United States’ Use of Coercive Economic Statecraft in an Era of Great Power Competition

Shapiro Nataliya Igorevna Junior Research Fellow at the National Research Institute Of World Economy And International Relations   117997, Russia, g. Moscow, ul. Profsoyuznaya, 23 nataliashapiro7@gmail.com Other publications by this author

IntroductionBy the beginning of the 2020s, the use of nonviolent (political, diplomatic, economic, informational) forms of pressure on opponents has significantly expanded in the tools of the rivalry of the major powers.

The use of economic sanctions has significantly increased in the arsenal of means used by leading States to weaken the economy and the long-term competitiveness of their main rivals. A vivid illustration is the actions of the United States, which has the widest opportunities to impose sanctions due to the dominant role of the dollar as the main reserve currency and means of external settlements, as well as the power of the national economy. By geographical scope, duration and number of unilateral restrictions imposed (economic sanctions, restrictions in the financial, trade and technological spheres) The USA is a world leader ^{[19, p. 95, 35, 61, 71, 75]}.

After the Ukraine crisis that began in 2014, the United States and its allies imposed a series of sanctions against Moscow. The new round of restrictions adopted in the context of Russia's recognition of the People's Republics of Donbass and the conduct of a special military operation in Ukraine from February 24, 2022, is unprecedented. For the first time in modern international relations, one of the largest powers is subjected to large-scale sanctions pressure. A record number of economic, financial, sectoral and personal sanctions have been imposed against Russia. According to the database for monitoring sanctions "Castellum" (Castellum.AI), after February 22, over 10,000 new restrictive measures were taken against Russia ^[85]. Although previous rounds of US restrictions have not achieved their political goals, the US continues to increase sanctions pressure on Moscow. Taking into account America's leading role in organizing and implementing a large-scale sanctions campaign against Russia, an analysis of the US sanctions policy is particularly in demand. The purpose of the study is to analyze the process of forming the American sanctions policy against Russia in the context of the current stage of the crisis in Ukraine; to assess the effectiveness of American sanctions in terms of achieving one of the key political goals – changing the opponent's course.

In theoretical terms, the author relies on the achievements of representatives of structural realism, also known as neorealism (first of all, K. Waltz and J. Mearsheimer), emphasizing the greater importance of structural coercion of the environment in international relations in comparison with the characteristics of the elements involved in them. Due to the anarchic state of international relations, the desire for one's own survival dominates other aspirations of States. Unlike K. Waltz, who believed that participants in international interactions are not always rational, according to other representatives of neorealism, especially J. Mearsheimer, subjects act rationally ^{[18, pp. 59-60, 74, pp. 30-31, 89]}.  The methodological basis of the work consists of systematic, logical-intuitive, comparative approaches. Processing, generalization and analysis of factual material are carried out based on a descriptive approach.

When studying the process of forming the US sanctions policy, the works of authoritative American experts on sanctions issues were used ^{[50, 51, 56, 62, 61, 63, 68, 70, 71, 75, 79, 82]}. In addition, the theoretical developments of leading foreign and domestic experts were used – first of all, the research of D. Beach devoted to understanding the logic of the development of the state's foreign policy ^[52], and the works of M. A. Khrustalev, who formulated a holistic model of the analysis of the state's foreign policy program ^{[42, 43]}.

In this paper, the concept of "sanctions" is used to denote unilateral restrictive measures of an economic nature applied by a State (or a group of countries) against another state to achieve the political goals of the initiator. The article complements the previous research ^{[2, 10, 37, 48, 53, 57, 59, 68, 75, 79, 83]} understanding the logic of the formation of the US sanctions policy against Russia in the context of the current stage of the Ukrainian crisis.

The routine of sanctions in Washington's Foreign policySince the end of the cold war, the growing demand for and expansion of the scope of unilateral sanctions measures have been associated with the strengthening of economic interdependence of states, increasing the scale of financial and investment interconnectedness, qualitative changes and deepening of forms of economic cooperation, increasing dependence of states on the main institutions of world economic regulation (the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund) and transport andcommunication infrastructure.

The intensification of inter–power rivalry in the second half of 2010-early 2020s and the reorientation of the United States to strategic competition with China and Russia led to the intensification of Washington's use of sanctions pressure tools. The United States uses economic sanctions in combination with other foreign policy tools to achieve political goals. Taking into account the long-term and intensive nature of the inter-power rivalry unfolding in all spheres, the United States mobilizes and adapts all instruments of national power, strengthens the previously formed infrastructure of American dominance, increases the use of the resource potential of allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region and Europe, intensifies efforts to form a military-political and techno-economic bloc ^{[5, 19, pp. 95, 61, 67, p. 42-79, 77, 86, p. 332-333]}.   

The United States has a wide arsenal of restrictive measures and considerable experience in their practical application against various types of actors. The arsenal of unilateral restrictions includes financial, investment, trade, technological and logistical restrictions, asset blocking, visa restrictions, diplomatic measures, export and import restrictions, including the supply of arms and dual-use goods, cyber sanctions, economic, trade and financial blockade. The objects of American restrictions are states, governments, foreign businesses, individuals and legal entities, and non-state actors.

The regulatory legal acts that regulate the application of US sanctions do not contain a definition of this concept. For the first time, the powers of the US president to apply sanctions were formulated in the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 (Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917). Currently, the introduction of unilateral sanctions at the national level is legitimized by the National Emergency Act of 1976 (National Emergencies Act) and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (International Emergency Economic Powers Act). The restrictions applied by Washington have an extraterritorial effect. To increase the effectiveness of primary sanctions, the United States uses secondary sanctions or the threat of their introduction, and the threat often turns out to be more effective than the application of sanctions. Secondary sanctions are used against individuals and legal entities that interact with the object of primary sanctions ^{[35, p. 24, 36, p. 22, 20, p. 155-156]}.

At the executive level, the Ministry of Finance (especially its Office for Foreign Assets Control), the Ministry of Commerce (deals with issues related to export and import restrictions), the State Department (oversees visa restrictions, issues of limiting the volume of foreign aid provided, as well as a wide range of other political issues) are involved in the implementation of the US sanctions policy.-diplomatic issues related to the implementation of sanctions restrictions). The Ministry of Justice carries out criminal prosecution of violators of sanctions. The Pentagon oversees issues related to restrictions in the field of military and military-technical cooperation. The Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, and financial regulators (the Federal Reserve System, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the National Administration of Credit Unions, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission) are also involved in the implementation of the American sanctions policy ^{[35, pp. 27, 90, p. 4-7]}.

In recent decades, there has been an increase in the activity of American legislators on the sanctions track. However, the executive branch, primarily the President, plays a key role in the adoption of sanctions. In executive orders, the President delegates "extraordinary economic powers" to federal agencies, primarily the Ministry of Finance, the State Department, and the Ministry of Trade (the "big three"). The sanctions fixed at the legislative level have been in effect for a long time. The low probability of their cancellation reduces the incentives for the targeted state to yield to Washington's demands. The USA has a powerful financial intelligence and an effective enforcement apparatus to comply with the imposed restrictions ^{[35, pp. 26, 62, 90, p. 4-7]}.

The above-mentioned Office for the Control of Foreign Assets administers financial sanctions, including the formation of lists of sanctioned persons. The most famous is the "List of Specially Classified and Blocked Persons" (Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, SDN). With the persons involved in this list, organizations and citizens of the United States are prohibited from almost all economic transactions. Individual transactions are prohibited with companies involved in the list of sectoral Sanctions (Sectoral Sanctions Individuals List). Among the recent innovations, it is worth mentioning the "List of companies of the Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List", whose defendants are prohibited from carrying out a number of operations on the US stock market. The Office for Control of Foreign Assets pursues sanctions violators, provides exceptions to sanctions regimes. Monetary fines are imposed on businesses that violate US sanctions, which can reach impressive sizes. For example, in 2018, the French bank Societe Generale was fined US$ 1.34 billion for violating US sanctions regimes against Cuba, Iran and Sudan ^{[20, pp. 155-156, 35, p. 26]}. 

The motives for the introduction of US sanctions are diverse: the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the promotion of the values of liberal democracy, countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, combating terrorist and drug threats, corruption and money laundering, the impact on the warring parties in armed conflicts and post-conflict dynamics, stigmatization of political regimes objectionable to Washington, individual political leaders, as well as the most influential representatives of the business elite supporting the political leadership of the targeted state, countering "malicious cyberactivity" against the United States, its allies and partners, strengthening the international isolation of antagonistic states of the United States ^{[90, p. 2-3]}. The US administration is also imposing unilateral restrictions "in addition" to international sanctions through the UN Security Council. Washington uses unilateral economic measures to force opponents to make concessions and change their political course. A rare example of the effectiveness of such pressure is Iran's agreement to settle issues related to its nuclear program and implement the Action Plan adopted in 2015 at the level of foreign ministers of the "six" (Russia, USA, China, Great Britain, Germany, France) with the participation of the EU High Representative F. Mogherini ^{[59, p. 1541]}.

The United States uses restrictions to punish other states for alleged interference in internal affairs, primarily in American elections ^[57]. The problems of external interference in domestic politics in recent years have been of growing concern to the American political and expert community. Back in 2016, the topic of Russia's alleged interference in the American elections was exploited by supporters of H. Clinton, the candidate of the Democratic Party, who lost the presidential election to Republican D. Trump. It is noteworthy that in the US National Security Strategy, published in October 2022, foreign interference in internal affairs is mentioned as one of the key threats. To counter this threat, the Administration intends to use all available means. Assistance is provided to other States to prevent subversive actions from outside ^[77].

Each type of sanctions has its own specifics and logic of application. The impact of some sanctions measures has a cumulative effect, while the impact of others weakens over time. The United States combines different types of sanctions depending on the nature of foreign policy goals. In particular, trade sanctions may be supplemented by restrictions in the financial sphere. Washington applies measures that have an immediate negative impact, combined with restrictions, the impact of which is fully manifested over time. Using various instruments of influence, the United States encourages allies and partners to join the sanctions campaign initiated by them against the targeted state. Such an approach makes it possible to maximize the economic damage from the imposed restrictions and contributes to strengthening the international isolation of the facility ^{[48, 51, 71]}.

The United States uses sanctions or the threat of their introduction to hinder the cooperation of its opponents with third countries in the trade, economic, technological, investment, energy and military-technical spheres. In particular, the law "On Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions" (CAATSA) adopted in August 2017, which has an extraterritorial orientation, codified the restrictions previously adopted against Russia and formed the basis for new sanctions actions by Washington, including restrictions on Moscow's interaction with third countries in the energy and military sectors.-technical areas. The use of economic and financial restrictions in combination with other (in particular, informational) measures is also dictated by Washington's desire to discredit the targeted state and damage its reputation as a responsible partner that faithfully fulfills international obligations. Thus, the United States creates financial difficulties for the target state, making it difficult to make settlements and payments, promotes the commercial interests of its own business and forces other countries to make a choice between maintaining access to American (and more broadly Western)  investments, technologies and the market, on the one hand, or the continuation of interaction with the targeted state, on the other ^{[16, 58]}. The US approach to the use of sanctions is characterized by rigidity and perseverance in achieving its political goals, including regime change in the target State.

Washington is imposing sanctions to weaken the position of the current government of the targeted state and provoke destabilization of the domestic political and socio-economic situation. Sanctions are used to inspire protest moods in society, followed by the use of public discontent to delegitimize the legitimately elected government and regime change, facilitating the coming to power of a political leader loyal to Washington or, at least, more compliant than his predecessor ^[56].

The United States is improving the tools of targeted ("smart") sanctions aimed at harming the opponent in the most sensitive areas for him. This type of restrictions, which has been increasingly actively applied since the 1990s, has become the most preferable for the American leadership due to their purposeful impact on the chosen object (in particular, specific groups of elites supporting the current government and its political course) and relatively low risks of a reverse negative impact on the American economy. The concept of "smart" (targeted) sanctions was formed in the context of intensive research discussions about the indiscriminate impact and negative humanitarian consequences of the use of large-scale sanctions restrictions ^{[55, 70, p. 316-318, 82, p. 59-77]}.

Among the key factors that have a profound impact on the current US foreign policy, we should first highlight the loss by America (and the West as a whole) of overwhelming dominance in the international system, despite persistent attempts by the US to maintain the role of global leader and slow down the processes of political and economic polycentrisation of the world ^{[4, pp. 38-39, 47, 54, 72, p. 7-23, 91]}. The continued strengthening of the complex power of China, which is the main strategic competitor of the United States in the XXI century, as well as the reactivation of Russia's foreign policy, which challenges America's claims to maintain global dominance and sole control over world processes, has a significant impact on America's foreign policy behavior. China is increasingly assertively and rigidly defending national interests and is striving to acquire the status of a superpower or a global power with roughly comparable material capabilities to the United States ^{[3, pp. 5-15, 29, 45, p. 333]}. The USA, China and Russia are three influential independent players in the international arena who have strategic autonomy ^{[34, p. 178]}.

The reorientation of the United States to strategic competition with China and Russia was first fixed at the doctrinal level in the National Security Strategy 2017 (NSS-2017), adopted by the Republican administration of D. Trump ^[76]. In the NSC-2017 and subsequent conceptual documents developed by the administrations of D. Trump and J. According to Biden, the prioritization of great-power rivalry is postulated in comparison with other challenges and threats, which, without losing their relevance, have shifted to lower positions in the list of threats to national security. We are talking about the challenges generated by terrorist and extremist formations, cross-border organized crime, illegal migration ^{[77, 84]}. In the NSC-2022, the confrontation between China and Russia is emphasized as a key priority of American foreign policy (a separate section of the document is devoted to this topic). The aggravation of international tensions is viewed through the prism of the struggle of "democracies and autocracies". One of the main innovations is the fixation of foreign interference in internal affairs in the list of key threats to US security. The perception of threats of foreign subversion is expanding. The United States intends to step up efforts to promote the liberal democratic model abroad and strengthen democracy in America ^[77].

Reflexivity, which is one of the attributes of international relations (along with synergy and nonlinearity), "causes an inevitable decrease in the effectiveness of previously successful strategies" ^{[18, p. 31]}. This is one of the reasons for the low effectiveness of economic coercion measures to achieve political goals. According to researchers, states and businesses that are the targets of sanctions are increasingly successfully adapting to interaction with partners under external pressure, adapting to the sanctions strategies of their opponents, improving counteraction measures, finding new opportunities to circumvent sanctions restrictions, and implementing economic reforms. Even under the yoke of "suffocating" sanctions, the economies of targeted states remain viable ^{[18, pp. 31, 38, 50, 63]}. Although American sanctions can be very sensitive for the economy of the target state, they rarely lead to political concessions on its part, changes in its domestic or foreign policy, especially if the United States seeks to achieve maximalist goals ^[56].

Successful in terms of achieving the initiator's goals, the experience of previous sanctions pressure on the object does not mean that in the future the impact of sanctions on the same player, but on other issues, will be effective. Within the same dyad of players, the impact of sanctions is not the same. Sanctions pressure can lead to results contrary to the initiator's expectations. For example, the maximum pressure policy that the Trump administration pursued against Iran gave impetus to the development of its nuclear program. After the unilateral withdrawal from the "nuclear deal" approved by UN Security Council resolution 2231 in 2015, the US attempts to use financial and economic sanctions to force Tehran to make concessions have failed. Eight of Washington's twelve demands, made public by Secretary of State M. Pompeo during a speech at the conservative Heritage Foundation research center, were not related to the Iranian nuclear program. Negotiations on the restoration of the JCPOA in the Vienna format have not yet led to a positive result. Moscow consistently supports the reanimation of the "nuclear deal" and the lifting of anti-Iranian sanctions ^{[38, pp. 56-71, 49, 59, p. 1542]}.

The United States applies sanctions not only against opponents, but also allies, and sanctions are more effective against the latter ^[60]. The losses of allies in the event of a reduction in trade, economic and investment ties with a partner state can be very significant. The use of economic levers of influence on opponents to solve current foreign policy problems is often considered by Washington as an alternative to diplomatic dialogue aimed at resolving interstate contradictions, minimizing or removing mutual concerns. This, in turn, is another evidence of the ongoing degradation of the culture of interstate communication. In this regard, it should be noted that Russia invariably emphasizes its readiness for a constructive substantive dialogue with Washington on the entire range of existing problems. Russian diplomacy is closely monitoring that the dialogue with the United States and other countries of the collective West is built on an equal and mutually respectful basis and has a substantive character.

The specifics of the current situation is that the United States is updating and expanding the practice of applying economic sanctions. The United States is diversifying and modernizing the instruments of sanctions pressure, in particular, it is increasingly using a new type of restrictions – cyber sanctions, diversifying the practice of using export control measures and logistical sanctions. Western countries, led by the United States, are carrying out an unprecedented campaign to freeze Russia's public and private assets. "Trade wars" acquire a new scale and quality. Taking into account the significantly increased role of the science and technology factor in modern international relations, the United States is expanding the use of technological restrictions against competitors. The "technological war" between the United States and China is escalating. Washington is trying to slow down China's transformation into a comparable and in a number of ways superior to America technological superpower. The administration of J. Biden is stepping up efforts to form an economic and technological block. The European allies and partners of the United States are showing increasing activity and ingenuity on the sanctions track, sometimes ahead of Washington with their sanctions decisions. The most radical sanctions initiatives are often taken by Poland and the Baltic States ^{[9, 37, 48, 69, 83]}.

The West's "sanctions blitzkrieg" against Russia after the start of a special operation in Ukraine After Russia recognized the People's Republics of Donbass and launched a special operation in Ukraine, Western countries imposed unprecedented anti-Russian restrictions in terms of their scale, speed of adoption and the degree of coordination of Washington's actions with its allies.

In the United States, the leading role in the adoption of new anti-Russian restrictions belonged to the executive branch, which is actively operating on the sanctions track. The formulation of the sanctions strategy was carried out under the leadership of U.S. Treasury Secretary J. Yellen with a special emphasis on the use of strict financial and economic restrictions, large-scale export and import restrictions ^{[48, 92]}. The dominant motives of Biden's restrictive policy are to limit Russia's competitiveness, weaken the long-term foundations of its great-power power, oust Russia from the "first league" of leading players in international politics, and reduce its ability to project power and influence in the long term.

The sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies since February 2022 are aimed at the economic isolation of Russia, limiting the innovative development of critical sectors of the domestic economy, reducing industrial potential, having a chilling effect on the development of the military-industrial complex, hindering further special operations in Ukraine ^{[53, 65, 68, 73, 80, 83]}. Representatives of the Biden administration publicly declare their desire to inflict a "strategic defeat" on Russia and continue sanctions pressure as long as necessary ^{[87, 88]}.

In the context of the current aggravation of relations with Moscow, Washington is stepping up efforts aimed at solving a number of practical foreign policy tasks, primarily strengthening the consolidation of the West on an anti-Russian basis; further strengthening NATO's military infrastructure at the Russian borders; reformatting the structure of trade and economic relations between the West and Russia to ensure the geopolitical advantages of the West ^[68]; ousting Russia from the energy sector the EU market; reduction of Russia's share in the global arms, raw materials and food markets. One of the key beneficiaries from the implementation of these tasks is American business, primarily energy companies that are increasing exports of liquefied natural gas to Europe, and the military-industrial complex, which benefits from large contracts for the supply of weapons. Taking into account the strengthening of inter-power rivalry and the ongoing redistribution of influence between traditional and new centers of power, the United States is strengthening its regulatory position and competitive advantages. Russia has to operate in a less predictable, denser and more competitive international environment, in which rivalry is growing not only between opposing powers and long-standing antagonists, but also between partners and allies.

Washington is making vigorous efforts to expand the extraterritorial application of anti-Russian sanctions and tighten control over their compliance ^[2]. In order to maximize sanctions pressure, the United States is increasing coordination with its allies in Europe, which bear the most significant costs from the restrictions imposed due to the severance of business, trade, economic, investment and energy ties with Moscow. The deterioration of economic dynamics in the countries that initiated anti-Russian sanctions (first of all, rising prices for energy and food, "sanctions inflation" and increased unemployment) does not stop them from introducing new and expanding existing restrictions. The political, strategic and geopolitical ambitions of the Western countries, led by the United States, prevail over economic pragmatics.

The new stage of the sanctions policy of the West is qualitatively different from the period 2014-2021. The system-forming Russian companies were subjected to a large-scale sanctions attack. Blocking sanctions have been imposed against the largest Russian banks, primarily Sberbank, VTB, VEB. Ten banks are disconnected from the SWIFT financial messaging system. A ban on transactions with Russian sovereign debt has been introduced. A part of the gold and foreign exchange reserves of the Bank of Russia (about 300 billion US dollars) has been seized in Western countries. In some jurisdictions, the assets of Russian individuals and legal entities have been frozen. The issue of mechanisms for the confiscation of Russian assets (both public and private) is being actively debated. Personal sanctions are being expanded against representatives of the Russian political leadership and business elite, parliamentarians, heads of law enforcement agencies, members of the public, cultural figures, as well as their family members. Sanctions pressure on the Russian Armed Forces and the military-industrial complex is increasing. Large-scale logistic restrictions have been introduced ^{[37, 65, 73]}.     

Strict sanctions restrictions have been imposed on Russian imports of high-tech products and dual-use goods. The sanctions measures are aimed at depriving the most important sectors of the domestic industry (in particular, the defense, aerospace, shipbuilding industries) of key technological elements. Export bans also apply to less technologically advanced industrial goods (machine tools, engines, etc.). The United States and the European Union have restricted the supply of a wide range of consumer goods to Russia. Consulting services and exports of "luxury goods" are limited. The United Kingdom, Switzerland, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Canada and other countries affiliated with the United States have joined the above-mentioned financial, trade and logistics restrictions to one degree or another ^{[37, 39, 64, 66]}.

The administration of J. Biden banned the import of Russian oil, liquefied natural gas and coal, as well as new investments in the Russian energy sector and other sectors of the domestic economy. The European Union has imposed an embargo on the supply of Russian oil supplied by sea to Europe (entered into force on December 5, 2022), as well as a ban on the sea transportation of petroleum products (effective from February 5, 2023). The European Union announced its intention to abandon the import of Russian hydrocarbons well before 2030. From December 5, 2022 came into force The restrictions on the value of Russian "black gold" agreed by the G7 countries, Australia and the EU. The marginal cost of Russian oil should not exceed $ 60 per barrel, it is supposed to regularly (once every two months) revise the level of the ceiling of oil prices. Russia does not intend to supply energy resources to states that form a cartel of oil importers ^{[37, 39, 64, 66]}.

American lawmakers – both Republicans and Democrats – continue to generate sanctions initiatives aimed at tightening existing and introducing new restrictions. In particular, a number of initiatives involve the suspension of Russia's membership in the World Trade Organization and a complete embargo on trade with Russia ^[78]. The exodus of foreign business from Russia continues. According to a study conducted by Yale University, over 1,000 foreign companies have completely stopped, temporarily suspended or reduced their activities on Russian territory. At the same time, a number of large foreign companies continue their activities, not wanting to leave the Russian market ^[81].

Informal restrictions apply to areas that are not related to politics, but are subject to increasing politicization (science, education, sports, culture). The "diplomatic war" against Russia is intensifying, in which Western countries expel Russian diplomats, introduce visa restrictions for members of official delegations, worsen the conditions for the functioning of Russian diplomatic missions, aggravate visa problems, seek to limit the participation of Russian representatives in international discussions, including UN bodies, and carry out a number of other hostile actions ^[26]. Extensive repressive measures are being taken against Russian and Russian-language media in order to minimize or stop their activities on the territory of Western states. After the start of the special operation in Ukraine, restrictive measures against Russian media resources were significantly tightened ^[25].

Russian officials emphasize the illegitimate nature of unilateral sanctions measures applied by the United States and its allies in violation of the UN Charter, generally recognized principles and norms of international law ^[22]. Russia harshly criticizes Western governments that openly disregard key norms and rules of international cooperation in the financial, economic and trade fields ^[28]. Moscow reacts to the next sanctions attacks of unfriendly states calmly, without affectation. Emphasizing the forced nature of its actions, Moscow introduces mirror and asymmetric measures. Among the persons "listed" in the Russian sanctions lists are experts involved in the process of forming the US sanctions policy during the reign of J. Biden and his predecessors (in particular, R. Nefyu – senior researcher at the Center for Global Energy Policy at Columbia University, E. Fishman – former head of the Department of Policy and Implementation of Economic Sanctions of the State Department) ^[8].

When formulating response measures, the Russian leadership proceeds from the need to ensure the stability of the national economy and financial system, to protect the interests of business and citizens ^[13]. According to the Minister of Finance of Russia A. G. Siluanov, "we are also reviewing internal principles, when Russia in its economic policy was primarily guided by the fact that we are part of the world economy. Now everyone has seen that the global economy can become an obstacle to the development of the country. We will focus on our own development, on the creation of domestic production. This is an objective necessity – to depend less on those countries with which we seemed to have friendly economic and financial relations. In fact, all this, as it turns out, is very fragile" ^[23].

In the context of large-scale sanctions pressure, Moscow is stepping up efforts to diversify foreign economic relations. Increasing interaction and qualitative improvement of Russia's relations with the non-Western world (in an expanded sense) becomes an even higher priority ^{[40, p. 7]}. Of particular importance is the increase in the presence of domestic goods and services in the markets of the Asia-Pacific region (APR), the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. In this context, it should be noted that the economic rapprochement between Russia and Asian countries began long before the Ukrainian crisis, which has been developing since 2013-2014. According to Russian researchers A.V. Torkunov, D. V. Streltsov and E. V. Koldunova, "the balance of power in the world today significantly depends on the situation in Asia, and Russia needs a reliable support in that part of the world where the main global economic and political processes are manifested in a concentrated form" ^{[40, p. 7]}. In addition to the need to reorient export commodity flows and search for alternative markets for Russian energy resources, one of Moscow's key motives is the desire to find new sources of technology and economic growth.

 A solid foundation for building up economic ties with Asian countries, which are the engine of global economic growth, was laid long before the crisis in relations between Russia and the West. Since 2010, the share of Asia-Pacific countries in Russian foreign trade has more than tripled and by 2022 exceeded 30%. The economic reorientation of Russia to the markets of Asian countries is part of a larger multidimensional phenomenon, which in Russian official and scientific discourses has been called a "turn to the East". Geostrategic and geo-economic motives underlie the Russian policy of turning to the East, implemented by Moscow since the early 2010s ^{[15, 40, pp. 5-17]}.

Russia's key strategic partners in the region are dynamically developing Asian giants – China and India. The course of developing relations with China and India, which has been a constant of Russia's foreign policy for more than two decades, has a distinct personification. It is associated with the name of one of the largest Russian statesmen – E. M. Primakov, thanks to whom, in the late 1990s, the eastern vector of Russia's foreign policy gained conceptual form. E. M. Primakov put forward the idea of forming a strategic triangle Moscow - Delhi – Beijing, advocated a multi–vector, balanced foreign policy strategy. He pointed out the "futility of the unipolar world order" and "the insolvency of the global financial system managed from one center." E. M. Primakov was a supporter of the formation of a world order based on the principle of multilateralism ^{[30, pp. 145-205, 40, pp. 9-10]}.

The policy of building up a multifaceted strategic partnership with Beijing is a long-term priority of Russian foreign policy. Qualitative positive changes in bilateral relations took place after Vladimir Putin took office as president in 2000. In 2001, the parties concluded an Agreement on Good-neighborliness, Friendship and cooperation, which fixed the key principles of the development of bilateral relations. In the 2010s, the strengthening of the Russian-Chinese tandem continued in the context of increasing Western pressure on Russia and the growing US-Chinese contradictions. Since 2019, bilateral relations have been officially characterized as "relations of comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction entering a new era" ^[33]. The priority development of partnership with China has become the most noticeable manifestation of the Russian turn to the East. By the end of 2021, the Russian-Chinese trade turnover increased by more than a third and reached a record level of $140 billion. The leaders of the two countries reached an agreement to increase the volume of bilateral trade to $200 billion by 2024. Taking into account the new realities, the parties can achieve this indicator ahead of schedule ^{[6, 40, p.12]}.

In February 2022, during the first face–to-face meeting of the leaders of the two countries in more than two years, a significant political document was adopted - a Joint statement on international relations entering a new era and global sustainable development. This document reflects the close or overlapping positions of the parties on key issues of the global and regional agenda. It is postulated that "Russian-Chinese interstate relations of a new type surpass the military-political alliances of the Cold War. Friendship between the two states has no borders, there are no forbidden zones in cooperation, the strengthening of bilateral strategic cooperation is not directed against third countries, is not affected by the changing international environment and situational changes in third countries." It is recorded that the parties oppose "unilateral sanctions and the extraterritorial application of jurisdiction, as well as the abuse of export control policies, support the promotion of trade in accordance with the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO)" ^[32].

Relations with India, which qualify as a particularly privileged strategic partnership, are one of the key priorities of Russian foreign policy. India is one of the main importers of Russian weapons and a major trading partner of Russia in Asia, although the existing volume of mutual trade does not correspond to the potential that states have. The goal has been set to increase the volume of bilateral trade to $30 billion by 2025. Moscow is interested in increasing exports of high-value-added products, processed and high-tech goods. In order to establish reliable interbank transactions, work is underway to connect Indian credit institutions to the Bank of Russia's Financial Message Transmission System. Work continues on the integration of the Mir and RuPei payment systems, the parties are increasing the share of national currencies in mutual settlements ^{[17, 31]}.

Moscow continues to search for new opportunities for economic cooperation with states that have not joined the anti-Russian sanctions. The tasks of maximum diversification of Russia's economic and geostrategic partners in the non-Western world and more substantial activation of the Asian track of Russian foreign policy are being reactualized. In this regard, it should be noted that the Asian countries friendly to Moscow – the already mentioned China and India, as well as small and medium–sized states - are significant subjects of international transformations, have their own ideas about the regional and world order, promote their own macro-regional projects ^{[1, p. 5-8]}. In particular, among the states of the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia that are interested in expanding the supply of Russian goods (energy resources, food, mineral fertilizers, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, machine-building products) and the implementation of joint promising high-tech projects (for example, in the fields of nuclear energy and peaceful space exploration), such significant regional economic players like Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand ^[15]. The dialogue between the business circles of Russia and Latin American states that are not participating in the sanctions against Moscow is not interrupted. On the Russian side, no Latin American state is included in the list of unfriendly countries ^{[14, 27]}. The importance of the African direction of Russian foreign policy is increasing. Preparations are underway for the second Russia-Africa summit scheduled for 2023.  

Sanctions pressure encourages Moscow to develop countermeasures to protect trade and economic ties and investment projects from the negative impact of the arbitrary actions of Western countries. Moscow continues its policy of de-dollarization of the economy and increasing the share of mutual settlements in national currencies in foreign trade operations, intensifies work aimed at establishing reliable channels for transmitting financial information and direct interbank correspondent relations with key partners ^[12]. In the 2010s, under increasing pressure from the West, Russia took a number of measures aimed at strengthening financial sovereignty. In particular, the National Payment Card System (Mir) and the Financial Message Transmission System (SPFS) of the Bank of Russia were developed. Traffic and the number of SPFS participants are increasing, Russia provides various connection options for non-residents. Plans for the development of a national digital currency are being adjusted. Testing on real operations is scheduled to begin in April 2023, the formation of a roadmap for the introduction of the digital ruble is scheduled for the end of 2023 ^[46].

Moscow is increasing cooperation with partners on its own, the most successful integration project in the post–Soviet space - the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). By 2015, the EAEU united Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Vietnam, one of the key Russian partners in Asia, became the first state to conclude an agreement on the creation of a free trade zone with the EAEU in 2015. Singapore is another ASEAN state that has signed a free trade agreement with the EAEU. The interim agreement with Iran is planned to be translated into a permanent one.  Negotiations are underway to conclude a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Egypt. It is planned to launch official negotiations on preferential trade with India, Indonesia, and the United Arab Emirates. Within the framework of a joint research group, the expediency of concluding a FTT with Mongolia is being studied ^[7].

Moscow and Beijing have reached an agreement on the pairing of two macro–regional projects - the EAEU and the Belt and Road Initiative (PPI), announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. The idea of the Great Eurasian Partnership (BEP), put forward by Russian President Vladimir Putin, contains a powerful consolidating potential. The essence of the initiative is to create a platform for effective economic cooperation between states and regions of the vast Eurasian continent. The practical implementation of the BEP concept will lead to the formation of a new subsystem – "Greater Eurasia", will allow Russia to consolidate the status of a key player on the continent, will contribute to more effective implementation of bilateral and multilateral projects, as well as contribute to the successful harmonization of the EAEU and the IPP ^{[40, pp. 18, 45]}.

As already noted above, the aggravation of political and economic contradictions with Western countries and the growing sanctions pressure encourage targeted states to develop countermeasures, in particular, to use national payment platforms more actively. Non-Western countries are stepping up efforts in the field of international institution-building, including the creation of new financial institutions alternative to the Bretton Woods institutions. The expansion of international associations with the participation of non-Western countries and the strengthening of their positions in the international arena continues. These processes are developing in the context of the ongoing devesternization of the international system and further changes in the institutional picture of the world (the formation of new, modification and adaptation of existing institutions). The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS interstate association (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) are a vivid embodiment of non-Western multilateralism. The key elements of the non–Western financial architecture are the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the New BRICS Development Bank, and the BRICS Contingent Foreign Exchange Reserves Pool. Although the new structures are not able to effectively replace the established system of global financial regulation, they attract a growing number of developing and developed countries. In particular, many member States of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development participate in AIIB ^{[44, p. 78]}.

The United States continues to maintain a leading position in global economic governance and the global financial system. However, in the long term, the continued strengthening of financial and economic power and the growth of political ambitions of a number of non-Western powers (primarily Asian heavyweights – China and India), accompanied by an increase in their influence on global political and economic processes and more active participation in the development of key decisions, will lead to the erosion of the global financial order, in which the dominant role is played by USA. In the new geo-economic and geopolitical conditions, there is an increasing need to form a more balanced, representative, independent of voluntarism and selfish interests of individual Western players of the international financial and economic system, capable of effectively responding to the challenges of the new time.

Despite the significant damage to the Russian economy, the scale and consequences of which have yet to be assessed, Western sanctions will not lead to the marginalization of Russia. Economic and political pressure does not force Moscow to change its independent and proactive foreign policy course with an emphasis on national interests. Despite unprecedented pressure from the collective West, Moscow is not curtailing a special military operation in Ukraine. On the contrary, the implementation of the goals and objectives set by the country's leadership continues until they are fully implemented ^{[24, 28]}.

Russia retains the initiative in the ongoing crisis, saves resources and does not force the achievement of victory. The United States and its allies provide various (political, military, financial, humanitarian) assistance to the Kiev regime. They continue to supply weapons to Ukraine, provide intelligence, facilitate targeting, expand military training missions, recruit mercenaries, and send instructors. Western countries are becoming more and more involved in an indirect confrontation with Moscow, balancing on the verge of a direct collision. The multidimensionality of the Ukrainian crisis and the multiplicity of players involved significantly complicate the analysis and forecasting of the further development of the crisis situation.

Being essentially both a European and an Asian power ^{[4, p. 33]}, Russia has valuable historical experience of macro-regional and global activities, powerful creative potential, promotes a creative and consolidating international agenda, in contrast to Washington's destabilizing and divisive foreign policy. Russia consistently defends the fundamental international legal principles enshrined in the UN Charter. Moscow is seeking to liberalize the world order, causing tough and persistent opposition from the United States.

The desire to increase the international status, which is one of the key priorities of Moscow's foreign policy, and its commitment to the formation of a more just polycentric world order contradict America's attempts to maintain sole leadership in the international system. Russia harshly criticizes the American-centric concept of "rules-based order", appeals to universal international legal norms, emphasizes the need to coordinate interests and resolve interstate contradictions by political and diplomatic means. Moscow points to the unacceptability of the ongoing expansion of NATO. Emphasizes the commitment to the principle of indivisibility of security, according to which the security of one State or a coalition of countries cannot be ensured by weakening the security of other States. Moscow opposes the creation of narrow, non-inclusive formats in Asia (in particular, "Quad", AUCUS) and Europe ^{[21, 41]}.

Russia's approach to solving global and regional problems is based on its commitment to the central role of the UN and its Security Council. Russia stands for the formation of a new, inclusive, more stable, based on the principles of equal and indivisible security, not subject to pressure from individual players, international security architecture ^[41]. The determination of the political leadership of Russia to strengthen its status as one of the leading states in the world system, having its own worldview, promoting its ideas about the future of the world order and playing an initiative role in shaping its foundations, is even more increasing. Russia demands to take into account its interests, which differ from the interests of Western countries, when designing and regulating the new world order, and firmly and resolutely defends them.

Conclusion

In the context of the intensification of great-power competition, which is a long-term trend, the United States is stepping up the use of nonviolent pressure tools on opponents, which makes it possible to compete, avoiding direct armed confrontation. Historical experience shows that sanctions can be very sensitive for the economy of the targeted state, especially in the case of the desire of the initiator state or a coalition of countries to economically strangle the opponent. However, economic sanctions rarely lead to political concessions on the part of the addressee State, a change in its policy or regime change. The low effectiveness of sanctions measures, which rarely force opponents to change their political course, contributes to the preservation of existing and the accumulation of new contradictions in interstate relations. The escalation of mutual claims of the major powers is fraught with the escalation of the political struggle into an armed confrontation with the use of a complex of traditional and new means of coercion. In general, these risks have a destabilizing effect on international security.

The US sanctions restrictions on Russia, primarily the measures fixed at the legislative level, will be in effect for a long time. The US administration will continue to exert sanctions pressure on Moscow, despite the fact that a number of subsequent restrictions may have only symbolic significance, bringing moral satisfaction to their initiator. The sanctions imposed since February 2022 differ in the degree of severity and the nature of the impact. In some cases, Washington deliberately left room for further actions to modify the measures introduced. Over the past decade, the range of reasons for the application of sanctions against Moscow has significantly expanded. At the same time, events that are neither directly nor indirectly related to Russia can be used as a pretext.

The US desire to weaken the Russian-Chinese tandem, including close cooperation between the two countries in the trade and economic sphere, may prompt Washington to soften a number of anti-Russian restrictions. Although the West continues to strengthen sanctions pressure on Moscow, it is impossible to exclude the possibility of easing or lifting a number of restrictions imposed since February 2022, primarily measures that have a negative impact on trade in food and fertilizers. However, Washington and Brussels granting exemptions from the sanctions regimes does not guarantee that there will be no problems for Russian exporters. An example, in particular, is the unsatisfactory implementation of the second part of the "package" Istanbul agreements – the Russia-UN Memorandum on the normalization of domestic exports of agricultural products and Fertilizers, which provides for the removal of financial and logistical barriers to the supply of Russian food and fertilizers to world markets (agreements reached in July 2022) ^[11]. The American expert community continues to analyze the feasibility of applying additional sensitive measures in relation to critical sectors of the Russian economy. In particular, the prospects of expanding the range of export controls, increasing technological restrictions, tightening measures against the domestic banking sector, weakening Russia's position in the global nuclear energy (Russia is the world's leading exporter of commercial nuclear technologies), strengthening and expanding restrictive measures against the domestic defense sector, introducing additional measures against the Russian energy cluster aimed at to reduce Moscow's revenues from the export of hydrocarbons ^[68].

Against the background of the deterioration of socio-economic dynamics in Western countries, including a record increase in inflation for almost half a century, Washington is making efforts to keep European allies and partners in the regime of sanctions pressure on Moscow. Due to the fact that the United States itself is experiencing the negative impact of anti-Russian sanctions, Washington will take into account the risks of potential damage to the American economy to a greater extent when making subsequent decisions. In line with the general line of updating sanctions enforcement, the United States will actively use existing and new ways to influence violators of sanctions regimes, limiting opportunities to circumvent sanctions.

Using both direct and indirect forms of influence, Washington will continue to exert political and economic pressure on states that have not joined the anti-Russian sanctions in order to limit their interaction with Moscow. American diplomacy will be particularly active in relation to Moscow's close partners and allies, wishing to reduce the intensity of their interaction with Russia. Washington will more actively hinder the strengthening of integration processes in the Greater Eurasia. Prospects for the return of Russia's reserves, as well as assets of Russian citizens blocked or frozen abroad, are not visible. They will be used by Western countries to continue providing assistance to the Kiev regime (the "Marshall Plan of the XXI century" for Ukraine). The US policy of limiting Russia's international competitiveness, as well as weakening its relations with allies and partners, will continue and is of a long-term nature.