The French Senate on the Possibility of Britain's Withdrawal from the European Union in 2015-2016.

Baidakov Ivan Mikhailovich ORCID: 0000-0003-0651-3029 Research Fellow, Laboratory of Contemporary History of the Institute of Social Sciences of the Russian Presidential academy of National Economy and Public administration 82 Prospekt Vernadskogo str., Moscow, 119571, Russia Baydakovivan2612@gmail.com

Naumova Natal'ya Nikolaevna PhD in History Associate Professor, Department of Modern and Contemporary History, M. V. Lomonosov Moscow State University 119192, Russia, Moscow, Lomonosovsky Prospekt str.,, 27k4 naumovafrance@yandex.ru

         In the mid-10s, the issue of maintaining Britain's membership in the pan-European house became the subject of lively political controversy in France. But not so much within the walls of the National Assembly, where discussions on it were not of a systemic nature, as among the members of the Senate, which acted as a mouthpiece of the "parliamentary democracy" of the Fifth Republic.The September 2014 Senate elections – in the second year of Socialist Francois Hollande's presidency (2012-2017) – were won by the center-right, whose main representatives were members of the Union for a Popular Movement (in May 2015 it was transformed into a political association "Republicans") and the Union of Democrats and Independents (formed as a party in September 2012 on based on the parliamentary group of the same name).

Together, they won 190 out of 348 seats in the Senate. The ruling Presidential Socialist Party with its allies had 156 seats; two seats went to the far-right National Front for the first time. On October 1, 2014, a "Republican" of conservative views, J. Larcher, who previously held this position in 2008-2011, was elected Chairman of the Senate.

It was in the Senate that three informational and analytical reports compiled by the Committee on European Affairs (April 16, 2015 ^[27] and January 28, 2016 ^[34]) and the Finance Committee (June 1, 2016 ^[29]) were prepared and discussed ^{[20, 35]}. These documents played an important role in shaping French public opinion about the expediency and prospects of British membership in the EU.

It should be noted that President Hollande has consistently adhered to a firm line on deepening European integration up to federalization, highlighting France's special responsibility in matters of Euro-building and demanding European reforms of a greater social orientation ^[23]. He was convinced that there was only "inconsistency" between the EU members in the details of the further integration movement and suggested a possible "political bargaining" of the UK about its "special regime". According to him, "France wants the UK to remain in the EU. We think it's in the interests of Europe and the UK to stay together, but the desire of [British — auth.] the people must be respected" [Cit. by: 14].

The French media in the first half of the 10s rarely published special analytical articles about the "turbulent" membership of the UK in the EU, although they noted the special positions of British politicians, the increase in euroscepticism in the country and often harsh, in connection with these circumstances, assessments of European leaders of British proposals to reform the foundations of Euro-building.

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Publicly announced by the first conservative coalition government of David Cameron (2010-2015), the UK's turn towards a decisive change in its position in the European Union in early 2013 was a logical continuation of the previous demands of the British leadership in the spirit of preserving and expanding the country's rights to national identity.

Back in a speech in Bruges on September 28, 1988, Prime Minister M. Thatcher openly demonstrated her rejection of the policy consistently pursued by French President F. Mitterrand, German Chancellor G. Kohl and European Commission President J. Delorme with the aim of deepening European integration: the British "did not agree to remove their national borders in order to see the creation of these same borders at the European level, despite the fact that the European superstate commands from Brussels" ^[36]. (Thatcher, of course, in no way meant the administrative boundaries of the state. She spoke in a broad figurative sense about civilizational boundaries, and in a narrow sense about economic boundaries.)

During the years of the global financial and economic crisis of the mid-70s - early 80s, the British leadership struggled to reduce the country's contributions to the Community budget and revise agricultural prices, due to which the country suffered large financial losses (because British agriculture was more dependent on state subsidies than continental countries, abbreviations required by the EU) [See subr.: 7, p. 289].

Since 1978, Great Britain has actively opposed the project of creating a European monetary system, and then the European currency. In September 1992, the cabinet of the conservative J. Major at the time of the fall of the pound sterling led the country out of the European mechanism of exchange rates, which was the basis for the creation of the euro. When at the end of the XX century . The economic and monetary union began to function, T. Blair's government flatly refused to include the country in the eurozone, not agreeing with the transfer of a new part of its sovereignty to supranational structures.

During the signing of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, British politicians successfully resisted the pressure of the Franco-German tandem to adopt a single European social policy and resisted the formation of a common sense of citizenship to the EU. As a result, the participants of the dialogue left the issue of the ultimate goal of the European Union virtually unresolved, despite the concession of France and Germany to the supporters of the confederate model of unification (Great Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Portugal): the wording "union with a tendency to federation" contained in the original draft was replaced by the more amorphous expression "an ever closer union of European peoples" ^{[10, p. 89]}.

In October 1994, Prime Minister J. Major, speaking in Leiden [See: 30], put forward the British concept of European integration (soon called "? la carte" – "prefer and choose"), based on the freedom of states to choose spheres and the speed of integration, as well as the possibility of selective compliance with the requirements of the governing, most often supranational, organizations of the European Union.

At the summit of the European Council in Nice (2000), the British did not allow the creation of a "European security yard" on the basis of EU structures, nullifying the intentions of President Jacques Chirac to create a "Europe-power" ("Europe-puissance").

Finally, in December 2011, the British side vetoed an agreement regulating pan–European financial rules based on supranational banking regulatory and control bodies, since this potentially threatened the interests of the City of London as a global financial center, which had closed significant volumes of financial transactions in the EU. ("London," Bloomberg wrote, "has to about 86% of currency swaps denominated in euros ... almost half of daily currency trading in euros and about 75% of the turnover of interest rate derivatives denominated in euros" [See: 28]).

Under Cameron, there was an actual return to the priorities of foreign policy formulated by W. Churchill shortly after the end of World War II (1948) [See note: 3], who said that Great Britain should actively use its unique position as "the only country playing an important role in each of the three orbits" [Cit. according to: 22] – Atlantic (all the leading Anglo-Saxon states), the Commonwealth of Nations (relations with former colonies) and European. On the European track, an outstanding British politician of the past assigned his country the role of "friend and patron" of the future European union, explaining that there are, of course, "common interests, but we do not want to dissolve in [Europe – auth.] and lose your face" ^[19]. It should be noted that this concept, which defines the goals of promoting British interests in all regions of the world to ensure comprehensive influence, was officially presented by the Conservative government under the name "Global Britain" only in November 2017 [See: 25].

Like his distant predecessor, Cameron, being (by his own definition) a "practical and reasonable" Eurosceptic ^[26], sought to strengthen British positions in the new globalized world and make the opinion of the British side be heard in the European polyphony, which does not agree with the further federalization of the European Union and with the creation of a future Eurogate, where nations will dissolve. The Prime Minister was aimed at preserving the special status of Great Britain in the EU and building the European Union on a basis that guaranteed that it would not "slip" into a supranational community. According to the Russian political scientist S.A. Shein, since the end of 2011, the actions of the British leadership "have seen the return of "Tory Euroscepticism" in its aggressive form" ^[15].

Cameron's "European Speech" on January 23, 2013 became the starting point of the turn publicly announced by the United Kingdom to such a statement of the issue [see the text of the speech: 21]. It outlined the British understanding of the "main challenges" facing the EU and the "vision of the new EU of the XXI century. ... for the whole EU, not just for Britain," based on the new founding Treaty.   Cameron backed up these proposals – if rejected – with the threat of a national referendum on Britain's membership in the EU, warning Europeans: "If we leave the European Union, it will become a one-way ticket."

The new principles of building the EU, according to the UK, boiled down to the following: at the heart of the Community "should be a Common market", not a political structure; the second principle of the functional renewal of the EU was the requirement to give it flexibility – turning the EU into "a structure that can accommodate the diversity of its members... whose basic premise is a Common market, not a single currency"; the third principle of functioning was called the balance of supranational and national authorities, bearing in mind that Brussels' intervention is possible only in those issues that cannot be resolved at the national level. (Somewhat later – June 11 , 2015 – British Ambassador to Paris P. Ricketts formulated it as follows: "National, where possible, European, where necessary" [See: 20]). The fourth principle was based on increasing the role of national parliaments: "there is no single European demos" and therefore "it is national parliaments that are and will remain the true source of real democratic legitimacy and accountability in the EU." Cameron called the fifth principle "justice" – pan-European euro support programs should be established not at the level of the eurozone, but the Common Market, participation in which "and the ability to set rules in it are the main reason for Britain's membership" in the EU ^[21].

The conclusions and requirements of the Prime Minister's keynote speech were substantiated in detail in an analytical study prepared in 2012-2014 on behalf of the British government ^[33], which Cameron designated as "a review of the balance of competencies designed to provide an informed and objective analysis" ^[21] of the UK's relationship with the European Union. British ministries, parliament, research institutes and experts have been working on the document for three years, having written 32 reports and justified the need for radical EU reforms, "without missing [according to French senators – auth.] out of sight of any competence ... of the European Union" ^[27].

The final version of the study was sent through diplomatic channels to all EU member states in early 2015. During its discussion in the French Senate, it was pointed out that there was no official reaction from the continental EU countries, because they "do not want to announce their position before any negotiations," but it was noted that the document "did not go unnoticed in the offices" ^[27].

It was the need to develop a French position on the provisions of the received British document that caused the discussions on a possible Brexit in the Senate to begin. The Senate Committee on European Affairs created a group under the leadership of the Deputy Chairman of the Committee F. Keller (independent senator) to prepare the relevant report. The group reviewed the British study itself, analyzed D. Cameron's "European Speech" and M. Thatcher's earlier speech at the college in Bruges. She held meetings with 20 representatives of political, public and expert circles of Great Britain. The conclusions of the group's work were discussed by the Senate on April 16, 2015 [For discussion of the report, see: 27].

The report of the Senate Committee listed the main aspects that caused British criticism of the current state of affairs in the EU.

         First of all, the statement of the British was stated about the "lack of transparency and democratic control" over the decision–making process in the EU, about non-compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which "is not sufficiently hindered by other [European - auth.] countries". The UK considered it necessary to "strengthen the role of national parliaments ... at all stages of the decision–making process ... supporting the idea of a red card, that is, the right of veto for them," and also advocated the principle of "better and fewer [pan-European - auth.] legislation".

The senators saw the second significant problem in the British document as "discrimination between members and non-members of the eurozone due to ongoing integration, which gives priority to decisions taken by the eurozone," as a result of which the development at the EU level of "mechanisms for coordinating economic policy goes beyond the competence of the European Union and affects purely national competencies."

         The senators also drew attention to the demands raised by the British on the issue of taxation for a clear separation of competencies of the member states and the EU. According to British analysts, the European Union could only interfere in areas that directly and exclusively regulate the intra-European market. The British "hostility to the possibility of introducing a tax on financial transactions", which directly affected the interests of the City of London, was particularly emphasized. (Back at the EU summit in December 2011, French President Nicolas Sarkozy noted: "Cameron has an obsession: to protect the City of London, to leave behind him the title of an offshore center" [See: 11]).

         The Senate report highlighted British dissatisfaction with the European budget, which is "disproportionate," and the pan-European agricultural policy, "too expensive, inadequate and too bureaucratic ... whose goals are vague."

The senators noted the dominant negative attitude in British society towards the "deplorable" state of the migration problem. The most important reason for this was the desire of the British to resist the "atmosphere of colonization", which is actively planted by immigrants, creating "their own civilizational enclaves in the places of settlement." ("It is characteristic that, speaking out against migrants," wrote the domestic researcher N.Y. Kaveshnikov, "the British (both politicians and ordinary people) do not make much difference between citizens of other EU countries and visitors from Asia or Africa" ^{[6, p. 24]}).

Also in the British document, and this was recorded by the French senators, a number of problems were indicated that require further study to understand whether EU reforms are needed in these areas (social security and employment, free movement of financial services, fishing).

According to the French parliamentarians, the sphere that more or less satisfies the UK turned out to be a pan-European foreign policy. At the same time, the British were convinced that the principle of unanimity existing in the EU creates "the difficulty of defining a clear strategy [foreign policy course – ed.], lack of leadership, slow decision–making," and "nothing in this area is possible [to change - ed.] until the UK, France and Germany agree." The UK has doubts about the compatibility of the principles of unanimity and the exercise of its sovereign rights in matters of security and defense with the "ineffectiveness of European foreign policy." As a result, the British wondered about the possibility of "taking the initiative in European defense."

The study emphasized that European construction for the UK is "an economic project: a common intra–European market... but it's not a political project, much less a geopolitical one."

However, it was claimed in the Senate report, although the UK is "afraid of [federalization – auth.] Europe ... and there is a common and well- established euroscepticism among the British ... at the moment, aspects of anti - European sentiment are not a decisive threat… So far [British – auth."public opinion remains confident in the country's ability to defend its national interests and traditions, the referendum on the UK's remaining in the EU is not dangerous."

The main conclusion of the report, which formed the basis of the initial French position on the issue of Britain's withdrawal from the EU, was that "Brexit is a lot of noise out of nothing", which was stipulated by an important addition, which turned out to be, to a certain extent, prophetic: "If the Conservatives win [in the upcoming May 2015 elections – auth.] we will have to prepare for a referendum on keeping Britain in Europe; but we must stop talking about it as Russian roulette, unless we notice ... that Cameron regularly adds another bullet to the barrel"^[27].

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A convincing victory in the British elections in May 2015 . The Conservative Party gave Cameron the opportunity to form a majority government. Leading French media noted that the victory of the Conservatives would allow them "to move from the election campaign to the preparation of the referendum without transition and take [the topic of Brexit – auth.] most of the public debate and the energy of political leaders" ^[18].

Discussing the results of the British elections, the Committee on European Affairs of the French Senate on June 7 heard its chairman, a member of the leadership of the "Republicans" J. Bizet [Speech by J. Bizet in the Senate on June 7, 2015, see: 20]. Speaking, among other things, about a possible referendum on Brexit, Bizet claimed that "65% of Britons do not want to leave the European Union ... But a referendum is a political tool... which is very sensitive to the general environment, especially because voters often do not answer a directly asked question, but based on their assessment of the government asking it." As a result, according to the senator's forecast, the Cameron government will focus after re-election not so much on the "European dossier" as on the implementation of the internal socio-economic program, which, in turn, will ensure the support of the population in the Brexit issue of the opinion that will actually promote the conservative cabinet, which means that it will create certain risks of a "double game" on the part of the British leadership.

The official letter sent by D. Cameron to the President of the European Council D. Tusk on November 10, 2015 with demands to reform the EU ^[17] again drew the senators' attention to the Brexit problem. The Prime Minister's letter outlined the most significant provisions previously presented in the "European Speech": guarantees of non-discrimination of non-member countries of the eurozone, including voluntary participation in the pan–European regulation of the financial sector; priority of the principles of building the EU as a Common Market; rejection of attempts to draw the UK into an "even closer [political - auth. the Union"; the need to increase the role of national parliaments with the right to block undesirable initiatives of the European Parliament. It also voiced demands related to the migration crisis that broke out in spring-autumn 2015 in Europe (about the "migration tsunami" of 2015, which resulted in the "EU migration crisis", see: [16], newspapers Le Monde and Le Figaro for September 21-25, 2015), which destabilized the political landscape in EU countries: restrict the freedom of movement of migrants and their receipt of social benefits in order to prevent their movement from "poor" countries to "rich" and "compromise" British identity. (As noted in the report of the French Senate of April 16, 2016, "54% of the UK population ... feels uncomfortable before the brutal and rapid phenomenon [of the migration crisis – auth.]... which calls into question his [British – auth.] identity". See: 27). On the whole range of issues, Cameron proposed to work out an appropriate "agreement that will be binding and, if necessary, enshrined in the founding treaties of the EU."

The Prime Minister's letter to the leadership of the European Union met with a mixed reaction from British society. According to the Russian English scholar E.V. Ananyeva, "both supporters of the EU (overstated requirements) and its opponents (too small) were dissatisfied with it" ^{[1, p. 99]}.

Deputy Chairman of the Committee on European Affairs of the French Senate F. On the eve of the meeting of the European Council on December 17-18, at which the initiatives of Great Britain were to be discussed, Keller submitted a certificate to the Senate Committee on European Affairs on December 3, 2015. Keller see: 20]. The document stressed that politicians should take into account the possibility of Cameron's double game when he "finds himself on a dangerous edge: ... if the tension [in the Conservative Party – auth..] will become too high, there will be a significant question [what is preferable for him – auth.]: whether to win the referendum [in favor of EU membership – auth.] or to preserve the unity of the party if these two conditions are incompatible?" Keller also wrote that, "fearing the spread of the "contagion" [the initiation of withdrawal from the EU of other countries – ed.], Brussels will consider the registration of the special status of the UK a lesser evil."

During the subsequent debate on the reference F. Keller in the Senate committee (December 15, 2015) noted (for example, in the speech of Senator-environmentalist A. Gattolin) that "the strategy of the British Prime Minister is more than dangerous… In London, he does not fight the anti–European aspirations of his public opinion, but prefers to put forward new demands [EU - auth.]... which is unacceptable blackmail" ^[20].

On the day of the start of the European Council summit on December 17, 2015, which considered Cameron's proposals, the British Parliament adopted an Act on holding a referendum on the country's membership in the EU. It is unlikely that the coincidence of events was accidental.

At the EU summit, it was not possible to reach a complete compromise between the British position and the views of the continental member states, and the main discussions on the proposed initiatives were postponed to the February 2016 EU summit.

On the eve of the next summit, on January 28, 2016, the French Senate discussed the second information and analytical report of the Deputy Chairman of the Committee on European Affairs F. Keller "Great Britain and the European Union: how to respond to the British demands?" ^[34]. It examined British assessments of the state of the country's relations with the EU and analyzed the positions of the main British domestic political forces on the Brexit issue. During the preparation of the report, the Senate delegation visited London.

As stated in the report, the British were characterized by "a fundamental confidence that the UK, inside or outside the European Union, will always remain Great Britain."… Any attempt to use the creation of a Common Market to promote the political construction of a federal Europe is condemned by them as a maneuver to which they refuse to obey ... the EU has ceased to be legitimate in the eyes of a significant part of British public opinion, which wants the member states to restore most of their sovereignty and that the actions of Brussels are under effective control ... [There is an auth.] Europe's impotence before the migration crisis ... After the [financial and economic crisis - author] of 2008, the European Union is concerned only with saving the single currency ... For London, the creation of a single currency is an illustration of Brussels' desire to go on a forced march to federalism," despite the fact that the UK is quite satisfied with the situation favorable to it, when "without its adoption of a single currency currencies ... on its territory is the financial capital of the EU and [held – auth.] most transactions related to the euro". (Earlier, on December 9, 2015, F. Keller noted that "the United Kingdom is concerned about threats to the interests of the City of London state in a globalized state… [which, in her opinion, is auth.] should remain the financial center of Europe" ^[20].)

 In such an atmosphere of conflict of interests and uncertainty, the French senators noted with alarm, London considered it "perfectly legitimate to give the floor to the voters," and excessive "optimism about the positive outcome of the referendum [i.e., the unconditional support of the majority of Britons for Britain's participation in the EU – auth.] is no longer relevant at the moment." However, as it was written in the report, "the stakes [on Brexit – auth.] are not so great", and therefore "British demands ... should not lead to questioning the fundamental principles of European construction" ^[34].

On the eve of the February EU summit (February 17, 2015), which was devoted exclusively to the discussion of British proposals and the search for a compromise, Senator P. Schillinger from the group of Socialists, describing the position of the British, stressed that "the proposals made [in Cameron's letter to Tusk – auth.] the proposals do not contain any obligations [in relation to the EU - auth.] from the UK", and a compromise with it "is fraught with weakening of the European project" ^[35].

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On February 19-20, 2016, an hour-long debate on finding possible agreements with the UK took place in Brussels at the EU summit. On the day of its opening, to emphasize the seriousness and immutability of the British position, Cameron announced the date of the future referendum on the country's membership in the EU – June 23, 2016. And although this shocked many European politicians, before the meeting, the continental leaders said that no circumstances "can prevent Europe from moving forward" ^[32] and the summit will discuss not the integration foundations of the European Union, but possible special conditions for Britain's participation in it.

Despite the agreements reached at the summit [See note: 2] – Cameron received assurances from the Europeans that "the United Kingdom will never be part of the EU superpower, the country will never switch to the euro, will not participate in those EU initiatives" in which the UK is not interested ^[24] – the decisions taken they did not meet the British requirements of cardinal reforms of the European Union itself (and not a special position for their country), having designated for the British only "red lines" through which continental Europe is not ready to cross. On the other hand, they gave rise to a completely erroneous belief among continental leaders that the UK, speaking of "serious reform of the Community", only creates a "bargaining space" in order to obtain new bonuses for its status in the EU. (From the British, Cameron removed the requirements for concluding a new fundamental treaty of the European Union, formally agreeing only to special conditions of stay in the EU for their country, but, of course, without canceling the decisions on holding a referendum on EU membership in the UK [See: 9]).

And although the European media emphasized that "the decision of the summit on the British issue should not be taken seriously and that it does not provide for any change in the fundamental treaty" ^[8], less optimistic assessments were already heard in the French Senate: Senator R. Danesi, a member of the Republicans party, on March 31, 2015, claimed that the agreement reached at the February summit compromise "nips in the bud any ambitions of a political, federal Europe. In fact, the EU will turn into a vast liberal economic organization in which competition between workers, economies and states will flourish," which will allow "the UK to become a tax haven with its 17% corporate tax rate before everyone's eyes" ^[20].

The decisions of the summit, in fact, meant the failure of the British demands for a radical reform of the EU, guaranteeing, as D. sought. Cameron, preventing further federalization of the European Union "for the whole EU, not just for Britain" ^[21]. According to the Russian English scholar N.K. Kapitonova, "in [British – auth. The media compared the agreements reached by the prime minister with the purchase of a ticket to the Titanic, after he collided with an iceberg, Cameron's actions with the policy of appeasing the aggressor pursued by Chamberlain and Baldwin, and assurances from Brussels with Hitler's promises."[8] After the February 2016 summit, all motivational reasons for further progress towards European unity disappeared from the UK, and the British government continued preparations for the referendum. And at the end of February, it published the wording of the question to be put to a referendum: "Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union?"

Cameron's position as Tory leader has proved to be very difficult. There was a serious and very dangerous split in the party on the dilemma: to support the UK's withdrawal from the EU or staying in it on special conditions, and such uncertainty of position threatened the Conservatives with the loss of some ministerial posts, a government crisis with a subsequent transition to the opposition. The status of an anti-Brexiteer, publicly voiced by Cameron, was preferable for him, because it allowed him to solve at least two other tasks inside the country: to prevent other politicians from taking the place of the leader of the opponents of Brexit (in the report of the French Senate of January 26, 2016, Alan Johnson stood out among British anti-Brexiteers, to whom "Labor can to entrust the campaign for the EU" [See: 34]) and to preserve the possibility of political maneuver with Scotland and Northern Ireland, which unequivocally supported EU membership [See note: 12].

In the foreign policy sphere, for Cameron, his declared Euro-optimism also seemed to be the most advantageous in a dialogue with continental partners, since the latter were interested in maintaining Britain's membership in the EU, and, as you know, in discussions, the position of a supporter and ally always gives more negotiating opportunities. According to the Russian political scientist and English scholar Al.A. Gromyko, Cameron, in fact, remaining "in the positions of Euroscepticism, but not hard-headed and parochial, but conscious ... played a double game" ^{[4, pp. 6-7]}.

Back on February 20, 2016, the Prime Minister abolished the principle of "state solidarity" at a government meeting, thus giving ministers the opportunity to openly express their opinion on the country's membership in the EU. This and Cameron's call for Conservative MPs to "vote with their hearts", i.e. not to associate their vote with the official position of the party leader, cannot be interpreted otherwise than as the Prime Minister's actual assistance to Brexit supporters.

However, during the March debate, French senators, discussing F. Keller's information on the state of the "European project" (March 31, 2015), proceeded mainly from "sincere conviction of the need to support Cameron in the fight against Brexit" ^[20].

On April 15, 2016, in the UK, as part of the struggle for votes on the issue of the country's withdrawal from the EU, put to a referendum on June 23, lively agitation campaigns of Eurosceptics and Euro-optimists began, involving all the media. According to the testimony of the French Ambassador in London, S. Berman (January 27, 2016), the total funding of agitation and propaganda in support of Brexit significantly exceeded the costs of promoting the ideas of Euro-optimists ^[31], and the majority of the English media, using the arguments of Eurosceptics, acted against the country's membership in the EU. (A similar opinion is expressed by N.K. Kapitonova: "Not so much the migration crisis itself, as its representation by Brexit supporters in propaganda work" influenced British voters to vote in a referendum in favor of the country's withdrawal from the EU [Cit. by: 13]). According to the fair remark of the domestic political scientist A.V. Zhidkov, "without the influence of the media conglomerate of Great Britain, Brexit would hardly have taken place" ^[5].

The need to reform the EU, but towards further deepening integration, was not in doubt among the overwhelming majority of French parliamentarians, which became the main topic of a joint meeting on May 17 of the Senate Committee on European Affairs and a similar Committee of the National Assembly with the invitation of French members of the European Parliament [Speeches of parliamentarians at the meeting on May 17, see: 31]. During the discussion, Socialist MP K. Karesh noted that the European Union was approaching a turning point, and the Brexit issue only "highlighted the shortcomings associated with the incompleteness of the integration process." Socialist MEP G. Balas and the heads of the committees J. Bizet (Republicans Party) and D. Auroi (environmentalist MP) they had no doubt that regardless of the outcome of the British referendum, "The European Union must be reformed. This can happen within the framework of the eurozone – the only existing supranational instrument"that provides a chance to "revive European sentiments among our fellow citizens."

It should be noted that the senators-members of the National Front, Marcel-Stephane Ravier and David Rashlin, did not actively participate in the discussions of issues related to Brexit until the announcement of the results of the British referendum.

As the date of the referendum approached, French senators, based on the available data on the increase of Euroscepticism in British society, began to seriously consider the prospect of Brexit and think about its consequences for the EU member states. On June 1, 2016, they heard the information and analytical report of the Deputy Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, a member of the leadership of the Republicans Party, A. de Montgolfer, "Brexit: economic and budgetary consequences?" ^[29]. It contained an in-depth analysis of various options for economic relations between the UK and the EU after a possible Brexit.

According to A. de Montgolfer, "the British referendum, whatever its outcome, will cast doubt on the stable development of European construction. On the basis of an economic project alone, it is impossible to fight disinterest, even with growing disillusionment with the EU. To reconnect with its citizens, the EU will need to fully understand the problems inherent in internal security, external protection and even immigration. The consequences of the UK's exit from the EU will be generally unfavorable both for its economy and for other European states… As for France, the level of GDP per capita [in this case – auth.] will decrease by 0.06-0.27%." The UK's exit from the EU will entail "significant budgetary costs for other member states. For example, France will face an increase in its contribution to the EU budget" by 1.2 billion euros (+ 5.6%). However, the speaker summed up, "Brexit will happen or not, [France – auth.] there is no danger of disaster."

On June 21, two days before the British referendum, the senators, summarizing all previous hearings on the Brexit issue, were quite optimistic about the future of the European Union. Expressing the general opinion, the right-wing centrist, member of the Union of Democrats and Independents party I. Pozzo di Borgo noted that "it does not matter whether the British choose to leave the European Union or not… The main thing is that the members of the [EU – auth. They were full of enthusiasm for the implementation of the existing common political and economic project of an integrated and more federalist Europe" [35]. The Euro-optimism of the overwhelming majority of French senators, at least at the official level, was not in doubt.

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         The conducted research has shown that during the years of the first premiership of D. Cameron (2010-2015), when he raised the question of the need to reform the European Union in order to prevent its further political federalization and strengthen national principles in British politics, the French political elite saw in British initiatives only a way to get additional bonuses, a desire to preserve and expand the country's special privileges in the EU and, possibly, the desire of British politicians on the eve of the 2015 parliamentary elections G. to win over the Eurosceptic electorate. At the initial stage, French politicians did not appreciate the danger of the UK putting the problem of its participation in the EU to a national referendum.

But, as crisis phenomena increase in the European Union, and euroscepticism increases in the UK, the split of the British elites, including the Conservative Party in power, and the demonstration by the newly elected Prime Minister Cameron in 2015 of the desire to hear the "voice of the people" on the issue of the country's membership in the integration construction aimed at creating a Eurostate, the mood of French parliamentarians changed. Now they reflected the wariness and fears, primarily of an economic nature, associated with a possible Brexit. However, even on the eve of the British referendum on June 23, 2016, French political circles were dominated by the belief in the commitment of the majority of Britons to the pan–European integration project, and in the case of a hypothetical victory of the eurosceptics - in the cohesion of the ranks of the EU states on the way to further federalization (maybe because of Brexit even faster) of a united Europe.