function), and even the subsystem of the output. For example, the process of electing a public politician with his political program is not only the recruitment of the political elite, but also a manifestation of articulation and aggregation of the political demands of society. At the same time, the appointment of an executive officer responsible for the implementation of a political decision can also be considered from the perspective of recruitment. And in these conditions, the principle of abstract functionalism of T. Parsons becomes in demand again. In addition, another disadvantage of the G. Almond model is the blurring of the function of political decision-making. To be more precise, Mr. Almond does not share the process of making a political decision and the process of initiating its implementation. It can be assumed that in the works of G. Almond, the professional deformation of the Western political scientist was manifested, on the one hand, separating the processes of political struggle and governance, and on the other, focusing attention on the political struggle within the modern democratic regime. On the other hand, it adds to the input subsystem (process function) and the issuance of court decisions (although institutionally it refers to a separate branch of government, and functionally it can be classified as a system function). It seems more logical to add such an element as the "core of political decision-making" to our model of the political system based on the developments of G. Almond, separating it from the other subsystems of the external circuit. It is also worth noting that such an approach will significantly change the functional fullness of the "process maintenance subsystem". This block cannot be completely discarded, but its significance in the interpretation of G. Almond was, on the one hand, unnecessarily expanded beyond the political system, including, for example, the processes of socialization, and on the other hand, the functional content necessary to maintain system processes is much broader.

In general, one of the problems of classical approaches to building models of the political system is the insufficient intensity of the use of the cybernetic approach and the information and communication paradigm. D. Easton outputs requirements and support as an input component, and political decisions as an output component. Both political decisions and political demands are informational in nature. At first glance, the situation with the phenomenon of political support is somewhat more complicated. For example, participation in public actions can be classified as political support. But if we do not enter the space of unconventional political behavior (riots, revolutions, terror against the political elite), then we see that in the conventional field, political support is converted into the same information. Public support actions essentially turn into indicator symbols that form the idea of the political elite about what is happening in society, and thus create information "at the entrance". As a result, we can distinguish two contours of the interaction of the political system with its environment. The first circuit is the circuit of information exchange between the political and public–state systems (we have to separate the state and the political system - despite the fact that the spaces of these two phenomena largely overlap, they are not identical). Information coming from society (in the format of demands and support), as well as general information forming ideas within a particular political system about what is happening, and information coming from outside, for example, within the framework of international political communication. Thus, it is possible to draw parallels with the work of the brain in biological organisms – information impulses enter the brain, are processed, and form a response that determines the adaptive actions of the organism. And in the case of the political system, we can extrapolate this analogy. However, as in the case of complex biological information processing systems, it should be borne in mind that the functioning of socio-political systems cannot be described within the framework of a rigid mechanistic model. In the case of living organisms, in addition to the information circuit of electronic signals in nerve tissues, we can also observe a variety of structural influences that interfere with thinking processes. Biochemistry of the body itself, viral damage to brain tissues, etc. The same structural influences, for example, lobbying and corruption, are inherent in socio-political systems. These structural impacts will change the environment of the political system itself and affect the information processing and political decision-making processes. Just as narcotic substances can be addictive, "financial injections" within the framework of corruption and lobbying cause similar addiction.

That is why G. Almond's scheme needs a certain revision: firstly, the dual nature of incoming impulses - informational and structural - affects. This implies both the need to isolate the "input" subsystem and the need to separate the subsystems responsible for responding to structural and informational impulses. Secondly, the very implementation of the adopted political decisions also cannot be reduced to a purely informational component, although the political decision itself in one form or another is such. Which leads us to the four-component scheme of the model of the political system (see Fig. 1).

As a result, the structure of the political system will look like this: firstly, it is a subsystem of "entry" - unlike the classical interpretations of Western political scientists, the channels of impulses entering the political system are quite diverse: This is not only a popular expression of will in a conventional and unconventional format, but also a lobbying circuit, feedback from public administration mechanisms, external impulses of international political communication, the situation in the current information field, and even the analytics of trusted think tanks. The complex nature of the "hub" of information channels at the entrance to the political system plus external structural influences, and this is only if we limit ourselves to the "entrance" itself. But the "entry" subsystem also includes the political periphery. Drawing sociobiological analogies, if the political system (first of all, its core of political decision–making) is the "brain" of the "Leviathan", then the broad strata of the population, as a set of individuals with social ties permeating society, act as a kind of "nervous system", where each individual is a "political the receptor." And these "political receptors", united in an extensive network of socio-political relations, are connected to the core of the political system through a relatively small number of "gateways". The structure of these gateways will determine which information flows will form the information environment within the political system within which political decisions will be made.

Secondly, the very "subsystem of process maintenance" proposed by G. Almond, which needs to be filled with a new meaning. In the interpretation of G. Almond, the work of any system must be maintained at the material level. As an analogy, examples can be given: even if we take the work of computer technology or a living brain, in addition to a purely informational function (information processing function), the very work of the material infrastructure, due to which this process takes place, must be ensured. However, the very possibility of ensuring the functioning of the political system opens up the possibility of influencing it. For example, if we are talking about the national government, then it will be in a certain informal dependence on the already local authorities, in the introduction of which the infrastructure of the national authorities is located. The possibility of a banal shutdown of a building in which a problematic authority may be located from the housing and communal services complex will at least create difficulties in its work. Do not forget that political elites usually have the desire and opportunity to provide themselves with comfortable conditions. Providing such conditions, either formally or informally, also turns into a channel of influence on the authorities. Finally, the work of various structures of the controlling type can also be turned into an instrument of influence on the authorities. That is, in addition to the standard, mostly informational "entry" channels, there are also various options for "hardware" interference in the political decision-making process. Moreover, the factor of "hardware interventions" can be interpreted in a fairly wide range, starting with corruption and lobbying and ending with revolutionary processes.

It is important to note that in an expanded interpretation, the function of the "subsystem of maintaining the process" can also include the function of internal structural adaptation necessary to correct the performance of the main function of the political system. Considering the mechanism of realization of this function, we can rely on such principles as "the principle of internal pressure" ^{[18, p. 580]} and "the principle of dynamic contours". The principle of internal pressure implies limited resources in the political system, which leads to increased competition for them. Accordingly, the higher the level in the hierarchy, the more resources are available, but at the same time there is less free space, which leads to stronger and tougher competition, not only at the level itself, but also in the form of pressure from below. It is also worth noting that political support coming from outside and political negativity can serve as a resource for structural transformations within the political system caused by the processes of competition and struggle for internal resources. The principle of dynamic contours is based on synergetics. As the political system itself is a contour of stabilization of social processes, so the "subsystem of maintaining the process" can be considered by us as such a stabilizer already for the political system. Here it is appropriate to talk about the model of a "recursive pyramid" of stabilization contours: there is an external (socio-economic) contour of society. Violations of the external circuit generate political instability, which comes in the form of demands already in the political system along the contour of the interaction of the political system and the internal social environment. Violation of this circuit of interaction between the political system and society activates the circuit of conventional adaptation (for example, within the framework of democratic institutions). If conventional adaptation does not work, then support flows are switched from conventional forces to unconventional ones. And as part of the unconventional adaptation of the political system, in other words, the revolution, these revolutionary forces are trying to transform the political system in order to return it to functionality. But the unconventional revolutionary forces themselves also have mechanisms of internal stabilization. Of course, the number of contours in a recursive pyramid is limited, and ends at the moment when the final contour closes on a specific individual, which usually acts as a political leader. For simplicity, we can reduce the number of adaptation contours within the political system to three: the contour of conventional adaptation, the contour of unconventional adaptation, and the contours of leadership adaptation.

At the same time, it should also be understood that the main task of the "process support subsystem" is actually to ensure the effectiveness of the process of converting demands and support coming into the political system into political decisions, which takes place in the element that we will designate as the "core of political decision-making". That is, the three subsystems identified by G. Almond essentially surround the "core" and provide external conditions for its functioning.

Actually, the very "core of political decision-making", which converts incoming political information directly into political decisions. We will consider in more detail the processes taking place inside the core later, but for now we will designate the "core" as an element of the functional structure of the political system. In principle, if we look at the model of G. Almond's political system, we will see that by identifying three subsystems, he, in fact, removed the "upper layer" surrounding D. Easton's "black box". Or "a black box inside a black box". But at the same time, the core itself did not receive a proper formalized description within the framework of the G. Almond model.

The "output subsystem" is the last subsystem. In the interpretation of G. Almond, formally, it was here that the process of making a political decision took place. However, it is worth noting that the political decision-making process itself is quite complicated, especially if we are talking about modern democratic institutions and the principle of separation of powers, as a result of which a narrow professional specialization has emerged in the political process. It is not enough to make a political decision, it is not enough to show political will, it needs to be transformed into those information formats that are used in the process of public administration. It should be transformed into laws, decrees, strategies, programs, specific projects, and other forms. After that, this impulse of political will, clothed in the appropriate form, must pass down the power hierarchy through various instances to executive structures functioning outside the political system and responsible for the implementation of political decisions made "on the ground". That is, the entire administrative structure involved in the process of wiring and transforming a political decision into an impulse that activates executive mechanisms is the "exit subsystem".

In addition to the functional approach, institutional approaches are also worth noting. We can always build a model of a system of institutions and channels of interaction between them. However, this approach has several disadvantages. Firstly, it is quite labor-intensive, and therefore poorly suited as a flow method. For example, a series of "Policy" projects implemented by INSCR ^[6] has already been mentioned above.

Secondly, at one time sociologist Shtompka noted ^{[3, p. 213]} that, of course, we can build a static institutional model of a dynamic system, but its usefulness (precisely because of the dynamics factor) will be very relative, since it reflects only the formal side of the issue.      In this sense, functionalist approaches have more prospects. The same principle of abstract functionalism of T. Parsons ^{[2, p. 14]} — no matter how institutions and social structures change over time, the basic functions that need to be implemented in society will remain unchanged. This principle will also work in the situation with the analysis of political systems.             Considering the logical basis of the method being developed, it seems promising to use the principle of the determinative chain. If we look at the political system from the point of view of the synergetic paradigm, we have a typical "black box" of D. Easton, which forms state policy in the space of "exit". Which, in fact, is of increased interest to a potential customer. It is at this stage that national and international programs are created, without which the implementation of the most "massive" cases of international cooperation is difficult. And if the technical aspects of international bureaucratic interaction are often studied in sufficient detail, then the issues of internal political conjuncture are lost against this background. But it is on them that the manifestation of political will depends, both in formal and informal aspects. At the same time, macro processes in the political system are certainly important, but tracking them requires a deeper and more comprehensive political expertise than most potential customers can afford. Therefore, the focus of attention should be directed primarily to tracking the state of the "core of political decision–making", and a deeper separate analysis of the remaining components of the political system of the country in question is a deeper detail, the need for which is met by individual studies on a specific country and with a specific goal. That is, if, for example, we are considering review and comparative studies aimed at developing international cooperation, then first of all we will be interested in the question – will it be possible to interest state structures on the other side in the development of international cooperation? And are there prerequisites for making a political decision on this kind of cooperation? And in this case, understanding the principles of the "core" of a particular political system will provide information for making strategic forecasts and choosing a suitable vector of international cooperation. But after the adoption of such a political decision, in order to prevent problems, it is possible to conduct in-depth studies, within which each subsystem will be studied separately. Nevertheless, as we have already written above, the outer layer of the political system (subsystems of entry, exit, and maintenance of the process) form the very conditions within which the "core of political decision-making" functions.

4.2. The issue of regime dynamics and regime transit

As mentioned above, the evolutionism of classical transitology dictates the need for more objective, pragmatic, and universal approaches to the issue of the essence of political regimes and regime transit. It is also worth noting that the models of political decision-making developed by transit scientists during the regime transit itself (for example, in the work of A. Przeworski ^[40]) have a narrow situational character and a limited set of role niches for political actors. For this reason, their use in other conditions with a different actor structure becomes a complex and cumbersome process with unclear prospects for the final result.

Thus, a fairly simple idea is needed, on the basis of which it would be possible to build the logic of a new approach. In this connection, it seems to approach the issue of analyzing political regimes and regime transit, so to speak, "from the end". At the exit of the process of the work of the political system, we get a political decision. If we consider the political system as a mechanism for making political decisions, then this mechanism may have different "modes of operation". These "modes of operation", in turn, will depend on the tasks that society sets for the political system. Or, if we look at the process from the standpoint of the elitist-procedural paradigm, depending on the conditions in which political actors and elites will be forced to act. Thus, external pressure will deform the political system, forcing it to change its mode of operation (the process of "issuing" political decisions). Such a technocratic approach allows us to look at the process of political decision-making from the perspective of the logic of the "triangle of relative optimum". The production of political decisions will also be stuck in the space formed by the criteria of "fast-cheap-high quality".

The "authoritarian pole" will help to reduce the burden on the political system by ignoring political problems or delegating their solutions down the vertical. Saving on tools in the categories of "stick" and "carrot" requires representatives of the political elite to show less organizational efforts and causes fewer conflicts in the system itself in the process of mobilizing efforts, or when carrying out reforms. Thus, the "authoritarian pole" becomes synonymous with "cheap".

"Totalitarian pole" — starting from cases diagnosed as totalitarian, we can state the presence of crisis conditions. That is, limited time and resources, the need to solve issues "here and now", the willingness of the elite to use mobilization tools, regardless of the political consequences, and the willingness to harshly suppress resistance to anti-crisis measures. All this can be characterized by the installation of "fast".

The "democratic pole" is characterized by an attitude towards the smoothness and predictability of the political process. In comparison with the simpler forms characteristic of the authoritarian and totalitarian poles, the architects of democratic regimes seek to build a system of checks and balances. Moreover, the category of "quality" is present rather not in the overall effectiveness of the decision-making process (there may be a delay caused, for example, by a bias in the representation of different political forces in power), but in a compromise and balanced satisfaction of the interests of those groups that finance key political actors. Investors should be confident in the reliability of their investments in politics.

Thus, we can talk not just about linear transits between the poles (this is how the situation looks at the first approximation), but about displacements (deviations) in a certain "transit field" formed by these poles (See Fig. 2).

It should also be noted that transit itself can be described in two categories: direct changes in the mode of functioning in response to an acute challenge (drastic anti-crisis measures, for example, the reaction of the US government to the Great Depression), and structural adaptation, when external influences qualitatively deform the political system, changing the mode of its functioning. Using the concept of a transit field in the triangle of administrative divisions (Authoritarian-Totalitarian-Democratic) allows us to ensure the scalability we have declared. Identifying the general deviation of the political system towards one of the three principles is relatively simple and intuitive for expert evaluation by a specialist working with a large volume of local operational information. If it is necessary to conduct comparative studies, each pole can be detailed through a system of scales and indicators, the volume of which is also scalable.

At the same time, the approach to regimes and regime transit through the "triangle of administrative divisions" avoids the problem of formal approaches (for example, institutional-legal) in identifying hybrid models and non-standard institutional-legal architecture, forcing to identify separate regime archetypes and overcomplicate regime typologies. For example, considering hybrid regimes through the poles of the AD triangle, we still will not be able to identify some unique approach to the problems being solved and the political solutions being formed, which would be an alternative to the poles. We will see a variant of regime borrowing, when the tools and technologies characteristic of another regime are used to a limited extent in the logic of the main mode. For example, the authoritarian-totalitarian regime in Ukraine uses totalitarian mobilization and totalitarian tools "from below" to politically stabilize society, while the Ukrainian political elite demonstrates full compliance with the authoritarian pole. Or the use of totalitarian tools in the United States to overcome the consequences of the Great Depression.

With regard to the combination with other approaches, the allocation of the political regime as a result of the process does not contradict either institutional and legal approaches (institutional and legal transformation is included in the process of structural adaptation, consolidating and stabilizing the change of regime practices in the political system), nor elitist-procedural (since strengthening regime stability will generally meet the interests of the ruling elites).

It is also worth noting that the nature of the political decision-making process determined by the political regime will affect the structure of the political forces operating in the system. To describe this complex phenomenon, we will use the concept of a "political vector". The allocation of this category is necessary to close the weakness of institutional and procedural approaches that focus on formal political institutions. At the same time, the influence of lobbyists, corrupt officials, and the masses as sponsors and activists of political forces is taken into account rather poorly. In turn, the type of political regime (or the predominance of the regime pole) will be inextricably linked with the form of organization of a complex of structures capable of forming and promoting the implementation of the political course. We can present several typical mode-oriented models (see Fig. 3).

In democratic regimes, the most frequent form is the so-called "iron triangles" (lobbying economic interest group, parliamentary representation sponsored by them, and executive power structures interested in the implementation of the political track (due to lobbying or departmental KiPiAi). In totalitarian regimes, a monovector is formed, built on the principle of U-balance (a kind of model based on the principle of "rock-paper-scissors": broad segments of the population-an ideological asset-administrative personnel rallying around totalitarian ideology). In authoritarian regimes, political vectors are formed according to the principle of a "corruption coma" (Owners of resource sources use corrupt methods to crush various sources and instruments of power, and use them to their advantage, forming a political vector). These models of the structure of political vectors most fully meet the regime specifics.

4.3. The UACR method

Returning to the method of the determinative chain and analyzing the work of the "core", we can begin to unwind the process of its functioning from the point of "exit" from the "core" itself. Thus, we have identified the first (from the end) link of the determinative chain present in the political system — namely, the element of the implementation of the adopted political decision through the system of public administration. Accordingly, the process of implementation will be preceded by the process of making a political decision, which, in turn, depends on the balance of forces in the political system, which is formed in the process of political competition and the struggle for power. Thus, the process of the struggle for power determines the balance of power, within which a compromise is formed between the power groups, the result of which is the adoption of a political decision. However, it is also possible that the very process of making such a decision provokes an aggravation of the political struggle, as a result of which the winner pushes a political decision by force. Which raises the question — which political vectors operate within a particular political system, how they are organized, from which actors they are formed. However, the very question of the formation of political vectors directly depends on the conditions prevailing in the political system. The conditions of the environment determine the specifics of the actors present in it and the nature of the political vectors formed from them. In turn, the conditions of the political system are the result of the influence of a whole complex of external factors on the political system.

Thus, we can build the following content model of the "core of political decision-making" (see Fig. 4), as a determinative chain "conditions — actors — competition — implementation" (UACR). Having identified the environmental conditions, we will be able to determine how the actors present in the political system form stable vector structures, and according to what principles the struggle for power levers is conducted between these structures. This allows us to calculate the approximate balance of power and the influence directly resulting from it on the process of making and implementing political decisions. And also to understand what the key vector structures are, who they consist of and what interests they promote.

4.4. The system of indicators according to the UACR method

In order to be able to simulate the reaction of the political system under consideration to a particular stimulus (for example, a proposal to organize international cooperation), we need to have an idea of all four components within the framework of the UACR model, for which, in turn, we need a system of indicators.

At the same time, if we take the most well-known modern complexes of indicators for the analysis of political systems, then we can refer to the developments of K. Bjornskov and M. Rode for example ^{[42, p. 531-551]}. Their set of indicators consists of such elements as: the number of chambers in parliament, the status of a colony, the presence of communism/socialism, the number of coups, membership in the British Commonwealth, the presence of democracy, the facts of postponement of elections, the type of party system (the degree of multiparty competition), the frequency of elections, the stability of the presidency, the presence of a monarchical system, the gender identity of the monarch (in the case of a monarchy), the updatability of the constitution, the presence of a presidential republic, the gender of the president (in the case of a presidential republic), the fact of regime change, the number of successful coups, the fact of full suffrage.

That is, as we can see, the indicators are relatively simple to fill in, but there is no systematic factor within this complex. Conditionally, the indicators are designed to reflect several characteristics: political stability, political competition, gender diversity, and a number of institutional nuances. Such a set of data is rather superficial and difficult to use to assess political processes.

The supplemented and revised subsystems identified by G. Almond, as well as the "core of political decision-making" disclosed within the framework of the UACR determinative chain, provide us with an understanding of the structure of the functional blocks that make up the political system. Accordingly, the indicators should be highlighted in accordance with the blocks. And since our main focus is on the "core", we will try to give the criteria by which each of its blocks can be evaluated.

The factor of conditions determines how and according to what principles the process of making a political decision takes place. We can identify three key characteristics that form the condition factor. This is a characteristic of the political regime that determines the specifics of the process of forming and making political decisions, it is the institutional and procedural structure of the political system (giving an idea of the structure of power niches, the distribution of power resources between them, and the duration of political cycles), as well as the question of the autonomy of the political system.

The institutional and procedural structure includes a set of indicators. Firstly, it is the "depth" of the power vertical at the national and supranational level. For simplicity of measurement, we consider it exclusively in an institutional and legal way. That is, it is a national system of administrative and territorial structure (its levels), and if the country is tightly connected to a sufficiently developed external integration circuit (for example, EU membership), then the power levels are in the integration vertical. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account the level specialization and interests of the holders of power. And the flow of power to the lower level can lead to its "stagnation" due to the lack of competence and interest in solving problems of another level. Secondly, in addition to the power vertical, the "power horizontal" is also of interest, namely the branches of government, and not only in the format of a democratic three-member. In addition to the standard of Western democracy, political systems may have their own specific structures (for example, the clergy and the IRGC in Iran). Thirdly, in addition to formal institutions, we can deal with shadow structures (for example, clan systems in traditional societies). Thus, we can display the very structure within which the distribution of the power resource will take place and the centers of power (and their balance) will be formed. However, as already mentioned at the beginning of the article, the very description of these elements in the framework of country certificates often goes in separate blocks, therefore, for accounting in the UACR chain, it is recommended to follow the principle of functional sufficiency in order to avoid overloading with insignificant details. It is also worth noting that within the framework of this indicator, we are interested not so much in specific centers of power as in the "power ecosystem" itself — the niches in which the power resource condenses. It should be emphasized that in this context we consider exclusively the centers of power within the political system, while outside the political system there may also be their own centers of power, but the influence on the process of adopting political systems from external forces will also have an external character corresponding to it. This methodological subtlety is sometimes ignored by individual researchers ^[43].

In general, the identification of the centers of accumulation of power can be carried out by analyzing the regulatory framework of the political system, in particular, based on the formal separation of power tools fixed in the framework of constitutional law, however, it is worth taking into account the existence of informal administrative tools and not taken into account the possibilities of using official tools, which will be expressed in the withdrawal of part of the real power resource "in shadow."

Apart from the "shadow substrate", in addition to the distribution of power, we can also use institutional and normative analysis to describe the duration of political cycles (a small cycle of political decision-making, an average cycle of political recruiting (electoral cycles), and a large cycle of political macro processes). Small cycles determine the efficiency of making and implementing political decisions. Average cycles are formal electoral cycles in the conditions of democratic institutions, prescribed in the framework of electoral legislation, or much less formalized in non-democratic systems, for example, the change of the absolute monarch. Within the framework of this indicator, the predictability factor is important, so we cannot include revolutionary processes related to a large political cycle here. However, the influence of the stage of the political cycle affects political stability and spills out into an aggravation of political competition during the planned procedure of "shuffling" elites.

Also, in addition to looking from the standpoint of the institutional-procedural paradigm, we can also use the resource-organizational paradigm. For the functioning of a political force, resources are needed, the sources of which can be conditionally divided into three categories: support from below (for example, electoral-oriented parties), support from outside (for example, "machines for elections"), and state support (state structures, administrative clans that exist directly in the system of state financing). The number of available sources of resources will also affect the number of alternative interests.

Another sub-indicator that can be used in a limited way to identify a political regime is the legal basis of the political system. In some cases, they can serve as a regime indicator: for example, the leading role of ideology or religion fixed in the constitution and laws of the country will testify to the legal foundation of totalitarianism, and the electoral "shutdown" of the political participation of the masses and the "freezing" of the mechanisms of turnover of persons in key positions is more characteristic of authoritarianism. It is also quite difficult to talk about a democratic regime in the absence of democratic institutions. However, the indication for these regulatory elements is not absolute, especially in a situation of regime transit. Moreover, these elements can act as an atavism or a decorative element.

Another indicator is the degree of "automation" of political processes. The more complex the system that has to be managed, the worse it tolerates "manual control" of processes and verticalization. In fact, the administrative and bureaucratic apparatus plays the role of a kind of "computing machine" assembled from people. And which must be properly "configured" for the managed system. Thus, gross interference in the operation of a "tuned" mechanism generates significant risks, especially when it comes to managing a fairly complex economic system. In this case, the economic elites, who have a resource of influence on the political system, will try to neutralize such risks through the introduction of an architecture of checks and balances. However, this requires a consensus among the economic elite itself regarding ensuring the stability of public administration processes and "playing by the rules".  At the same time, political monopolization, anti-crisis measures, or the primitiveness of the managed system will reduce the "automation" of political processes and the level of readiness to "play by the rules".

It is worth noting that the willingness to "play by the rules" will be largely influenced by the factor of stability of the political system. If there is discontent in the country, it will contribute to the aggravation of political competition.

Another indicator can be the structure of the power elite: which social groups have a real influence on the political system.

Also of great importance in the context of globalization processes can be the inclusion of a country in external formal or non-formal contours. At the same time, in relation to the UACR method, it is necessary to distinguish between the influence on the political decision-making process itself in the system (which will act as an indicator), and the mechanisms for ensuring this influence.

Summing up, we can identify seven main indicators that allow us to reflect the factor of conditions in the "core of decision-making": the political regime, the level of automation of political processes, the level of political stability, the stage of the political cycle, the "power ecosystem", external influence, and the structure of power elites.

The factor of political actors determines which figures are present on the political board. Based on the analysis of the conditions factor, we can identify specific political forces capable of occupying power niches and participating in the struggle for the seizure, retention, and use of political power. Within the framework of the conditions factor, we have already noted the structure of the sources of resources that actors can rely on. But if at the level of conditions we were interested in the structure of sources from the point of view of the question of their number sufficient to ensure competition between them, then here they act as a resource basis in the process of forming political vectors. We have already written about the political vectors themselves and their typical models in more detail above. The very identification of the political vector and its structure, on the one hand, will greatly simplify the process of analyzing the situation in the political system, on the other hand, it will avoid the idealization of processes, as in A. Przeworski ^[40].

And although political vectors, in fact, are a key indicator for the factor of political actors, but also of interest are such moments as, for example, the type of party system, types of parties, etc. They make it possible to describe individual structural elements of political vectors more effectively.

The factor of political competition. Having identified the key political actors and the political vectors formed by them, our next step is to determine the power balance between them. Unfortunately, it is quite difficult to formalize the procedure for its indication. For example, the distribution of seats in parliament can be used for this, but this is only one of the indicators that can be relatively easily identified. But, say, at the level of the executive branch, this kind of information will be quite relative. It should also be noted that, for example, the lobbying factor is studied differently in different countries and regions, and the approaches of European researchers are radically different from those of American ones.

The factor of implementation of political decisions. After a political decision has been made, whether by an overbearing advantage, an overbearing compromise, or even the suppression of political opponents, the task of its implementation arises. Conditionally, this process can be divided into three stages – the design of a political decision, its "wiring" through the management system, and its implementation by executive structures. At the same time, only the first stage refers directly to the "core", the second stage refers to the "output" subsystem, and the third stage refers directly to the executing structures. By itself, this process is quite complicated, it can have a difficult logistics of a power impulse. However, within the framework of the UACR method, only the first stage is of interest to us. It is not enough to achieve a political decision, this decision can be distorted by those political structures that configure the political impulse. If we are talking about the legislative process, then this may result in the adoption of amendments that will reduce the effectiveness of the decision due to "pitfalls". If we are talking about executive power structures, then they may turn out to be quite autonomous on the one hand, and on the other – not interested in the effective implementation of a political decision. Or even be insufficiently competent for this.

Also, "technical" aspects will play an important role at the implementation stage. For example, in addition to political decision-making cycles, the implementation process also has its own duration. And if the implementation process involves budget financing (and not from reserve funds), then this means inclusion in the budget cycle. Similar problems will arise in a situation where a political solution involves the formation of special institutions within the political system, which will require time for institutional construction (we do not consider institutional construction directly in executive structures, speaking about the political system). It is worth noting that the formats of power impulses themselves, into which decisions are transformed (the formation of regulatory norms, the management of resources, institutional construction, program and project implementation) form a huge number of nuances. However, taking into account the goals set in the framework of the study, these aspects will be of interest in the case of scaling the UACR method, by default, the main task is to analyze the conditions for direct decision-making by establishing the general logic of the process, and identifying within this logic as potentially interested/not interested forces and establishing the distribution of power resources between them, as well as diagnosis of possible technical problems on the part of the opponents of the solution at the phase of the final formulation of power impulses.

5. Application of the UACR method

            As an illustration of the application of the UACR method in practice, we chose Japan as an example in the period from 2000 to 2015 ^[44],[45]. It is also worth noting that there are a number of fundamental differences in goal-setting between the developments of theoretical researchers and practical researchers, and if the practitioner often does not have "freedom of hands" and the fullness of information (due to its limited availability or lack of research resources), and therefore has to take certain risks, then the theorist has the opportunity to choose already completed cases with high illustrative potential. And in this case, we act precisely from the position of theoretical researchers, choosing more "visual" material than the political systems of conditional Gabon or Madagascar (countries no less interesting from a scientific point of view, but much more complex and time-consuming in terms of obtaining information).

            The condition factor. As applied to Japan, we can note a number of features. Firstly, according to the indicator of external dependence, Japan can be classified as a vassal of the first level in the system of American cooperative hegemony (strategic position in the region, difficulties in relations with neighbors, and counting on Japan's active interest in joint projects). It is worth noting that for this reason, in strategic matters, Japan as a whole tries to follow in the wake of American policy, but in the foreign economic aspect it is quite independent. Secondly, Japan's political regime can be classified as democratic (the Japanese economy, due to its level of development, forms several large interest groups, which creates prerequisites for the formation of a system of checks and balances, as well as an interest in the stability and conventionality of the political process; American external influence also contributed to the process of adopting democratic practices, there is also a system democratic institutions). Thirdly, the complex structure of Japanese society and the Japanese economy dictates a higher level of managerial "automation", which makes it possible to classify Japan as a group of countries existing "in a rules-based space". Fourth, from the point of view of average (electoral) cycles, the Japanese system is quite complex - four–year cycles for the House of Representatives, and three–year cycles for half of the House of Councillors. Thus, elections are held with a fairly high frequency, and one or another part of the Japanese parliament is in pre-election tension almost every year. Fifth, the level of political stability can be assessed as quite high (Japan has its own set of socio-economic problems, but its influence is not enough to activate revolutionary processes). Sixth, if we talk about the elites of Japan, we should note the traditionally strong corporate elites (which synergizes well with the democratic regime). It is also worth noting the factor of professional dynasties and the high level of organizational culture of civil servants. Seventh, speaking about the power ecosystem of Japan, it should be noted such nuances as the relative weakness of the parliament (emphasis on clientelism, characteristic of Westernized political models of Asia, weak inter-party ideological competition, the stretching of pre-election tension) with sufficiently strong and autonomous ministerial structures (dynasties, family ties, organizational culture). It should also be noted the traditions of the state's work with aggregators of the interests of big business.

The factor of actors. Having considered the power ecosystem of Japan, we can conclude that it contributes to the formation of non-standard variants of political vectors according to the "iron triangle" model - in the Japanese version, the political weight will be concentrated on large aggregators of business interests (due to their sponsorship and lobbying potential), as well as on ministerial structures (due to the cohesion of the personnel and enough close ties with aggregators of business interests). Thus, the parliament turns out to be a "weak link" in the "iron triangles", which turns it into the most promising "arena" for competition between political vectors. Typical examples of such aggregators are JA Zenchu (Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives) and Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations). Accordingly, the "agrarian triangle" included JA Zenchu and, from the "ministerial angle", it was represented by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. Parliamentary representation was carried out by the agrarian clans of the LDP. The "industrial triangle" was formed by Keidanren, the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Trade, as well as industrial clans of the same LDP. Thus, there are two powerful vector structures in Japanese politics that actively compete with each other on a number of issues based on economic interests.

The competition factor. Since the Asian financial crisis, there has been a track to change Japan's foreign economic policy, which was previously characterized by a fairly high level of closeness from the processes of globalization and regional integration, which led to a clash of interests between the industrial and agricultural vectors. Agriculture in Japan has insufficient profitability, and therefore urgently needs such tools as protective duties and subsidies, and, as a result, a higher level of integration into the global economy becomes a threat to the industry. At the same time, the integration track would provide easier access for Japanese industrial goods to foreign markets. In general, the industrial bloc had a large resource potential, convertible into political influence, which allowed it to provide a preponderance by the beginning of the implementation of "abenomics", and, ultimately, led to a structural change in 2015, when the processes of competition went beyond the usual framework, and the Abe cabinet managed to significantly weaken the lobbying capabilities of the agrarian triangle, limiting JA Zenchu in the possibilities of obtaining financial resources. Thus, the result of the confrontation was, albeit not absolute, but a significant preponderance of the "industrial triangle" over the "agrarian" one.

The implementation factor. On the one hand, the isolation of the ministerial structures in Japan is usually more characteristic of authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, the ministerial structures themselves are very active participants in the Japanese political process. Therefore, if the formed political course meets departmental goals and interests, then there will be no artificial problems with initiating the implementation of the course. There will also be no significant gap between direct decision-making and its implementation through an interested structure, which is quite often observed in the conditions of "departmental feudalism" of authoritarian regimes. At the same time, due to the same factor of departmental closeness, carrying out the formalization process through hostile ministries and departments will face serious difficulties.

6. Conclusion

Thus, we have solved the goal: to develop a method for analyzing the decision-making process within the political system (the UACR method) and formulate a system of indicators to assess the "core of political decision-making". It is worth noting that due to the stated conditions, the main emphasis was placed on the aspect of political decision-making within the framework of small political cycles, and the processes of structural dynamics in the political system were considered as a background factor (as underlying subsystems of process maintenance). Thus, the medium (electoral) and large (regime-transit) political cycles are presented in the framework of the UACR method only as external processes affecting the factor of conditions. Nevertheless, when scaling up the research and connecting additional methodological tools (for example, external determination chains that include the political system, as well as tools for analyzing the other three subsystems of the political system), it becomes possible to build more complex and detailed models of the political system. That is, the UACR method should be considered in the format of two roles – as a separate practical tool for obtaining well-defined, but rather limited results, and as an instrumental module within the framework of a comprehensive study of the political system.