Soviet-Algerian Relations in 1962-1971 in the Context of the Rivalry Between Moscow and Paris. Based on the Materials of the RGANI and the Archive of the French Foreign Ministry

Osipov Evgeny Aleksandrovich PhD in History Senior Scientific Associate, Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences 119334, Russia, Moscow, ul. Leninsky Prospekt 32a, 26 eaossipov@gmail.com Other publications by this author

The Franco-Algerian War ^[1,2] lasted eight years and ended with the signing in 1962. The Evian Agreements, which granted Algeria independence. As a result of the war, France finally lost its imperial status, and the Algerian People's Democratic Republic (ANDR), in addition to sovereignty, gained international prestige as a country that challenged European colonialism and won this struggle. The socialist orientation of the Algerian government created conditions for the development of privileged cooperation with the USSR, especially since it was in the first half of the 1960s that the expansion of the COMECON countries into the "Third World" began. France, having agreed to the Evian Agreements, hoped to maintain its position in Algeria, but no longer as a metropolis, but as the main trade and economic partner of the young Arab state. Prerequisites were created for the rivalry of the USSR and France in Algeria.

The first months after the Evian Agreements were difficult for Soviet-Algerian relations. In October 1962, in an interview with Izvestia newspaper, ANDR leader Ahmed Ben Bella said that his country "will continue to pursue an active anti-colonial policy in Africa," but at the same time stressed that his socialism would take into account "the specific features of Algeria" ^[3], which was ambiguously perceived in Moscow. And on November 29, 1962, it became known about Ben Bella's decision to ban the activities of the Algerian Communist Party. Despite the fact that the Algerian Communists did not play a serious role in the political life of the country, the USSR could not help but react to the events that took place. On December 4, the Central Committee of the CPSU issued a statement noting "alarm and regret over the decision taken, which will weaken the democratic forces in Algeria and will benefit the imperialists" ^[4]. In January 1963, as reported in one of the references of the French Foreign Ministry, Soviet Ambassador to France S.A. Vinogradov called Soviet-French relations "disgusting" ^[5]. However, the situation has changed in the future.

In the certificate of the head of the department of the USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations V. Mordvinov on economic and technical cooperation of the Soviet Union with Algeria dated September 28, 1971, it is not said at all about the first months after the Evian Agreements and it is noted that bilateral cooperation began in 1963 ^{[6, p. 29]}. According to the French Ambassador to the USSR Maurice Dejean, the agrarian decrees of the Algerian authorities in March 1963 became the starting point for the normalization of relations ^[4]. By that time, many large foreign landowners had abandoned their farms and left the country, fearing persecution. Algerian peasants began to take control of abandoned farms into their own hands, preventing the plundering of their property and the cessation of production. For these purposes, elected management committees were created on farms. By decree of March 18, 1963, all abandoned farms were declared ownerless property and transferred to the management of workers without the right to appeal this act by the former owners. The decree of March 22, 1963 defined the status of self-governing enterprises, their organization and management methods, and the decree of March 28, 1963 established the procedure for distributing their income, which was divided into deductions to the state and payments to workers. The decrees adopted in March obviously violated the rights of foreign owners, primarily large French landowners who had been farming in Algeria for generations, but at the same time they emphasized the determination of the new Algerian authorities and the impossibility of returning to the old, colonial order. For Moscow, all this meant that Algeria really intended to move towards socialism, albeit with local peculiarities.

The last quarter of 1963 was marked by important high-level meetings and the signing of the first agreements between the USSR and the ANDR. First, in September, the editor-in-chief of the Izvestia newspaper (and Khrushchev's son-in-law) A.I. Ajubey and the chairman of the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers on Television and Radio Broadcasting M.A. Kharlamov visited the Arab country on an unofficial visit ^[7]. On September 30, Ben Bella gave an interview to both Pravda and Izvestia, which, according to the French Ambassador to the USSR, Dejean, "strikes first of all with its deliberately optimistic tone" ^[8]. The Algerian leader is called by the text a "great friend" of the USSR, and he himself says that "friendship between the two peoples will only strengthen as Algerian society moves towards socialism" ^[8], and that Moscow's decision to grant a loan of 90 million rubles to the ANDR is "a new expression of this friendship." At the same time, on September 30, 1963, an Algerian representative delegation headed by the Minister of Defense, Colonel Houari Boumediene, arrived in the USSR on an official visit.

For six days, the Algerian guests traveled around the country, visited Leningrad and Tashkent in addition to Moscow. During the negotiations, the issue of concluding an agreement on economic and technical cooperation was resolved in principle, the details of which the parties were going to discuss in the coming weeks ^[9]. On the Soviet side, the negotiations were conducted by the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.N. Kosygin and Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee P.F. Lomako. Boumediene did not meet with N.S. Khrushchev, but was received by L.I. Brezhnev. The top leadership of the Soviet army met at Boumediene airport: the Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal R.Ya. Malinovsky, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR Marshal S.S. Biryuzov and the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces of the USSR, Marshal of Aviation K.A. Vershinin. During the visit, the Algerian delegation was also constantly accompanied by representatives of the army structures. Maurice Dejean wrote about this: "It seems that the issue of military assistance has not yet been raised. The presence of Soviet generals is explained by the positions of members of the Algerian delegation" ^[9]. However, subsequent events have shown the fallacy of the conclusions of the French ambassador. French historians I. Gridan and G. le Boulanger rightly point out that the topic of providing military assistance to Algeria was one of the key issues in the negotiations and it was with Boumediene's visit to Moscow in the autumn of 1963 that close military-technical cooperation between the USSR and the ANDR began. According to French estimates, Moscow provided Algeria with a loan of 1.1 billion francs for the supply of weapons and training of specialists ^{[10, p. 43]}. Subsequently, until 1989, Algeria received Soviet weapons worth $ 11 billion, including supplies of modern military aircraft, tanks and ships ^{[11, p. 61]}.

The trip of the Algerian delegation headed by Boumediene to the USSR was supposed to prepare the ground for the arrival of Algerian President Ben Bella in Moscow, which took place on December 18-28, 1963 and became a landmark event for the development of Soviet-Algerian relations. 

The main result of Ben Bella's trip was the official signing of the agreement on economic and technical cooperation on December 27, 1963. The USSR undertook to assist in the reconstruction and construction of industrial enterprises, the development of agriculture, geological exploration, training, etc. The details of providing Algeria with a long-term loan in the amount of 90 million rubles were also finally agreed. In the Soviet interpretation, it is with the signing of the agreement of December 27, 1963 that genuine Soviet-Algerian cooperation begins ^{[6, p. 29]}. The French analysis of events was somewhat different. On the one hand, the summit meeting, the signing of the agreement and the provision of a long-term loan testified to the building of a solid foundation for Soviet-Algerian relations. In France, it was also noted that the topic of banning the Algerian Communist Party was not mentioned during the negotiations, that is, this "page was turned" ^[4].

On the other hand, M. Dejan noted that Ben Bella's visit to Moscow in December 1963 also showed the limits of Soviet-Algerian cooperation. According to Dejan, one of the representatives of the Algerian delegation, Mohammed Lebjaoui, in his speech on December 27, outlined the areas in which Algeria intends to distance itself from the USSR, among which was the desire of the ANDR to develop relations not only with the USSR, but also with Yugoslavia, Cuba and, what was especially crucial for Moscow, with China, as well as the determination The Algerian leadership is committed to maintaining relations with France "for the benefit of the two countries" ^[4], despite Algeria's socialist path.

On April 25 – May 7, 1964, Ben Bella made another visit to the USSR. The Algerian leader visited Moscow, Leningrad, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine. For 12 days, the Algerian delegation was surrounded by the top Soviet leadership, several meetings were held with N.S. Khrushchev, L.I. Brezhnev, marshals, ministers, members of the Politburo. Moscow has agreed to provide Algeria with another loan in the amount of 115 million rubles, to build an Oil and Gas Institute for a thousand students and a technical school for a thousand students.

The French closely followed the Algerian leader's next trip to Moscow. Philippe Bode, who replaced M. Dejean as French ambassador to the USSR, wrote that Moscow, having arranged such a solemn reception for the Algerian leader, sought, first of all, to consolidate a leading role in the anti-colonial movement. In this sense, Ben Bella's very arrival in Moscow and the vivid anti–imperialist speech he delivered on May 1 about the liberating role of the USSR is an unconditional success of Moscow ^[12]. As for bilateral relations, the construction of the Institute of Oil and Gas, a technical school and a loan of 115 million rubles were supposed to consolidate the privileged status of Soviet-Algerian cooperation. It was also important for the USSR to counteract the growing influence of China on Algeria. The PRC openly supported the ANDR in its struggle for independence from France, supplied weapons to the Arab state, and diplomatic relations between Beijing and Algeria were established back in 1958, that is, four years before Algeria gained independence. After 1962, Sino-Algerian relations continued to develop actively. In 1963, an agreement on cultural cooperation was signed, and in December 1963, Premier of the State Administrative Council of the People's Republic of China Zhou Enlai paid an official visit to ANDR.

The Algerian leadership also achieved its goals. According to Bode, the solemnity of the reception and the large number of mass media covering the stay of the Algerian delegation in the USSR raised Ben Bella's authority. And the economic and technical assistance of the Soviet Union was supposed to help reduce Algeria's dependence on France in key sectors of the economy ^[12].

After the overthrow of Ben Bella as a result of a coup in 1965 and the coming to power of Boumediene, the Soviet leadership took a wait-and-see attitude. However, as Boumediene's position strengthened, Soviet-Algerian relations also gradually normalized. From December 13 to December 19, 1965, the new President of Algeria was on an official visit to Moscow. No significant agreements were signed, the visit itself was also not held in such a solemn atmosphere as Ben Bella's trip to the USSR a year and a half before, nevertheless, the preservation of the socialist orientation of the Algerian leadership and three meetings of Boumediene with Leonid Brezhnev on December 14, 15 and 16 emphasized the mutual desire of the parties to fully restore the former the level of relations and the development of new projects.

As already noted above, Algeria, as a country, on the one hand, socialist and authoritative among the third world countries due to its tough anti-colonial position, and on the other hand, as a former colony of France with a special status and advantageous geographical location, inevitably had to become an arena of rivalry between the USSR and France. However, for a long time it was not noticeable. Soviet-Algerian relations were steadily developing, the 215 million rubles provided by Moscow on a loan to the ANDR in 1963-1964 became the basis for the financial and economic stabilization of the young Arab state and allowed the implementation of several large industrial projects to begin, but the growing influence of the USSR in Algeria in the first years after the Evian Agreements of 1962 did not affect strategic French interests in Algeria..

As for French-Algerian relations, in the period from 1962 to 1967. they had a special, privileged character. Algeria has become a symbol of the so-called neocolonial policy of Paris, aimed at establishing as close as possible relations between the metropolis and the former colonies ^{[13, p. 222]}. During this period, a number of important bilateral agreements were signed, among which the most significant role was played by the agreements on the supply of Algerian wine to France in 1964 and on cooperation in the hydrocarbon sector in 1965, primarily concerning the sale of Algerian oil to France. It was precisely the violation of the guilt treaty at the end of 1967 ^{[14, p. 109]} that caused the deterioration of Franco-Algerian relations and, in turn, gave an additional impetus to Soviet-Algerian contacts, becoming at the same time a point of report to the rivalry between Moscow and Paris in Algeria.

Under the terms of the 1964 agreement, Paris undertook to import 8 million hectoliters of Algerian wine per year. In fact, wine imports to France in 1967 amounted to 3.5 million hectoliters, in 1968 – 3.1 million ^[15]. Paris's failure to fulfill its obligations was explained by the good grape harvest in France, which reduced the domestic needs of the Fifth Republic, as well as the fact that Algeria found it difficult to compete for the French market with Italy, which, as a member of the EEC, enjoyed the right of preferential trade.

In the same 1967, after significant purchases of Soviet equipment by Algeria, the trade balance of the Arab state with the USSR turned out to be negative by a very serious amount – 15 million US dollars ^[16]. Considering that the USSR did not produce enough wine to saturate the domestic market, since the end of 1967 a very favorable moment has come for some reorientation of Algerian trade towards Moscow.

In July 1968, during the visit of Algerian Minister of Industry and Energy Belaid Abdessalamah, the Soviet-Algerian protocol was signed, which just spelled out the USSR's obligation to buy 5 million hectoliters of Algerian wine per year in the period from 1969 to 1975. in exchange for an increase in Algeria's purchases of industrial goods from the USSR and the expansion of the program for the training of national personnel. Considering that France at that time was purchasing about 3 million hectoliters instead of the 8 million prescribed in the agreement, the agreement with the USSR allowed Algeria to compensate for losses.

An even more important factor in the development of relations with Algeria was oil. As a result of the Evian Agreements, Algeria, indeed, achieved independence, but in some particularly sensitive areas, Algerian sovereignty was severely limited, primarily in the oil sector, which initially developed solely thanks to French investments. Under the Evian Agreements, France retained the rights to explore, research and transport Algerian oil. French companies have also received significant privileges over non-French and non-Algerian companies in the Algerian oil industry for a period of six years. In the future, such conditions became the subject of constant disputes between independent Algeria and France.

In December 1963, Algeria, in violation of the terms of the Evian Agreements, founded its own Sonatrak oil company, whose first task was to build a third oil pipeline to expand oil production in the Sahara. The contradictions that arose were partially resolved within the framework of the already mentioned French-Algerian oil and gas agreement of July 29, 1965. Algeria gained control over its minerals, having achieved the abolition of the priority provision for French companies. In the sphere of oil transportation, the Arab State has also achieved an expansion of the scope of its control ^{[17, p. 16]}. At the same time, France retained its concessions and a favorable tax regime for the sale of Algerian oil ^{[18, p. 378]}.

Despite the compromise of 1965, Algerian-French cooperation in the oil industry developed very difficult. French companies did not invest serious money in the modernization of existing infrastructure and did not seek to explore new deposits, because they feared that sooner or later the Algerian government would decide to nationalize natural resources. Algeria produced about 40 million tons of oil per year, French experts believed that oil production, due to lack of investment, would gradually decrease and reach a level of 27-28 million tons by 1975. According to Soviet experts, the expansion of Soviet-Algerian cooperation in the oil industry could lead to an increase in production of up to 100 million tons of oil per year ^{[19, p. 9]}.

The Soviet-Algerian protocol of 1968, in addition to Moscow's obligations to purchase Algerian wine, also stipulated the export of Algerian oil to the USSR in the amount of 500 thousand tons per year and, more importantly, the expansion of technical assistance to the USSR in the development and exploitation of Algerian hydrocarbons. Also, the protocol of 1968 provided for the construction of a large steel mill in Al-Hajar in the ANDR, an increase in Soviet exports of industrial products to Algeria, and the conduct of geological and engineering works by Soviet specialists on the territory of the Arab state on a systematic basis. In general, the signing of the Soviet-Algerian Protocol of 1968 indicated the intention of the parties to reach a fundamentally new level of development of bilateral cooperation.

After the signing of the protocol, the number of visits made by Soviet delegations to Algeria increased dramatically. Only during the period from July 1968 to April 1969 Marshal A.A. Grechko (July), Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade of the USSR V.S. Alkhimov (August), Minister of Oil Industry V.D. Shashin (January 1969), Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee N.K. Baibakov (February), Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR N.V. Podgorny (March-April) ^[20]. In March 1969, during the visit of Algerian Foreign Minister Abdel Aziz Bouteflika to the USSR, a permanent bilateral commission on economic, scientific and technical cooperation was established, that is, Soviet-Algerian relations were institutionalized ^[16].

France's reaction to Moscow's growing influence on Algeria was mixed. In the telegrams of the French Embassy in the USSR and in the notes of the French Foreign Ministry, it was regularly emphasized that, despite the socialist orientation of the Algerian authorities, it is impossible to talk about Algeria's proximity to the communist idea and that as a result of Moscow's influence, a Cuban-type regime could be established in the ANDR ^{[4, 16]}. In France, it was emphasized that the USSR was only the sixth most important trading partner of Algeria ^[16]. The share of the USSR in the total turnover of the ANDR was only 3.3%, of all socialist countries – 8%, while France still occupied about 70% of the Algerian market ^{[19, p. 5]}. Even Germany and the USA were ahead of Moscow in trade with Algeria, although they did not have diplomatic relations with it. And the trend towards an increase in trade turnover between the ANDR and Western countries continued. For example, in 1968 Algerian imports from the USA increased by 70% compared to 1967 ^[21].

French documents also note that despite the large number of Soviet specialists who were constantly in Algeria, their number has not increased since 1968 ^[16]. As for the program for training local personnel, it was noted in Paris that for all its scope, the USSR did not control any of the major schools in the country. There were serious political differences between Moscow and Algeria. In the USSR, Algeria's position on the Middle East conflict, consisting in calls for the Arab world to fight with Israel until the tasks were completed, was considered "extremist" ^{[19, p. 8]}. In general, the prospect of Algeria's gradual subordination to the USSR in France was considered a "hypothetical threat" ^[22], which did not quite correspond to the real state of affairs.

However, France was very concerned about the strengthening of the USSR's position in strategically important areas for the young Arab state, primarily in the oil industry. In Paris, it was rightly feared that cooperation with the USSR could push Algeria to nationalize the oil industry, which would lead to serious losses for French companies. The famous Dutch newspaper Telegraaf on April 2, 1969, during the visit of N.V. Podgorny to Algeria, published a headline article entitled "Urgent meeting in Paris – de Gaulle against the Russians in Algeria", from which it followed that the French president, concerned about the growing influence of the USSR on the oil sector of Algeria, gathered an emergency meeting with the closest advisers ^[23]. A few weeks after the meeting on Algeria, on April 27, 1969, de Gaulle resigned, after which Georges Pompidou won the early presidential elections in June 1969.

The new president was well aware of the Algerian dossier, even before the signing of the Evian Agreements, he, as de Gaulle's personal representative, conducted secret negotiations with members of the National Liberation Front (FLN) of Algeria. The Mediterranean policy, and, accordingly, the building of relations with the ANDR, was one of the key directions in Pompidou's foreign policy. Moreover, he always stressed that the rivalry with the USSR for the third world countries, especially those that in the past belonged to the zone of French national interests, is of great importance for French politics. For example, in November 1969, a few months after Gaddafi came to power in Libya, Paris agreed to sell 110 Mirage aircraft and 200 tanks to Tripoli. The total cost of the contract was about $ 1 billion, at that time it was the largest contract in the history of the French military-industrial complex ^[24]. The Soviet factor played a significant role in France's readiness to develop relations with the Arab states. In an interview on February 2, 1970, Pompidou said: "No one can deny the fact that Soviet Russia is penetrating the Mediterranean today, that it has interests there, that it is ready to defend them. This is a new element that wasn't there before. Tsarist Russia tried to play a role in the Mediterranean, but it failed. Today, Russia is present in the Mediterranean, it's true" ^[25]. And on February 10, in an interview with the New York Times, the French president noted: "Why should we reject the proposals of countries that are not parties to the conflict? (meaning the Middle East conflict – E.O.) To give way to others?". To the journalist's direct clarifying question whether competition with the USSR is meant, Pompidou replied that, among other things, we are talking about the USSR ^[26].

In the Algerian direction, the activation of French politics began immediately after Pompidou's victory in the elections. Already in June 1969, it was announced that 28 French subsonic Fuga-Magister fighters would be delivered to Algeria, and in January 1970, the construction of a flight school in Bu–Spheres was announced ^{[14, p. 109]}. The importance of the supply of lethal French weapons to Algeria, despite the fact that only seven years had passed since the end of the Franco-Algerian war, is difficult to overestimate, and this was largely due to Paris' desire to put an end to the supply of Soviet weapons to Algeria and, in general, to reduce Moscow's influence on the Arab state. In October 1969, French Foreign Minister M. Schuman visited Algeria, which was the first visit to Algeria by a French Foreign minister after the signing of the Evian Agreements. During the negotiations, the parties agreed on the purchase by France of 4 million hectoliters of Algerian wine by the end of 1969. The agreement was short-lived, since September 1970, France again stopped buying wine in Algeria due to the high yield of its own grapes ^[27]. Also during Schuman's visit, it was agreed to create a Large Commission (7 months after the creation of the permanent Soviet-Algerian commission on economic, scientific and technical cooperation), which was to meet at the ministerial level at least once a year alternately in any of the capitals ^[28].

During the same period, Soviet-Algerian cooperation in the oil sector continued to develop. In May 1970, it was announced that three contracts had been signed between the Algerian Sonatrak and the Soviet Technoescport. They assumed long-term assistance from Moscow in the exploration and exploitation of oil fields in order to increase oil production in Algeria to 100 million tons per year; an agreement on the development of the largest oil field in Algeria and in all of Africa in Hass Messaud according to the technological scheme developed by Soviet specialists; cooperation with the USSR on fields that were not exploited at that time foreign companies ^[16]. For Algeria, the contracts signed in May 1970 were of great importance. In the certificate of the head of the GKES Department V. Mordvinov on economic and technical cooperation of the Soviet Union with Algeria dated September 28, 1971, Algeria's difficult economic situation was noted: "The deterioration in 1970-1971 of the monetary and financial situation of Algeria, caused, in particular, by the aggravation of Algerian-French relations on oil issues, leads to a shortage of funds for Algerians to finance works on construction projects, slowing down the fulfillment of commitments" ^{[6, p. 3-4]}. The Soviet-Algerian oil agreements made it possible to improve the situation and became one of the main reasons that on February 24, 1971, Algerian President Houari Boumediene decided to announce the nationalization of oil transportation facilities and 51% of the shares of French oil companies operating in Algeria, which meant that the Arab state achieved genuine sovereignty in the oil industry and what was not it would have happened without Soviet technological and economic assistance. In response to Algeria's actions, the French government in April 1971 declared that from now on relations with the ANDR would be built "on common grounds" ^[29], which meant a crisis in Pompidou's Mediterranean policy.

In other areas, relations between Moscow and Algeria were difficult. The USSR has repeatedly complained about Algeria's failure to fulfill its obligations and the Arab state's unwillingness to take bilateral relations to new frontiers. In the already mentioned Mordvinov's reference, it was noted that large Western companies are actively penetrating into the ANDR. Only in the "first half of 1971, firms and banks of capitalist countries provided or promised loans to Algeria in the amount of about 400 million rubles" ^{[6, p. 4]}, which exceeded the Soviet injections into the Algerian economy over the previous nine years. Soviet organizations found themselves in Algeria "in conditions of acute competition with firms of capitalist countries," and Soviet equipment "did not always meet the best world standards in its technical characteristics (for example, the cold rolling mill offered by our (Soviet – E.O.) industry did not provide the thickness of the sheet requested by the Algerians)" ^{[6, p. 4]}. Under the current conditions, Algeria did not seek to "formalize an agreement in principle with Soviet organizations on cooperation in the construction of new facilities (if this is not related to the provision of a loan), preferring to announce international auctions for them" [6. p. 5].

The note of the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the USSR signed by V.B. Spandaryan and addressed to the Chairman of Gosplan N.K. Baibakov dated June 17, 1971 notes that at first the protocol of 1968 was carried out within the framework of the signed obligations. In 1969-1970, 10 million hectoliters of wine and 1 million tons of oil were delivered from Algeria. Their payment was made by deliveries of machinery and equipment from the USSR (for 50 million rubles), raw materials (for 2 million rubles) and due to repayment by the Algerian side of state loans (for 47 million rubles)" ^{[30, p. 1]}. However, starting in 1971, Algeria began to refuse to purchase machinery and equipment in the USSR and insisted, as part of the payment for wine, on supplies from the USSR of scarce foreign exchange goods (wheat, lumber, sugar, butter). Algeria also restricted purchases of coke, cement, and rolled non-ferrous metals in the USSR, although this was provided for by bilateral agreements ^{[30, p. 2]}. As a result, trade with Algeria took an unfavorable turn for the USSR. Moscow continued to buy Algerian wine and oil as part of its obligations, but in response Algeria imported goods for a smaller amount.

In general, Soviet-Algerian relations in the first ten years after the signing of the Evian Agreements were contradictory. On the one hand, during this time, the USSR built in Algeria the country's largest metallurgical complex in El Hajar, a large mining and metallurgical plant Ismail for the production of mercury, a large lead-processing plant in El Abed for processing 2 thousand tons of ore per day, a thermal power plant with a capacity of 55 MW. in Annaba. All these were the largest construction projects in Algeria at that time, which still form the basis of the Algerian industry. Cooperation with ANDR in geological exploration was actively developed. Thanks to Soviet specialists, large deposits of mercury, barite, antimony, zinc, lead, and tungsten were explored. Cooperation in the training of national Algerian cadres was of particular importance. The African Petroleum and Textile Center was opened in Boomerdes, consisting of an Oil and Gas Institute (for 1000 students) with an oil college (also for 1000 students) and a textile college (500 students) with an engineering department for 250 people. The teaching was conducted according to the Soviet methodology by Soviet teachers (240 people). A Mining and metallurgical Institute for 700 students with a technical school for 800 people was also established in Annaba to train specialists in the mining, metallurgical, and machine-building industries. In the field of vocational and technical education, vocational training centers were created for 3,700 students. In the period from 1964 to 1970, 6,000 skilled workers of industry and agriculture, or about 17% of the total training of qualified workers in the centers of vocational education of the ANDR, created with the assistance of the USSR, were trained ^{[6, p. 5]}. As mentioned above, in the oil sector, Soviet-Algerian cooperation contributed to Algeria's nationalization of oil transportation facilities and 51% of the shares of French oil companies, which became one of the most important decisions in the modern history of Algeria. On the other hand, despite Moscow's large-scale assistance to the Arab state and constant meetings, including at the highest level, in absolute numbers, the USSR remained only the sixth trading partner of the ANDR, lagging behind not only France, but also Germany and the USA. Algeria retained its socialist orientation in its development, but it never became part of the socialist bloc, and the competition between Moscow and Western countries for the Algerian market has only increased over the years.

France also experienced serious difficulties in developing its contacts with the former colony. In the end, no compromise was found on the import of Algerian wine and the preservation of French control over the Algerian oil industry, which are key for Franco-Algerian cooperation. Algerian-French relations have lost their privileged status, and Algeria has not become a symbol of the new "neocolonial" policy of France. The main objectives of the Mediterranean policy of the Fifth Republic have not been achieved.

The main beneficiary of the Soviet-French rivalry for the ANDR turned out to be Algeria itself. The Algerian leadership, skillfully maneuvering between Moscow and Paris, managed to get the maximum possible from cooperation with the two powers, while strengthening its independence and high status within the Non-Aligned Movement. Thanks to Moscow and other countries of the socialist camp, Algeria received modern industry, loans for the modernization of production and agriculture, qualified specialists ready to build the Algerian economy. Thanks to its ties with France, Algeria retained ample opportunities to enter Western markets, which was especially important in terms of attracting investment and access to technology.