The Process of Transformation of the Policy of the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany in 1921-1922.

Lysenko Maksim Postgraduate Student, Department of Modern and Contemporary History, Faculty of History, Lomonosov Moscow State University 119991, Russia, Moscow, Leninskie Gory str., 1 maximus-lysenko@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

The NSDPG (Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany) was a unique phenomenon in the history of the labor movement. Having broken away from the SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany) in 1917, it became a protest force against the compromisers with the so-called policy of civil peace during the First World War. Its main idea and strength were orthodox principles, which consisted in promoting orthodox democratic socialism and internationalism, i.e. in international solidarity of workers to build a socialist state, and at the same time rejecting violent actions that could lead to civil war. The promotion of the program became especially possible when radical elements of the undemocratic persuasion left the party in 1920. However, the period from the spring of 1921 to the summer of 1922 was marked by a sharp change in the policy vector of the NSDPG, which led to its merger with the parent party.

The history of the Independents is much less represented in historiography than the SPD and the KKE. Of course, the NSDPG became the object of research, but scientists mainly focused their attention on the first 3 years of the party's existence before its split (1917-1920). Thus, Robert Wheeler linked the death of the party due to the failed November Revolution and the further influence of the Comintern, which played on the contradictions between the wings of the party and attracted radicalized independents to his side ^{[1, 263]}. David Morgan attributed the failures of the NSDPG to the fact that its leaders belonged to the Social Democratic school, therefore they faced difficulties in presenting organizational alternatives, various political programs or new ways of action due to the ephemeral and limited theoretical base of the party ^{[2, 12]}. Hartfried Krause emphasized the structural failure of the NSDPG in competition with other stronger workers' parties ^{[3, 229]}. Aspects of the activities of independents were presented in other works, where similar conclusions were drawn ^{[4] [5],[6],[7]}. The period from 1921 to 1922 was given a place where the "survival" of the party before the merger with the SPD was considered in an overview form, and there are no separate studies devoted to this period of time at all.

Proceeding from the above, it seemed necessary to us: firstly, to analyze the ideological development of the NSDPG in the period from 1921 to 1922 and its place in the party-political spectrum of the Weimar Republic; secondly, to identify changes in the political practice of independents against the background of threats to the Weimar Republic on the left (represented by the KKE – the Communist Party of Germany) and on the right (in the person of nationalists) in this period; thirdly, to consider the factors within the NSDPG that contributed to and opposed the process of unification of socialists.

            The formation of the NSDPG was the result of disputes within the German Social Democrats during the First World War. The priority of the SPD's policy was the creation of a democratic parliamentary republic, while the NSDPG demanded state reforms to create a socialist republic. In the wake of the November Revolution of 1918, the Independents attracted socialists who could not accept the opportunism of the majority Social Democrats. At the same time, a large number of radical elements joined the party, who were alien to the traditions of European socialism and who were impressed by the radical scenario of the October Revolution in Russia. For ordinary independents, this option was attractive due to the successful activities of the Bolsheviks during the Civil War ^{[8, 200]}.  Against the background of disappointment in the failed revolution in Germany and the creation of the Comintern at the party congress in Halle in October 1920, more than half of the independents went to the more radical KKE, resulting in 340 thousand people out of 894,000 members in the NSDPG ^{[1, 262]}. 61 out of 81 people remained in the Reichstag faction, which still retained the third largest Reichstag for the party ^{[9, 797]}.

The problem of the relationship between the NSDPG, the SPD and the KKE was a different approach to how the proletariat was to come to power. The main topic of discussion between them was the attitude to the October Revolution and its methods ^{[10, 3]}. The position of the leading independents was initially predisposed to the views of the Social Democrats, i.e. "revolutionary socialism" for the NSDPG essentially meant a process in which representatives of the working class sought to gain power by democratic, not violent methods. They assessed the Russian version of the revolution, which was promoted by the KKE, no more than "the unbridling of fratricidal war" ^{[11, 217]}. Therefore, any initiatives and proposals of the Communists, especially after the split, were perceived negatively by independents and with great distrust. In turn, the NSDPG differed from the SPD in its loyalty to the pre-war Marxist traditions ^{[12, 12]}. For the independents, the Workers' Party had to rely on the proletariat and fight capitalist exploitation, primarily in the socio-economic sphere. Proceeding from this, the NSDPG demanded broad socialist reforms (for example, the nationalization of large-scale industry) and refused all cooperation with liberal forces. Therefore, the coalition policy of the SPD and the limited changes in the economy under its leadership caused an extremely negative reaction.

The strengthening of the KKE at the end of 1920 contributed to the fact that the NSDPG was forced to abandon the revolutionary rhetoric that was its key to success in the early years of the Weimar Republic. The Communists occupied the extreme left flank in the spectrum of political forces, so the role of "revolutionaries" who opposed the existing order of things in the new republic belonged only to them. Any attempt by the independents to act as an extrasystemic force pushed them into the sphere of influence of the KKE, where they could not compete with it. The NSDPG had to carefully work out its slogans so that the Communists could not seize the leadership in one or another manifestation.

The crises engulfing Germany during 1921-1922 more than once put the NSDPG in a situation where its actions differed from what it stated in its printed bodies. The party attempted to draw a clear line between itself and the Communists and the right-wing Social Democrats. If this task was successfully carried out until the spring of 1921, then as various threats escalated, the party was literally thrown from among its ideological dogmas to solve purely practical tasks.

The first challenge for the NSDPG was the "March Action" of 1921, during which the Communists raised fruitless uprisings in central Germany. Both the Independents and the Social Democrats had a fairly clear position towards the KKE from the beginning, while their approaches to solving problems were completely opposite. The NSDPG reacted ambivalently to this action. The independents believed that the radical left threat could be eliminated by the workers themselves with the help of propaganda work and non-participation in actions with communist slogans: "With all the readiness of the workers' association, we intend to isolate the Communists in a short time and neutralize the communist leadership" ^[13]. Thus, they defended the democratic principles of the socialist movement, therefore they opposed any attempts of the KKE to seize power by putschist methods. At the same time, the NSDPG actively opposed the repressions that were allowed against ordinary workers — the party tried to prove itself as a defender of purely class interests. For the Social Democrats, any such provocation of this kind was an anti-state activity and was subject to suppression.

The events of the winter and spring of 1921 also took place against the backdrop of a difficult international situation, which directly or indirectly influenced the decisions of political forces in Germany. In January 1921, at the Paris Conference, it was decided to pay reparations for 225 billion gold marks over 42 years. There was not a single party that spoke in favor of approving reparations. The Social Democrats also opposed the acceptance of the conditions put forward by the winning countries ^{[14, 2310]}. However, unlike Hermann Muller (SPD), who pointed out the excessive pressure of the new conditions on workers, Georg Ledebur's (NSDPG) decision was justified by the protection of "German workers from Western capitalists in Germany" ^{[14, 2314]}. 

The position of the Social Democrats demonstrated a pragmatic approach to the problem - large reparations payments would fall on the shoulders of enterprises, which was associated with greater exploitation of their workers. The Independents demonstratively used socialist rhetoric to emphasize that their position is not directed against the decisions of the Paris Conference as a whole, but against its capitalist component. The difference in the motivation for the refusal was that the NSDPG expressed not the will of the state power, which balanced between the interests of various strata of society, but exclusively the will of the proletariat against the decisions of the "capitalists".

After the threat of partial occupation of the Ruhr region by the Entente countries, the independents spoke out for compliance with reparations payments, while trying to draw out that refusal of the demands would immediately lead "to an imminent catastrophe and the death of the German people, and especially the German workers" ^{[15, 3637]}. This event is unique in that for the first time in the political practice of the republic, independents approved a government statement that went beyond purely class politics.

The main challenge for the NSDPG was the right-wing radical threat to the Weimar Republic. On June 9, 1921, Karl Garais, an independent, was killed, and then, on August 26 of the same year, a member of the Center Party, Mathias Erzberger, who was considered a supporter of the democratic development of Germany. The NSDPG raised the question of its entry into the ruling coalition to solve this problem. However, the party did not demand the formation of a socialist cabinet as before, but put forward a minimum program that the existing coalition (the SPD, the Center Party and the German Democratic Party) had to accept. It featured the nationalization of the mining industry, the continuation of social reforms, the policy of executing the London ultimatum, the creation of a jury based on universal secret and direct elections, as well as the dismissal of officials expressing monarchical views ^[16]. The Liberal parties, in turn, rejected such proposals.

Thus, the strategy of the NSDPG underwent significant changes during 1921. Threats to the stable existence of the young republic from anti-systemic forces (communists and monarchists) forced the party to show features not of a class, but of a system-forming party, which brought it closer to the SPD. At the same time, independents still took a principled position in relation to the liberal parties. The position of the NSDPG could be called involuntarily half-hearted. The defense of the Weimar Republic was important for the party, but its dogmatic ideological base did not allow it to cooperate with other political forces. The ambivalent attitude towards Weimar democracy and the almost fruitless attempts to pass socialist laws through the Reichstag forced the independents to turn to the revision of their political doctrine.

The failures were indicated by the indicators of membership in the party: If at the time of the split in 1920 there were about 340,000 people in the party ^{[1, 262]}, then in January 1922 there were 300,659, and by August their number had decreased to 290,762 ^{[17, 127]}. For comparison, the SPD numbered 1,174,105 people at the beginning of 1922, and the KPD in August 1921 about 360,000 people ^[5,490]. The party faced two alternatives: to make significant changes in its policy, thereby modifying approaches to class ideology, and join the SPD, or remain a marginal party representing the interests of only one social group.

By the summer of 1922, groups with opposing views on the future of the party had formed in the party. Thus, it was possible to single out supporters of the former class doctrine and supporters of unification with the SPD to solve urgent practical problems. Among the former were mainly representatives of the party leadership: Georg Ledebur, Arthur Crispin and Wilhelm Dittmann, and among the latter: Rudolf Hilferding (editor-in-chief of the NSDPG "Freiheit"), Karl Kautsky and Paul Levy, who came from the KPD in April 1922.

At the Leipzig Congress in January 1922, the party leaders attempted to establish in the NSDPG a policy of uncompromising class struggle as opposed to the idea of "class harmony" of the SPD: "The unity of the proletariat <...> is becoming an increasingly urgent task in the near future. This will happen and should happen, but it is practically feasible only when the socialist parties stand on the same base" ^{[18, 27-28]}. The leadership again returned to the scenario when unification could be carried out only in conditions of a single ideological base, implying a return to pre-war socialism. The rhetoric of the congress demonstrated that the independents did not see prospects for unification with the SPD and tried in every way to emphasize the difference between "revolutionary socialism" and "treacherous reformism" ^{[18, 27]}.

The very policy of the independents contradicted the uncompromising class struggle proclaimed by her. The party could not completely exclude the experience of 1921 from its tactics: "The NSDPG can temporarily support the government if it does not act to the detriment of the working class and if it applies measures to protect the republic and combat the monarchist reaction" ^{[18, 27]}. Even against the background of attempts to regain the appearance of irreconcilable fighters for workers' rights, independents still unwittingly continued the coalition game. In its foreign policy strategy, the party declared its commitment to compliance with the London Ultimatum ^{[19, 5585]}. Support for the foreign policy of the coalition government was the most sustained in parliamentary practice, and in addition, it became a solid point of contact for cooperation with the SPD. Although this policy, as before, was justified by the protection of German workers from ruin and the guilt of the right forces in non-compliance with the Entente's conditions for the disarmament of the Reichswehr, this item went beyond the scope of the original program.

In turn, the supporters of unification with the SPD did not attempt to create an autonomous group within the party, had an unorganized character, and, as a result, did not aim to break away from the party or oppose themselves to the leadership. In addition, the main claims of the opponents of the leadership were beyond ideological disputes and concerned primarily the practical policy of independents.

Rudolf Hilferding, at the January 1922 congress, spoke out against competitive actions against right-wing socialists: "The unity of the proletariat can be achieved not only by discussions; it emerges from the struggle of the entire working class for goals that come directly from class interests. There should be no mutual competition, the association should follow the path of solidarity in an effort to achieve the maximum achievable unity" ^{[18, 105-106]}. R. Hilferding's speech did not go beyond understanding how the party leadership imagined unification. But its distinctive feature was that the desire for unity was not suppressed by criticism of the coalition policy.

Karl Kautsky, in turn, accused the leadership of the fact that the Independents are not trying to unite the labor movement with their agitation, but to split the right-wing Social Democrats. At the same time, he pointed out: "Experience has shown enough that honest revolutionary elements, which, according to your [leadership – M.L.] opinion, are clearly many in the SPD, do not yet think to turn away from their party" ^[20]. In other words, this politician still saw in the NSDPG only dissenters who are not capable of uniting workers, despite the assurances of the leadership: "Unfortunately, the vitality of the party is not based on its own successes, but on the mistakes of its opponents. When the opponents stopped making big mistakes, the growth of the NSDPG stopped" ^{[21, 16]}. Karl Kautsky thus emphasized that the revolutionary potential of the independents had long since dried up and their field of activity was concentrated in parliament, where the SPD was the only partner close in ideology.

Paul Levy held a similar position. This figure, despite the long experience of the leadership of the KKE, belonged to the pre-war school of democratic socialism, therefore, the idea of a revolution where the people, and not a limited group of people, should make a change of power, was important to him. The former communist did not perceive the half-hearted policy of the NSDPG leadership as viable. It was obvious that independents could not be revolutionaries as long as the KKE existed. Paul Levy's opinion was based on the principle that there could be only one force in parliament that had to defend workers' interests. He believed that only the tactics proposed by the SPD could "politically" ^{[22, 165.]} to solve the issues of the labor movement, therefore, he did not consider the NSDPG and its policy of "parliamentarism" in a revolutionary way "" seriously ^{[23, 1098.]}.

Researchers agree that the assassination of Foreign Minister Walter Rathenau on June 24, 1922 was a turning point in the fate of the NSDPG. Nevertheless, the question arises: why exactly did this attempt cause a storm on the moderate-left flank, after all, attempts were made on high-ranking officials before that? This event has fallen on fertile ground. The fact that the murder of a member of the democratic government was committed by members of the right-wing radical organization "Consul", independents and Social Democrats regarded as "a monarchical coup on the threshold" ^[24]. The acute political crisis forced independents to seriously think about the problems of their party's tactics. The murder of Walter Rathenau demonstrated that the oppositional position of the NSDPG could lead to the collapse of the Weimar Republic, and with it to the loss of even small achievements of the November Revolution by the standards of independents. The change of mood among independents is also indicated by the agitation for a new tactic that immediately began: "Overcoming the strife that paralyzes the forces of the proletariat, uniting the working class, as far as it is now possible – this is the demand of the time!" ^[24]. The scales swung in favor of joining the government, and the leadership could not but go against this movement, otherwise it would have met with misunderstanding. Already on June 26, 1922, the NSDPG faction began negotiations on joining the coalition cabinet ^[24].

On July 14, the factions of the socialist parties announced the creation of a single working group with the aim of forming a single proletarian front and promoting a common political agenda ^[25]. Despite the fact that this did not yet mean the unification process, this rapprochement demonstrated that the previous relationship between the NSDPG and the SPD was impossible. Firstly, the active inclusion of independents in the coalition game meant a break with the old tactics. Secondly, the promotion of the left program in the Law on the Protection of the Republic and the resistance of the liberal parties made the unification of socialists an urgent problem.

If the NSDPG had previously made temporary exceptions to its program, then in the summer and autumn of 1922 Arthur Crispin put forward a strategy that is no different from the strategy of the right-wing Socialists: "The proletariat is not so strong to take power, but the bourgeoisie is no longer so strong to govern itself. There are several options – a purely workers' government, or a bourgeois government pleasing to the workers' parties, or a mixed government, or a bourgeois government against which the workers' parties will fight. A purely workers' government is possible only when the proletariat is strong enough to take over power, and only then will the decisive battle begin" ^{[17, 140]}. Despite the revolutionary rhetoric, this quote was a litmus test demonstrating the transformation of the NSDPG policy.  The Independents shifted from the initial demand of a purely socialist cabinet to rather flexible policy options, finally abandoning, in fact, their principle of class hostility. From now on, the construction of socialism was postponed indefinitely, when the workers in the republic would be able to assume sole power. During August, a common program of action of the two socialist parties was being worked out. The finished draft was published on September 6, 1922, and in mid-September separate party congresses were held to discuss it. However, the main subject of discussion was not the program itself, but the decision to merge. The main opponents in the NSDPG have long been known. Despite the resistance of Georg Ledebur and his supporters, the congress voted for unification by 185 votes to 7 ^{[17, 173]}.

***

The NSDPG intended to continue the traditions of the pre-war Social democratic movement. It was assumed that the competitors of independents on the left and right would not be able to retain their electorate in the near future, since they did not represent the "true interests" of the working class. The promotion of the ideological program of the NSDPG became impossible for practical reasons. From 1921 to 1922, the Independents tactically approached the SPD as close as possible, i.e. they completely abandoned extra-parliamentary activities in an attempt to distance themselves from the Communists. The NSDPG positioned itself as an exclusively workers' party, but, nevertheless, political crises motivated it to all new exceptions to its program. Thus, it was blocked with the right-wing socialists against the actions of the Communists ("March action"), which contradicted the doctrine of the united proletariat. The motivation of the Independents to counter the KKE was the struggle against putschism aimed at destroying the Weimar system.

The main exceptions to its program were made by the party in the fight against the right-wing radical threat. It was the reparations issue, as well as the murders of Matthias Erzberger and Walter Rathenau, that led step by step to the fact that the NSDPG turned from a party that sought to unite the labor movement on the basis of pre-war social democracy into a party that switched to the position of defending the Weimar Republic against its internal enemies. This meant the death of the universalist idea of socialism as such, which in fact equated the NSDPG with the position of the post-war SPD, i.e., to defend a separate national democratic republic for the gradual construction of socialism. The events of the summer of 1922 showed that the overwhelming majority of the socialists remaining in the NSDPG were ready to abandon their old program.

The process of transformation of the NSDPG policy took place gradually. Independents had to compete with parties that had their own practical experience of power and a well-developed program of action, while their own strategy remained on paper. Since the split in 1920, the remaining part of the party has strategically become more predisposed to interaction with the SPD, and relations with the Communists have increasingly demonstrated an insurmountable gap in the labor movement. By the summer of 1922, the only "screen" that divided the Socialists was the coalition issue and the pride of the independents.