Discussion of the Japanese intervention in the Far East and Siberia in the House of Commons of Great Britain on March 14, 1918 as an event of the British policy of intervention in Russia

Mironiuk Sergei PhD in History Assistant Lecturer, Department of History, Institute of Economics and Management in Agribusiness, Russian Timiryazev State Agrarian University 127550, Russia, Moscow, ul. Timiryazevskaya, 49 privetsergey95@mail.ru Other publications by this author

The policy of intervention of one state against another in a critical period is one of the urgent social and research problems. This is due to the degree of influence of this foreign policy course on the further political and socio-economic development of the affected country, as well as the nature of its relations with the interventionist country.

The policy of intervention itself implies the conduct of a certain contingent of armed forces in the whole or some part of the country and/or the provision of substantial military-technical, financial, organizational and consulting assistance to one of the parties to a bilateral conflict between two States or a conflict within one state. It most clearly emerged and developed in Yugoslavia in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011, when NATO countries under the leadership of the United States (under the respective administrations: 42nd President B. Clinton (1993-2001), 43rd — George W. Bush (2001-2009) and on the 44th — to Barack Obama (2009-2017)) in the first and fourth cases took part on the side of opponents of the central government during the most acute conflict within the state (the Kosovo war in 1998-1999 and the Civil War in 2011), in the rest they invaded.

Also relevant is the participation of Parliament in the process of making important decisions on various aspects of the country's policy, including interference with another. Since it is the highest legislative body, is elected by citizens/subjects (either to both of its chambers, or to one, most often the lower one) and influences the formation of the composition of the government and its policy, the executive power represented by the government is forced to take into account the positions and moods of political factions and their individual representatives in parliament when making appropriate decisions.

As a result, the scientific community is rethinking the current and past intervention policies of different countries as a factor in the development of the affected country, region and the world; there are discussions about the real causes, technologies, dynamics and consequences of the chosen foreign policy course; the problem of the participation and role of parliament in the development, implementation and completion of the intervention policy is considered.

In this regard, it seems necessary to investigate in this article the discussion of Japan's intervention in the Far East and Siberia at a meeting on March 14, 1918 of the House of Commons of the United Kingdom – the lower house of the British Parliament, elected, unlike the House of Lords, by subjects. It was this event that was among the significant dates of the British policy of intervention in Russia, since it influenced the formation and transition to practical steps in the implementation of this foreign policy line by the Military Cabinet headed by Prime Minister D. Lloyd George.

The proceedings of the meeting of the House of Commons of the United Kingdom (March 14, 1918) regarding the discussion of the Japanese intervention in the Far East and Siberia are evidence of an important milestone of the British policy of intervention in Russia. At the same time, they were either not fully considered in the domestic and foreign historiography of the Civil War and intervention in Russia, or they were only partially considered in the context of certain topics. Soviet and modern Russian historians: A. I. Anishev, M. P. Pavlovich, M. N. Pokrovsky, N. N. Yakovlev, S. Polunin, I. I. Mints, G. E. Mymrin, O. F. Soloviev, G. V. Kuzmin, S. G. Livshits, F. D. Volkov, M. I. Svetachev, N. G. Dumova, V. G. Trukhanovsky, A. I. Utkin, N. E. Bystrova, E. Y. Sergeev ^[1-15] – studied mainly the foreign policy of the Government of the United Kingdom towards Russia and the forms of implementation of the country's intervention policy in various regions of the former Russian Empire. In this context, some meetings of the lower house of the British Parliament were considered, including the meeting on March 14, 1918. If we consider foreign historiography, represented mainly by Anglo-American historians, the works of U. and Z. Coates, J. White, J. Albert, J. Kennan, R. Sellen, J. Swettenham, J. Bradley, R. Jackson, R. Ullman, K. Keeble, M. Hudson and J. Moffat ^[16-30] in most cases less considered the activities of the British Parliament in the context of the Russian direction of the policy of Great Britain and its countries-allies.

The object of this article is the meeting of the House of Commons on March 14, 1918, the subject is the discussion of the Japanese intervention in the Far East and Siberia at this meeting as events of the British policy of intervention in Russia. The purpose is to disclose and analyze the content of speeches in Parliament on this issue.

The scientific novelty of this work is that for the first time in the historiography of the Civil War and foreign intervention in Russia, a meeting of the lower house of Great Britain on one of the topical issues of British and world politics regarding Russia is being considered: The Japanese intervention in the Far East and Siberia – as a significant event in the history of the British policy of intervention in Russia.

The main research methods used in this work are the content analysis method and the system method. The first method allowed to reveal and analyze in detail the content of speeches with the presented positions and arguments at a meeting of the lower house of parliament. Using the second method, the connection of this event with the military-political and international situation that developed in March 1918 and which influenced the nature of the discussion in the House of Commons was presented.

The meeting of the House of Commons on March 14, 1918 took place against the background of three events that influenced the foreign policy of the state and the dynamics of international relations.

First of all, it was the ongoing First World War, in which Great Britain was part of the military-political bloc of the Entente. Britain was critically interested in defeating Germany. The latter sought to take the place of the most influential world power, which Britain considered exclusively its own, and to become the only hegemon in Europe, which was historically unacceptable for Britain, which pursued a policy of the European balance of power as a way to preserve its leadership in the world. In particular, in a note by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff dated March 7, 1918, "The consequence of German control over Odessa and from there through Baku over Northwestern Persia," it was noted that Germany "sought to establish full control over Central Europe and the Middle East in order to expand to the east" ^{[31, p. 264; 32, c. 128]}.

Also, the tense foreign policy and military situation for Britain was aggravated by the holding in Soviet Russia of the IV All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers, Peasants, Soldiers and Cossacks Deputies (March 14-16, 1918), where the main issue was the ratification of the Brest Peace Treaty signed on March 3 between Soviet Russia and the Central Powers. The main content of the document was the withdrawal of Russia from the war, the deprivation of its territories in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus and the liquidation of the vast Eastern Front ^{[33, pp. 288-291]}. In the short and long term Germany has received many opportunities, including the transfer of their units on the Western front, operation, land acquisition and application of a new strike in Germany through Russia to the side of the British colonies in the Middle East and India that have strategic importance for the British Empire.

In view of this situation in the UK, the policy was changing towards intervention with the participation of other Entente countries in the Russian regions, especially in the Far East and Siberia. These two regions were of great importance, since Vladivostok had a warehouse of allied military equipment, where 640 thousand tons of reserves were concentrated, 60-70% of which could be qualified as military ^{[34, p. 33]}. Also, in addition, there was the Trans-Siberian Railway, and control over it made it possible to block any German offensive into Turkestan, dangerous for India ^{[35, p. 170; 36, p. 156]}. According to N. E. Bystrova, "The intervention was more a means to scare the Bolsheviks and force them to negotiate on the terms of the Entente than a tool to change the political system" ^{[14, p. 222; 37, p. 184]}. At the same time, it, in particular, was aimed at solving the tasks of protecting the warehouse in Vladivostok and controlling the Trans-Siberian Railway, as well as contributing to the establishment and consolidation of Britain's dominant influence in Russia.

 Before practical preparation for the policy of intervention in Russia, the Military Cabinet needed to know the opinions of representatives of political parties in the House of Commons about the expediency and possibility of Japanese intervention in the Far East and Siberia, as a result of which the British side could realize its national interests and establish its sphere of influence in different parts of the former Russian Empire.

The House of Commons on March 14, 1918 consisted of 670 deputies. The leading political forces were the Liberal Party (272 mandates) and the bloc of Conservative and Unionist-Liberal parties (271 mandates). The formation and development of the British policy of intervention against Russia depended on their positions.

On this day, March 14, 1918, many hours of debate on the problem of "Russia and Japan" began and went on in the House of Commons. In essence, the discussion was about the permissibility of Japanese intervention in "Asian Russia", that is, in the Far East and Siberia.

The first speaker was Liberal Party MP G. Lees-Smith. He wanted to learn from the government its official attitude to Japanese intentions regarding Russia. They expressed the opinion that the weapons and ammunition accumulated in Vladivostok do not constitute any basis for declaring war. G. Lees-Smith gave a judgment on the so-called theory of arming Austrian and German prisoners of war by the Bolshevik government and organizing an army from them by a German general. As the deputy stated, "All this seems to me very improbable. The Bolsheviks, whatever one may say about them, have the same hatred for the German war machine as any other party in Russia, and besides, there is no evidence of the existence of any of these prisoners in Eastern Siberia. This story is not based on any authority. There is no justification for where it came from. It mysteriously originated in Beijing, which is a thousand miles away" ^{[38, p. 512]}. He concluded: "... if our goal is to help, then the best way to do this is to allow Russia to cope with its own disorder and disorganization and thus ensure its own salvation with as little interference from any foreign power as possible" ^{[38, p. 513]}. The deputy explained the senselessness of the Japanese intervention, fraught with conflict with the United States. Speaking about the situation in which Russia found itself and how it will get out of it, Mr. Lees-Smith suggested: "I don't know Russia myself, but everyone who knows it agrees that Russia will be reborn. It will be reborn as democratic, but more purified and stronger than it was before. I believe that it will be reborn and will be able to make a great contribution to the development of civilization. When that day comes, I think we will be happy to have Russia as a friend, but if the allies will take part in this speech, the result of which is more than any other, designed to drive Russia into the orbit of diplomacy of Germany and the Central powers" ^{[38, p. 517]}.

The next speaker was a deputy from the same party as G. Lees-Smith, A. McCallum Scott. In his opinion, the intervention of Japan or any other allied country will be one of those fundamental mistakes that will lead to the failure of the campaign and at the same time change the course of history. According to the deputy, the goal of the intervention in Siberia was not the plundering of the country or the restoration of tsarism, but an exceptional desire at the moment to protect the allies and the British Empire from great dangers. A. McCallum Scott himself hoped that the government would not approve of the idea of intervention, since it would only create new dangers and lead to the unification of all Russian belligerents against the invasion. "We will have to fight not with Germany, but with Germany and Russia. Intervention at this time, in my opinion, would undoubtedly throw Russia's forces and resources into the arms of Germany. This is a fact that should be the subject of the most serious consideration," he concluded ^{[38, p. 518]}. If we resort to it, then only when the Germans become aggressors and occupiers, and after that Russia "... will rebel against them, and if we intervene, we will come as liberators, and we will be welcome" ^{[38, p. 518]}. A. McCallum Scott recalled the French Revolution and its disastrous consequences. The same thing will happen with the Russian Revolution, but only worse. In his opinion, it is not just an "orgy of crime and violence", but one of the greatest milestones in the history of mankind, the essence of which was a revolt against centralization, which took such an extreme form that in its manifestations it seems to be a revolt against any government in general and a movement in favor of decentralization. The implementation of the Japanese intervention will bring new dangers and will become a useless enterprise.

After A. McCallum Scott, the representative of the Conservative Party R. McNeil took the floor. He spoke in favor of Japanese intervention in Russia, since there was a danger of the release of enemy prisoners of war in various parts of Russia. Their total number was probably about 1 million people, and maybe more. According to R. McNeil, Japan, if it sees fit, will intervene, which was in the interests of the Russian people and the Entente countries. He also stated the importance of controlling the Trans-Siberian Railway, along which huge material reserves are concentrated, important from a military point of view.

Following R. Mcnail, a liberal unionist, Captain J. Lloyd. Emphasizing the importance and uniqueness of Japan as a British ally, the situation in Russia should be viewed from the point of view of the Japanese themselves. He noted the following: "No one can deny that the collapse of power in Russia seems to be a serious moment for the Japanese, and therefore I believe that we in the House of Commons should not try to dictate any policy course to Japan to the extent that this course can be taken in defense of its own legitimate interests and its future" ^{[38, p. 530-531]}. But, as J. put it. Lloyd, since Japan is a long-standing and reliable ally of Great Britain, who deserved respect and gratitude for her actions during the war, it is necessary to support her in any decision. The very assumption that Russia will fall into the hands of Germany as a result of Japanese intervention is debatable, since it is unknown what the reaction of the "unsociable and broken masses of the Russian people" will be ^{[38, p. 531]}. Russia's salvation should be carried out by itself, not by the UK. He concluded his speech with words about British support for the Japanese: "... criticizing or reflecting on the dangers of the present moment, we would prefer to trust rather than suspect, and help rather than hinder" ^{[38, p. 532]}.

Other deputies spoke in approximately the same spirit, until the turn came to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain A. Balfour. He declared his optimism about Russia, but not for its immediate future, since it has only nominally withdrawn from the war and will still suffer from the invasion of Germany. About the Bolsheviks, he said: "I do not want to question the sincerity and zeal of the Russian revolutionaries in the slightest degree. I'm talking about the Bolsheviks now. <...> I do not undertake to judge people with whom I am not familiar and in whom I am very poorly versed in order to express my opinion" ^{[38, p. 547]}. According to the head of the Foreign Office, the fact that the course of the Bolsheviks would have made them completely helpless in the face of German aggression was obvious to the whole world from the very beginning, and now it has become obvious to them. As A. Balfour stated, "Now they express a desire – I am sure they express it sincerely and responsibly – that they will restore the Russian army for the purposes of defending Russia, and they would undoubtedly welcome our help in achieving this goal" ^{[38, p. 547]}.

Responding to criticism of Japan's intervention, this country would become Russia's friend against Germany, not its enemy. The goal would not be the plundering of Russia, but its preservation from Germany. The UK will act in Russia's interests. As A. Balfour himself explained, "This is not done to satisfy the greed of a particular power. This is not done with any hope of winning. My God, our relations with Russia in this war do not imply a win!" ^{[38, p. 550]}. This is being done as part of the fight against Germany. If the Germans infiltrate Russian territory, they will transport huge reserves of it, especially the richest part of the former empire – Western Siberia.

From the point of view of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Russia was in such a position that without external assistance it would not resist the Germans. Therefore, intervention represents the help and sympathy that the Allies wish to give her, not invasion and plunder. Great Britain, the United States of America, France, Italy, Japan must overcome the "great crisis of fate" of Russia. In response to the statement about the selfishness and dishonesty of the Japanese, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs noted that they would keep their promises regarding the integrity of Russia or on another issue related to this country.

Concluding his speech, A. Balfour noted that the decisions reached by the allies were not made without difficulties. But their principles "... are neither ignoble, nor unjust, nor hostile to Russia, nor hostile to the Russian Revolution, but, on the contrary, that our only goal is that Russia should be strong, safe, free and not suffer damage. And if these goals can be achieved, then, undoubtedly, and only then, the Russian Revolution will bring all the fruits that Russia's best friends want to see" ^{[38, p. 553-554]}.

Of the other speakers at the debate, Major Davis is worth noting. Having expressed concern about the inevitable restoration of the old, tsarist power in Russia, not without the participation of the Germans, it would be wrong to assume that the Japanese will only push for this by their actions. Davis stated one important detail: "The Germans undoubtedly decided to turn the Black Sea into a German lake. They have already reached Odessa and are said to be 100 miles west of Petrograd. Their goal is to ensure control over transportation throughout Siberia and, if possible, over all food and agricultural products that are currently stored in large quantities in Siberia" ^{[38, p. 560]}. Then he talked about democracy and the constitutional monarchy of Japan. Great Britain, according to the major, should tell the Japanese the following: "... 'come and help us restore balance in the East; now that Russia has surrendered, help us establish a new state of affairs in the world that will make these things impossible in the future'" ^{[38, p. 561]}. Therefore, the Government's position should be to welcome Japan's cooperation and assistance in every possible way.

During the discussions in the House of Commons, polar views on the Japanese intervention were expressed. This polarity was due to the fact that the two leading political parties had an equal number of deputies in Parliament. If the representatives of the Liberal Party saw in the Japanese intervention and the participation of Great Britain in it senselessness and a new problem for relations with Russia and the United States, as well as the conclusion of a Russian-German alliance as a result of Japanese actions, then the bloc of Conservative and Unionist-Liberal parties advocated the implementation of this operation and cooperation with Japan against German domination in Russia, in particular in Siberia.

Thus, the House of Commons hesitated on the issue of Japanese intervention in Siberia and the Far East. But it was important for the Military Cabinet of the United Kingdom that there were voices in Parliament in favor of this intervention, and the topic itself caused a lively discussion. Therefore, this allowed him to act cautiously in the direction of building a British policy of intervention in Russia and determining the place of Japanese military intervention in the eastern Russian regions in it. Only major events inevitably predetermined the adoption of very important decisions in the top British leadership in building this foreign policy course and to tilt the position of the lower house of parliament in their favor. Such an event was the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty on March 15, 1918 by the IV All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers', Peasants', Soldiers' and Cossack Deputies (March 14-16, 1918), which seriously changed the military-political situation in Europe and became a significant factor in the influence of changes in the policy of the Entente countries, especially Great Britain.

Therefore, March 14, 1918, when the Japanese intervention in the Far East and Siberia was discussed in the House of Commons of the United Kingdom, is a memorable and significant date in the history of British intervention policy in Russia, which determined its formation and development in dynamics and logic.