The Jewish Lobby and U.S. Policy Toward Israel in 1952-1954.

Ivanova Nadezhda Andreevna ORCID: 0000-0001-6874-4098 Post-Graduate Student, Modern and Contemporary History Department, Lomonosov Moscow State University 119192, Russia, Moscow, Lomonosovsky Ave., 27 k 4 nadinivanova97@mail.ru

The Jewish lobby is increasingly becoming a topic of both historical and political studies. The interest around the lobbying forces is dictated by the peculiarities of the US-Israeli relations, which outwardly changed depending on the geopolitical situation, but in fact remained partner. At the moment, lobbying is an important socio–political element of the US government system. The Jewish lobby, which is the most well-known in the media, has become a political reality in the United States and one of the topics of discussions and discussions of the scientific community.

The topic of the Jewish lobby gained particular popularity after the publication of the fundamental work of D. Mearsheimer and S. Walt "The Israeli Lobby and US Foreign Policy"^[1]. It is in lobbying the interests of Israel that American researchers see the reason for the financial and political support provided to the Jewish state by the United States. At the same time, as the authors note, it often goes to the detriment of the American economy and US relations with other partner countries in the Middle East. Significant factual material supports the authors' point of view about Jewish lobbying as an important factor influencing the US foreign policy.This work marked the beginning of a whole galaxy of studies in which the authors either agreed with the ideas of D. Mearsheimer and S. Walt, considering them in different aspects, or harshly rejected the main postulates of the authors, questioning the effectiveness of the Jewish lobby in the US foreign policy discourse.

The works that enter into controversy with D. Mearsheimer and S. Walt include the works of D. Yuravlivker ^[2], R. Leberman ^[3]. Considering the issue of the Jewish lobby from different points of view, they agree that Jewish lobbying does not have enough influence to change the US foreign policy. It can influence public opinion or slightly adjust the political decisions made regarding Israel, but it is not a direct lever of influence on the American government.

When studying the Jewish lobby, researchers focus their attention on the modern period. Rare works devoted to the later period include the works of V. P. Rumyantsev ^[4], I. D. Zvyagelskaya ^[5], as well as the general works of T. A. Karasova ^[6] and A. D. Epstein ^[7], where Israeli lobbying is reviewed in the context of Israel's foreign policy strategy.

In historiography, there are two terms that characterize the activities of a group of individuals defending Israel's interests in the United States – the "Jewish lobby" and the "Israeli lobby" ("pro-Israel lobby"). In Russian historiography, the term "Israeli lobby" is more often used, considering it more correct, since the lobby works in the interests of Israel. In foreign historiography, the line between the terms "Jewish lobby" and "Israeli lobby" is blurred. The term "Jewish lobby" is more often used, but, for example, the already mentioned D. Mearsheimer and S. Walt write that non-Jews also belong to the group of lobbyists for Israel's interests, therefore it is incorrect to use the term "Jewish lobby". In this work, the terms "Jewish lobby" and "Israeli lobby" are used synonymously.

The main objective of this article is to determine the main methods of work of Jewish lobbying and its representatives in the United States in 1952-1954, to assess the effectiveness of this method during the period of change of power in the United States, which was accompanied by the adjustment of foreign policy priorities by the administration of D. Eisenhower.

The choice of the chronological period from 1952 to 1954 is due to the fact that at the end of 1952, the US presidential elections were held, according to the results of which Jewish lobbyists had to adapt to the new political realities of the Republican Party, traditionally not close to the Jewish diaspora in the United States. The upper limit was chosen in 1954, which foreshadowed a deep crisis in US-Israeli relations, which caused a decrease in the frequency of contacts between lobbyists and the US administration, and was further demonstrated during the Suez crisis of 1956. The study of the stated period will help us to more accurately determine the main features of Jewish lobbying during its formation, which took place in parallel with the formation of the US foreign policy strategy in the Middle East.

A document has been preserved in the archives of Israel, which is an analysis of A. Eban, the Israeli ambassador to the United States, of American-Israeli relations in 1952 ^{[8, p. 116]}. In it, he notes that Israel has succeeded in obtaining financial assistance from the United States, as well as enlisted support in resolving a number of political issues (the issue of Arab refugees, the internationalization of Jerusalem, the free passage of ships through the Suez Canal). The document concludes that Israel has not received a refusal from the United States on any important issue. The next part follows an analysis of methods of influencing the Congress, which "has become a key player in those issues that are important for Israel" ^{[8, p. 116]}. Consequently, A. Eban suggests "paying more attention to the dissemination of information and influence on public opinion... efforts should include working with many departments and agencies, and not as before, when it was possible to concentrate only on the US State Department" ^{[8, p. 116]}. Based on this, it can be assumed that by 1952 the Israeli government actively used the practice of lobbying and adjusted it based on the US political agenda. The expansion of institutions of influence confirms the idea of a gradual expansion of the opportunities and connections of Jewish lobbyists in the American government.

However, the Jewish lobby had many limitations, as evidenced by the forecast of financial assistance from the United States in the 1952-1953 fiscal year from T. Kollek, the Israeli envoy in Washington. He says that Israel has lost significant support from American politicians in connection with the use of US financial assistance to cover the balance of payments deficit, which "created the impression that Israel is not able to conduct its economic policy intelligently" ^{[8, p. 116]}.

Valuable material is the memoirs of I. Kenen, the head of the American-Israeli Public Relations Committee formed in 1951, who was a direct lobbyist for financial assistance to Israel in the US Congress. He writes that, taking into account the political realities of that time, their main goal for the 1952-1953 fiscal year was not to increase the amount of economic aid from the United States, as it was last year, but not to allow it to be cut ^{[9, p. 82-86]}. Initially, the forecasts were positive: A. Gardiner, Adviser on economic operations in the Middle East Affairs Department of the U.S. Department of State, agreed that Israel is in a difficult financial situation; D. Acheson, U.S. Secretary of State under G. Truman, said it was necessary to allocate funds to Israel to resolve the issue of resettlement of Palestinian refugees. However, when it came to the discussion in the US Congress, everything turned out to be not so positive. Many congressmen representing both the Democratic Party and the Republican Party have accused the Israeli Government of being in this position because of its own actions against Arab countries. Some doubted that Israel would really solve the problem of Palestinian refugees. The issue with the resettlement of refugees was aggravated by the fact that their bank accounts were still frozen at the initiative of Israel. In response to the negative reaction of congressmen, I. Kenen sent a 16-page memorandum, where he refuted the thesis that Arab countries would move away from the United States if the American government provided financial assistance to the Jewish state. He also added that Israel is pursuing a pro-Western foreign policy and the weakening of the country could hit US interests in the region. As a result, compared to the $65 million received in 1951, lobbying by I. Kenen helped to secure $73 million in the 1952-1953 fiscal year. Nevertheless, as a result, having made a comment that lobbyists overcame negative trends in Congress, he will note with alarm, as he did earlier, that "many congressmen doubt the viability of our economy" ^{[9, p. 86]}.

M. Shalit, the first secretary of the Israeli Embassy in the United States, commented on the US military assistance to Israel in the context of expanding the capabilities of the Jewish lobby. He stated that the divergence of opinions on military assistance both in the Israeli government and in the country's military circles led to "the failure of establishing contacts with American military attaches" ^{[8, p. 117]}. In the future, indecision on this issue contributed to the fact that in December 1952, D. Eisenhower's administration began to "look for or have already found ways to transfer weapons to Egypt" ^{[10, 726-727]}. At the same time, earlier, in July 1952, D. Ben-Gurion, the President of Israel, received an official letter from the U.S. Ambassador to Israel, M. Davis, stating that Israel has the right to receive military assistance from the United States ^{[10, 342-344]}. This implied that, in order of priority, Israel was to receive first aid. After the revolution in Egypt, G. Nasser came to power in the country. The United States began to consider him as a new leader in the Middle East region. Thus, even despite all the successes of Israeli lobbyists, they could not convince the American government that support for Israel, and not Egypt, at that time was more in line with US interests in the region.

At the same time, it is worth noting that the Israeli government has been constantly working to expand contacts with the White House. For example, already on November 5, 1952, immediately after the US presidential election, A. Eban stated that J. Jewits [Republican, Congressman from New York - N. I.], D. Sarnov [businessman, one of the founders of radio and television broadcasting in the USA – N. I.] and F. Lazarus [former Vice-president of the American Jewish Committee – N. I.] will become contact persons for communication with D. Eisenhower ^{[8, p. 282]}. Historically, the Jewish diaspora in the United States has supported Democratic presidential candidates. Historians identify a variety of reasons for this phenomenon. J. Levey tried to collect the main ones, which were: the proximity of liberal values, historical continuity (a positive attitude towards Jews on the part of Presidents T. Roosevelt and G. Truman), the image of the Jewish diaspora as an American minority, upholding the interests of Israel within the Democratic Party, and many others ^[11]. At the same time, historian E. Uslaner connects the democracy of Jews in the United States with their desire to preserve their religious identity ^[12]. He writes about the direct connection between Republicans and the Christian right, who together are trying to blur the line between the state and religion, which violates the Jewish identity of Jews. Thus, despite the variety of reasons, it remains a phenomenon that the Jewish diaspora has remained loyal to the Democratic Party for a long period of time. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the Jewish lobby also focused on the Democratic Party, however, even supporting the Democratic presidential candidate, the Israeli government did not lose contact with another party that was not close to the administration of the Jewish state.

According to archival sources, since 1953, the Israeli government has been strengthening cooperation with representatives of prominent Zionist organizations located in the United States. They are increasingly attracted to informal contact with representatives of the D. Eisenhower administration on various issues.

It cannot be argued that this interaction did not exist before. Historical documents demonstrate that all the main communication between Zionist organizations and the Israeli government took place through A. Eban. It was he who reported to Israel on the progress of negotiations between Zionist leaders or lobbyists with representatives of the D. Eisenhower administration. The American researcher E. Tivnan writes that in the 1960s the practice of preliminary briefings of employees of the Israeli Embassy in the United States with Zionist leaders before their meeting with representatives of the American administration was widespread ^{[13, p. 60]}. It can be assumed that earlier this practice was also conducted in order to consolidate efforts and lobby for common interests. In addition, in 1952, J. Blaustein, president of the American Jewish Committee, took part in negotiations on the issue of German reparations to the Jewish state ^{[10, 205]}. In this dialogue, the United States acted as a mediator who learned the intentions of both sides through informal representatives. All this was done with the aim of maximum secrecy of the very fact of negotiations on a sensitive topic for the Jewish people. Nevertheless, in 1953, with the coming to power of the Republican Party, which historically was not close to the Jewish diaspora in the United States, lobbying for Israeli interests intensified in order to obtain guarantees that the government would not choose a pro-Arab foreign policy course.

In March 1953 , President D. Eisenhower had a conversation with F. Lazarus spoke about the growth of anti-Semitism and asked the US President to act in support of Israel ^{[14, 185]}. D. Eisenhower, in response, emphasized the need for an early settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and a solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees. This conversation did not take place by chance at all. As stated earlier, the Israeli side was concerned about the possibility of changing the US foreign policy course under the new administration. However, when D. Eisenhower came to power, the White House did not openly speak in favor of the Jewish state. Prior to the trip of J. F. Dulles, the US Secretary of State, to the countries of the Middle East in May 1953, no important decisions were made on the region ^{[14, 156]}. This fact not only alarmed the government of Israel, but also gave hope to Arab countries that assumed changes in the US foreign policy strategy. Under these conditions, Israel has made every effort to find out whether changes in the US political course are planned and what sentiments regarding Israel prevail in the new administration.

At a time when the US administration considered Egypt with its new leader as a potential candidate for starting the process of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and concluding a peace agreement with Israel, the Israeli government in March 1953, through J. Blaustein, announced its intention to establish Israeli-Egyptian relations with the mediation of the United States ^[15]. One of the conditions on the Jewish side was the recognition of Israel within the borders in which it was at that time, that is, within the borders following the results of the Arab-Israeli war of 1947-1949. At the same time, the establishment of relations mentioned before the trip by J. F. Dulles, who plans to visit both Egypt and Israel, was beneficial to both the United States and the Jewish state. For Israel, it was an opportunity to improve relations with the D. Eisenhower administration. The Israeli Government tried to demonstrate that it was taking real actions to stabilize the situation in the region. Also, at the conclusion of the agreement between Israel and Egypt, the Jewish state could count on the lifting of restrictions on the passage of ships through the Suez Canal and the rejection of the economic boycott declared to Israel by Arab countries. For the United States, the establishment of Israeli-Egyptian relations provided an incentive to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and, accordingly, consolidated the region as an American zone of influence.

However, these plans failed to materialize. After J. F. Dulles' trip to the Middle East in May 1953 and specifically a visit to Egypt, the US Secretary of State, in a report to D. Eisenhower, emphasized strong nationalist tendencies in the country, as well as the growing anti-British sentiment due to the presence of a British military contingent at the Suez base in Egypt ^[16]. In accordance with these conclusions, as well as at the request of W. Churchill, the British Prime Minister, J. F. Dulles and D. Eisenhower decided in early June 1953 to postpone the provision of military assistance to Egypt. For its part, the Egyptian side correlated the postponement of military aid with the successful actions of Jewish lobbyists, as stated at a meeting with H. Herzog, the military attache at the Israeli Embassy in the United States ^{[17, p. 227-228]}. It was also said that Israel should not count on peace agreements with Egypt. In response to the statement about lobbying against Egypt, H. Herzog noted that it is in Egypt's power to stop it. In this case, it can be seen that the foreign policy decision to suspend military assistance to Egypt was not the result of successful lobbying by Israel, but was a US decision taken after analyzing negative domestic political trends in Egypt. The United States skillfully used the Jewish lobby to its advantage.

At the same time, it is impossible to say for sure whether the Israeli government guessed that the Jewish lobby played not the first role in the US decision to suspend funding for Egypt. In November 1953, Mr. Raphael, an employee of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had a conversation with Egyptian representatives. He, trying to convey to the Egyptian representatives that Israel wants to hear official statements from Egypt about the peace agreements, and not assurances in an informal format, added that "the strength of the Jewish lobby was demonstrated by the example of assistance [to Egypt from the United States – NI] and everything is still ahead" ^{[17, p. 459]}. Thus, the Israeli side made a reference to the suspension of military assistance to Egypt by the United States in June 1953, which, in their opinion, was the result of Jewish lobbying. They also hinted that Egypt should translate talks about peace agreements into an official paradigm, otherwise lobbyists may continue to block decisions made in the United States in the interests of Egypt.

During the meeting, the Egyptian representative commented on Zionist organizations: he stated that the existence of a large number of organizations created by the Jewish diaspora in the United States "confuses the Egyptian embassy" ^{[17, p. 228]}. To this, the Israeli military attache replied that "the Israelis themselves are not fully aware of the goals and sentiments in every Jewish organization in the United States" ^{[17, p. 228]}. It can be assumed that the Jewish organizations at that time were not a cohesive organized group that was under the full control of the Israeli government. Researcher V. P. Rumyantsev comes to similar conclusions, who notes that Jews in the United States have always been distinguished by high social activity, but even within the Zionist organizations of the United States at that time there was obvious disunity ^{[4, pp. 7-8]}.

The situation with economic aid in the 1953-1954 fiscal year was exactly the opposite. With the coming to power of the new American administration, it was decided to cut financial assistance to Israel. In mid-1953, the D. Eisenhower administration proposed a "belt-tightening" program aimed at reducing the amount of financial assistance to Israel and creating additional leverage on it ^[18]. When discussing the amount of financial assistance, the figure of $ 70 million was discussed, then it was decided to allocate only $ 100 million to Arab countries and Israel in total. I. Kenen addressed senators X. Ferguson (Republican, representative from Michigan), G. Gillett (Democrat, representative from Iowa), H. Humphrey (Democrat, representative from Minnesota) and members of the House of Representatives R. Chipperfield (Republican, representative from Illinois), J. Jewits with a request to help in this matter, but they did nothing we were able to do ^{[9, p. 98-99]}. After that, I. Kenen contacted A. Gardiner to complain about the state of affairs, but he accused Israel of escalating the conflict over the water issue. As a result, having achieved nothing, the Israeli lobbyist developed a memorandum in which he pointed to the deterioration of relations between the administration of D. Eisehauer and the Government of Israel.

In 1953, the Jewish state especially often went into conflict with its Arab neighbors and did not want to make concessions on many key issues that worried the US public. One of such events was the construction of the All-Israel water pipeline. Israel planned to divert water from the Jordan River using a canal from the Bnot Yakov Bridge. The construction of this canal meant carrying out work along the border with Syria and partially through the demilitarized zone. Deliberately failing to coordinate these works with Syria, which could reject this proposal, and also implying that in this way Israel would gain control over this section of the demilitarized territory, Israel began work ^{[19, p. 68]}. The Syrian government officially expressed its dissatisfaction with the actions of the Israeli side and appealed to the UN, which obliged Israel to stop work on the demilitarized zone. The Israeli Government, which has created a conflict situation in the unstable Middle East region, has received disapproval for its short-sighted actions among the countries of the world community. In the future, employees of the Israeli Embassy in the United States at one of the meetings will discuss that Israel's policy only "alienates close and loyal friends [of Israel – NI]. Even such as L. Lipsky [chairman of the American Zionist Council – NI], A. Silver [a prominent Zionist figure, former president of the Zionist Organization of America – N. I.], N. Goldman [Chairman of the World Jewish Congress – N. I.], J. Blaustein express their doubts about the reasonableness of Israeli policy" ^{[17, p. 354]}. The US government, in response to Israel's refusal to stop work on the demilitarized zone, decided to suspend financial assistance to the country, but did not officially announce it. Israeli researchers expressed the opinion that this could be caused by the unwillingness to provoke the Jewish community of the United States to lobby for a revision of these actions of the American administration.

Another conflict that again made the Jewish diaspora of the United States doubt the correctness of Israel's actions was the incident in Kibiya. As a result of an operation carried out by the Israeli army on October 14, 1953 as a retaliatory act of retaliation for another border conflict that occurred on the Israeli-Jordanian border, in Kibiya, a Jordanian village, more than 60 civilians were killed. The conflict, which received a negative reaction both around the world and among the population and political circles of the United States, also caused discontent among Zionist organizations, which the leaders openly expressed when meeting with A. Eban ^{[17, p. 360]}. Nevertheless, even despite disagreeing with the policy of the Israeli administration, Zionist figures tried to do everything possible to improve the image of the country. They held a number of meetings with D. Eisenhower, J. F. Dulles, G. Byroud (Head of the Middle East, South Asia and Africa Affairs Department of the U.S. Department of State) to receive recommendations on Israel's further actions at the UN meeting, which was going on this issue, as well as to understand the mood among the administration about the current situation ^{[17, p. 379-380]}. After a personal conversation between G. Byroud and J. Blaustein, a Zionist figure, stated that the general atmosphere of the conversation was positive, but it was obvious that G. Bayroud was more concerned about the situation of the Arabs, and not Israel ^{[13, p. 380]}. The situation was also made difficult by the fact that the United States publicly announced the suspension of financial assistance to Israel on October 20, 1953. Immediately after that, lobbying began to change this decision. I. Kenen turned to Senators S. Bridges (Republican, representative from New Hampshire) and H. Ferguson for support, but they could not change the situation ^{[9, p. 102]}. Further, on October 26, 1953, J. F. Dulles and G. Byroud held a meeting with representatives of prominent Zionist organizations, at which they discussed the deterioration of relations between Israel and the United States ^[20]. The Zionist representatives stated that the improvement of relations with Arab countries should not come at the expense of weakening cooperation with Israel and that the Jewish State is experiencing financial difficulties related to the economic boycott carried out by Arab countries. In response to this, J. Dulles said that the suspension of financial assistance was necessary to demonstrate the mechanism for resolving the acute international conflict in the Middle East by the United Nations. The whole situation threatened to result in an armed conflict if the United States had not done so. The United States had no other reason other than this. On October 27, 1953, financial aid to Israel resumed. The October 26 meeting can be considered a successful outcome of Jewish lobbying, but at the same time it is worth saying that, as Israeli representatives noted, there were no positive trends in relations between Arab countries and the United States, so it made no sense for the United States to continue to distance Israel from itself.

The US reaction to the conflict in the Israeli-Syrian demilitarized zone in September-October 1953, as well as to the incident in Kibiya in October 1953, only strengthened the confidence of the leaders of American Zionist organizations that the US administration decided to adhere to an unfriendly policy towards Israel ^{[17, p. 491-492]}. As a result, it was decided to strengthen the lobbying of the Republican Party and the need to obtain guarantees for Israel from the D. Eisenhower administration.

In 1954, one of the main tasks of the United States in the Middle East was the creation of a regional defense organization. Iraq, as one of the potential members of the organization, insisted that Israel should not be included in it. At the same time, the United States did not seek to completely isolate Israel and invited it to general meetings to discuss the future organization. However, the main problem remained that the creation of a defensive alliance implied the provision of financial and military assistance to a member country from the United States. This went against the interests of Israel. Nevertheless, neither official negotiations with the participation of Israeli and American diplomats, nor lobbying could change the US intention to consolidate Iraq's determination to join the Middle East defense organization with financial and military assistance. It is worth paying attention to the fact that negotiations with Iraq were quite difficult. Arab nationalists led by Egypt opposed the entry of any Arab country into the union without all other Arab countries ^{[21, p. 97]}. The accession of Iraq to the organization, of which Turkey and Pakistan were participants, threatened to worsen relations with other Arab countries. Thus, in the issue of arms supplies to Iraq, the United States could not make concessions because of the desire to gain a foothold in the Middle East, which could become a zone of influence of the USSR.

After the conflict situations initiated by Israel in 1953 (the incident in Kibiya in October 1953, the conflict with Syria over the water issue in September-October 1953), and the ongoing tensions on the Israeli-Jordanian border in 1954, Jewish lobbyists did not feel as confident in their ties with the American administration as before R. Shiloah, an envoy at the Israeli Embassy in the United States, wrote in his report to the Israeli government that "Israel's friends in Congress and such Zionist leaders as F. Klutznik [president of the organization B'nai B'rith–NI], J. Blaustein, claimed that Israel had lost the initiative in the attitude of Congress and public opinion; it is important that Israel make itself heard..." ^{[22, p. 179]}.

In order to create a positive image, as well as to enlist the support of the United States, Israel again initiated contact with Egypt to reach peace agreements. However, Egypt did not want to negotiate at the official level, but continued to give assurances at informal meetings and conversations with Israeli representatives. One of these representatives was J. Blaustein, who at the next meeting with the Egyptian side again insisted on meeting representatives of Israel and Egypt in an official format, but received only a recommendation to continue negotiations with an unofficial person from the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and an invitation to visit Cairo ^{[22, p. 193]}.  After that, J. Blaustein held a meeting with G. Byroud, informing him about the conversation with the Egyptian side. G. Byroud replied that J. Blaustein should maintain contact with an unofficial representative of Egypt and that the actions of the Zionist figure will favorably influence the discussion of financial assistance to Israel ^{[22, p. 210]}.

In 1954, distrust of the American administration on the part of Israel began to grow even more. In April and May 1954, G. Byroud made a speech where he said that "Israel should consider itself a part of the Middle East, and not the core of the world association of people of a certain religious affiliation who have special rights" ^{[22, p. 154]}. In addition, Israel's attempts to obtain any official security guarantees from the United States also failed. A draft version of the guarantees was being developed, but after prolonged contact with the American side, M. Sharet, Prime Minister of Israel from 1954 to 1955, admitted that this document would not change anything significantly ^{[22, p. 397]}. Later, R. Shiloah, assessing the state of US-Israeli relations, will write that "Israel is in a long conflict with the changes and adjustments of US policy in the Middle East. ... Unfortunately, he [p. Shiloah – N. I.] does not see any significant differences in the attitude of Republicans or Democrats to this issue" ^{[22, p. 405]}. The fatigue of the Israeli issue in the American administration is becoming obvious, as the Israeli Government clearly understood.

In October 1954, Zionist organizations, through lobbying, did not give up trying to change the situation of Israel. The American historian M. Yurofsky writes that at that time American Jews actively lobbied for Israel's interests, but "these efforts brought meager results" ^{[23, p. 306]}. Lobbying during this period was massive and unnerved the administration of D. Eisenhower. A. Eban was told that the White House was under great pressure and felt uncomfortable ^{[22, p. 417]}. It is during this period that the issue of institutionalization of the Zionist communities into a single whole becomes particularly acute. Back in September 1954, A. Eban decided to organize a meeting of the leaders of the main Zionist organizations to report that J. F. Dulles demanded a unified and organized position from lobbyists, who by that time were chaotic in their efforts. The thesis about the disorganization and illogicality of the actions of lobbyists at that time is also confirmed by I. Kenen. After the organization of the American Zionist Public Relations Committee in 1954 (the predecessor was the American–Israeli Public Relations Committee), he could not find a common language with the main Zionist organizations for a long time, because he did not agree with the methods used there. For example, E. Stone, a representative of the Zionist Organization of America, continuously called members of the US Congress and tried to embarrass the US State Department in order to get his way. I. Kenan's approach was more delicate and aimed at creating a network of members of the US political circle friendly to Israel ^{[24, p. 30]}.

Summing up, it is worth saying that in 1952-1954 the Jewish lobby was quite heterogeneous. On the one hand, at that time there was a process of folding the Israeli lobby from disparate organizations, the disunity of which became especially evident in 1954. At the same time, the organization of the leaders of Zionist organizations under the auspices of the Israeli Embassy in the United States and their common desire to defend the interests of Israel moved them in one direction. In addition, lobbyists often did not support certain political decisions of Israel, such as the 1953 conflict situations initiated by Israel itself, but made efforts to improve the country's image even in the face of increasing negative trends. The Israeli government, for its part, used lobbyists for informal contact with the administration of D. Eisenhower. Israel attempted to turn the Jewish lobby into a lever of pressure on the US government, resorting to the help of a whole network of contacts in the US Congress and administration, who belonged to both the Democratic and Republican parties. The United States, in turn, viewed the Israeli lobby as a tool that promoted constant dialogue with Israel even in conditions of cooling relations. With the change of the Truman administration to the D. Eisenhower administration, the Jewish lobby underwent a transformation associated with changes in American foreign policy strategy. The United States tried to build relations with Arab countries, which was completely hampered by the actions of the Israeli government aimed at creating conflict situations in the region. More consolidated efforts were required from Jewish lobbyists and there was a need to revise the existing lobbying mechanism in order to prove that the support of Israel was more beneficial for the United States from a foreign policy point of view than the support of Arab countries.