The Solution to the Russian Dilemma of WTO Membership in the Context of Agricultural Trade

Kontorin Aleksandr Deputy Head, Department of International Law, Agroexport Federal Center; Expert, MGIMO University 105064, Russia, Moscow, ul. Zemlyanoy Val, 9 inaes@bk.ru

Volkov Vladimir Chief Specialist, Department of International Law, Agroexport Federal Center 105064, Russia, Moscow, ul. Zemlyanoy Val, 9 v.volkov.4224@gmail.com

IntroductionToday, the world economy is facing the strongest global economic and geopolitical challenges in recent times.

The COVID-19 pandemic and the anti-Russian sanctions regime have radically changed the world and provoked the development of the energy and food crises. Existing international institutions, primarily the WTO and its instruments in the field of trade policy, are called upon to help cope with these problems or mitigate their effect. However, the WTO itself is currently experiencing an institutional crisis that has affected the functioning of many of its mechanisms.

In such circumstances, the voices of supporters of the termination of Russia's membership in the Organization are becoming more and more frequent and louder. Such a possibility is being actively discussed both on the territory of the country and abroad. Legislators, business, scientific and academic communities are faced with a dilemma, which consists in where to put a comma in the expression "WTO: you can't leave". At the same time, it is assumed that both mutually exclusive solutions carry certain risks.

Agricultural products are particularly sensitive to the consequences of dispute settlement. In 2022, ensuring food security was one of the key topics discussed at the United Nations and WTO venues. An ad hoc working group has been established in the WTO on this issue (URL: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news22_e/acc_22nov22_e.htm (accessed: 03/27/2023)). Therefore, representatives of the Russian agro-industrial complex are particularly interested in determining the vector of further development of the country's trade policy.

It is worth noting that with a large number of foreign studies on WTO law and participation in it, the termination of membership in the Organization remains poorly studied. Among the authors who have touched on this topic in their works, it is necessary to note P. Van den Bosch, V. Zduk, D. Trahtman, M. Trebilcock. In the Russian peer-reviewed scientific literature, the issues of the consequences of withdrawal and the argumentation of the need to continue the country's participation in the WTO remain unexplored. Therefore, the author of this article cites the positions of domestic experts, which are publicly available in analytical publications.

Regarding this study, it is worth making the following reservations. Firstly, the analysis of Russia's membership in the WTO and its termination has been carried out in the legal and organizational planes, but not in economic terms. The economic indicators cited by the supporters of the exit have a large share of conditionality due to the fact that they do not take into account the multifactorial factors that determine the development of the Russian economy after joining the Organization (sanctions, outflow of foreign investment, the COVID-19 pandemic and other factors ^[21]) and the delayed effect of joining (a comprehensive assessment of the results can only be given in the long term). Secondly, the question of the expediency of Russia's withdrawal from the WTO should be resolved taking into account the positions of all sectors of the economy in aggregate. In this article, this issue is considered in the context of trade in agricultural products, namely goods covered by the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Fish and Seafood. Thirdly, despite the second reservation, the conclusions will be mostly general in nature: they can be extended to both agricultural and industrial goods.

1. Termination of WTO membership: theory and lack of practiceTermination of a Member State's membership in the WTO can be considered as a result of the unilateral expression of the will of such a State (withdrawal from the Organization) or the will of other Member States (temporary suspension or exclusion).

To understand the legal possibility of termination of membership, one should refer to the text of the WTO Agreement of 1994 (the Marrakesh Agreement) ^[1].

Firstly, the rules of the said agreement do not provide (with a single exception) for the temporary suspension or exclusion of a Member State from the Organization by other Member States. The absence of such procedures stems from the principle of consensus in decision-making in the WTO (Article IX:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement), which is in force as a general rule. Under such conditions, a Member State may formally object, i.e. block a potential decision on its suspension or exclusion. The principle of consensus makes it possible to maintain equality of rights and opportunities of participants in multilateral trade negotiations ^[10]. Formally, in some cases, decisions in the WTO can also be taken by vote, but until now, in practice, the consensus method has mainly been used ^[5].

Let us consider individual cases that could potentially be grounds for the temporary suspension or exclusion of a Member State from the Organization.

— Systematic violation of its obligations under the WTO agreements

In this case, the Member States whose rights have been violated can challenge the violations in the WTO Dispute Resolution Body (LFS). This body has the opportunity to authorize, in accordance with paragraph 6 of Article 22 of the "Agreement on Rules and Procedures Governing Dispute Settlement in the WTO" (Dispute Settlement Understanding, DSU), the suspension of certain concessions or other obligations (as retaliatory measures) against a member who does not comply with the decisions. In November 2004, a number of countries that challenged the law of the United States of America (USA) on the Continuation of Dumping and subsidy Compensation from 2000 (often called the Byrd Amendment), in accordance with the decision of the WTO Appellate Body (Report of the Appellate Body, DS217, United States — Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act 2000) received the right to on the introduction of retaliatory measures (suspension of concessions) against the United States. In the future, the plaintiffs (including the countries of the European Communities, Japan, Canada, Brazil, India) exercised this right with the sanction of the WTO LFS.

— Gross violation of human rights or acts of aggression

From a legal point of view, the WTO can have a direct impact on domestic State policy in the field of human rights protection through the same dispute resolution mechanism. WTO LFS decisions may require the adaptation of certain trade-related human rights policies or establish the legality of trade restrictions to protect such rights ^[8]. For example, in 1997, the European Communities submitted a Request for Consultations (DS88, United States — Measure Affecting Government Procedure) regarding a Massachusetts (USA) law prohibiting government agencies from entering into contracts with companies doing business in Myanmar. The law was passed in connection with alleged human rights violations in this Asian country. However, the case was resolved in court within the United States, and the request for consultations was withdrawn at the WTO site.

— Rejection of amendments to WTO agreements that have entered into force

This case is the only exception to the general rule. In accordance with Article X:3 of the Marrakesh Agreement, a Member State that refuses to accept certain amendments to WTO agreements may be excluded from the WTO by failing to provide the consent of the Ministerial Conference for its further participation. It is worth noting that this very reason is highlighted by foreign supporters of Russia's exclusion from the WTO, for example, a former member of the Appellate Body D. Bacchus (URL: https://www.wsj.com/articles/boot-russia-from-the-wto-world-trade-organization-putin-international-economic-sanctions-tariffs-legal-authority-11646092051 (accessed: 03/27/2023)). However, the actual meaning of this provision seems limited, and in practice it has never been used ^{[6, p. 261]}.

Secondly, WTO rules provide for the formal right of Member States to withdraw from the Organization unilaterally. Thus, Article XV of the Marrakesh Agreement and Article XXXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994 (GATT-1994) establish that a country that has decided to withdraw from the WTO must send a corresponding written notification to the Director General of the WTO, and the withdrawal is carried out six months from the date of receipt of the notification.

In this situation, first of all, it is necessary to recall the principle of a single Package (Single Underlying Rule), which operates according to the general rule. A Member State that has expressed a desire to withdraw from the Organization cannot continue to be a party to the WTO multilateral trade agreements (agreements that form the basis of WTO law and are valid for all members). In addition, such a state ceases to be a party to plurilateral agreements of the Organization (agreements with a limited number of participants and valid only for the countries that signed them), for example, Agreements on government procurement in accordance with Article XXII:13 of this Agreement. Withdrawal from the WTO is an all-or-nothing option and does not provide an ? la carte option.

An exception to this rule is the withdrawal from individual plurilateral agreements. For example, the state has the opportunity, while remaining a WTO member, not to be a party to the Agreement on Government Procurement (which entered into force in a new version in 2014) and, without violating WTO rights, freely discriminate in favor of local goods, services and service providers in the context of government procurement. Moreover, having become a party to the Agreement, the State can leave it: this happens after 60 days from the date of receipt by the Director General of the WTO of a written notification of withdrawal (Article XXII:12 of the Agreement). At the same time, such a country will continue to be a member of the Organization. To implement this exception, the WTO will have to deal with the institutionalization and development of plurilateral agreements ^[19].

As for the practical side of the issue, to date there has not been a single case of withdrawal of a member State from either the WTO (Marrakesh Agreement) or any plurilateral agreement ^[11]. Officially, only two examples are known when the leaders of countries spoke about a possible withdrawal from the Organization: a) in the Caribbean banana-producing countries disappointed by the outcome of the DS27, EC — Bananas III, 1997 dispute, and b) in the USA, where President D. Trump has been seeking WTO reform in a similar way since 2018 ^{[6, p. 261]}.

Summarizing the above, it should be emphasized that the termination of a Member State's membership in the WTO is possible only as a result of its withdrawal from the Organization, but not temporary suspension or exclusion by other Member States (especially by individual members). However, the right to withdraw has not been implemented by any State to date.

2. Five misconceptions of supporters of Russia's withdrawal from the WTOSome groups of opponents of Russia's participation in the WTO are pushing to take such a step.

The content of their positions can be found in the following sources: a) in Bill No. 91393-8 initiated by deputies from the Fair Russia — For Truth party (introduced in 2022, rejected by the State Duma (State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation), URL: https://sozd.duma.gov.ru/bill/91393-8 (date of appeal: 03/27/2023)); b) in Bill No. 494210-7 initiated by deputies from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (submitted in 2018, is under consideration in the first reading in the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, URL: https://sozd.duma.gov.ru/bill/494210-7 (date of reference: 03/27/2023)); c) in the article of Doctor of Economics V. Yu. Katasonov (URL: https://www.rline.tv/podrobnosti/2022-06-04-bez-vykhoda-iz-vto-vosstanovlenie-ekonomiki-rossii-nevozmozhno / (date of reference: 03/27/2023)); d) in an article with the positions of some representatives of the agricultural business (URL: https://www.agroinvestor.ru/analytics/article/38381-smazannyy-effekt-vto-rossiya-ne-smogla-vospolzovatsya-vsemi-preimushchestvami-chlenstva-v-organizats / (accessed: 03/27/2023)), etc. According to their key arguments, five misconceptions about the effectiveness of Russia's participation in the WTO are outlined below.

The counterarguments formulated by the author of this article are of key importance, including on the basis of the positions in open sources of the following representatives of state bodies, scientific and academic circles: a) representatives of the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation (URL: https://www.interfax.ru/business/845332 (date of appeal: 27.03.2023)); b) representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (URL: https://tass.ru/politika/14186797 (date of address: 27.03.2023)); c) Doctor of Economics, Professor T. M. Isachenko (URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/vykhod-rossii-iz-vto-realnaya-neobkhodimost-ili-politicheskaya-spekulyatsiya / (accessed: 03/27/2023)); d) Ph.D. in Economics, Professor M. Y. Medvedkov (URL: https://tass.ru/ekonomika/14162053 (date of reference: 03/27/2023)); e) Ph.D. in Economics, Professor A. P. Portansky (URL: https://www.imemo.ru/publications/policy-briefs/text/updating-the-strategy-of-russias-membership-in-the-wto-is-on-the-agenda (accessed: 03/27/2023)).

2.1. The WTO does not help to cope with sanctions pressure, in particular with violation of the principle of non-discrimination

It is worth agreeing that the sanctions pressure exerted on Russia in 2022-2023 has become unprecedented in its scale. At the same time, only part of the full range of restrictions imposed are in the legal field of the WTO (trade and trade-related restrictions). Thus, some Members of the Organization have taken measures contrary to the most favored nation regime (MFN, Article I of the GATT-1994) and the rule of inadmissibility of quantitative restrictions (Article XI of the GATT-1994). For example, export or import bans today affect the following agricultural products: fish and seafood, luxury goods (caviar, truffles), beet pulp, alcoholic and tobacco products.

However, it should be noted that, firstly, the vast majority of member states continue to be guided by WTO rules in trade with Russia. According to the data of the Russian Export Center, at the end of March 2023, out of 164 WTO members, only six MFN were canceled against the country, and seven members introduced quantitative restrictions (URL: https://www.exportcenter.ru/company/bulletin / (accessed: 03/27/2023)). In order to mitigate sanctions pressure, foreign trade flows from countries applying sanctions are redirected to countries that comply with the rules. As for the latter, they continue to adhere to most of the WTO rules (national regime, technical regulation, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, trade policy review rules, etc.).

Secondly, the WTO has a tool for protecting violated rights — the WTO LFS. All trade restrictions imposed on Russia can be challenged on this platform. It is logical that a state not participating in the WTO does not have such an opportunity. Russia's withdrawal from the Organization is only beneficial to countries applying sanctions: In this case, they would impose their restrictions without violating the rules and not caring about upholding the legality of their actions in the WTO LFS.

It should also be noted that since the sanctions are politically motivated, the main (if not the only) legal justification for their introduction is the exception established by WTO law from the principle of non—discrimination — protection of national security interests (in relation to goods - Article XXI of the GATT-1994). At the same time, Russia has an exceptionally successful judicial practice on this basis: in the dispute DS512, Russia — Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit (where Russia was the defendant), the arbitration panel recognized Russian actions as consistent with Article XXI of GATT-1994, and in four other disputes (DS544, DS552, DS556, DS564 United States — Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products, in which Russia was a third party) the arbitration groups announced that the US measures did not comply with the norms of this article.

Thirdly, one of the functions of the WTO is to monitor trade policy. Member States undergo periodic review of their trade policies and practices, and various boards and committees of the Organization strive to ensure proper implementation of agreements. Documents under the jurisdiction of the WTO Committee on Agriculture are publicly available in the digital system AG IMS (Agriculture Information Management System, URL: https://agims.wto.org / (accessed: 03/27/2023)). This system records 97 questions about trade in agricultural goods that Russia has asked at Committee meetings since the introduction of sanctions against it in 2014.

2.2. The institutional crisis of the WTO has turned it into a non-functioning organizationMost experts in the field of international trade agree that the role of the WTO as a global regulator of the world trading system has significantly decreased in recent years.

Back at the Tenth WTO Ministerial Conference in Nairobi at the end of 2015, for the first time, several States recognizing obvious problems called for an end to the Doha Round of negotiations ^[12]. In the field of agriculture, the reasons for the "stalling" of the trade dialogue can be called the overestimated desires of developing countries requiring certain benefits under special and differential treatment; the weakening of the activity of the United States as the largest player and initiator; the "slowdown" on the part of the European Union (EU), which has its own subsidy programs; difficulties due to the principle of a single package ^[17].

The WTO dispute resolution system is also in crisis. The appellate body has not been functioning since December 2019 due to the expiration of the term of office of the former arbitrators and the blocking by the United States of the appointment of new ones. The American side cites the need for fundamental reform of the dispute settlement system as the reason for such actions. As a result, some countries abuse this situation by filing appeals to "freeze" disputes.

However, under the circumstances, it is important to understand that, firstly, the presence of rules is better than their absence. The WTO today remains the only global international organization dealing with trade issues. As an example of successful trade negotiations, we can cite the solution of the issue of export subsidies. Since the beginning of the Doha Round, export subsidies have been seen as one of the most trade-distorting instruments. Against this background, in 2015, a Ministerial Conference in Nairobi adopted a Decision on export competition ^[3], according to which developed countries pledged to immediately cancel export subsidies from the date of the Decision, and developing countries — by the end of 2018.

Among the recent successes of international trade negotiations, the signing of an Agreement on Fishing Subsidies in 2022 can be noted. It prohibits subsidies that threaten the sustainability of fisheries. For example, the volume of European subsidies is estimated to be significantly higher than the support of the industry in Russia, and should be subject to a greater reduction. Experts expect that this agreement will help reduce the negative impact of foreign subsidies on the Russian fishing industry (URL: https://www.finam.ru/publications/item/na-konferencii-vto-dogovorilis-po-soglasheniyu-o-rybolovnyx-subsidiyax-kotoroe-obsuzhdalos-bolee-20-let-20220618-173307 / (accessed: 03/27/2023)).

Secondly, the WTO leadership, the majority of Member States, and the leaders of the Group of Twenty (G20) support the need for a full-fledged reform of the Organization's institutions. The main world economic players (the USA, China, the EU) and various groups of countries within the WTO are promoting their reform proposals in problematic areas: the dispute resolution system, the negotiation system, maintaining transparency and monitoring trade policy, the introduction of protectionist measures. In the final document of the Twelfth WTO Ministerial Conference ^[2] in Geneva in June 2022, the obligations of the Member States to work on the necessary reform and the obligations of the General Council to analyze the progress of work and consider decisions that will be presented at the next Ministerial Conference were fixed.

Thirdly, during the period of reforming the institutions of the Organization, countries can actively use alternative ways of regulating international trade. These primarily include the mechanism of regional integration that does not contradict WTO rules. Regional trade agreements (RTAs) are made exceptions to the principle of non-discrimination: their creation and operation are allowed under certain conditions. The agreements themselves are built on the principles and rules of the WTO, but may also include obligations that go beyond the current mandate of the Organization (for example, labor relations). Russia has a number of RTAs, primarily the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) of 2014. Within its framework, a common market, a single customs space, a single customs tariff and common measures of non-tariff regulation, supranational regulatory bodies function. As an example of an agreement covering a wide range of trade and trade-related issues, the Free Trade Agreement between the EAEU and Vietnam from 2015 can also be cited. It provides for the mutual abolition of customs duties, and also contains provisions in the areas of competition, trade in services, investment, sustainable development, e-commerce, public procurement, etc. In addition, negotiations on the conclusion of free trade agreements with Iran, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, etc. are at different stages.

Regarding the crisis of the WTO dispute resolution system, several temporary alternative mechanisms with varying degrees of effectiveness can also be proposed: bilateral agreements on non-filing of appeals, transfer of appeals to international arbitration, dispute resolution using RTAs ^[18].

2.3. The WTO does not allow for a protectionist policyOf course, the Organization's activities are aimed at liberalizing international trade and reducing trade barriers.

But how low these barriers should be, the member states decide among themselves on the WTO platform. Based on the principle of reciprocity, a trade negotiator offering a smaller set of concessions is likely to receive a similar offer from other negotiators in return.

WTO agreements establish the rules for liberalization. It is worth noting that these rules contain special tools to protect the national industries of the member states. Russia uses the following mechanisms:

— Transitional periods after the adoption of the rules, during which national producers can adapt to new conditions. For example, after joining the WTO, Russia received 2-3 years to reduce tariff protection for most goods and 5-7 years for sensitive (including some agricultural) goods. The latter include goods of special economic importance and the ability to use preferences in trade negotiations. The report of the working group on Russia's accession to the WTO (Table 15) ^[4] contains a list of strategic (sensitive) goods.

— The mechanism of tariff quotas is a two—tier tariff, in which a lower tariff rate is charged on imports within the quota volume (within the quota), and a higher tariff rate is charged on imports outside the quota (above the quota). Tariff quotas for agricultural products were agreed by Russia during its accession to the WTO. Today, they are set for the country at the EAEU level: in 2023, tariff quotas for cattle meat, poultry meat and offal, and whey were allocated to Russia ^[15].

— Exceptions (exemptions) from the MFN and the national regime, including general exceptions under Article XX GATT-1994 (to protect public morals, life or health of people, animals and plants, etc.), exceptions for reasons of national security under Article XXI GATT-1994, exceptions to ensure the balance of payments under Article XII of the GATT-1994.

— Trade protection measures (measures to protect the domestic market), which include anti-dumping, countervailing and protective measures (safeguards). They can be introduced in cases where imports flow at dumping prices, are subsidized by the country of origin or sharply increase in volumes.

— Subsidizing agriculture (domestic subsidies), with the exception of export subsidies. The WTO Agreement on Agriculture permits the use of subsidies from the green basket (not subject to mandatory reduction) and the yellow (amber) basket (allowed, but subject to reduction). The agreement provides for the establishment of a maximum threshold for the total amount of support for local producers (Aggregate Measurement of Support, AMS). The AMS does not include green basket subsidies, payments to producers under production reduction programs (under certain conditions), as well as subsidies at the de minimis level, i.e. amounting to less than 5% (for developed countries) from the cost volume of production of a particular product in the country (URL: https://mgimo.ru/files/6613/praktikym_sybs-agr_files.doc (accessed: 03/27/2023)). It should be noted that of the $4.4 billion in AMS available to Russia per year, it used only $94.19 million in 2019 and $89.47 million in 2020. The de minimis level according to the latest data notified to the WTO was exceeded only for four groups of goods (flax/hemp, grapes, deer and wool) (Committee on Agriculture, Notification s G/AG/N/RUS/34; G/AG/N/RUS/37). Thus, Russia uses about 2% of the AMS available to it and has the opportunity to significantly increase the level of agricultural subsidies without violating its WTO obligations.

2.4. Russia does not win disputes in the WTOIt is worth mentioning two of the most famous disputes with Russia's participation in the WTO.

The first case is a ban on the import of live pigs and pork from EU countries (DS475, Russian Federation — Measures on the Import of Live Pigs, Pork and Other Pig Products from the European Union). This measure was introduced in early 2014 in connection with the outbreak of African swine fever. The actions of the Russian side were found unfounded first by the arbitration panel, and then by the WTO Appellate Body. In December 2017, the Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance of the Russian Federation lifted the import ban, retaining restrictions only on those regions where outbreaks of the disease were recorded. However, subsequently, pork imports from the EU were again banned, but this time because of the food embargo.

The second case is the restriction of transit of goods coming from the territory of Ukraine, which was introduced by Russia for reasons of national security (DS512, Russia — Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit). This dispute is unique. The arbitration panel's decision, issued in April 2019, is the first in the WTO dispute resolution system, where exceptions for national security reasons under Article XXI of GATT—1994 were interpreted and applied. Russia became the first country to win a dispute on this basis: the arbitration panel found that the measures imposed did not contradict WTO law ^[7]. Prior to this case, the members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 and the WTO made references to the article on national security 18 times, and an arbitration panel was established four more times on it, but did not consider the dispute until the end ^[20]. Later, on this basis, in four more disputes in which Russia was a third party, the arbitration groups announced the inconsistency of the US measures.

In general, it is worth noting that, compared with some other countries, Russia initiated fewer disputes in the WTO. According to the WTO (URL: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm (date of appeal: 03/27/2023)), since the beginning of 2013, it has submitted eight requests for consultations, while the EU — 23 requests, the USA — 21, and China — 12.

Thus, Russia has a successful practice of challenging trade restrictions in the WTO and has the capacity to do so on an ongoing basis.

2.5. Further development of international trade will be solely due to regionalizationIn response to the slowdown in global trade integration in recent years, there has been a quantitative and qualitative acceleration of regionalization.

RTAs are one of the key elements of the global trading system and the legal basis for building mutual trade relations between world countries. Article XXIV of GATT-1994 does not prevent Member States from creating customs unions or free trade zones, as well as concluding temporary agreements subject to certain conditions. For example, such agreements should not lead to restrictions on third countries. Unlike the WTO multilateral agreements, RTAs are concluded by a limited number of countries and therefore have greater flexibility in taking into account the interests of the contracting parties, the scope and scope of obligations, and the speed of negotiations.

Foreign economists also speak about the negative side of regionalization. A set of ideas of supporters of global trade, called the "spaghetti bowl" effect (the term was first used by D. Bhagwati in 1995, URL: https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8CN7BFM (accessed: 03/27/2023)), contains evidence that an increase in the number of RTAs inevitably leads to a slowdown in global trade based on WTO principles. This is due to violations of the principle of non-discrimination, differences in the wording of the rules of origin, distortion of trade, increased political and economic inequality, etc.

It should be emphasized once again that all RTAs are created and operate in accordance with the principles and rules of the WTO. Further development of international trade is possible only with the complementarity of globalization and regionalization. But for this, the WTO will have to develop deeper forms of cooperation, taking into account the different stages of economic development of the member states ^[9].

3. Expected consequences of leaving the OrganizationTaking into account the above-mentioned common misconceptions about Russia's participation in the WTO and solving the dilemma, we can assume the onset of certain consequences in a situation when the withdrawal from the Organization will still take place.

The comparison of positive and negative consequences is crucial.

3.1. Positive consequences— Non-compliance with WTO rules and principles

Russia will be able to introduce more unilateral trade measures (including increasing export (but not import) customs duties, providing support to national production above the permissible levels of WTO support, allocating export subsidies, tightening technical regulation, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, adopting a differentiated tax rate for imported goods), not notifying the WTO of the measures introduced, etc.

— Termination of all trade disputes in the WTO

Russia will be able to stop disputes in which it is now acting as a defendant: according to the WTO, these are six disputes at different stages (URL: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm (accessed: 03/27/2023)).

— Closure of the national market for foreign goods, development of domestic production

According to T. M. Isachenko, this may correspond to the interests of individual manufacturers who seek to exist in a less competitive environment, but it will not benefit consumers for whom goods will become more expensive, less high-quality and less accessible (URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/vykhod-rossii-iz-vto-realnaya-neobkhodimost-ili-politicheskaya-spekulyatsiya / (accessed: 03/27/2023)).

3.2. Negative consequences— Retaliatory discrimination by other Member States

According to M. Y. Medvedkov, "the alternative to the WTO is trade without rules," and the potential withdrawal of the country from the trade organization is comparable to the refusal to comply with traffic rules (URL: https://tass.ru/ekonomika/14162053 (accessed: 03/27/2023)). Russia's withdrawal from the WTO makes it possible for other states to discriminate against Russian goods in all spheres and at all stages of exporting Russian products. A multiple increase in both tariff and non-tariff barriers is likely (unreasonable prohibitions, delays in the approval procedure, burdensome requirements). A. P. Portansky notes: "Finally, we must not forget that the domestic economy faces new ambitious goals. Thus, according to the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 474 dated July 21, 2020, by 2030, it is expected to achieve a real growth in exports of non-raw non-energy goods to the level of $ 273 billion. Achieving this goal is absolutely unrealistic without free access to world markets, which ensures WTO membership" (URL: https://www.imemo.ru/publications/policy-briefs/text/updating-the-strategy-of-russias-membership-in-the-wto-is-on-the-agenda (accessed: 03/27/2023)).

— Limited freedom in establishing new regulation in the field of trade

It should also be taken into account that all legal regulation of the EAEU is based on WTO rules. For example, the rates of import duties are fixed in the Unified Customs Tariff of the EAEU (the EAEU ETT), and for its change, the consent of all EAEU member states is required. Other free trade agreements in which Russia participates also contain references to WTO rules. Additionally, it is worth paying attention to the fact that measures initiated by a non-WTO member state of the EAEU for adoption at the EAEU level and adopted by other EAEU member states may be challenged in the WTO ^[16].

— Forced actual preservation of some WTO obligations in case of loss of rights

At first glance, this seems illogical, but after leaving the WTO, Russia will receive imported goods at lower duties. Currently, the EAEU ETT is based on the level of the Russian tariff, and after the country leaves the WTO, it will rely on the level of tariff obligations of Kazakhstan, which is significantly lower than the Russian one. Currently, about 3.5 thousand tariff items can be imported into Kazakhstan from third countries at rates below the EAEU ETT levels, but such goods must be released for domestic consumption exclusively on its territory ^[14].

— Isolation from participation in the development of the world trading system

Russia will lose the opportunity to participate in the discussion of trade policy issues, to defend and defend its national trade interests within the framework of the world's largest trading platform with 164 members ^[13]. Thus, access to special mechanisms will be lost to resolve various trade issues raised for political purposes, as well as to remove illegal trade barriers (for example, the opportunity to speak in specialized WTO committees). There is also a high probability of a negative perception of Russia's withdrawal from the WTO by countries that have not imposed anti-Russian sanctions. In addition, major economies, including the US, EU and China, will strengthen their role in setting global trade rules.

— Tightening of membership conditions upon re-joining

It will be difficult and long to return to the Organization after leaving. Firstly, the terms of membership will be negotiated anew, and the previous accession negotiations lasted 18 years. Secondly, the bar of requirements for candidates for membership has been growing over the years, and the volume of obligations is increasing.

Based on the above, withdrawal from the WTO will have significantly more negative consequences for Russia for international trade than positive ones.

ConclusionThus, Russia cannot be temporarily suspended or excluded from the WTO.

The country needs to continue participating in the Organization, and Russian economic agents engaged in international trade in agricultural products should continue to build their relations with foreign partners on the basis of WTO rules. The solution to the Russian dilemma should be embodied in the form of "WTO: you can't leave, you can't stay."

Russia's further participation in the Organization is possible taking into account the following recommendations.

— Improving the effectiveness of the use of WTO mechanisms

To date, Russia has the opportunity to increase activity within the scope of the rights granted to it on the permissible amount of support for local producers, on trade protection measures (in particular, in relation to agricultural products), and on challenging trade restrictions. In addition, further work is needed to increase awareness of WTO mechanisms among citizens, businesses, and government officials.

— Participation in the development of both global and regional trading systems

During the period of reforming the WTO institutions, Russia can make more active use of regional integration mechanisms. The country has signed a number of rules-based regional trade agreements, primarily the EAEU Treaty, and there is a prospect of concluding agreements with new partner states. On the other hand, it is necessary to prevent the reform of WTO institutions and the development of new rules for international trade from taking place without Russia's participation.

— Setting the vector for long-term planning of participation

Membership in an Organization is impractical to evaluate based on an analysis of short-term trends. The Russian economy can receive significant benefits in the long term by improving its investment attractiveness, the possibility of protecting violated rights, removing discriminatory measures and applying measures that do not contradict WTO law to protect national industries.