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Reference:
Chmyreva V.
The Role of Turkey in the Post-Soviet Space in US Foreign Policy Analysis
// World Politics.
2023. ¹ 1.
P. 26-36.
DOI: 10.25136/2409-8671.2023.1.39166 EDN: LTIYPG URL: https://en.nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=39166
The Role of Turkey in the Post-Soviet Space in US Foreign Policy Analysis
DOI: 10.25136/2409-8671.2023.1.39166EDN: LTIYPGReceived: 14-11-2022Published: 04-04-2023Abstract: The subject of the study is a set of current ideas, concepts and strategies of representatives of American expert community on Turkish issues. The relevance of the work is determined by the need for a comprehensive analysis of the process of geopolitical transformations in the region taking into account the rising role of Turkey. The research is based on publicistic sources, which include analytical studies, articles, reports and expert assessments of specialists from the leading centers and institutions. The paper shows that the study of the potential of Turkish influence is intended to find a manageable balance of power in the region where Turkey will not oppose to American interests. It is noted that in the post-Soviet space Turkey has already become an indispensable player, proactive and ready to fill the vacuum of political will and power swiftly. The author points out that the expert community emphasizes differing degree of geopolitical influence of Turkey and Russia in the post-Soviet space, which determines the readiness of Turkish leadership to rely on NATO support as a counterbalance to the historical influence of Kremlin in the region. The author concludes that US still considers Turkey as a strategically valuable partner, and in certain scenarios the Republic has a chance to get carte blanche for a sovereign foreign policy and secure a place of a new key player; in this case, the USA can find a new manageable equilibrium in which Turkey's unfriendly actions will not undermine American strategic interests. Keywords: Turkey, USA, NATO, Russia, post-Soviet space, Russian-Turkish relations, foreign policy analysis, expert community, foreign policy, international relationsThis article is automatically translated. Over the past two decades, in the context of the transformation of the world political system, the Republic of Turkey has been striving to establish itself as one of the key actors in modern international relations. By adjusting its own foreign policy vision and building new vectors of the country's sovereignty, Turkey is guided by national interests and successfully hedges risks in the context of a progressive confrontation between Russia and the West, despite membership in the North Atlantic Alliance and close cooperation with the United States, EU states, and the United Kingdom. The strategic paradigm of Turkish foreign policy is changing towards a more flexible model, which demonstrates a high degree of adaptability in achieving its own foreign policy and economic goals. The intensification of Ankara's foreign policy efforts against the background of the Ukrainian crisis since 2014, the deepening and institutionalization of economic, military, military-technical, humanitarian cooperation with the states of the post–Soviet space and the intensification of relations with Russia (RF) - all this fits perfectly into the Turkish ideology of the "hub" [1] and allows us to predict the transition of its influence to a new trans-regional level. On the threshold of the global transformation of the modern system of international relations and the formation of new geopolitical alliances, Turkey demonstrates its readiness not only to participate in key world political processes as a mediator, but also to act as their moderator, proving that "the world is more than five." ("The world is bigger than five" is a thesis popularized by Turkish President R. Erdogan, which characterizes the disruption of global equilibrium in the world and Turkey's desire to change existing institutions and norms. See: "The World Is Bigger than Five": A Salutary Manifesto of Turkey's New International Outlook. Insight Turkey Winter 2019 / Volume 21 Number 4). The active and multi-vector Turkish foreign policy is attracting increased attention from the American political and academic community. The US foreign policy discourse on Turkish issues is an actual system of views and ideas, characterized by a polyphony of political assessments and approaches that traditionally agree in understanding that the Republic of Turkey is a "strategically critical" American ally [2 p. 136], but differ in terms of tactics and strategic approaches to the interaction of the United States with the Republic. If in the Middle East Turkey "by its very existence serves the interests of the United States" [2 p. 130], then the projection of Turkish influence in the post-Soviet space directly correlates with the interests of the Russian Federation in the region, and Turkey is forced to take into account Moscow's position when implementing its own foreign policy projects. In this context, the attention of experts to Turkey is determined by the need to ensure the security of the Euro-Atlantic community both on the European continent and beyond, and in this regard, the key question for the expert community is whether Turkey is an "asset" of the United States and NATO in the region or is a regional "spoiler" [3] in the current the process of global political transformation. In the context of the acute geopolitical confrontation between NATO and the Russian Federation and the solidarity of Euro-Atlantic partners regarding the fact that "the Russian Federation represents the most significant and immediate threat to the security of allies, as well as peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region" [4], Turkey's role in the post-Soviet space is becoming the subject of close study by the American expert community. The relations between Turkey and Russia in the expert assessments of the United States are traditionally presented from the position of geopolitical competition between the powers and Russian-Turkish historical antagonism. The emphasis on the situativeness and short duration of bilateral interaction while recognizing the increased potential of cooperation is clearly expressed in current research. Experts are puzzled by the Russian-Turkish rapprochement, which has been systematically implemented for two decades, despite the growing rivalry in which Moscow and Ankara adhere to a kind of "condominium" in an effort to neutralize Western influence. According to J. Mankoff, Senior Researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Moscow and Ankara are implementing a successful formula for cooperation: the parties have developed a "managed negotiation process based on personal diplomacy", which is likely to continue regardless of domestic political events [5]. Despite the fact that this model of relations is based on a shaky foundation, the parties are interested in moving away from the Western-centric global order and have a similar foreign policy vision: Russia and Turkey maintain close ties with neighboring states and regions on the basis of a common cultural, historical and ethnic identity, developing an "imperial type of geopolitics" [5]. At the same time, J. Mankoff notes two multidirectional trends: on the one hand, there is a reversal towards the imperial geopolitical model due to the destruction of the modern American-centric world order and the acceleration of the Russian–Turkish rapprochement, on the other hand, the collapse of this world order may strengthen the opposite trend, expose the geopolitical rivalry of the powers and lead to an escalation of the Russian-Turkish confrontation. The analysis of American sources indicates that Ankara and Moscow maintain close relations regardless of the political conjuncture, based on the common experience of historical interaction and the personification of foreign policy, which is reflected in the key role of political leaders in regulating relations between the countries. At the same time, it is recognized that there is a potential for conflict between states, which in a changing foreign policy environment can provoke an escalation of relations. The expansion of energy and economic Russian-Turkish relations, the partnership built at the level of Presidents R. Erdogan and V. Putin, diplomatic and military cooperation in the Middle East and the Caucasus, Turkey's purchase of Russian defense systems, exclusive cooperation on the launch of Turkish nuclear power plants and other projects – all this, according to experts, is interspersed with persistent systemic contradictions in part of the implementation of the national interests of the parties. Such duality leads to the understanding that Russian-Turkish strategic ties are quite vulnerable, but Turkey's relations with Euro-Atlantic partners are also uncertain, because Turkey in the eyes of Euro-Atlantic partners appears to be an "unpredictable" ally of the United States and NATO [6]. There is an axiomatic belief among the expert community that blocking the expansion of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to the east is a priority task of the Kremlin in order to preserve the region as a zone of its privileged interests [7], and "large-scale and opportunistic propaganda activities" are being conducted to achieve it [8], aimed at undermining cooperation Turkey with the USA and Europe. In this regard, "unpredictable" Turkey, exposed to the influence of the Russian Federation due to the imbalance of Russian-Turkish economic relations and Turkish energy dependence, may pose a danger to the global aspirations of the United States. The identified threat-forming factors, from the point of view of American interests, are partially offset by Turkey's desire for a multi-vector course and diversification of energy markets, as well as close ties with the US and NATO defense industries. An additional factor, as experts of the RAND Center note, is that Ankara is not interested in increasing Russian influence in the Black Sea basin [6]. Thus, competing interests and potential conflict factors in Turkish-Russian relations do not allow us to consider the current cooperation between the countries as a new paradigm. In the event of a crisis in relations with the Russian Federation, Turkey will turn to NATO for support to ensure regional security, which will put Washington in front of fundamentally new challenges and problems different from the real ones. At the same time, Turkey, as J. Mankoff notes, continues to play a system-forming role in ensuring Euro-Atlantic security and acts as the political core of the Middle East, East Mediterranean and Black Sea regions, claiming to be a supra-regional leader. At the same time, it enjoys Moscow's support in developing its own regional ambitions and benefits from the security guarantees that the country continues to enjoy as a NATO member, despite the desire for "strategic autonomy" [5]. In this regard, it should be noted that the focus of expert attention is shifting from the regional to the global context in order to determine the factors of preserving US world leadership: Turkey's ambitions in the post-Soviet space and the dynamics of Russian-Turkish relations are of interest to the American expert community from the point of view of projecting US political and economic influence in the region. The role of Turkey in the context of preserving the global leadership of the United States is the subject of most applied studies on Turkish issues, the ultimate goal of which is to strengthen the international and regional positions of the United States and neutralize trends in world politics that contradict American interests. One of these trends is the activation of centrifugal and centripetal trends within the North Atlantic Alliance, which, as noted, does not meet American interests and leads to the regionalization of NATO. This trend, according to a number of experts, is a consequence of the US policy of self-exclusion from solving the problems of allies and consolidating forces to ensure long-term economic, technological and military competition with China, which disrupts the process of adapting NATO to new threats and challenges and leads to "erosion of cohesion, political will, authority, military potential and relevance of the alliance". [9]. R. Ellehuus, Senior Researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, emphasizes that "raising the level of ambition without ensuring political cohesion and adequate resources will undermine the credibility of the alliance and its relevance in the next decade" [9]. In this context, special attention is paid to the study of political risks, in particular, the possibilities of expanding the US and NATO military presence in Europe in order to curb Russian foreign policy ambitions. Experts of the RAND Center note that the high level of hostility between the countries is caused by mutual conviction of the irreconcilability of the positions of the parties in the conditions of the existing world order, and the possible "consequences of changes in the position of the United States and NATO in the region are not yet observable" [6]. Experts believe that the reaction of the Russian Federation to changes in Europe since 2014 (deployment of troops near the borders of the Russian Federation, arms supplies, etc.) "has been relatively mild, but many potential consequences may be unnoticeable" [10], while upholding American leadership in a competitive world powers may have as a deterrent (due to military advantage and a demonstration of solidarity with the allies), and provoking (in case of creating an additional threat as a result of the build-up of military potential) to the escalation of military conflicts effects. At the beginning of 2022, S. Pezard, a senior political scientist at RAND, stated that competition between the United States and the Russian Federation is becoming a new international reality [11], thus confirming the relevance of the fundamental report "Understanding the new era of international competition ..." and the thesis that "the coming era ... will be a long, persistent struggle for advantage, which needs to be managed, not won" [12]. This concept is not new: in the American-centric picture of the world, there is a belief that the United States needs to maintain a presence in remote countries and the possibility of indirect control "from the outside" [2]. More J. Friedman, reflecting on the role of the Turkish Republic in the Caucasus, noted that "Turkey by its very existence serves America's interests in its relations with Russia," and will allow the United States to withdraw from the region without much harm, while retaining real levers of influence" [13]. A threat to American interests, according to J. Friedman, represents the Russian-Turkish union, which seemed possible to the researcher. Today, experts say that the formation of new centers of power and the growing influence of the Russian Federation, Turkey, China and Iran harms American interests and leads to a decrease in US influence [14]. Turkey's role in the new geopolitics is of particular importance and the future of the region and the role of the United States in it depends on how the United States will continue to interact with Ankara. Among the American expert community, there are calls for the formation of clear rules for pragmatic Western-Turkish interaction. K. Kirishi from the Brookings Institution emphasizes that "... geopolitical realities ... will reduce Erdogan's desire to separate from the Transatlantic Alliance" [15]: despite the development of the Turkish narrative challenging the current world order and anti-Western discourse, R. Erdogan continues interaction with all Western institutions, which is a clear signal to the political establishment of the West. In general, it is generally recognized among the expert and analytical community that a formal break in relations between the United States and Turkey is unlikely, even though US-Turkish relations are stagnating and the parties are neither allies nor adversaries in the conventional sense. At the same time, it is recognized that in the emerging world order, Turkey "challenges the United States" [16], and America should not only reinvest in bilateral relations with Ankara, but also strengthen additional assets (partnerships with other regional players – Greece and Cyprus, as well as strengthen ties with Turkish civil society both inside and outside outside Turkey). This will allow the United States to find a new, more manageable balance in which Turkish hostile actions will not undermine American interests and international policy [14]. Ultimately, the study of Turkey's potential in terms of projecting Turkish military power and its influence on the regional security system in Central Asia and Transcaucasia, the Middle East, the Black Sea region and the Eastern Mediterranean is aimed at finding a new manageable balance of power in regions where Turkey will not oppose American strategic interests. In addition, Turkey has already become an indispensable player in the post-Soviet space, which plays ahead of the curve and is ready to quickly fill the vacuum of political will and power. Turkey's policy in the post-Soviet space, in general, corresponds to the strategic interests of the United States in the region. The US National Security Strategy 2022 proclaims readiness to "support the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Central Asia", "contribute to efforts to increase sustainability and democratic development in five countries" (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the USA), "strengthen integration in the region and expand opportunities to connect to global markets" [17], and in this context, the intention to cooperate with the Republic of Turkey is indicated "to strengthen its strategic, political, economic and institutional ties with the West" [17]. The American expert analysis of Turkey's extensive network of strategic, defense and military partnerships, the country's economic and diplomatic activity in a changing geopolitical environment is designed to ensure the effectiveness of the US foreign policy strategy in the region in terms of creating competitive advantages over China and Russia, which poses an "immediate and constant threat" to the regional security system. It is noteworthy that in the Strategy-2022, the United States emphasizes its readiness to develop in the world "effective democratic governance that meets the needs of citizens ... and to protect against external interference or coercion emanating from China, Russia or Iran" [17]. It should be noted that American analytical centers are also developing in detail the capabilities, strategy and tactics of projecting Russian influence, up to the ability of the Russian Federation to deploy and maintain ground combat forces. In particular, the RAND analyzed conditional scenarios of ground deployment in a number of regions - in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan), Syria and Ukraine [18]. Despite the fact that the predicted models appear to be conditional and, according to the authors, have limited possibilities of implementation, one cannot ignore the very fact of the existence of such developments, the high level of their conceptualization and analytical component. Thus, given that Turkey is a strategic American ally, Ankara's policy in the post-Soviet space is a conditional bridge to the Euro-Atlantic system of politics and security for regional governments that are interested in closer relations with the West, but due to certain factors (historically significant influence of the Russian Federation, ethno-religious, etc.) at the moment, a full-scale political, economic and military cooperation is difficult to implement. At the same time, according to experts, back in 2008, Ankara demonstrated that it has neither the ability nor the intentions to confront the Russian Federation in the region by providing "restrained rhetorical support to Georgia after the Russian invasion of South Ossetia" [6]. Regional elites also received an important signal: despite numerous joint trade, economic and energy projects and the growth of bilateral trade, Turkey is not a strategic reliable partner in the field of security; Russia's "aspirations" (among other things, the military presence of the Russian Federation in Armenia) and frozen conflicts in the region hinder [6]. It draws attention to the fact that the expert community emphasizes the different degree of geopolitical influence of Turkey and Russia in the CIS and the Caucasus, which determines the readiness of the Turkish leadership to rely on NATO support as opposed to the Kremlin's historically established influence in the region and to choose a "soft power" strategy in matters of foreign policy and economic cooperation with Moscow and the post-Soviet countries. Ankara is persistently striving to promote "soft" integration, developing the East-West axis of economy and security. In Central Asia, since the early 2000s, the Turkish government and a number of non-governmental organizations have been actively developing economic, socio-humanitarian and cultural projects, but Turkish participation, according to experts, today outweighs China's investments, and Turkish-Central Asian cooperation in the field of security and defense seems modest in comparison with Russian participation in the security architecture of the region. According to experts, Moscow's policy "includes a heavy mixture of inducement and coercion in maintaining political, economic and forceful influence on its former satellites" [6], and Turkey is forced to take into account the status quo and the delicate balance of relations with the Russian Federation. As a result, it seems that Turkey's relations with the states of the Caucasus and Central Asia in the future will become secondary in comparison with its ties with Russia and the West; at the same time, Ankara will remain committed to promoting regional integration through balanced security cooperation with Georgia and Azerbaijan, acting in the wake of the interests of Euro-Atlantic partners. In addition, the West is interested in strengthening Turkey's role in EU energy security issues and as an East-West economic corridor. Ultimately, Turkish activity in the post-Soviet space (development of trade, investment activity, construction projects, etc.) will contribute to the diversification and expansion of the economies of Central Asian countries and their foreign policy directions, contributing to "political stability and a gradual reduction of diplomatic dependence on Russia and China" [6], which ultimately meets the interests of USA in the region. Russia, as noted by J. Mankoff, will support the growth of Turkey's political subjectivity and show tolerance for Ankara's regional ambitions, even if they contradict its own, based on the belief that "Russia benefits from a strategically isolated, albeit unpredictable, Turkey" [5]. In addition, it is Turkey that can play a key role in solving the existential problems of cooperation between Russia and NATO, while the United States maintains open channels of communication with Moscow to manage and reduce risks, while at the same time strengthening the deterrence and defense of allies. In conclusion, it can be stated that, despite the difficulties of Turkish-Euro-Atlantic relations and the growing desire of the Turkish Republic for great power, the United States still considers Turkey as a strategically valuable partner. At the same time, it is noted that Moscow admits the key importance of Turkey as a coordination center between the EU, the United States, NATO and Russia. It follows from this that the pressure on Ankara, striving to take its rightful place in the new world of "more than five", on the one hand, will increase. On the other hand, in an effort to maintain global leadership, the United States is forced to take into account the rapidly changing international architecture and reformat relations with partners, building new models of interaction. It is noteworthy that the American National Security Strategy-2022 sets the task of strengthening Turkey's Western orientation. In fact, a condition has been determined under which the Republic has a chance to get carte blanche for a sovereign foreign policy course and consolidate the role of a new global center of power, and the United States will find a new controlled balance in which Turkey's unfriendly actions will not undermine American strategic interests in the long term. References
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