Media as a Technological Tool and Channel for the Formation and Promotion of the Image of Political Parties

Nevskaya Tatiana Alexandrovna PhD in Politics Senior Educator, Department of Political Science and Sociology of Political Processes, Faculty of Sociology, M. V. Lomonosov Moscow State University 119234, Russia, g. Moscow, ul. Leninskie Gory, 1, str. 33 Nevskaya_t@mail.ru Other publications by this author

The dynamism of the modern information and media environment persists and is still accompanied by changes, sometimes unexpected, which have a serious impact on democratic governance. These measures have changed the way elections are conducted and citizens' participation in political life. Thanks to the development of the media, the methods of work of state institutions have radically changed, the activities of which have become more transparent, transformations have taken place in the organization of elections, which has also influenced the inclusion of citizens in this process, while traditional media continue to record the smallest details of the changing image of political parties.

New political media refers to forms of communication that contribute to the creation, distribution and exchange of political content on platforms and social networks that ensure interaction and cooperation [3. p. 18]. They have developed rapidly over the past three decades and continue to develop in new, sometimes unforeseen ways. As a result of technological innovations, the former effectively functioning media, consisting of well-established media institutions that existed before the advent of the Internet, such as newspapers, radio broadcasts and television news programs, coexist with trending media, which have acquired special importance in recent years.

Modern technologies have a huge potential to launch the processes of democratization. The Internet and social networks have become the central breeding ground for the functioning of social movements, the manifestation of political activity and the promotion of political parties. The Internet and social networks offer an easy-to-use infrastructure that enables users to share content widely. Online information spreads in real time and overcomes physical and social. The ability to anonymously create content is of great importance in such political contexts [9. p. 25].

The existing scientific and political literature on the use of digital technologies by political parties and their interactions with modern media, as a rule, revolves around three main theories that have developed consistently: equalization, normalization and hybridization [10. p. 126].  Early equalization theories focused on the democratic potential of the Internet and emphasized the ability of digital technologies to undermine traditional political institutions, including parties, and replace them with new forms of participation. In response, empirical studies of the first wave of digital campaigns tended to show that digital technologies reinforce existing institutions and inequality – this view became known as the normalization hypothesis.

More recently, with the development of social networks and other technologies, the scientific point of view has converged on the concept of hybridization. Although most parties have retained traditional forms of organization and membership, they have introduced digital technologies in such a way as to provide new forms of participation at different levels of involvement. At the same time, in the literature currently presented, we observe a lack of information about how, in fact, and with what, parties adapt to specific technological innovations. There are several reasons for this gap in scientific discourse.

Firstly, the theoretical foundations of how digital technologies will affect political parties, especially the early optimistic equalizing estimates, are mostly speculative and untested [9. p. 26]. Secondly, although the volume of empirical work devoted to the use of digital technologies by parties is large and continues to grow, it usually focuses on the study of individual cases, and not on international comparisons. Thirdly, empirical research was geographically limited mainly to countries with a high level of technology and an effectively functioning party system. These limitations have prevented the development of general conclusions about the circumstances in which new digital technologies undermine, strengthen or change political parties and their image.

New industry publications aimed at individual independent users have joined the mass media designed to convey general news to a wide audience. Thus, the appearance of these media increased the level of variability and unpredictability of the process of political communication and, at the same time, allowed a new look at the image of existing political parties: in traditional media, due to the established boundaries of censorship, it is not so often possible to hear direct criticism of the authorities or harsh opinions about the new laws they introduce, but in free online communities, you can hear opposite opinions [2. p. 105].

In recent years, the Russian political system has experienced a number of innovations. The elections to the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation in 2011 and 2016 and the implemented bills concerning the activities of political parties as socio-political institutions led to a number of transformations in the Russian party system. Party competition has increased significantly.

It is noteworthy that young people began to show themselves as a full-fledged participant in the policy after a long break. The street protests of March 2017-2019, and then 2020-2021, showed that Russian youth are capable of being politically active, and political forces have intensified the struggle to win the hearts of young people. Currently, there is a change of political generations, that is, new political figures are coming to replace the leaders of the 1990s-2000s. In these conditions, the younger generation of Russians is beginning to play a more prominent role, and updating the image through modern sources of information should become a primary task for the parties.

On September 17-19, 2021, elections were held on the territory of the Russian Federation at the local, regional and national levels, and first of all to the State Duma. Since 2003, the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation has been dominated by the United Russia political party, but at present we are witnessing the fact that voters are repelled by the party's reputation associated with corruption and the general unpromising context of political and economic stagnation. And indeed, the number of votes that the party received in the 2021 elections decreased by 4.38% according to the CEC ^[5].

Since the late 2000s, YouTube has turned from just one of the most popular international platforms for sharing video materials into a successful tool for political campaigns, and an important milestone in this development was the 2008 Obama presidential election campaign [15. p. 494]. Over the past 10 years, YouTube has established itself in Russia as an alternative to state television, with a high level of political content among trending videos ^[7]. In 2017, political analysts in Russia started talking about the increased role of YouTube as a protest space, especially for the younger generation, who, as a rule, do not watch TV. The reason for this conclusion was the protests after the scandalous A. Navalny's video on YouTube, accusing the then Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev of corruption, and then his other reports. After this incident, we have seen more attention from political institutions to the content and activities of social media and their use to promote their own agenda.

At the same time, according to the RBC media company, the main focus of Vladimir Putin's 2018 presidential campaign was officially placed on his promotion in social media. It also highlights the importance of these channels for official political communication in Russia ^[11].

In a recent study of the media promoting the political course on YouTube, Litvinenko A. analyzed which videos are most often found by users of the site in the field of politics and what political image of modern Russian parties they create. A total of 169 videos were viewed, which were shown on the main page ^[13]. 41 out of 79 accounts that have published popular political videos can be described as oppositional, 27 as pro–state and 11 as neutral.

The author notes that there is only one clear leader in the pro-state sector: the account "Politics Today: Russia, USA, Ukraine", which published videos from pro-state federal channels (seven videos). All other pro-government accounts did not appear in the top 12 videos systematically, while A. Navalny's accounts appeared. The leader of the "neutral" list was blogger Yuri Dud, thanks to his interviews with journalists and politicians (nine videos).

The results show a significant difference in the effectiveness of the work of opposition and pro-government campaigns to promote the image of parties on the social network YouTube. At least the number of videos can show that although the United Russia party is mastering the Internet community and some followers decide to shoot videos in its support, but it was the opposition parties that dominated the discourse of the most popular videos during the last presidential and parliamentary elections in Russia.

Pro-government accounts have not been successful in promoting their discourse through political videos on YouTube, which did not greatly affect their overall image, but precisely set up some of the platform's users against the United Russia party [12. p. 314]. This may be partly due to the fact that their content did not meet the requirements of the audience who were looking for alternative information on the platform. Moreover, there is an obvious contradiction between the nature of an open platform for content exchange and the desire of the state to control communication flows [15. p. 498].

Communists and Liberal Democrats are at opposite ends of the ideological scale, but the Communist Party and the Liberal Democratic Party are the largest political parties in the country after United Russia. This is confirmed by the results of the vote to the State Duma in 2021, where the Communist Party won 18.93% of the votes, and the Liberal Democratic Party – 7.55% ^[4]. Despite the fact that both parties mostly avoid criticism regarding the policy pursued in the country, from time to time they come into confrontation with the government. In 2017, the Communists accused Dmitry Medvedev of economic mismanagement, and in 2018 they organized protests against pension reform.

In 2021, after the electoral authorities banned Pavel Grudinin, the party's presidential candidate in 2018, from participating in parliamentary elections on the grounds that he had previously owned real estate abroad, Gennady Zyuganov reacted furiously to this, calling the incident "fascization" of the country ^[8]. In turn, Vladimir Zhirinovsky accused the authorities of using "Stalin-era methods" after the detention of Khabarovsk Governor Sergei Furgal in 2020 on suspicion of organizing an attempted murder of a businessman and the murders of two other entrepreneurs.  

The above parties are united by their media presence and increasing popularity among young people [12. p. 316]. Since 2018, both the Communists and the Liberal Democrats have benefited somewhat from the decline in support for the ruling party.

In September 2018, after the pension reform, discontent on the part of the population increased, which led to a decrease in the trust ratings of United Russia. After that, in the elections to the State Duma, the number of mandates of United Russia decreased by 19, and the Communist Party increased by 15 ^[4].

In this regard, it is worth considering strategies for forming the image of the United Russia party and analyzing which actions in the online space cause criticism, and which tactics of coverage in traditional media, on the contrary, turn out to be advantageous. G. Miyazevich claims that this party, like the entire Russian government, directly attacks its opponents using technology mirror reflection [14. p. 579]. Mirroring is a technique where a party shows those who are watching what they see in themselves. This implies retaliatory attacks on criticism of the opposition media, but does not imply the initiation of any critical statements. This, for example, happened with A. Navalny's reports: they were an attack on both the regime of government and pro-state parties, to which the parties criticized Navalny himself and condemned his "unreliable evidence".

We can say that such tactics are perceived on the Internet as a passive and fearful policy. Internet users, in particular, condemn people who fully support such behavior. This is especially noticeable on the Twitter text platform.

Twitter is used all over the world. The platform has more than 300 million active users and more than 1.3 billion accounts. According to research, about 83% of world leaders have an account in this social network [12. p. 316]. Journalists also use this platform; this profession accounts for 24% of all accounts. As Twitter strives to create a discussion environment, users can discuss political issues anytime and anywhere they have access to the Internet.

Instagram Facebook users perceive Twitter as an "information" platform, as opposed to a "social" platform such as Facebook or Instagram. This means that people use Twitter to keep up to date with world events. This makes it possible for States to use users' trust in the information aspects of the network to their advantage.

Russian political parties have also used Twitter to conduct programs to shape their political image. Governments and parties can communicate directly with foreign and domestic audiences, which speeds up their way of transmitting information and getting a reaction to it. However, due to the oppositional sentiments of users of this and other social networks, it becomes difficult for pro-state parties to maintain their positive image.

Against this background, the party's persistent electoral support may seem paradoxical, but the explanation for this may be that United Russia is viewed as a political institution whose activities are supported by Vladimir Putin, who has a consistently high level of trust and approval as President of the Russian Federation. Thus, the image of United Russia is strongly connected with the image of our leader, and the support of the party is derived from the support of V. Putin.

The ruling United Russia party is represented in almost all social networks. The number of followers on Instagram is more than 141,000, but the likes on posts are on average no more than 400, reels gain up to 30,000 views. The publication agenda is devoted to elections, healthcare, ecology. However, commenting on posts is limited, which indicates that the party is not ready to conduct an open dialogue with its audience on this site. Since March 13, the official Instagram account has stopped publishing posts.

The digital agency Interium assessed the effectiveness of social networks and SMM work of the New People party and parties that did not pass the 5% barrier in the elections.

"The rating was calculated based on a set of quantitative and qualitative parameters based on the analysis of the official accounts of the parties in social networks, each parameter has a different weight on the final rating: audience – 15%, engagement - 20%, stories - 10%, responses - 10%, social networks -10%, frequency - 10%, regions - 15% and mobilization - 10%. Ratings for each parameter are reduced to percentage values and in total give a normalization under 100%" ^[1].

Table 1. Effectiveness of political parties in social networks

Active and "high-quality" maintenance of social networks allowed to expand the media presence and became a factor in the choice of the New People party in the elections. The party's social networks are characterized by strong engagement: the party has more than 63,000 followers on Instagram, and the average number of “likes” on posts is more than 1,000, and reels gain up to 70,000 views. The publications are devoted to the issues of elections, the economic crisis, ecology, coronavirus infection and the attitude to the "special operation".

Such an analysis of the activity of parties in social networks allows us to conclude that "parties are quite active, do not ignore them as a channel of campaigning activity ... social networks are essentially an unavoidable tool in the campaigning activities of the Duma campaign" [6. p. 17].

Thus, the revealed role of the media as a technological tool for the formation and promotion of the image of political parties allows us to conclude that social networks are extremely effective in informing voters about the activities of parties and introducing them closer, but it is the traditional media and the main political actors that receive the most attention during election campaigns. 

The image of political parties is of great importance for the success of their activities. It directly affects the number of voters, has an impact on the perception of political decisions by the population. In the modern world, in order to form an effective political image of a party, it is necessary to take into account a number of peculiarities of people's perception of politics, and therefore apply the latest methods to identify them. 

Currently, political parties are increasingly using digital technologies during election campaigns. Current forms of technology, such as social media, contribute to the expression of public opinion at a new level. Mass mailing, TV and radio advertising are no longer enough to win elections, so the digital strategy of forming the image of a political party during a campaign is often as important for victory as traditional methods of campaigning.

Not only increasing the media presence, but also the competent use of social networks allows you to form a positive image of political parties. A high-quality presentation can not only provide a positive image of the state power and, as a result, a high level of public confidence in the institutions of socio-political representation.

Mass media approach the field of political coverage in different ways, therefore, political parties need to build a strategy for forming their image on these platforms, taking into account all the smallest details: demographics and political moods of users, the seriousness of the media, the type of perception (whether it is a social network or informational), and so on.

In the Russian political environment, there are many examples of a negative effect on the image of a party due to illiterate access to new mass media, therefore, the very scope of research on the mechanisms and factors of the formation of the image of political parties remains important in practical application.

Summing up the above, it should be noted that a high-quality presentation of political parties in the media is necessary to construct their effective image and increase the level of trust of citizens in the institutions of socio-political representation.

The formation and promotion of an effective image of political parties is the technological side of the political issue and concerns the establishment of full-fledged interaction between political parties and voters. In this sense, by effective political image we also mean effective communication, effective political decision-making by the party in the process of performing the functions assigned to it by modern legislative and party legislation.