Domestic policy of Michael IV Paphlagonian (1034 – 1041) in the context of internal political struggle in Byzantium

Sukhodolskiy Dmitriy Nikolaevich Postgraduate, Department of Ancient and Medieval History named after Professor V. F. Semyonov, Moscow State Pedagogical University 119991, Russia, Moscow, Malaya Pirogovskaya str., 1 building 1 dsukhodolsky@gmail.com Other publications by this author

An important place in historical science has always been occupied by issues related to the political development of states, as well as their internal evolution and transformation in various crisis periods of history. The internal political development of states during periods of change and crisis not only exacerbates the contradictions between various political forces claiming power, but also exposes various political, social, religious and other features of a particular state in the period under review.

Of great interest within the framework of this topic is the study of the history of the Byzantine Empire – a state that existed for almost a thousand years and probably experienced the greatest number of internal political troubles in its history, which, on the one hand, led to the weakening of the state, and on the other – led to a change in the management system, its adaptation to new difficult realities, which and allowed the empire to exist for such a long time. The most difficult period of internal troubles and the subsequent military defeat of the empire falls on the XI century and is inextricably linked with the decline and suppression of the powerful Macedonian dynasty, which ruled the empire since the second half of the IX century. Against the background of the extinction of the Macedonian dynasty, an internal political struggle broke out within the empire between various forces, which are traditionally reduced to two groups – the metropolitan civil bureaucracy and the landed aristocracy.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the internal politics of Michael IV Paphlagon (1034-1041) and his family in the context of the internal political struggle in Byzantium

The subject of the article is the internal policy of the Paphlagonian dynasty in the context of internal political struggle against the background of the extinction of the Macedonian dynasty.

The object of the study is the specific activities of Michael IV Paphlagon (1034-1041) and his family members aimed at preserving power.

In modern Russian historiography, there are not so many studies devoted to the internal policy of Mikhail IV Paphlagon. First, it is important to mention the article by G.G. Litavrin "The Uprising in Constantinople in April 1042" ^[1], written in 1973. In addition to a detailed analysis of the reasons for the fall of the Paphlagonian dynasty, the author pays special attention to its social origin and relationship with various political forces: the metropolitan civil nobility, the provincial military aristocracy and the church. Secondly, the study of the internal policy of the Paphlagonian dynasty is impossible without understanding such an important component of it as military policy, which is the subject of the article by the modern Byzantinist A.S. Mokhov "Military policy of the Paphlagonian Emperors (1034 - 1042) ^[2]. In the article, the author analyzes a number of activities of the Paphlagonians aimed at exercising control over the army, and also touches on the origin of the dynasty and its role in the foreign policy events of the 1030s.

The source base of the research is primarily made up of Byzantine sources of the second half of the XI – first half of the XII centuries, among which the following should be distinguished: "Chronography" by Mikhail Psellus ^[3], "Review of History" by John Skilica ^[4], "History" by Mikhail Attaliat ^[5] and "Advice and stories of the Byzantine commander" Katakalon Kekavmen ^[6]. Among the sources presented, the most important is the "Chronography" of Mikhail Psellus, a direct witness and participant in the events of the Paphlagonian dynasty. Additional information about the internal political development of the Byzantine Empire in the X – XI centuries is provided by sources of earlier origin – the "History" ^[7] of Leo the Deacon and the treatise "On Ceremonies" ^[8] of Emperor Constantine the Crimson (945-959).  It is important to mention foreign sources, primarily of Scandinavian origin. Among them are collections of royal sagas "Rotten Skin" ^[9], "Beautiful Skin" ^[10] and "Circle of the Earth" by Snorri Sturluson ^[11]. In addition, a number of important information about the Paphlagonians is contained in the "Chronicle" ^[12] of the Antioch chronicler Yahya of Antioch

The novelty of the research lies both in the comprehensive analysis of Byzantine and Scandinavian sources about the activities of the Varangian Guard in 1034-1042, and in the consideration of the Varangian Guard as an instrument of retaining power by the Paphlagonian dynasty.

The methodological basis of the study is a comparative analysis of Scandinavian and Byzantine sources, which allowed us to draw the most complete conclusions about the role of the Varangian Guard in the internal political struggle in Byzantium in 1034-1042.

The geographical scope of the study covers the territory of the Byzantine Empire in 1034-1041, as well as those territories where the Byzantines conducted military campaigns during the period under review.

The lower chronological limit of the study is 1034. This border is due to the coming to power of the Paphlagon dynasty in the person of Michael IV Paphlagon and his relatives.

The upper chronological limit of the study is the end of 1041. At this time, the death of Michael IV Paphlagon and the coming to power of his nephew Michael V Kalafat, whose policy eventually led to the fall of the dynasty, occurred.

In 1034, as a result of a conspiracy organized by the parakimomen John Orphanatrof, representatives of the Paphlagonian dynasty came to power, whose rule lasted from 1034 to 1042. At first glance, the representatives of the new dynasty did not have a high chance of gaining a foothold in power for a long time: they had neither a solid foothold at court, nor family ties with representatives of the civil or military elite, nor a loyal army. However, despite this, the Paphlagonians managed to create a solid system that existed throughout the reign of Michael IV Paphlagon (1034 – 1041). To understand how such a situation became possible, we need to consider a number of key features and activities of the Paphlagon dynasty.

 The new dynasty had its origin in the region in the north-west of Asia Minor called Paphlagonia, and by the early 30s, most of its representatives had moved to Constantinople, where they were engaged in usury. It is known that until 1034, the brothers of John Orphanotrophus, Konstantin and George, were engaged in usury ^[13] and were part of the top of the rich trade and craft corporation of Trapezites.^[1] The trade and craft circles, despite their wealth, were not among the elite of the Byzantine Empire, were removed from the administration of the empire and could not influence the policy pursued by it in their own interests. The coming to power of immigrants from this environment for the traditional elites of the empire was largely a shock and served as a reason for criticism and ridicule. For example, the patrician Konstantin Dalassin expressed open dissatisfaction with the Paphlagonians coming to power and openly called for the overthrow of Emperor Michael IV Paphlagon: "Only the patrician Konstantin Dalassin, who lived in his estate, did not take this news kindly. He could hardly bear what they were saying and wondered aloud why, when there are so many excellent people from noble families and noble origins around, a three-penny merchant gets preference over everyone else and becomes an emperor."^[4] Psellus also wrote about the low origin of the Paphlagonians, but without serious criticism, in Chronography, noting that the eunuch John Orphanatrof was "of simple and low origin, but of a very active character" ^[3].

However, despite their humble origins, representatives of the Paphlagonian dynasty were able to get into the highest echelons of power already during the reign of Emperor Roman III Argyrus (1028-1034). Byzantine chroniclers associate this rise with the name of John Orphanatrof. John made a career during the reign of Emperor Basil II (976 – 1025), who brought him closer to himself and trusted him in many ways. At that time, he held the position of protonotary – the second person after the patriarch in the Byzantine Church ^[3]. During the reign of Emperor Roman III Argyrus (1028 – 1034), John's career took off. He successively holds the positions of preposite, parakimomen and orphanatrophe. The first two of them give John a real influence on the emperor and the opportunity to directly participate in the management of the empire. Thus, the position of the preposit – the manager of the royal chambers – despite its low status, allowed John to control the entire inner life in the palace. The duties of the preposit included the announcement of imperial orders and ensuring the security of the palace ^[8]. The office of parakimomen was the highest position in the empire that could be held by eunuchs in the Byzantine Empire. By the XI century, the positions of the preposit and the parakimomen had similar functionality in many ways, but the rights of the parakimomen were broader: he had to ensure the emperor's rest at night, had the right to carry weapons in the palace and was actually a person holding all the threads of the empire in his hands. Thus, a similar position in the reign of Emperor Roman II and at the beginning of the reign of Vasily II was occupied by the parakimomen Vasily, an all–powerful temporary worker who concentrated all power in the empire in his hands ^[7].  The third position – the position of Orphanatrof, that is, the caretaker of orphans – was rather nominal than providing any real levers of influence on affairs in the empire. Thus, the positions held by John Orphanatrof gave him a real opportunity to influence the internal political situation in the empire during the reign of Roman III Argyrus, and the fact that it was during his reign that John occupied these positions speaks in favor of the fact that the emperor fully trusted the eunuch.

John Orphanatrof took full advantage of the opportunities presented to him and not only stood at the head of the civil administration, but also brought his own relatives closer to power. So in the early 30s of the XI century, he introduced his younger brother, Mikhail Paphlagon, to the palace, whom he introduced to the emperor and Empress Zoya. Soon Mikhail became the lover of Empress Zoya, and Roman III Argir (1028 – 1034), either did not know about this connection, or deliberately pretended not to know about it ^[3]. In the end, the political ambitions of John Orphanatrophe and his brother Michael, the love for the latter on the part of Empress Zoya, and the indifference of Emperor Roman III Argyrus to this led to the overthrow of the latter. John Skilica in the "History" suggested that during the conspiracy drawn up against Roman Argyrus (1028-1034), it was decided to poison him. He directly notes that John Orphanatrophe, Empress Zoya and Mikhail poured poison into the food and drinks of Roman III Argyrus (1028-1034), which, however, acted too slowly ^[4]. Then it was decided to move on to more drastic measures: Roman Argir (1028-1034) was drowned while taking baths in his own palace, and the next morning Mikhail Paphlagon was proclaimed emperor and became the second husband of Empress Zoya ^[3].

The rapid rise to power of the Paphlagonians did not allow potential opponents to react to the threat and somehow prevent the coronation of the new emperor, but this did not mean that all representatives of the elite calmly and meekly accepted the emergence of a new force in the political field of the empire. To neutralize the opposition, the Paphlagonians took a number of important steps. First of all, it was necessary to ensure the loyalty of the highest officials of the capital, who were at the court. According to Mikhail Psellus, when Mikhail IV Paphlagon came to power, "... he did not introduce any innovations, did not abolish the old law and did not introduce a new one that contradicted him, and did not replace anyone in the supreme council, as other kings like to do when they ascend the throne. Having gained power, he did not deceive the hopes of any of those with whom he was close or to whom he promised favors before becoming king; however, he did not immediately give them higher positions, but first trained them in more modest and lower ones, and then elevated them to those that are higher" ^[3]. This is also confirmed by John Skilica, noting that "all the others willingly accepted it [the death of Roman Argyrus and the accession of Michael IV Paphlagonets] and greeted the new emperor with words of gratitude" ^[4]. Thus, nothing changed for the vast majority of the civil nobility. Its representatives remained in their places and received traditional awards upon the accession of the new emperor to the throne, and John Orphanatrof remained at the head of the civil administration of the empire, just as under Roman III Argyrus (1028-1034).

However, despite this, part of the capital's bureaucracy was dissatisfied with the Paphlagonians coming to power and tried to resist it. Oppositional synclitics grouped around Empress Zoya. Let us turn again to Mikhail Psellu: "Those who held court positions (most of them were her father's servants, as well as people close to her husband and connected with this family even during his father's time), kept her [Empress Zoya] from hasty decisions in such important things, advised her to reflect as best as possible, to think over her position and place on the royal throne the most worthy of all, ready to serve her not as a spouse, but as a mistress" ^[3].  It is not entirely clear which "most worthy of all" representatives of the elite are talking about, but it clearly did not mean Mikhail Paphlagon. One way or another, but John Orphanatrof managed to outplay his opponents. Already on the morning after the death of Roman III Argyrus (1028-1034), the members of the synclite individually swore allegiance to the new emperor. The Empress herself, after taking the oath to Michael IV, found herself under house arrest in the palace: "He [John Orphanatrof] expelled the empress's eunuchs from the palace and escorted her most loyal servants, appointing women who were devoted to him to be her overseers and guardians. There was nothing she could do, big or small, without his permission."^[4]

From a formal and legal point of view, Empress Zoya remained the ruler of the empire, but in fact power was concentrated in the hands of John Orphanatrophe and Michael IV Paphlagon. Thus, having eliminated the threat from the capital's civil bureaucracy and having got the supreme power into their own hands, the Paphlagonians had to resolve the issue with the opposition in the person of the provincial aristocracy.  The representative of the views of the provincial aristocracy on the accession of a new dynasty was the patrician Konstantin Dalassin, who openly expressed his views on the changes that had taken place in the empire. In order to neutralize the disloyal patrician, the Paphlagonians summoned him to Constantinople, having previously sworn that no harm would be done to Dalassin. Immediately after arriving in Constantinople, the patrician was arrested and exiled to the island of Plataea. Immediately after his arrest, his supporters from Asia Minor also fell into disgrace, the most prominent of whom was Konstantin Duka. The property of Konstantin Dalassin and his supporters was confiscated and handed over to the Paphlagonians ^[4].

Having neutralized the threat from both the metropolitan nobility and the provincial aristocracy of Asia Minor at the initial stage of government, the Paphlagonians had to move on to consolidating their position and developing mechanisms for retaining and transferring power. The basis of the Paphlagonians' management system was based on extensive family and professional ties ^{[4, 14]}. The Paphlagonians, who actually usurped power in the country, could not rely on the loyalty of the representatives of the Byzantine elite brought to submission, and therefore such support became the only way out for them. Starting from 1034 – the moment of the accession of Michael IV Paphlagon – for the relatives of the new emperor and the parakimomen John Orphanatrof, wide opportunities for holding positions in public administration are opening up ^[14].  So John Ofanatrof concentrated the supreme civil and military administration in his hands, while his numerous relatives and supporters began to occupy other key positions [Appendix 1]: the brother of John and Michael IV, Nikita, became the duke of Antioch ^[4], and after his death their other brother, Constantine, took the position ^[5]. While the remaining brother named George took the position of protovestiary ^[5], which allowed him not only to manage the imperial finances, but also gave him the opportunity to be present in military campaigns and command the army ^[16]. In addition, the son of the sister of John Ofanatrof and Michael IV Maria named Michael was elevated to the rank of Caesar ^[3,4], which made him heir to the throne in the event of the death of the emperor.

In addition to the spheres of civil and military administration, the Paphlagonians tried to put the church under their own control, elevating their supporters to key episcopal chairs and elevating them in every possible way. So John Skilitsa cites the following fact: "Since Archbishop John of Bulgaria died, the emperor appointed another. He was a Paphlagonian by origin, who had previously distinguished himself in the service of the Great Church, having served there for many years as a hartophylax" ^[4]. In addition, John Orphanatrof, enlisting the support of Metropolitans Demetrius of Cyzicus and Anatoly of Nicomedia, as well as a number of other bishops, attempted to occupy the patriarchal throne, removing from there the patriarch of the disloyal Patriarch Alexei Studit. However, this attempt was defeated, and the patriarch retained his throne.

 According to G.G. Litavrin, "Penetration into the environment of the capital's official nobility still seemed to be the limit of life success for people from any other social stratum during this period" ^[1]. Paphlagonians, having occupied key positions in civil administration, thus gained access to the state treasury, becoming the richest people of the empire ^{[4, 5]}, which caused great discontent among both the common people and representatives of the elite.  However, this wealth in itself did not make sense for the reason that in the Byzantine Empire, power provided wealth, and not vice versa ^[15], and the loss of power automatically meant the loss of wealth. In this regard, the Paphlagonians faced the task not so much of defeating the oppositional elites, as the task of integrating into its composition. Indirectly, this idea is confirmed by the fact that during the reign of Michael IV Paphlagon (1034-1041), the discontented were exiled, deprived of property and positions, in rare cases thrown into prison, but not executed ^{[3, 4]}.

However, neither the capital's bureaucracy nor the military aristocracy sought to create strong ties with the Paphlagonians – in 1034-1041 the representatives of the dynasty failed to become related to any noble family in the empire. Representatives of the Paphlagon House, even after seizing power, remained part of the trade and craft circles. They also drew support from them. So the sister of the Paphlagon brothers named Maria was married to Stefan Kalafat, who was engaged in the preparation and launching of ships. Despite his humble origin, Kalafat had influence and wealth, which was later used in the internal politics of the Paphlagonian dynasty.

An important, but not obvious factor in the stability of the Paphlagonian dynasty should be considered the fact that from a physiological point of view, the time allotted to the Paphlagonian dynasty was limited to one generation, which, of course, representatives of the Byzantine elite had to understand. Thus, of the five Paphlagon brothers, three were eunuchs [Appendix 1], and the young Michael IV Paphlagon was seriously ill ^{[3, 4]}. In addition, it is important to take into account the fact that Empress Zoya had already passed out of childbearing age by the time of the accession of Michael IV. Proceeding from this, the Byzantine elites should have considered the power of the Paphlagonian dynasty as situational and temporary, and then any active contacts with this power were not needed. The death of Empress Zoya, John Orphanatrophe or the emperor would have led to the end of the dynasty's reign, since with the death of any of them, the whole system would have collapsed.

However, despite this, the Paphlagonians planned to transfer power to his nephew, Mikhail Kalafat, in the event of Michael's death, who for this purpose was elevated to the rank of Caesar ^{[3, 4]}, and therefore it was necessary to strengthen power not only over the generally submissive metropolitan bureaucracy, but also over the provincial aristocracy that formed the backbone of the army. During the reign of Emperor Michael IV, the Byzantine Empire, after a relative lull under the Emperors Constantine VII (1025-1028) and Roman III Argyre (1028-1034), again switched to an active foreign policy in several directions at once. So in 1038, a large-scale expedition to Sicily was organized, during which most of the island was conquered from the Arabs by Byzantine troops. At the same time, Byzantine troops operated on the Balkan Peninsula, suppressing the Bulgarian uprising, as well as in Transcaucasia and the Middle East, where they not only ensured border security, but also conquered new territories ^{[3, 4, 5]}.

The active foreign policy of the Paphlagonian dynasty solved a number of domestic political problems. Firstly, successful conquests ensured the receipt of new revenues into the treasury of the empire, which were distributed between the emperor, a representative of the civil nobility and the military aristocracy. Thus, successes in foreign policy served as a stabilizing factor for the internal affairs of the empire and reduced the likelihood of an uprising or conspiracy against the current government. On the other hand, the difficulties of military campaigns, on the contrary, could lead to discontent among the military aristocracy and the army, which could aggravate the situation of the ruling emperor and lead to an armed uprising and his overthrow. With regard to the Paphlagonian dynasty, the situation was further aggravated by the fact that there were no military leaders among its representatives – the Paphlagonians came from trade and craft circles and built a career in the civil service in Constantinople.

Based on this, each military campaign for the Paphlagonians contained a significant threat of rebellion, which had to be taken into account when planning it. In order to prevent such a danger, the Paphlagonians sought to control every step of the strategos, the commander of the army, which sometimes negatively affected the success of the campaign.  For example, let's turn to the "History" of John Skilica. Thus, the author, describing the Byzantine campaign in Sicily in 1038 – 1040, reports on the conflict that arose between the strategos George Maniac and the representative of the Paphlagonian clan Stefan Calafat, who was at the head of the naval forces in Sicily and was subordinate to Maniac. Due to Calafat's inattention, the Arabs received reinforcements from Africa in Sicily, which caused the anger of Maniac. The dispute was resolved quickly: "When Stefan [Kalafat] came to him [George Maniac], he attacked him with excessive abuse and, raising the whip, hit him several times on the head. He called him a lazy and coward who betrayed the interests of the emperor. Stefan did not take lightly the fact that he was trampled into the mud and insulted; without delay, he sent a letter to Orphanatrof, in which he informed him that Maniac was plotting an uprising against the emperor. Maniac was immediately taken to the capital under arrest and imprisoned together with the patrician Vasily Theodorokan. The entire command was transferred to Stefan, to whom a certain eunuch was sent, preposit Vasily Pedidat. Soon these two spoiled the whole situation and lost Sicily because of their own greed, cowardice and carelessness."^[4] As a result, by the end of the reign of Michael IV Paphlagon (1034-1041), all of Sicily except Syracuse was lost, and all the conquests of the Byzantine army led by Maniac were nullified.

Similar situations were not uncommon for Paphlagonians. The fear of strengthening the military aristocracy and open military rebellions forced them to make decisions that strengthened their own power, not the security of the empire. Thus, at the beginning of the reign of Michael IV Paphlagon, John Orphanatrof appointed one of his brothers named Nikita as the duke of Antioch. According to the Attalate, upon entering the city, Nikita staged mass executions and arrests in Antioch: "As soon as he took possession of the city and began to manage its affairs, he almost did not pay attention to his oaths [which he had given earlier, promising not to execute anyone and not to disgrace]. He executed a hundred people by beheading them or impaling them; he arrested eleven prominent and extremely wealthy people of noble origin and sent them in chains to Byzantium. He wrote in a letter to his brother John [Ofanatrof] ... that this city was favorable to [Constantine] Dalassen"^[14]. Konstantin Dalassin, who was the duke of Antioch before the Paphlagonians came to power, continued to enjoy great popularity in the city and had many supporters in it.^[12]  Thus, by sending first John's brother Nikita to Antioch, and after his death another brother named Constantine, the Paphlagonians sought to provide direct control over a potentially dangerous region and minimize the risks of an uprising in favor of Constantine Dalassin there. This was all the more important because Antioch was the largest and richest Byzantine city in the east, which was also under constant military threat from the Arabs.

Using the example of the Sicilian campaign and the activities of the Paphlagonians in border Antioch, it can be concluded that they primarily sought to prevent a potentially dangerous situation on the borders of the empire, where a large number of troops were concentrated and the likelihood of an uprising was very high. The main tool for preventing this goal was the appointment of relatives and relatives and people as loyal to the Paphlagonians as possible to responsible positions. Sometimes this bet turned out to be very justified. So in the case of Antioch, the appointment of relatives to the post of dukes of the city stabilized the situation in the eastern part of the empire and allowed to avoid rebellions. Thus, several attempts to organize military rebellions in Asia Minor were discovered in time, and the perpetrators were punished ^[4].  These examples show that the management mechanisms created by the Paphlagonians proved to be effective in terms of retaining power.

However, it seems to us that in many respects the nominal control of the army by the Palthagonians was not enough. In addition, the constant arrests and confiscation of property, coupled with forced monastic tonsure and the deprivation of sight in all those who were suspected of loyalty to competitors of the Paphlagonians in the struggle for power, together with the failure of the campaign in Sicily, hardly contributed to the growth of the authority of representatives of this dynasty within the empire. The response to these concerns on the part of John Orphanatrophe and Michael IV was the increase in the number of mercenaries in the imperial service in 1034-1042 . During the eight years of Paphlagonite rule, mercenaries in the empire began to play a significant role in ensuring internal stability in the empire. The most professional and numerous association of mercenaries since the reign of Emperor Basil II was the Varangian Guard. Both under Emperor Vasily II and under the Paphlagonians, representatives of the Varangian Guard primarily dealt with the emperor's security issues and formed part of his personal guard – the etheria. The guards were engaged in the protection of the imperial palace and the emperor during his campaigns. Another part of the mercenaries took part in military campaigns, assisting the troops.

During the reign of Michael IV (1034-1041), the Varangian Guard was significantly replenished by immigrants from the north – Varangians and Rus. So it is reported by a number of Scandinavian sources, such as the collections of sagas "Rotten Skin" ^[9] and "Beautiful Skin" ^[10], as well as the saga of Harald the Harsh, which is part of the collection of sagas "The Circle of the Earth"^[11] Snorri Sturlusson. The "Rotten Skin" reports the following: "It says here that he [the future Norwegian king Harald the Harsh] brought warships with a large number of people to the king of Miklgard, who was called Mikael Catalakt" ^[9]. Upon Harald's arrival in Constantinople, he meets a lot of Varangians, i.e. Scandinavian mercenaries, who by that time had already served in the Varangian Guard, and joins their ranks ^[10]. The significance of Harald's arrival in Constantinople is added by the fact that he did not arrive alone, but as part of an entire detachment that entered the imperial service. The same thing happens during the short reign of the second native of the Paphlagonian dynasty – Michael V Kalafat (1041 – 1042), as reported by Michael Psellus: "He handed over the protection of his person to the Scythian youths he had bought earlier – all these were eunuchs who knew what he needed from them, and fit for service, which he demanded of them; he could safely rely on their loyalty, especially after he had honored them with high titles. Some of them guarded him, others carried out other orders" ^[3].

These examples show that in matters of their own security, the Paphlagonians did not trust the Byzantines and relied primarily on mercenaries who served in the Varangian Guard. However, representatives of the Varangian Guard were engaged not only in the protection of the emperors, but also participated in the military campaigns of the Byzantine army. So the sagas report that Harald the Harsh as part of the army of George Maniac participated in the campaign in Sicily (1038 – 1040) and in the suppression of the uprising of Peter Delyan in Bulgaria (1040 – 1041). Moreover, it is noteworthy that the sagas report that the relationship between Harald and George Maniac was tense character and more than once led to contradictions. The sagas explain these contradictions by the fact that Harald was a head taller and more successful than George Maniac during the war, however, it is hardly possible to take this assumption on faith. Under the command of George Maniac, there were about thirty thousand people in Sicily ^{[4, 5]}, while Harald's detachment hardly reached several hundred people ^[6].  Most likely, in addition to purely military tasks, Harald was sent to Sicily in order to deprive George Maniac of the opportunity to raise an uprising. This could explain the fact that Harald, according to the sagas, refused to obey George Maniac ^{[9, 10, 11]} and entered into constant conflicts with the commander, while avoiding participation in the battles where the strategos commanded.

Using the examples discussed above, it can be seen that during the reign of Emperor Michael IV (1034-1041), the Paphlagonians pursued a multi–vector internal policy, which was aimed at strengthening their own power and neutralizing the opposition from both the metropolitan bureaucracy and the provincial aristocracy. The Paphlagonians used various tools to strengthen their power: military, economic, and political. Some of them can be considered quite successful. So in 1034, John Orphanatrof managed to avoid the threat of an uprising from Constantine Dalassin, exposing him and his supporters to disgrace and depriving them of their property. At the same time, having refused mass executions, the Paphlagonians had to attract a part of the Byzantine elite to their side. By placing Empress Zoya under house arrest and removing her supporters from power, the Paphlagonians concentrated civil administration in their hands, while the military command partially remained outside their control.

The impossibility of full control over the army led to a number of ambiguous decisions of the Paphlagonians. First of all, the army was filled with mercenaries – Russians and Scandinavians who joined the Varangian Guard. This step not only and not so much strengthened the army, but provided internal security to the Paphlagonians and reduced the risks of conspiracies and rebellions to a minimum. This was necessary due to the fact that the Paphlagonians, having neither military experience nor military talents, were forced to nominate people from the Asia Minor aristocracy to the main positions in the army, the main one of whom during the reign of Michael IV (1034-1041) was the commander Georgy Maniak. Fearing the rebellion of a talented and influential commander, the Paphlagonians, in our opinion, assigned to him a detachment of Harald the Harsh and other Varangians, who did not directly obey the strategos-avtokrator during the campaign in Sicily. Considering that Maniac commanded all the forces in Sicily, the assumption that the Varangian detachments were not so much fighting the Arabs as trying to prevent Maniac's rebellion looks convincing. Another measure of the army's control was the appointment of people close to the Paphlagonians to key positions in the army. The most striking example is the appointment of Stefan Calafat, who had neither military command experience nor fleet management experience, as commander of the Byzantine fleet in Sicily. Such a policy, aimed primarily at maintaining control over the army and preventing rebellions, could not be successful, as evidenced by the failure of the Byzantine expedition to Sicily.

On the other hand, not all the internal political activities of the Paphlagonians were successful – the opposition to the dynasty persisted throughout the reign of Michael IV (1034-1041). So, contrary to the desire of John Orphanatrof, he failed to deprive the oppositional Patriarch Alexei Studit of the throne. The very attempt to remove the highest church hierarch from power inevitably had to complicate relations between the dynasty and the church. In addition, the Paphlagonians have not managed to establish strong ties within the elite.  Representatives of the capital's bureaucracy and provincial nobility apparently took a detached and wait-and-see attitude, hoping for a case that would allow the Paphlagonians to be removed from power. This was explained both by the origin of the Paphlagonians and by the circumstances of their coming to power, as well as by their internal policy.

Summing up, it should be noted that despite the attempts of the Paphlagonians to firmly take root among the Byzantine elite and lead it, all their successes were only situational and were ensured by, on the one hand, personal control over the most important spheres of government, on the other, by controlling the Empress Zoya, whose halo gave the Paphlagonians legitimacy. However, this situation was only temporary and was maintained only as long as the power remained in the hands of Michael IV and John Orphanatrophe.  The death or resignation of one of them was bound to lead to the fall of the Paphlagonian dynasty.

Appendix 1. Relatives of John Orphanatrophe in the highest civil and military positions of the Empire in 1034 – 1041 ^{[3, 4, 5]}