P. F. Unterberger's Policy and Views on Korean Migrants in the Far East of the Russian Empire

Burdin Evgenii Sergeevich Far-East Institute of Management, Branch of RANEPA 680000, Russia, Khabarovsk Krai, Khabarovsk, Muravyov-Amursky str., 33 burdin-1955@mail.ru

IntroductionP. F. Unterberger, who held the posts of military Governor of the Primorsky Region (1888-1897) and Governor-General of the Amur Region (1905-1910), played an important role in the development of the Far Eastern outskirts of the Russian Empire and rightfully holds the title of honorary citizen of the cities of Khabarovsk and Vladivostok.

Being a staunch follower of the ideas of N. N. Muravyov-Amursky, he, as a military engineer, made a major contribution to the construction of the defensive fortifications of Vladivostok and the construction of roads. P. F. Unterberger supported the creation of the Sino-Eastern Railway and stood at the origins of the construction of the Amur Railway. During the agrarian reform of P. A. Stolypin, he made great efforts to settle new settlers from the central provinces in the region. His attention was constantly focused on problems in the fields of education and healthcare.

Russian Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and the First Russian Revolution of 1905-1907 fell to the lot of P. F. Unterberger during the leadership of the Amur Governorship-General. Acting as a conductor of the interests of the autocracy, P. F. Unterberger at this historical period has established himself as an irreconcilable fighter against anti-government manifestations.

However, for researchers of the history of the formation of the Korean diaspora in the Russian Far East, P. F. Unterberger is interesting primarily as a regional administrator who pursued a policy of limiting resettlement from Korea, as well as strengthening control over the Korean population settled in the Far East.

The works of P. F. UnterbergerFirst of all, valuable sources of information about P. F. Unterberger's views and approach to the settlement of the Korean issue are the essays he wrote "Primorsky Region 1856-1898" ^[1] and "Amur Region 1906-1910" ^[2].

In the first book, the Governor-General concluded that the Koreans, as a colonization element, were unsuitable for the development of the Primorsky Region. In his opinion, the state interests demanded the consolidation of the indigenous Russian population there, which would be able to counteract the peaceful invasion of the "yellow race" and ensure Russia's strategic interests on the Pacific coast.

The official pointed out that the lifestyle, habits, mentality and ways of farming inherent in the Korean population are alien to the Russian population. P. F. Unterberger explained the low degree of assimilation of Koreans and their preservation of national traditions by their constant connection with compatriots who regularly come to work in Russia from Korea. In this regard, he questioned the success of missionary activity in the Korean environment, noting that most Koreans did not know Russian and only a few missionaries spoke Korean. The essay noted a low number of marriages between Russians and Koreans, which was explained by differences in everyday life, cuisine and methods of cultivating the land. Russian schools founded in Korean settlements, according to the official, existed "for show", whereas most of the boys, in fact, studied Korean literacy ^{[1, pp. 114-115]}.

Describing the widespread practice of leasing land plots to Koreans by the Russian population, the Governor-General pointed out that it led to the loss of the habit of agricultural labor, the development of laziness and drunkenness among the Far Eastern peasantry. In the context of the land issue, he also noted cases of unauthorized seizure of land plots by Koreans in remote areas where there was no administrative supervision.

In the essay, P. F. Unterberger opposed the acceptance of Koreans into Russian citizenship. From the official's point of view, this act equalized the rights of foreigners with the rest of the Russian population and provided them with the patronage of the Russian authorities with all the accompanying material benefits. However, the Koreans themselves, in his view, perceived the oath of allegiance to Russia only as a formality. With this in mind, he expected that in the event of complications with other states, the Korean population would be guided by considerations of their own benefit and support the stronger side. Thus, swearing in would bring unilateral benefits to the Koreans and would not contribute to the realization of Russian interests. ^{[1, p. 116]}. In the light of these circumstances, P. F. Unterberger believed that a course should be pursued with respect to Korean residents, focused only on state interests. He explained this position by the fact that Koreans are "alien people" who have voluntarily transferred to Russia, to whom the government has no moral obligations.

P. F. Unterberger highlighted his views on the Korean problem in more detail in the essay "The Amur Region 1906-1910" ^[2]. In it, he spoke from a more rigid position, noting that the Russian colonization of the Amur Region will proceed at a low pace until the "yellow labor" is limited there ^{[2, p. 82]}. From the official's point of view, in the Far East it was necessary to create a "strong, homogeneous, and friendly Slavic stronghold" capable of withstanding the "performances of the yellow race" ^{[2, p. 83]}. Russian Russian colonists, the author expressed confidence in the need for state measures to support the Russian colonists and warned the government against passively waiting for the "yellow worker" to be ousted by the Russian ^{[2, p. 82]}. Moreover, the Governor-General stressed that in case of military actions, it is more profitable for Russia to have undeveloped empty lands in the Far East than territories occupied by the "yellow element" ^{[2, p. 86]}.

P. F. Unterberger drew attention to the fact that there are a large number of Koreans in the Amur Region – foreign nationals, whose number he estimated at 30 thousand people. As in the previous essay, he again noted the negative experience of Korean land lease in the region (the development of drunkenness and parasitism among the Russian population) ^{[2, p. 72]}, as well as numerous cases of seizure by foreigners of empty government plots. In this context, he stressed that not only peasant farmers, but even Korean workers also tried to "sit on the ground" at the first opportunity ^{[2, p. 83]}.

Due to the fact that the Koreans of the "millennia" lived a separate life in their homeland, the Governor-General in his book skeptically assessed the possibility of their Russification in the near future. Korean culture and mentality in his understanding were so different from the Slavic one that it was pointless to hope for a quick mixing of the Korean and Russian population. Russian Russian is a confirmation of the author's repeated reference to isolated cases of marriages between Russians and Koreans, a low percentage of Korean men who know Russian, as well as the almost complete absence of Russian-speaking Korean women ^{[2, p. 83]}. In addition, the Governor-General expressed doubts that the passage of Korean youth military service will be able to significantly promote assimilation. He justified his position by the fact that after three years of service, young Koreans returned to their settlements, where they again found themselves in a "purely Korean situation" ^{[2, p. 84]}.

In an essay on the Amur Region, P. F. Unterberger categorically opposed the initiative to accept into Russian citizenship all Korean immigrants who illegally settled in Russia after the annexation of Korea by Japan. Koreans, who in his understanding had little resistance to the enslavement of their fatherland, should not have been expected to sacrifice themselves in the interests of Russia. In this sense, the official repeated the thesis that the main goal of foreigners in obtaining Russian citizenship is to improve their material well-being ^{[2, p. 84]}.

Touching upon the development of the anti-Japanese movement in Korea, P. F. Unterberger noted that in parallel with him, a trend in support of Japan was born in the country. Against this background, he suggested that when the Japanese government conducts a wise colonial policy, the next generations of Koreans can come to terms with the fact of the annexation of their state and take a more loyal position towards the invaders. In addition, Japan, according to the official, "by its racial characteristics" had a better chance of merging with Korea and arousing sympathy among its population. Given the close contacts of Koreans living in Russia with their relatives in their historical homeland, the official did not rule out that over time pro-Japanese views may spread among the Korean population of the Amur Region. In the event of such a trend, the Russian government in the conflict with Japan risked not meeting "selfless patriotism" among Russian-Korean subjects ^{[2, p. 85]}.

P. F. Unterberger also criticized the opinion on the need to swear in Koreans-foreign nationals in order to eliminate the risks of interference by Japan, which after the annexation of Korea may declare its jurisdiction over Korean residents living in Russia. On this occasion, the Governor-General noted that for Koreans who do not have Russian citizenship, St. Petersburg can determine such living conditions that correspond to Russian interests in the region and do not contradict trade and political agreements with Japan. Having accepted Koreans into citizenship, the Far Eastern administration will be forced to endow them with land "in order not to create a homeless proletariat." At the same time, if at the initial stage the Korean population agrees even to remote and unsuitable plots for Russian agriculture, just to get citizenship, then later it will be necessary to apply for improvement of their land conditions. This will inevitably lead to a reduction in the land fund for Russian colonists ^{[2, p. 86]}.

In the development of the topic, P. F. Unterberger also rejected the proposal to swear in only Koreans currently living in Russia with the further closure of the border for all new arrivals. He explained the ineffectiveness of such a measure, firstly, by the inability to stop migration flows from Korea due to weak control over the common border, and secondly, by the lack of the Russian administration's ability to accurately establish the identity and time of transition to Russia of each specific Korean migrant. He recognized the involvement of translators from the Korean environment in solving this problem as undesirable because of the risks of abuse ^{[2, p. 86]}.

Along with this, P. F. Unterberger considered it inappropriate to implement the initiative to create Korean societies designed to increase the cohesion of Korean residents and strengthen "patriotic ties" between Koreans and Russians. According to the authors of the idea, these societies should have been granted the right to establish schools with teaching in Korean, as well as to conduct church services in Korean. It was assumed that their functioning would make it possible to counteract the negative influence on the Korean population by representatives of other countries. However, from the point of view of the Governor-General, the appearance of such associations would lead to the opposite effect, namely, the development of national separatism among Koreans. Due to the absence of persons who know Korean among Russian officials, administrative control over the societies would be weakened. As a result, the main goal of the associations in the future could be to promote the economic interests of Koreans in the region, including by initiating various petitions to the Far Eastern administration. If these collective appeals were rejected, elements hostile to Russia could launch agitation in the societies ^{[2, p. 89]}.

And finally, P. F. Unterberger again questioned the effectiveness of the work of the missionaries of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Korean environment. As the official noted, due to linguistic and cultural barriers, missionaries could not significantly influence the spiritual life of Koreans when presenting the basics of Orthodoxy. Most of them perceived the act of baptism as an "external rite" and easily lost touch with Christianity against the background of weak pastoral supervision and constant contacts with Koreans professing other religions. The Governor-General explained the cases of mass conversion of Koreans to Orthodoxy by their desire to accelerate the Russian oath in this way ^{[2, p. 89]}.

Review of other sources and literatureIn view of P. F. Unterberger's great contribution to the formation of the course of the Far Eastern administration regarding migration from Korea, the policy and personal views of the official on the Korean issue are touched upon in most works on the history of the resettlement of Koreans to tsarist Russia.

Among the pre-revolutionary works, researchers are particularly interested in the information about the position of P. F. Unterberger contained in the report of a member of the Amur expedition V. V. Grave ^[3].

V. V. Grave's report contains a pragmatic assessment of the reasons for the delay of the Far Eastern administration regarding the swearing in of Koreans who settled in Russia before 1884, which is very characteristic of P. F. Unterberger. Russian Russian believes that the authorities deliberately delayed with this issue, since the uncertain legal status of foreigners made it possible to expel unreliable persons abroad, as well as to effectively influence the situation in Korean settlements (the creation of Russian schools, the spread of the Russian language). In addition, Koreans without citizenship could be involved in paying taxes on an equal basis with other foreigners ^{[3, p. 132]}.

V. V. Grave associates the end of the period of favorable approach of the authorities to the Korean population with the appointment of P. F. Unterberger as Governor-General of the Amur Region. Under his leadership, the Far Eastern administration took a number of restrictive measures against foreigners who settled in the region. Thus, the rights of Koreans of the 1st category (who settled before 1884) to obtain citizenship were checked, the issuance of permits for hiring Koreans to work in mines and fishing was stopped, and the leasing of state-owned land to Russian-subject Koreans was prohibited. In addition, a series of minor restrictive measures were taken against Korean schools, associations and cabotage, while positive decisions were made for Chinese living in Russia on similar issues.

To illustrate the views of P. F. Unterberger, V. V. Grave cites the theses of his memorandum to the Minister of Internal Affairs dated March 8, 1908 (RGIA DV. F. 394. Op. 1. d. 37. L. 2-3). In it, the official noted the tendency of Koreans to settle firmly on the ground at the first opportunity. As their allotments "overflowed", they settled on the edge and, renting land, created new "hotbeds" for the resettlement of Koreans-foreign subjects. The note emphasizes that it was extremely difficult for the authorities to combat this trend. The reason is that the Russian population, seeing cheap labor and "profitable tenants" in Koreans, very willingly "accepted" them to their lands. However, in conditions when the task of state importance was the settlement of the region by the Russian population, the seizure of vast territories by the Koreans was identical to the weakening of Russia's positions on the Pacific coast ^{[3, p. 34]}.

In a note to the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Governor-General also noted the low degree of assimilation of Koreans with the Russian population and expressed doubts about their loyalty in the event of a clash with Japan or China. According to the official, in the conditions of military operations, the enemy could widely deploy espionage activities in the Korean environment.

After a brief summary of individual theses from the essay "Primorsky Region 1856-1898", V. V. Grave gives the content of his personal conversation with P. F. Unterberger, held on October 18, 1910. The Governor-General then noted that "the yellow danger threatens the Amur region greatly, therefore it is necessary to take radical measures against it, trying with all his might to fight with representatives of the yellow races… But it is impossible to take drastic measures against them, but it is necessary to gradually oust them from the edge." The official said that according to his instructions, a ban has already been imposed on the implementation of state-owned works by foreign workers. The next necessary steps he outlined the "correct organization" of transportation to the Far East of Russian workers and, finally, the introduction of a ban on the hiring of Asian subjects by entrepreneurs ^{[3, p. 136]}.

According to P. F. Unterberger, after the introduction of restrictions on the work of foreigners in private enterprises, the region would easily be freed from the presence of the Chinese. The official described them as a "wandering element" that will leave if there is no need for it. However, the situation with Koreans is described differently in the document. From the point of view of P. F. Unterberger, Koreans, unlike the Chinese, sought to gain a foothold and were not limited only to work for hire. They built residential houses, equipped vegetable gardens and arable land. Therefore, after the introduction of a ban on the use of their labor, it was to be expected that they would remain in the Amur region ^{[3, p. 136]}.

Thus, V. V. Grave came to the conclusion that it was precisely because of the desire of people from Korea to settle firmly in Russia that the Governor-General adhered to a tough position towards Koreans and was more loyal to the Chinese in the province. At the same time, a member of the Amur expedition in his book noted that P. F. Unterberger recognized the Korean residents for their ability to farm in such areas, the development of which was beyond the power of a Russian peasant. But in the same circumstance, he saw danger, because, mastering inconvenient areas, the Koreans subsequently captured neighboring good areas. As a result, their relatives and acquaintances moved in with them, as a result of which a new Korean settlement was formed in the region. Considering this, the Governor-General considered the plans of the resettlement Administration to be erroneous, intending to transfer lands to Koreans that were not suitable for Russian colonization. The implementation of this measure, according to the official, in 10 years could lead Russia "to a new Tsushima." ^{[3, pp. 136-137]}.

At the end of the consideration of P. F. Unterberger's views, the researcher quoted his words: "I am not an enemy of Koreans ... but I cannot agree with the opinion of my predecessors, who believed that the desert Region should be populated ahead of everything, even by Koreans. I prefer the desert, but Russian, than the cultivated Land, but Korean. The time will come when the region will be filled with Russians, the land reserves will be cultivated, but already by them, not by Koreans. True, this may happen in 100 years, but at least I will not have it in my heart that I let some yellow-faced people plunder the Russian land" ^{[3, p. 137]}.

One of the first Soviet researchers of the Korean question in Russia, S. D. Anosov ^[4] refers P. F. Unterberger to the opponents of the settlement of the Far East by Koreans and the use of their labor in the region. Summarizing the information contained in the essays of the Governor-General himself and the works of V. V. Grave, S. D. Anosov concludes that, recognizing the benefit of Koreans at the first stages of the development of the region, the official saw the main threat to Russian interests in the desire of Koreans to settle firmly on the ground, as well as their low ability to assimilate with the Russian population. These circumstances contributed to the formation of an ethnic enclave in the province, the presence of which made it difficult for Russian colonization due to the reduction of land funds ^{[4, p. 11]}.

S. D. Anosov calls P. F. Unterberger a resolute opponent of the acceptance of Koreans into Russian citizenship, who believed that such a step would require their further allotment of land and would lead to the consolidation of their position in the province. As the researcher notes, the Governor-General considered the desire of Koreans to become Russian citizens to be "purely external" and even considered sworn foreigners as closer to Japan than to Russia. In this regard, the official considered it more expedient to leave the Far Eastern lands empty than to populate them with an unreliable element ^{[4, p. 11]}.

According to S. D. Anosov, there were two main points of view on resettlement from Korea in tsarist Russia. P. F. Unterberger, who opposed the use of Korean labor in the colonization of the Far East, was a prominent representative of one of them. The author considers the members of the Amur expedition to be supporters of the opposite approach, whose conclusions formed the basis of the loyal policy towards the Koreans, which was carried out by Governor-General N. L. Gondatti ^{[4, p. 10, 15]}.

Similar ideas are expressed by the modern Kazakh researcher G. N. Kim ^[5]. When classifying pre-revolutionary sources of historiography of the resettlement of Koreans to the Russian Far East, he refers P. F. Unterberger to the monarchical direction. According to the researcher, the authors of this group are united by an exclusively utilitarian approach to the Korean issue, as well as a desire to see Russian colonization of the Far Eastern outskirts of the country.

The views of P. F. Unterberger in the context of the conclusions of the Amur expedition are also considered in the article by E. L. Lee ^[6]. The author characterizes the position of the members of the expedition as more balanced and believes that her works have allowed to some extent to neutralize the ingrained idea of the "yellow danger" hanging over the edge, which was formed under the influence of P. F. Unterberger.

E. L. Lee argues his opinion with the conclusions of the members of the expedition, in particular, S. P. Shlikevich ^[7]. He believed that while Russian colonization was moving from the center to the outskirts, it was necessary to allow Korean colonization in the opposite direction, i.e. from the most remote Far Eastern borders to the center. As a result, Russian settlers would come not to the desert, but to inhabited areas where there were food and livestock supplies ^{[7, pp. 129-130]}.

Along with this, E. L. Lee notes that before the Amur expedition, views prevailed about the impossibility of assimilation of Koreans with Russians, as P. F. Unterberger argued in his essays. However, S. P. Shlikevich's analysis showed the existence of not cultural, but economic assimilation of the two peoples. This found expression in the rapid introduction into Korean agricultural production of crops not previously cultivated by them. At the same time, there was also a reverse movement, when Russian peasants used atypical farming methods for them and grew new crops (soybeans, rice) ^{[6, p. 37]}.

In addition, E. L. Lee points to the development by expedition member V. D. Pesotsky ^[8] of a set of recommendations that were designed to use the potential of the Korean population in Russian interests, minimizing the risks identified, including P. F. Unterberger.

In the classic work of B. D. Park ^[9], a separate paragraph entitled "Unterberger and his anti-Korean policy" is devoted to the Governor-General's course. Russian Russian population The author characterizes P. F. Unterberger as a supporter of the settlement of the Amur region by the Russian population and notes that since his appointment as Governor-General of the Amur Region, the negative attitude of the Far Eastern administration to the influx of the Korean population to the region after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 has become especially noticeable. In confirmation of this, he provides excerpts from the works of S. D. Anosov, V. V. Grave, as well as working correspondence and orders of P. F. Unterberger.

To illustrate the views of the official, B. D. Pak outlined the contents of the Most Comprehensive report of Governor-General Unterberger for 1906-1907 (AVPR. F. "Pacific Table, 1896-1908". d. 1089. L. 39.). This document largely repeated the theses of the memo to the Minister of Internal Affairs of March 8, 1908. However, the thesis that that as a result of leasing land to Koreans, the tsarist government in the event of war risks encountering a faint-hearted and relaxed Russian population in the region, which will not support the troops, but will rather be a burden.

Among P. F. Unterberger's specific restrictive measures against Koreans, the author highlights the establishment of prohibitions on the surrender of state-owned land to foreigners for settlement, the hiring of foreign workers for state-owned work. In this context, his demands to the leadership of the Primorsky Region to replace the labor of Koreans at state-owned enterprises, concessions and "leases of state-owned land", to stop providing benefits to the "yellow" and to take decisive measures to stop the influx of Koreans were also noted. To implement these measures, the Governor-General ordered, at the expense of fees from Chinese and foreign Koreans, to establish additional positions of 19 police officials, 8 interpreters and 101 mounted police officers in the Primorsky and Amur regions ^{[9, p. 99]}. In addition, under P. F. Unterberger, the military governor of the Primorsky Region and officials of various levels received the right to apply arrests and fines against Koreans – foreign nationals who committed minor offenses ^{[9, p. 99]}.

Along with this, B. D. Pak calls P. F. Unterberger the initiator of the convocation in Khabarovsk in 1908 of a meeting of governors and representatives of commercial, industrial and agricultural circles of the Amur Region. Having considered the "yellow" and Korean issues, the participants of the event recognized the undesirable Korean lease of land, which has become widespread in the Far East of the country. The reasons for this decision were called the inconsistency of this phenomenon with the interests of strengthening economic efficiency and diligence among the peasantry, as well as the use by tenants of predatory methods of land cultivation ^{[9, p. 99]}.

The participants of the event advocated the speedy development of rules restricting the lease of land by Chinese and Korean subjects, the reduction of Asian labor at private and state-owned enterprises, as well as the relocation of Russian-Korean subjects living in border areas deep into the region ^{[9, p. 100]}. According to T. N. Sorokina, the rules pursued two goals – to create obstacles to the further influx of the population from neighboring Asian countries and to strengthen the control of the Amur administration over foreign nationals in the region ^{[10, p. 69]}.

The proposals of the participants of the meeting, convened at the suggestion of P. F. Unterberger, were supported by the Government. As a result, on June 21, 1910, the "Law on the establishment of certain restrictions for persons who are Foreign nationals within the Amur Governorate-General and the Trans-Baikal Region of the Irkutsk Governorate-General" was approved. This act prohibited the transfer of state contracts and supplies to foreign nationals, restricted their hiring for state-owned work, as well as the leasing of state-owned and turnaround lands to them. Detailed information about the role of P. F. Unterberger in the adoption of the law of June 1, 1910 is contained in the article by M. B. Averin ^[1]. Thus, B. D. Park concludes that P. F. Unterberger's policy on the settlement of the Korean issue was based on openly great-power and racist views, which were supported by the chauvinistic part of the Russian bourgeoisie.

At the same time, the researcher's mention of the role of P. F. Unterberger at the 2nd Congress of governors and other representatives of local authorities of the Amur Region, held in Khabarovsk in 1886, is very interesting. Referring to the work of I. Nadarov ^[12], B. D. Pak notes that the commission working within the framework of the congress found the stay of Koreans in the region useless and even harmful due to the depletion of their lands. At the same time, the congress ignored the remark of "Colonel Unterberger", who asked what data the commission operated on when considering the harm of Koreans and how much damage they cause to the soil compared to the Russians and Chinese. In this sense, P. F. Unterberger also asked whether the eviction of Koreans from their current places of residence would not be premature ^{[9, pp. 59-60; 12, p. 22]}.

In our opinion, the materials presented give grounds to assume that during the 2nd Congress P. F. Unterberger, who was not even the military governor of the Primorsky Region at that time, proposed to study in more detail aspects of the economic activities of Koreans in the region in order to avoid taking rash measures against them. If we follow the conclusions of B. D. Park, then P. F. Unterberger was actually one of the few participants of the event who indirectly spoke in defense of the interests of the Korean population. This little-known fact goes against the prevailing point of view in most works about the ardent anti-Korean views of the official.

The key role of P. F. Unterberger in developing the approach of the Far Eastern administration to Koreans living in the Amur Region is evidenced by the monograph of A. I. Petrov ^[13]. Along with the works of B. D. Park, this study is rightfully considered another classic work on the history of Koreans in the Russian Empire. To understand the contribution of P. F. Unterberger, the materials presented in the book on the process of developing measures by the Amur Governor-General within the framework of the implementation of the oral (gentleman's) agreement reached by representatives of Russia and Korea during negotiations on the signing of the Russian-Korean treaty on border relations in 1888 are of great value. Thanks to this agreement, the Korean government de facto recognized as full-fledged Russian subjects of those Koreans who settled in our country before 1884 and were sworn to the Russian oath. Within the framework of this agreement, the Amur Governor-General A. N. Korf in 1891 sent Circular No. 2977 dated June 21 to the military governors of the Primorsky and Amur regions, which prescribed dividing all foreigners living in the region into 3 categories. Koreans of the 1st category were subject to acceptance into Russian citizenship. Representatives of the 2nd group within two years were obliged to liquidate their farms, vacate the occupied state lands and move out. Koreans of the 3rd category were recognized as temporarily staying in Russia for the purpose of earning money. It was on the basis of this circular that the legal status of Korean residents in the Amur region was determined in subsequent years.

When studying most of the works on the history of the resettlement of Koreans to pre-revolutionary Russia, it may seem that the main developer of this classification was the Amur Governor-General A. N. Korf ^{[9, 5]}. In a number of studies, its original author is not indicated at all ^{[4, 14]}. However, A. I. Petrov's monograph mentions the submission No. 2277, which P. F. Unterberger, who then held the post of military governor of the Primorsky Region, sent to A. N. Corfu on February 23, 1891. In this document, he proposed dividing Korean residents into three categories and presented for consideration the procedure of the authorities in relation to each of them. The researcher points out that P. F. Unterberger's proposals were slightly finalized in the office of the Amur Governor-General, after which they were sent to the field in the form of the above-mentioned circular No. 2977 ^{[13, p. 106]}.

Thus, the information presented by A. I. Petrov gives grounds to assert that it was P. F. Unterberger who with a high degree of probability owned the original idea of categorizing Koreans living in the region and it was he who developed the rules subsequently introduced for representatives of each category.

Doctor of Historical Sciences N. I. Dubinina ^[15] in his documentary-historical narrative highlights P. F. Unterberger's views on the Korean question during his governorship. According to the author's conclusion, the official generally paid increased attention to the problem of the influx of Asian subjects to the Amur Region, but he felt the greatest concern precisely in connection with the massive influx of Koreans. Russian Russian citizenship and the adoption of Orthodoxy, the negative impact of the Korean lease of land on the labor abilities and moral character of the Russian rural population, highlighted by the Governor-General, are briefly highlighted in the book: the low degree of assimilation with Russians even after the transition to Russian citizenship and adoption of Orthodoxy.

It seems that the assessments of P. F. Unterberger's views on the Korean question contained in the article by J. G. Song ^[16] should be considered separately. According to the author, during the leadership of the Primorsky Region and before the appointment of the Amur Governor-General, there was a transformation of the official's approach to resettlement from Korea. During 10 years as the Primorsky governor, P. F. Unterberger was quite loyal to the Koreans and, according to the researcher, even protected them from eviction from the Posyet area deep into the region. This thesis confirms the attitude of the military governor of the Primorsky Region, P. F. Unterberger, on the issue of the resettlement of Koreans to the Amur Governor-General on March 18, 1889 (RGIA DV. F. 702. Op. 1. d. 94. L. 19-20ob.). In this document, the official expressed the opinion that it was inappropriate to evict Koreans from border areas until their proposed new places of residence along the Amur River and tributaries of the Ussuri River were investigated, and funds were allocated from the treasury for the needs of resettlement. Moreover, in the letter, the governor expressed concern that as a result of the eviction of foreigners in the Posyet district, there may not be residents able to serve zemstvo natural duties, which at that time were successfully performed by local Koreans. In conclusion, the official also directly noted the benefits brought by the Korean population for the economy of the South Ussuri district. In particular, he pointed to the cultivation of yaritsa, wheat and oats by Koreans, which relieved local authorities of the need to extract these products from abroad and Odessa.

However, from the point of view of J. G. Son, after the Russian-Japanese War, P. F. Unterberger's position changed. The reason for this was the widespread avoidance of Korean peasants from performing underwater duty during the period of hostilities. The official mentions this problem in a letter to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers P. A. Stolypin on the Korean issue (RGIA DV. F. 702. Op. 1. D. 676. L. 1 – 4ob.). Taking into account the position of P. F. Unterberger at the 2nd Congress of Governors and other representatives of local authorities of the Amur Region (1886), as well as his letter dated March 18, 1889, the opinion of J. G. Song about the transformation of the official's views on the Korean problem towards a gradual deterioration seems quite convincing. However, the presentation of the military governor P. F. Unterberger on the issue of the acceptance of Koreans into Russian citizenship dated November 6, 1890 (RGIA DV. F. 702. Op. 1. d. 94. L. 36-38.) clearly proves that already as head of the Primorsky Region, the official did not have any sympathy for immigrants from Korea.

Thus, P. F. Unterberger in his submission recommended postponing the swearing-in of Koreans who settled in Russia before 1884, arguing that they did not study the living conditions of their lives deeply enough in practice. He proposed to postpone this act until the Russian authorities are fully confident in the full solidarity of the interests of Koreans with Russian aspirations in the province. He explained this necessity by the fact that most of the Korean population lives on the border with "a state with which they have incomparably more in common, both in beliefs and in living conditions, than with us" ^{[17, p. 75]}. In the letter, he expressed doubts about the loyalty of Koreans to Russia and expressed confidence that they lack an understanding of the "sanctity of the oath." In the context of this, he suggested that in case of dissatisfaction with the Russian-Korean subjects with any decision of the Russian authorities, they would be evicted abroad.

Russian Russians. In our opinion, the greatest significance for understanding the views of P. F. Unterberger is another argument against bringing Koreans to the Russian oath, given by him in the submission of November 6, 1890. "If then, in a collision with China, the enemy would have cut out this or that Korean village, whose inhabitants enjoyed only the right to live on Russian soil Russian Russian citizens, but not the right to be Russian subjects, then this could not be such a burden on us, as if it were done in one of the indigenous Russian villages" ^{[17, p. 75]}. Based on this, the official proposed to make it a rule not to accept Koreans into Russian citizenship, but only to allow them to live in Russia on "certain rights" for which they must fulfill "certain obligations". It seems that the contents of the letter dated November 6, 1890, as well as the wording used in it, are convincing evidence of P. F. Unterberger's lack of any favorable attitude towards Koreans during his time as military governor of the Primorsky Region.

ConclusionThe analysis of scientific works, archival materials and essays by P. F. Unterberger himself allows us to confidently call him a staunch opponent of the resettlement of Koreans to Russia and the use of Korean labor in the development of the riches of the Far Eastern region.

The official's contribution to the development of measures to streamline the legal status of Korean residents, as well as the steps he took as the Amur Governor-General, give good reason to consider him the main initiator of the policy of limiting the influx of immigrants from Korea and tightening administrative control over Korean residents of the region.

Summarizing the above materials, the following main reasons for the official's negative attitude towards immigrants from Korea can be identified:

1. The tendency of Korean immigrants to settle quickly within the Russian borders, including through the unauthorized seizure of empty government lands. This circumstance created prerequisites for the resettlement of new migrant parties, the spontaneous formation of new Korean mono-ethnic settlements and the reduction of land funds for Russian colonists.

2. The negative impact of the Korean land lease on the moral character and ability of the Russian peasantry to conduct agriculture.

3. The inability of Russian workers to compete with Koreans who are willing to perform work on worse conditions.

4. Low degree of assimilation of Koreans, which was reflected in poor knowledge of the Russian language, a small number of mixed marriages. The official saw the reason for this in the long period of isolation of the Korean state, the peculiarities of culture and mentality, as well as constant contacts with compatriots from abroad.

5. The formal attitude of the Korean population to the adoption of Russian citizenship and Orthodoxy. The official was convinced that when the Koreans were sworn in, they were guided not by political views, but by material considerations. The adoption of Orthodoxy was considered by them as a way to accelerate the acquisition of citizenship of Russia.

Based on this , P. F. Unterberger declared the need for a policy towards Koreans based on the following principles:

1. Refusal to accept Koreans into citizenship. According to the official, swearing in foreigners did not benefit the Russian state, but required the authorities to provide Koreans with land and gave them the opportunity to collectively defend their economic interests.

2. The removal of Koreans from work at state-owned and private enterprises in order to support the position of Russian workers.

3. Strengthening administrative control over Koreans settled in Russia.

4. Refusal to create Korean public associations on the territory of the Russian Empire in order to prevent the emergence and development of separatist sentiments and hostile agitation in the Korean environment.

In the modern sense, the views expressed by P. F. Unterberger in his works contradict the basic principles of the national policy of the Russian Federation. Individual formulations of an official by modern standards are politically incorrect and cannot be used either in official documents or in scientific or journalistic materials.

However, it should be borne in mind that the official wrote his works in the socio-political conditions of the Russian Empire in the second half of the XIX – early XX. At that time, such views on the national question were widespread and were not perceived as a manifestation of extremism and xenophobia.

Despite P. F. Unterberger's criticism, it should nevertheless be noted his fundamental contribution to the formation of the policy of the authorities on the settlement of the Korean issue. His proposed approach to the distribution of Koreans into categories was actively applied, including during periods of favorable attitude of the Far Eastern administration to Koreans, which are usually called the times of the governorship of S. M. Dukhovsky, N. I. Grodekov and N. L. Gondatti.