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Genesis: Historical research
Reference:

War in Rhodesia (1965-1979): fight against terrorists or civil conflict?

Gonta Semen Nikolaevich

Student, Department of Theory of Law and State, History and Philosophy, Sochi State University

354000, Russia, Krasnodar Territory, Sochi, ul. Plastunskaya, 94

rudolf.diesel.bmw@gmail.com
Other publications by this author
 

 

DOI:

10.25136/2409-868X.2023.7.43415

EDN:

TBNIFI

Received:

23-06-2023


Published:

08-08-2023


Abstract: The article is devoted to the study of the war between the Rhodesian government and the black rebels from 1965 to 1979. The relevance of the work is due to the lack of fundamental research on these events in modern Russian historiography. The object of the study is the armed conflict in the territory of the Rhodesia, which took place in 1965-1979. The subject of the study is the activities of the rebel organizations that opposed the white government of the country. The author studied in detail the main events of the war in Rhodesia. Also, the work defines the role of external influence on the parties to the conflict under consideration, special attention is paid to the study of terrorist acts that were committed by members of rebel organizations. Based on the study, it can be concluded that the war in Rhodesia (1965-1979) was a civil conflict, while also being a local conflict within the global confrontation between capitalist and socialist countries. At the same time, the actions of the rebel organizations were by no means just a struggle for independence, but were accompanied by bloody terrorist acts against the civilian population.The scientific novelty of the article lies in the study of the main events of the military conflict, as well as in the study of the methods of fighting the rebels against the government of Rhodesia. The author's special contribution to the study of the topic is a detailed description of the terrorist acts in Rhodesia that were committed by members of the rebel organizations.


Keywords:

Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, local conflict, war in Rhodesia, civil war, terrorism, ZAPU, ZANU

This article is automatically translated.

Introduction

The study of such a topic as the war in Rhodesia (1965-1979) is still problematic. This fact is facilitated by the general bias and one-sidedness of the consideration of the issue. Harsh terms such as "white racists", "racist regime", "Smith regime", etc. are often used against the white government of Rhodesia, while the activities of African rebel groups that fought to overthrow the white government are called "people's revolution", "liberation war", etc.

The relevance of the research lies in the fact that today there are no fundamental studies in Russian historiography devoted to the events of 1965-1979 in Rhodesia, the same can be attributed to the study of the armed conflict on the territory of the country. In modern historiography, only a few scientific publications in Russian are devoted to this problem, which consider certain aspects of the war in Rhodesia. Thus, in this article it is proposed to consider and analyze the armed confrontation in Rhodesia, based on existing works, as well as to introduce new data from various sources into scientific circulation.

Materials and methods of research

The bibliographic base in this work consists of studies by foreign and domestic authors that relate to the events of 1965-1979 in Rhodesia. In addition to scientific research, for objectivity, the following are used: international normative legal acts, articles in periodicals of mass media, as well as data from various information resources on the Internet.

The methodology is directly determined by the research topic. The author uses general scientific research methods: analysis, synthesis, classification method. Special historical research methods: narrative and historical-genetic. 

Research results

Before starting to consider the war in Rhodesia, it is necessary to immediately determine the chronological framework of the analyzed period. Among researchers, there is no clear definition of the time of the beginning of the armed struggle of the rebels against the white government of Rhodesia. Western researchers are of the opinion that the "people's liberation struggle" began even before the unilateral declaration of independence in 1965 - indicating various events before 1964-1965 [1].

In the domestic environment, the beginning of the armed struggle is considered to be 1965, namely the creation of the ZIPRA – the military wing of the ZAPU party. In particular, K. S. Bobrinev [2], Ndali-Che Kamati [3, p. 23] adhere to this opinion in their works. The author, in the context of this article, proposes to consider 1964 as the starting point, when the first cases of attacks and murders of Rhodesian citizens (primarily white farmers) by future members of the rebel movement began to appear.

After the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (British Protectorate) ceased to exist in 1963, 3 separate states were formed. Malawi and Zambia gained independence, and the third country of the federation, Southern Rhodesia, did not receive it, because in the process of decolonization, Great Britain was guided by the so–called "NIBMAR" principle, which meant "independence only after granting power to the African majority."

Southern Rhodesia, led by a white minority, was expected to remain under the formal rule of Great Britain, but in fact in a "suspended" state, since the white population, being in a minority and understanding how all this could end for them, was not going to give power to the black majority. Among white Rhodesians at that time, there was a popular opinion that the UK, under the pretext of "NIBMAR", simply wanted to maintain control over their economically developed and resource-rich country.

It is worth noting that these sentiments were not groundless – Southern Rhodesia of the three countries of the Federation was the strongest in economic and military terms, since its economy was traditionally capitalist in nature, interacting widely with developed Western countries after World War II [4] (in terms of living standards, Rhodesia was second only to South Africa, and the strongest sector of the economy Rhodesia – agriculture was the first on the continent). In turn, the country's army corps consisted mainly of experienced officers who were veterans of the Second World War and fought quite effectively in North Africa and Europe as part of the British Armed Forces.  

In April 1964, a white farmer, a former pilot of the British Royal Air Force (took direct part in World War II) and an active supporter of Rhodesian independence, Ian Smith, as the political leader of the Rhodesian Front party, became the new Prime Minister of the country. In the same 1964, on November 5, a referendum was held, as a result of which 90% of the voting population supported secession from Great Britain, the turnout was 61.9% [5]. A year later, in the parliamentary elections in May 1965, the Rhodesian Front party led by Ian Smith won a landslide victory [6].

In 1965, namely on November 11, the history of the actual independence of Rhodesia from Great Britain began, because after long and unsuccessful attempts to gain recognition, the white government of Rhodesia published a declaration of independence declaring independence unilaterally [7]. Great Britain was outraged by this act and did not recognize the independence of Rhodesia, declaring its government "the illegal Smith regime" [8]. The UK also began to seek the introduction of international economic sanctions, which were aimed at restricting the export of important goods for the Rhodesian economy and imposing an embargo on the supply of goods to Rhodesia (including humanitarian medical supplies) [9].

The international community has taken an anti-Rhodesian position, not recognizing the unilateral declaration of independence of the country. And a year later, on December 16, 1966, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution on the severance of all economic relations and the imposition of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia [10]. As K.V. Kritsky notes in his dissertation, this fact caused considerable debate in legal circles and disputes about the legality of the introduction of such restrictions by the UN Security Council. "Southern Rhodesia was subjected to international sanctions after attempts by the government of Ian Smith to declare independence from Great Britain, in addition, the official government of Southern Rhodesia was also accused of racial segregation and violation of human rights the black population of the country" [11, p. 48].

At the same time, the leaders of the opposition parties (which at that time were banned and illegal) – ZAPU (Joshua Nkomo) and ZANU (Robert Mugabe) began openly calling for armed struggle and the overthrow of the white government.

Stage I (1965-1975) The beginning of a violent confrontation: a split in the ranks and the temporary defeat of the black rebels.

The first stage of the war in Rhodesia consisted of small guerrilla sorties in the north of the country, since the rear bases of both rebel groups were located on the territory of Rhodesia's northern neighbor, Zambia [12]. The first unsuccessful stage is explained by the fact that at that time the ZAPU and ZANU groups were still insufficiently prepared and equipped.The disunity in the actions of these rebel organizations also affected.

The beginning of the "second chimurenga" (as the war of the rebels against the white government is called in modern Zimbabwe) is considered to be the so-called "Battle of Sinoya". Upon a detailed study of this event, it can be concluded that the "battle" was a counter-terrorist operation of the Rhodesian Police against small rebel groups that planned to attack the critical infrastructure of the country. In early April 1966, 14 people from the ZANU rebel group entered Rhodesia from the territory of neighboring Zambia, after that the group split up – 2 people went to the area of Fort Victoria, 5 people were ordered to sabotage the Beira-Umtali oil pipeline and, if possible, attack white farmers. But all seven people were arrested by the Rhodesian police before they could commit the planned crimes.

The third group of 7 people managed to move inland and escape. They were caught and arrested only in September 1966, and during the investigation it turned out that they were responsible for the murder of a family of white farmers on May 16 in the Hartley area.

On April 29, 1966, another group of ZANU rebels (7 people) was surrounded and destroyed by police and reservists on a farm near the town of Sinoya. Their goal was to attack the city and its police station, having previously destroyed the Kariba power line and cut off the city from electricity. All members of the group received military training in China and were armed with Type 56 submachine guns (a Chinese copy of the Soviet Kalashnikov assault rifle) [13]. These events were later referred to as the "Battle of Sinoia".

In the period from 1965 to 1968, rebels from the ZAPU and ZANU groups carried out a series of attacks (uncoordinated among themselves and with little effect). The geography of the activity was the same: "entering" the territory of Rhodesia from Zambia and attacking nearby cities. The rebels used the tactics of ambushing and mining roads. The victims of these "actions" were mostly ordinary civilians – both white and black.

And here it is briefly worth paying some attention to the interaction of the South African Republic (South Africa) and Rhodesia. South Africa was, in fact, the only country that provided significant assistance to the Rhodesian Army in providing equipment and weapons (especially after the introduction of anti-Rhodesian sanctions). This fact was possible due to the fact that international economic sanctions did not greatly affect its economy, so South Africa remained a desirable partner, especially for European arms manufacturers (the United States officially stopped cooperation in 1965), who still continued to supply military equipment to South Africa [14]. Based on this, the country had a wide opportunity not only for the modernization of old weapons, but also for the production of new ones.

And the Rhodesian army, in turn, could count on non-advertised assistance from a more developed military industry of a neighbor. For example, it is reliably known that most of the first full–fledged armored vehicles for the transportation of personnel of the "MRAP" type - Hyena (hyena) produced in South Africa, were sent to Rhodesia (about 230 pieces of such armored vehicles were produced in total) [15]. And although the active phase of using mine ambushes on civilian and military equipment began only in 1974, the first cases of car bombings began already from the first days of the war. Before the appearance and the beginning of the active use of "MRAP", the Rhodesian Army, along with civilians (primarily farmers), employees and police officers, used ordinary cars – Land Rover I, IIa, III jeeps and British-made Bedford trucks (which have remained since the days of the British Protectorate). This technique was strengthened and modernized in an artisanal way. It was she who took the "first blow" of the insurgent terrorist attacks with the use of mines and planted explosives before the appearance of those "MRAPs" [16].

By 1968, the rebel struggle against the white government of Rhodesia had actually reached a dead end. In October 1971, another rebel "party" appeared – the Zimbabwe Liberation Front (frolisi), which broke away from ZAPU. The split occurred on national grounds, since the top leadership of the ZAPU belonged to the Shona people, and the middle-level commanders to the Ndebele. But this fact did not significantly change the balance of power, except that the white government of Rhodesia was now formally opposed by 3 organizations. 

As Charles Lohman and Robert MacPherson note, "in early 1973, Frolisi raided Rhodesia in an attempt to demonstrate her importance. Two groups of six people each caused some alarm by committing several robberies and murders, but were quickly and effectively destroyed by the Rhodesian authorities" [17, p. 18].

In 1975, an important event took place, which further influenced the course of the entire war of the Rhodesian government with the rebels. A year after the carnation Revolution in the metropolis, Portuguese Mozambique gained independence in 1975. After that, power in the country was seized by the "pro-communist" Frelimo party, which was oriented towards the Soviet Union and enjoyed its financial and material support. Rhodesia was expected to be declared an enemy of Frelimo, and the ZAPU and ZANU rebel groups, respectively, allies in the fight against "racists".

Rhodesia's strategic losses consisted in the fact that after Frelimo seized power in Mozambique, the Rhodesians actually received a 1,402 km long border with the enemy, and also lost access to the important seaport of Beira (560 km from Salisbury), through which until 1975 the Portuguese allowed to transport contraband goods and conduct economic activities. It is worth noting here that by the end of 1972, the border regions of Mozambique had become the main springboard for the ZANU rebels. Portuguese forces could not control this region, so in response to Salisbury's claims, they allowed the Rhodesian Army to conduct operations throughout the Tete district south of the Zambezi, as well as use Portuguese military airfields. In September 1972, Rhodesian aviation units (SAS) made the first raid on the ZANU base in Tete [18]. Subsequently, the joint military operations of Rhodesia and Portugal began to be regular.    

Phase II (1976-1979) The consolidation of rebel groups and the political concessions of the government of Ian Smith.

After Mozambique in 1975 turned into the main springboard of the rebels from which they attacked Rhodesia, the situation of the country deteriorated greatly.

In the period from March to November 1975, the armed rebel groups of the ZAPU and ZANU parties consolidated. Ndali-Che Kamati (former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Namibia to the Russian Federation) in his dissertation indicates that "the external leadership of ZAPU and ZANU in Zambia united military leaders from their armed wings of ZIPRA and ZANLA and formed the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA)" [3, p. 33]. Its command totaled 18 people, where both "military wings" of the parties were equally represented.

On January 17, 1976, the now united rebel army resumed the war against Rhodesia and its white government. From that moment on, the rebels chose a new tactic of warfare, replacing the previous "guerrilla raids" with the tactics of "psychological terror".

The first deafening, for the Rhodesian society, terrorist attack was committed in Salisbury on August 6, 1977 – at about 12 o'clock in the afternoon, a bomb exploded in the Woolworths store. 11 people became victims, 76 people were injured of varying severity [19]. The ZANU rebels and their leader Robert Mugabe claimed responsibility for the attack. This terrorist attack was condemned by the moderate African opposition in the person of Abel Muzoreva and Ndabaninga Sithole, with whom the white government of Rhodesia negotiated a gradual transfer of power to the black majority.

Another terrorist attack, during which 2 people were wounded, was committed on September 8, 1978 – armed rebels allegedly fired mortar or rocket fire (eyewitnesses also reported that they heard machine gun bursts) at a hotel in the center of Umtali, which was 226 km from the capital Salisbury and only 8 km from the border with Mozambique. The hotel "Cecil" and a residential building near the police station were shelled [20]. ZANU and Robert Mugabe also claimed responsibility. It is worth noting here that Umtali was subjected to similar attacks in August and November 1976, also with the use of mortars from Mozambique.

But the most massive terrorist acts (in terms of the number of victims) committed by the black rebels can be considered the downing of two civil aircraft of the Air Rhodesia company over the resort town of Kariba, which is located in the north of the country (near the border with Zambia). On the evening of September 3, 1978, passenger flight RH-825 took off from the Caribbean Airport to Salisbury, the capital of the country. During the climb, the ZAPU rebels shot down the plane with a heat-guided missile, presumably from a Soviet-made Strela-2 MANPADS (SA-7 Grail according to the NATO classification) [21]. 38 people out of 56 on board were killed immediately during the crash, another 10 wounded were killed by the ZAPU rebels at the crash site [22]. Only 8 people survived, who could move and immediately left the crash site.

The day after the crash, ZAPU rebel leader Joshua Nkomo publicly claimed responsibility for the downing of the plane in an interview with BBC News, but at the same time denied that his people had killed the survivors [23]. He also claimed that the plane was for military purposes and was carrying cargo for the Rhodesian Army. But most of all, the Rhodesian society was struck by the fact that "during the interview, Joshua Nkomo happily laughed when he said that it was his people who shot down the plane" [24, p. 121].

Another Air Rhodesia aircraft (flight RH-827), under the same circumstances and using the same Strela-2 MANPADS, was shot down on February 12, 1979 [25]. This time, all 59 people on board, including 54 passengers and 5 crew members, became victims of the disaster [26]. The rebels ZAPU and Joshua Nkomo again claimed responsibility for the attack, stating that their target was the commander-in-chief of the Rhodesian Army, General Peter Walls, who, as it turned out later, was late with his wife for the flight and flew on the next [27].

Against the background of "psychological terror" and the rapidly deteriorating economic situation in the country, the white government of Rhodesia was forced to begin the process of transferring power to the black majority. On June 1, 1979, the government was headed by a black "moderate centrist", former Bishop Abel Muzoreva, and the country was renamed Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The new government was also anti-communist and continued to fight the rebels. It is worth noting here that back in March 1978, the "Auxiliary Security Forces" (SFA) were formed – armed formations, which were joined by black supporters of moderate African parties (Abel Muzoreva and Ndabaningi Sitole). A year later, the formation numbered about 10 thousand people, and its main functions were to fight partisans, protect various objects, and maintain order in its own settlements [28]. The functions of this formation were in many ways similar to the functions of the "Guard Forces of Rhodesia" or, more simply, the National Guard [29, 30].

The ZAPU and ZANU rebels did not recognize Abel Muzoreva as the black head of state and accused him of "betrayal" and "collusion with racists." Eventually, after the Lancasterhouse Conference of 1979, new elections were called under the formal control of Great Britain. On April 18, 1980, Zimbabwe was officially declared an independent state, and the head of the ZANU rebels, Robert Mugabe, came to power. 

Foreign influence on the parties to the conflict.

In the context of considering the war in Rhodesia, it is also worth paying attention to foreign aid to both sides of the conflict. Formally, no country recognized Rhodesia, but in fact the country had allies.

As mentioned above, South Africa remained the only ally of Rhodesia (along with Portuguese Mozambique until 1975), in addition to close trade and economic ties [31] and the supply of weapons of its own production, there were also non-standard cases of providing the Rhodesian army with military equipment. So, in early 1979, the French cargo ship Astor, which was heading to Angola, stopped for refueling at the port of Durban in South Africa (whose captain most likely did not know about the current political situation in the region), which was waging a so-called "border war" with Angola.

Customs officers boarded the cargo ship to inspect the vessel and the cargo being transported. During their inspection, they found 10 Polish T-55L tanks in desert camouflage, as well as a significant amount of ammunition and spare parts for them (and they were originally intended for Ugandan dictator Idi Amin). These tanks were confiscated by South Africa and soon 8 of them were transferred to the Rhodesian Armed Forces [32]. The Rhodesians based on these tanks formed the so-called squadron "E", which consisted of 2 platoons of 4 tanks. The squadron was trained by instructors from South Africa. It is worth noting here that these tanks did not take part in the battles, remaining only a "weapon of intimidation".

Thus, the assistance provided by South Africa to the Rhodesian government can be considered a decisive factor in the long enough existence of the country (1964-1979) in conditions of incessant war. Another important aspect of supporting Rhodesia's high defense capability was access to mercenaries from all over the world. Mostly citizens of European countries, as well as the United States and Great Britain, who sympathized with the Rhodesian government, fought as mercenaries [33, 34]. However, Western countries did not directly prevent this (for example, the United States) [35], since the Rhodesian government positioned this war as a fight against the "communist contagion" in Africa.

The role of the socialist bloc countries in this war is also ambiguous. The ZANU rebels were ideologically oriented towards socialist China and North Korea (DPRK), which provided them financially and militarily (one of the rebels who participated in the Battle of Sinoya was trained at the Nanjing Military College). The ZAPU rebels were primarily focused on the USSR and its allies. Currently, it is known about the financial and military assistance of Joshua Nkomo and his party from the USSR. And also that the ZAPU fighters were trained on the territory of the Soviet Union, at the 165th training center for the training of foreign servicemen of the USSR Ministry of Defense in the Crimea. This fact was described in his 2003 article by historian D. I. Zubarev, who claims that he served there in 1974-1976 as a military translator [36].

The historian V. G. Shubin also writes about this, who in particular points out that "only in 1970, almost a decade after such assistance began, in an interview with the newspaper Pravda, the head of the Soviet delegation at the International Conference of Solidarity with the Peoples of the Portuguese Colonies V. G. Solodovnikov, at that time director of the Institute of Africa of the Academy of Sciences The USSR declared for the first time that Moscow supplies the liberation movements with weapons, means of transport and communications, clothing and other goods necessary for a successful struggle, and that military and civilian specialists from these movements are trained in the USSR."

In the same article, V. G. Shubin also points out that in 1977, the first group (12 people) of officers were sent from the USSR to Angola to train the ZAPU rebels, who "trained over 10,000 fighters and commanders" over a year of work.

V. G. Shubin also points out that there were deaths of Soviet instructors in Angola (Ensign G. I. Skakun) [37]. And the book by the military journalist S. A. Kolomnin even describes the case of the capture in Angola of the ensign of the Soviet troops N. F. Pestretsov by the armed forces of South Africa [38].

Thus, it can be argued about the decisive role of the assistance of socialist countries in the victory of the ZAPU and ZANU rebels. Their high combat capability (especially at a late stage) was directly related to the comprehensive assistance of China, the DPRK, the USSR and its allies.

Conclusion

Based on the conducted research, it can be concluded that the war in Rhodesia (1965-1979) was a classic local conflict (small war), which was part of the global cold war between socialist and capitalist countries. Answering the question put in the title of the article, it can be argued that it really was a civil conflict that tried to solve the accumulated racial and social contradictions in Rhodesia. However, it is also worth noting that the Rhodesian Government really fought terrorism, since the examples given in the study clearly qualify the activities of the ZAPU and ZANU rebel formations as terrorist.

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A review of the article "The War in Rhodesia (1965-1979): the fight against terrorists or a civil conflict?" The subject of the study is indicated in the title and explained in the text. The research methodology is based on general scientific methods:analysis, synthesis, classification method.The work uses narrative and historical-genetic research methods. The relevance of the topic is determined by the fact that the topic of the war in Rhodesia has not yet received an objective assessment, since the topic is considered mostly one-sidedly and is classified as a white government - a "racist government".Russian historians have practically not dealt with this topic, meanwhile, in the modern period, the confrontation between different groups of forces in African countries remains an important problem and military clashes between opposing forces occur in one or another country. The identification of the true causes of these events does not lose its relevance. Scientific novelty in the formulation of the problem and objectives of the study. The novelty lies in the fact that the study and analysis of the armed confrontation in Rhodesia is based on various sources, many of which are being introduced into scientific circulation for the first time. The article was prepared on the basis of the works of its predecessors, various documents, primarily a wide range of international normative legal acts, as well as articles in periodicals, data from various information resources on the Internet, etc. The style of the article is academic, the language is clear, but accessible not only to specialists, but also to a wide range of readers. The structure of the work consists of the following parts: Introduction (it explains the relevance of the study, the purpose and objectives); Materials and methods of research; Research results (the chronological framework of the study is explained and the author explains the specific date of the beginning of the conflict (war); Stage I (1965-1975) The beginning of a violent confrontation: a split in the ranks and a temporary defeat of the blacks Rebels; Phase II (1976-1979) The consolidation of rebel groups and the political concessions of the Government of Ian Smith. In the sections on stages 1 and II of the war, there are many interesting materials about the events in Rhodesia and about the confrontation of forces, the author emphasizes that the government of Rhodesia was fighting terrorist organizations - which were essentially rebel formations of ZAPU and ZANU, showing the weaknesses and strengths of the warring parties, what mistakes the government made and much more. In the section "Foreign influence on the parties to the conflict" it is shown that the only ally of Rhodesia was actually South Africa, the author notes the ambiguity of the positions of the countries of the socialist bloc. In conclusion, the author concludes that "the war in Rhodesia (1965-1979) was a classic local conflict (small war), which was part of the global cold war between socialist and capitalist countries. Answering the question posed in the title of the article, it can be argued that this was indeed a civil conflict that tried to resolve the accumulated racial and social contradictions in Rhodesia. However, it is also worth noting that the Rhodesian government really fought terrorism, since the examples given in the study clearly qualify the activities of the ZAPU and ZANU rebel groups as terrorist." The bibliography of the work is general (38 sources) and gave the author the opportunity to explore the topic quite deeply and objectively. The appeal to the opponents is presented in the author's work and bibliography. The article has a scientific novelty, is devoted to an actual topic and will be of interest to readers of the journal. Bibliography