DOI: 10.7256/2454-0641.2022.3.38757
EDN: UNFDVQ
Received:
08-09-2022
Published:
15-09-2022
Abstract:
The article is devoted to the analysis of the US foreign policy in the Middle East. The study analyzes the military-political, energy and information aspects of the offensive and defensive models of the Middle East policy of the United States at the present stage. The purpose of the study was to examine the results of the implementation of expansionist and exploitative geopolitical projects of the United States in the Middle East, taking into account the influence of the information factor and the Russian-American confrontation in the region. The methodological basis of the study is a systematic approach. The historical approach, statistical methods, event analysis, case-study method, analysis, comparison, induction and deduction were also applied. The novelty of the work lies in considering the offensive and defensive models of the US political course in the Middle East and the results of expansionist and exploitative geopolitical projects in specific regional situations. Attention is paid to the consequences of Washington's offensive foreign policy on the example of the invasion of Iraq and the occupation of Syria. The article considers the defensive model of US policy in the Persian Gulf with an emphasis on US-Saudi relations against the background of the visit of the US president to the region in July 2022. Examples of Russia's successful creative policy in the Middle East are given. The conclusion is made about the destructive nature and low effectiveness of both offensive and defensive models of the US geopolitical strategy in the Middle East. Against the background of Washington's weakening influence on regional processes, the sovereignty of states is gradually increasing, and it becomes possible for them to pursue an independent political course. The turn of a number of traditional Middle Eastern partners of the United States towards Russia and the system of multipolarity world order proposed by Moscow is becoming more and more noticeable. A change in the balance of power in the Middle East region in the future may lead to a gradual decrease in information influence and a deterioration in Washington's image, with a very likely continuation of conflict interaction between Russia and the United States.
Keywords:
foreign policy, geopolitical strategies, Middle East, information confrontation, USA, Russia, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, multipolarity
This article is automatically translated.
The Middle East region is of strategic importance in modern international relations. For decades, this space has been and continues to be a zone of collision of the national interests of the largest world powers. The collapse of the bipolar structure of international relations in the early 1990s led to serious changes in the division of spheres of influence on the world stage between the leading countries. The collapse of the USSR and the termination of the Warsaw Bloc led to the fact that the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) remained the only strong global military bloc whose member countries had the capabilities, ambitions and were ready to take part in most major armed conflicts in the world, including in the Middle East. Having endowed itself with the powers and functions of a world arbiter, the US-NATO alliance actually displaced the UN and other international institutions for ensuring and maintaining security, seriously limiting their capabilities [1, p. 55]. As a result, the United States began to claim the role of the only world leader, political pole, hegemon, and the absence of competitors led to the formation of Washington's model of pluralistic unipolarity [2]. U.S. policy in the Middle EastIn the early 90s of the twentieth century, the United States and its allies used the thesis of the "war on terrorism" to justify their aggressive expansionist policy against individual sovereign states. Gradually, the "war on terrorism" was replaced by a "war on undesirable regimes" and a policy of democratic messianism [3]. Within the framework of such a model, "international" intervention is preceded by the accusation of countries in which internal conflicts (civil wars, mass protest actions) or which are actively developing economically (for example, Libya, Syria) that they pose a "threat to peace". This is followed by attempts to include the state in the list of vulnerable, unstable countries to justify the subsequent aggression. An example of such a division is the Rating of Incapacity of states (Fragility States Index), which is developed and updated annually by the American Peace Foundation and Foreign Policy magazine. According to statistics, for example, in 2019, Yemen ranked 1st in the world in terms of weakness, Syria - 4th, Afghanistan – 9th, Iraq - 13th, Libya - 28th. In 2022, the rating has changed: Yemen continues to occupy 1st place, the situation in Syria (3rd place), Afghanistan (8th) and Libya (21st) has worsened, the situation in Iraq tends to improve - 23rd place [4]. After such a "classification", military operations should be prepared and accompanied by appropriate information attention from state institutions, the media and controlled organizations. Often, methods of undermining the authority of the authorities, sanctions pressure, destabilization of society, etc. are used to achieve special non-military goals. At this stage, methods of information warfare aimed at achieving national interests are beginning to be actively applied. Two world powers are actively involved in regional processes in the Middle East: USA and Russia. Speaking about the participants of information conflict interaction in this region, it is necessary to first outline the boundaries of the Middle East space, primarily from a political point of view. Within the framework of this work, the "Middle East" region includes the countries of the Arabian Peninsula (Bahrain, Yemen, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, Oman, Saudi Arabia), the Arab Mashriq (Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria), Israel, as well as states that are located on the borders of the region (Egypt in the west, Turkey in the north and Iran in the east), as they play a leading role in all regional processes. Among the above-mentioned countries, it is necessary to single out five cross-regional actors that participate in the processes not only in the Middle East, but also in neighboring regions and geopolitical spaces. These include: Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel. In addition to state actors, various intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations are involved in information conflict interaction in the Middle East, which play an important role in information confrontation [5]. Among them: the United Nations, UNESCO, the World Health Organization, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the IAEA, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Persian Gulf, Doctors Without Borders, White Helmets and other organizations. Many of them are controlled by one or another participant in the information confrontation. Some are more of an arena of struggle in the media space and are used as a separate tool. These include the United Nations and its individual structures: mainly the General Assembly and the Security Council. In addition to open measures of information confrontation, the United States and its allies actively use secret directives that directly define UN policy on certain issues. For example, on October 17, 2017, an internal UN document was issued, intended for all the Organization's structures that work in Syria, which indicated that assistance to Syria in post-war reconstruction can be initiated only after a "genuine and comprehensive political transition." Thus, a ban was created on UN units to participate in the restoration of the Syrian economy [6]. Also, both world and regional mass media are actively used for information support of foreign policy [7], for example, The New York Times, BBC, France Press, Reuters, CNN, The Guardian, Fox News, RT, SANA, Al Mayadeen, Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, Haaretz, and others. Most of the foreign policy doctrines of US presidents are based on the geopolitical concepts of A. Mahan, F.J. Turner, H. Mackinder, N. Spikeman and other theorists of geopolitics and assume the implementation of purposeful expansion [8]. These concepts include, for example, the idea of "mobile borders" by F.J. Turner [9], the concept of "anaconda" ("theory of sea power") by A. Mahan, the concepts of "Heartland" by M. Mackinder [10] and "Rimland" by N. Spikeman [11]. At the same time, the United States is not only engaged in expanding its sphere of influence, but also maintains control of the space that was "conquered" earlier. In order to systematize and simplify the consideration of various types of geopolitical strategies of states (primarily the United States), this study will use the classification of I.V. Shamin, who identified 3 main varieties of geopolitical projects [12]:
1. "expansionist", aimed at "conquering" certain spatial and geographical areas and at neutralizing the presence of opponents in this area; 2. "operational", aiming at the development of previously occupied space, operation and maintenance of control in the future; 3. "military-political" plans aimed at ensuring security at the strategic level (primarily in the military-political field) both the state implementing this project itself and the countries in its sphere of influence. These plans , in turn, are divided into two subspecies: a. "stationary military-political programs" that are focused on creating a "fixed geopolitical defense" in the area of concentration of state interests; b. "shock-attacking military-political programs" that allow the interested state to ensure reliable and effective deterrence of opponents, with the possibility of their neutralization and/or guaranteed military destruction. Shamin also identifies three models of the geopolitics of states: 1. "offensive model", in which the main projects are "expansionist" and "shock-attacking"; 2. "defensive model", which provides for the implementation of "operational projects" and "stationary military-political programs"; 3. a "balanced model", which assumes a balanced implementation of all types of geopolitical projects simultaneously [12]. Within the framework of this study, examples of the offensive and defensive model of the US foreign policy in the Middle East are considered, including taking into account the peculiarities of information policy, which in most cases is destructive. At the same time, it should be noted that the information aspect in this case is often not so much an independent as a complementary factor of the foreign policy course. However, before proceeding to the analysis of concrete examples, it is necessary to identify some semantic features of the meaning of "expansion" in Russian and English. The concept of "expansion" comes from the Latin word expansio ("spread, expansion") and is used in various fields of science, generally denoting the expansion of the habitat or influence of the state, people or a particular species. In the political context, expansion is often understood as an aggressive policy of spreading the influence of some countries on others in various areas, including political, economic, ideological and value, up to the actual seizure and retention of territories [13]. Also, a possible outcome of expansion may be not only the spread of influence, but also the subordination of a foreign state, involving it in its sphere of influence [14]. In English, the word "expansion" means a wide or open area of something, especially land or water [15], and "expansion" means the process, the act of increasing, expanding or giving something a larger size, quantity, degree of importance [16; 17]. The root word "expansionism", identical to the Russian word "expansionism", is translated either as a policy of expansion (territorial, economic, etc.) [18], or as a process of increasing the size and importance of something, especially in a country or business [19]. At the same time, synonyms of the word "expansionism" in English are such concepts as "imperialism" (imperialism), "development" (development, development), "progress" (progress) and "economic expansion" (economic growth) [20]. Thus, the differences between the predominantly aggressive and neutral status of the concepts of "expansion" and related words of the same root in Russian and English are visible. The offensive model of US foreign policy in the Middle EastThe offensive model (expansionist project) of US policy is being implemented in the Middle East using both "hard" and "soft power" tools. The first included the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the intervention in Iraq in 2003, as well as the expansion of the number of US military bases and the American presence in the region. Special attention should be paid to the invasion of Iraq by the United States and its allies in 2003. The official reason for the invasion was the connection of Saddam Hussein's regime with international terrorism, as well as the search and destruction of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) allegedly in Baghdad. As proof of the presence of WMD, US Secretary of State Colin Powell demonstrated a test tube at the UN Security Council, which allegedly contained anthrax spores. However, no WMD was subsequently detected [21], and the test tube became a model of misleading the world community and one of the clearest examples of "fakes" distributed by the United States that affect the fate of entire states [22]. December 22, 2021 The Joint Headquarters of the Iraqi Armed Forces Command announced the completion of the withdrawal of combat units of the international anti-terrorist coalition under the auspices of the United States from Iraq and noted that only military advisers and instructors remained in the country [23], whose number was estimated at about 2.5 thousand people [24]. The reason for the withdrawal of US troops was the statement adopted by the Council of Representatives of Iraq (Parliament) on January 5, 2020 [25]. It is noteworthy that for almost 19 years of the US presence in Iraq, the country has remained destroyed and has not overcome the internal political crisis, which especially intensified in August 2022 [26].
Syria has also faced a tough US offensive policy. Official Damascus has been trying for many years to oust American troops from its territory. However, Washington continues to keep part of the country's regions under its control. The Syrian government considers the armed presence of the United States in the country as an illegal occupation, which is justified by Washington's "fight against terrorism" [27]. The eastern regions of Deir ez-Zor and part of the provinces of Al-Hasaka (Hasakah) and Raqqa are controlled by Kurdish formations with the support of the United States. At the same time, for example, in January 2022, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR) demanded "the withdrawal of US troops from the northeast and Turkish forces from the northwest of the country" [28]. Later, on January 27, 2022. The Military Prosecutor's Office of the SAR stressed that "the American presence in the country has no legal justification and no other name than occupation. The situation in these provinces is one of the elements of the plan aimed at keeping the region under US occupation for as long as possible" [29]. Nevertheless, despite the repeated demands of official Damascus for the withdrawal of US troops from Syria, on February 3, 2022, by order of US President Biden, US special forces conducted an operation in Idlib in northwestern Syria near the border with Turkey, as a result of which the leader of the Islamic State terrorist group was killed (IG, banned in Russia) [30]. At the same time, the Pentagon did not provide any information about civilian casualties, despite the fact that the American amphibious operation claimed the lives of at least 13 people, including six children and four women [31]. In addition, the US Air Force regularly conducts airstrikes on various objects in Syria. For example, on August 24, 2022, objects allegedly used by groups associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the province of Deir ez-Zor were attacked [32]. Moreover, the United States is actually "robbing" Syria: for example, on January 3, 2022, they transported a convoy with tanks and military equipment, including 60 tankers with illegally extracted Syrian oil, from the Al-Hasakah province through the Al-Walid border crossing to the American base located in northern Iraq, including 60 tankers with illegally extracted Syrian oil, which accompanied by 8 armored vehicles [33]. On August 21, 2022, 137 oil tanks were removed from the territories in the north-east of Syria under the control of the Kurdish formations of the Forces of Democratic Syria [34]. In addition, a full-scale information war has been launched against Syria, involving many news agencies, including major media outlets subordinate to the United States and its allies in the West and the Middle East: CNN, BBC, Fox News, Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya and others [35]. In addition to discrediting the Syrian regime and its allies Russia and Iran, these media also carry out information "legitimization" of the American occupation presence in the Syrian Arab Republic, which adds additional difficulties to attempts to return the sovereignty of Syria. The tools of "soft power" within the framework of the US offensive policy in the Middle East include the development, implementation and promotion of Western American-centric ideas and concepts, for example, "democratic transit", which is extremely destructive for the Middle East subsystem of international relations and justifies the US right to overthrow the ruling regimes in those states whose course is at odds with Washington's vision. Among the concepts promoted, one can single out the "Greater Middle East" [36], which was formulated by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (USA) as part of the task set by the US administration in 2004. This project tries to simplify the existing system of balance of forces and interests by combining into one subsystem the regions of North and East Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, as well as, in some cases, the South Caucasus and Central Asia that differ in geographical, political, economic, social, information and other spaces. In addition, information influence on the Middle East space through controlled or pro-American mass media and various organizations has been actively used and continues to be used. One of the results of such an impact (which coincided with numerous socio-economic and domestic political problems) were the revolutionary events of 2011, which received the general name "Arab Spring". These processes are studied in detail in the collective monograph of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Asian and African Countries of Lomonosov Moscow State University [37], in the works of E.M. Primakov [38], A.B. Podtserob [39], M.A. Sapronova [40], A.I. Vavilov [41], D.B. Malysheva [1], J. Sharpe [42] and other Russian and foreign researchers. A special role in this process was played by the "moral wear and tear" of the authorities. The governments of the States of the Middle East, instead of solving real problems, strengthening sovereignty and improving the economic situation in the states, used a "distracting" model of reaction, shifting the attention of the population to other issues [43]. At the same time, unresolved territorial disputes, confessional diversity, low availability of water resources, difficult economic and demographic situation, as well as significant informational influence and manipulation of public opinion, including by the United States, contribute to the growth and intensification of hotbeds of instability in the Middle East region, which was vividly demonstrated by the events of the "Arab Spring" [44, p.35-37]. As practice has shown, the offensive model of US foreign policy leads mainly to long-term destabilization of the situation in states and an increase in the level of conflict in the region. The defensive model of US foreign policy in the Middle EastExamples of the defensive model of Washington's foreign policy, especially in the context of "operational" projects, are the position and activities of the United States in the energy sector in the Persian Gulf. Regional instability and a high level of conflict cause certain risks for the world export of hydrocarbons from the Middle East region [45]. The United States is a long-standing partner of the oil exporting countries from the Persian Gulf zone. At the same time, to the greatest extent, the issues of oil production and pricing concern Saudi Arabia, which, despite the contradictory and unconstructive policy of the current administration of J. Biden is one of the strategic partners of the United States in the Middle East [46].
Over the past few years, there has been a tendency of the Gulf States to create, maintain and develop multi-vector relations with various actors in international relations [47]. At the same time, the United States does not stop trying to keep the monarchies of the Persian Gulf in its sphere of influence. Thus, on September 9, 2022, the Central Command of the US Armed Forces announced plans to open a test center in southern Saudi Arabia [48]. New systems for countering unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) will be tested at the test site, as well as testing and development of integrated air and missile defense systems. Despite this, there are difficulties between Washington and Riyadh on the OPEC line/OPEC+ in the field of oil production and the impact on world energy prices. At the same time, against the background of the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis in 2022, Saudi Arabia refused to impose sanctions against Russia, which caused a negative reaction from Washington [49]. One of the most striking evidence of the difficulties associated with the implementation of the defensive model of Washington's foreign policy is the results of the first tour of J. Biden as President of the United States to the Middle East, which took place between July 12 and 16, 2022 and received widespread media coverage. The previous visit of the American leader to the Middle East took place in 2017 under the presidency of D. Trump, and among its results was the conclusion of an arms deal between the United States and Saudi Arabia totaling about 110 billion US dollars [50]. As for the 2022 visit, the White House initially announced one of the key goals of the visit – the intention to convince Arab countries (and primarily Saudi Arabia) to increase the volume of oil produced in order to reduce its price on the world market [51]. Nevertheless, the tour had very limited results and some Arab media even called it a "diplomatic defeat of the United States in the Middle East" [52]. Moreover, during the visit of J. Biden to Saudi Arabia, the US president blamed Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman for the murder of journalist Khashoggi (Khashoggi) [53]. At the same time, this statement was not made for the first time: Biden had previously actively used this accusation against Saudi Arabia and members of the ruling dynasty during the election race [54]. In response, Riyadh pointed out to Washington human rights violations [55] and confirmed the impossibility of increasing oil production above 13 million barrels per day [56]. Moreover, Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud stated that there is no shortage of oil on the world market [57]. Washington failed to fully restore its influence in the region, especially given the earlier withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan at the end of August 2021 [58]. There was no consensus either on the nuclear negotiations with Iran (which Israel actively opposes) or on the implementation of the "two States for two peoples" plan in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli settlement. The four-day visit of the US president to the Middle East demonstrated the existing and rapidly progressing distrust of Saudi Arabia regarding Washington's initiatives and plans [59]. This, among other things, can also be judged on the basis of statements by Riyadh about the planned accession to the BRICS group, expressed by Saudi Arabia (as well as Egypt and Turkey, which were also considered "traditional" partners of the United States in the region for many years) a few days before the start of the tour of J. Biden's intention [60]. In addition, Riyadh announced the conclusion of an agreement with Baghdad on the unification of the energy systems of the two states [61] and the continuation of the process of normalization of relations with Iran [62], calling on Tehran to actively cooperate with all Arab states. The issues of energy cooperation between Moscow and Riyadh through OPEC+ deserve special attention. The agreements reached within this format have an impact on the global energy policy of the OPEC oil cartel, which the United States cannot agree with. So, in May 2022, Washington attempted to put pressure on OPEC with the help of the norms of the anti-cartel legislation of the United States, whose jurisdiction extends to other states. In particular, the Law on the Prohibition of Cartels in the field of oil production and Export (NOPEC) was adopted [63]. Riyadh and its allies responded by using various mechanisms, including lobbying groups within the United States, in order to prevent American attempts to influence the formation of oil prices. Earlier, in April 2019, Riyadh announced the possibility of abandoning the use of the US dollar in payments for oil supplies [64]. Thus, there is active resistance from Saudi Arabia to US attempts to regain the position of hegemon in the region. Conflict between OPEC/OPEC+ and Washington in the future may entail not only a global energy crisis, but also the expulsion of the United States from decision-making processes in the oil and gas sector, forming a separate eastern subsystem of the global world order. Thus, the US defensive operational policy of forcing third countries to fulfill their own goals and interests is also currently failing, giving other players (including Russia) the opportunity to strengthen their influence on the world stage through interaction with one of the key actors on the Middle East energy agenda – Saudi Arabia. The confrontation between Russia and the United States in the Middle East
Russia's return to the world stage [65], which followed the speech delivered by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin at the Munich Security Conference on February 10, 2007, became for Washington a challenge to national interests and the system of regional relations that the United States had been forming for several years of pluralistic unipolarity [4]. Subsequently, the level of confrontational interaction between Moscow and Washington in the Middle East remained mainly in the form of confrontation, i.e. a form of dynamic stability, in which one side (the United States) conducts an active and proactive policy, and the other side (Russia) – passive and reactionary. On the one hand, this means finding Moscow's foreign policy course in the long-term periods of the game on the sidelines. Without acting proactively, Russia allows the United States to lead and determine the places and forms of confrontation (for example, US intervention in the development of the Syrian conflict). However, at the same time, on the other hand, Washington is forced to constantly act, spend time and resources on provocations and actions, without assuming the full range of possible responses that Moscow can give to certain steps that do not cross the conditional "red lines" drawn by the two world powers. Russia's return to the world stage has begun to change the balance of power in the region. Washington proved powerless to maintain global stability alone and promote its model of hegemony [66, p. 48]. Probably, it was precisely this unpredictability and, as a result, the often asymmetric defensive nature of Russia's actions that contributed to the formation of the image of a reliable long-term partner and guarantor of stability in the region and allowed Moscow to maintain and actively develop bilateral relations with all the key cross-regional powers of the Middle East, especially in the conditions of a special military operation to protect the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics [67] and the subsequent transformation of the system of international relations. At the same time, the informational and geopolitical confrontation between the United States and Russia in the Middle East mainly boils down to the Syrian, Palestinian-Israeli, Turkish and Iranian issues. For example, among the results of Moscow's asymmetric defensive actions, one can single out Russia's military operation in the Syrian Arab Republic, many rounds of negotiations in the "Astana format" and the format of the three guarantor states itself [68], the creation of an inclusive security architecture in the Middle East [69], as well as Russia's long-term partnerships with countries in general-OPEC [70; 71] and such cross-regional powers as Turkey [72; 73], Iran [74] and Saudi Arabia [75], despite certain periods of difficult relations and crises (as, for example, after the Russian Su-24 destroyed by the Turkish Air Force in Syria in 2015; "price wars" between Moscow and Riyadh for oil quotes on the world market, etc.). The foundation of relations between Moscow and the countries of the Middle East is both the long-term experience of bilateral partnerships and a common vision of the future polycentric world order and the accompanying rules of the game in the international arena, which are currently being built by "non-Western" world and cross-regional powers. Within the framework of the new world order, the effectiveness and efficiency of attempts by the United States and its Western partners to establish the hegemony of certain views and ideas with the help of expansionist and exploitative policies will be significantly reduced. Unlike the destructive policy of the United States in the Middle East, Moscow is pursuing a creative course. This can be seen both in the statements regarding BRICS and in the results of the meeting of the heads of the guarantor states of the Astana process, which took place on July 19 in Tehran, a few days after the visit of J. Biden to the Middle East [76]. The main topic of the talks in Tehran was the process of resolving the Syrian crisis, and among the results, first of all, we should note the achievement of a certain level of mutual understanding between Russia, Iran and Turkey regarding Ankara's planned military operation in Syria, which could lead to another round of escalation of the conflict and did not receive support from Moscow and Tehran [77]. As a result, Turkey temporarily put on pause the issue of launching a military operation against the Kurds in the Syrian Arab Republic. This mutual understanding is especially important in the context of the concept of an inclusive security architecture promoted by Russia in the Middle East [69], which primarily involves a dialogue on equal terms between all participating countries, with the aim of coordinating actions and clearly defining red lines for a possible compromise. At the same time, practical achievements (such as the Memorandum on Idlib [78] of 2018, or the agreements on the Turkish military operation in the summer of 2022) demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of this approach. In the future, the existing trilateral format of an inclusive security architecture can be expanded: Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other interested regional and cross-regional actors can be included in it. This, in turn, may lead to a gradual decrease in Washington's informational influence on the Middle East processes. Nevertheless, it is very likely that the existing conflict interaction between Russia and the United States will continue in the format of confrontation between active and reactionary actors. At the same time, Moscow's defensive (reactionary) position and policy within this form of information conflict can become decisive, since it will maximize the realization of national goals and interests with minimal expenditure of resources, using vulnerabilities and weak positions of Washington's foreign policy. *** Summing up, it should be noted that the US foreign policy in the Middle East is predominantly destructive. The existing systems of relations are being destroyed, the authority of power structures is being undermined, society and the state are being destabilized with low real performance. The expansionist approach implemented within the framework of the offensive model, as the examples of Iraq and Syria show, leads mainly to the collapse of statehood, the loss of sovereignty by countries, the growth and intensification of internal and interstate conflict contradictions. States have been losing their internal political stability for decades and are becoming targets of active external influence. The effectiveness of the defensive model used to exploit the spaces and resources (primarily hydrocarbons) located in the Middle East countries in the sphere of influence of the United States is also gradually decreasing. Among other things, Washington uses technologies to overthrow the governments of countries whose course is at odds with the interests of the White House, and also tries to actively promote its opinion and force third countries to follow it.
In parallel, there is a gradual turn of the once traditional (including strategic) Middle Eastern partners of the United States towards the system of a polycentric world order being constructed by Russia. This is facilitated by Russia's constructive approach in discussing and resolving many issues, its willingness to listen to the opinions of all parties, and to seek and find compromise solutions. Against the background of the problems and difficulties faced by Washington, which seeks to maintain the model of hegemony built by Russia with the support of individual cross-regional powers of the Middle East, the new system of international relations is extremely attractive to many of Moscow's partners. In the framework of the Middle East, this may in the future lead to a gradual decrease in information influence and a deterioration in Washington's image, with a very likely continuation of conflict interaction between Russia and the United States. At the same time, the main confrontation between Moscow and Washington is currently taking place in the information and political space (although some areas of confrontation have other forms of interaction, including armed ones within the framework of the Syrian conflict), through public statements, speeches, reports, visits, negotiations, etc. In this regard, the defensive, but at the same time creative nature of Russia's foreign policy and the focus on achieving concrete results may be crucial in the information confrontation with the United States in the Middle East. This will allow Moscow to maximize its national interests with minimal waste of resources, using vulnerabilities and weak positions of Washington's foreign policy. * An organization banned in the territory of the Russian Federation.
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Peer Review
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The subject of the peer-reviewed study is the models of the US foreign policy in the Middle East. The author rightly connects the high degree of relevance of this topic with the collapse of the bipolar structure of international relations in the 1990s and the subsequent redistribution of the sphere of influence in the international arena. It is also impossible not to agree with the claims of the United States to the role of the only world leader noted by the author and the increasingly evident tendency towards the formation of the "Washington model of pluralistic unipolarity." The conceptual design of the reviewed study is based on various geopolitical concepts by A. Mahan, F.J. Turner, H. Mackinder, N. Spikeman and, in particular, projects and models of the geopolitics of states by I.V. Shamin. Unfortunately, the author did not pay due attention to the reflection of the methodology used, however, from the context it can be understood that in addition to general scientific analytical methods, historical, systemic and institutional methods, as well as media content analysis, were used. The correct application of the specified methodological tools allowed the author to obtain results with signs of scientific novelty. First of all, the explication of the offensive and defensive models of US geopolitics in the Middle East region is of scientific interest. It is also interesting to describe the factors leading to the change of one model to another. Finally, the author's general conclusion about the destructive nature of the US foreign policy in the Middle East, as well as a description of the prospects for Russia in this regard, is no less interesting. Structurally, the article also makes a positive impression: its logic is transparent and consistent and reflects the main aspects of the research, and the structural elements are categorized. In addition to the introductory and final parts, the following substantive sections are highlighted in the text: "US policy in the Middle East", "Offensive model of US foreign policy in the Middle East", "Defensive model of US foreign policy in the Middle East", "Confrontation between Russia and the United States in the Middle East". Despite the fact that the section headings do not indulge in diversity, constantly repeating the same terms, they sufficiently reflect the content of relevant text fragments. In addition, perhaps, to the first title, which not only describes US policy in the Middle East, but also contains a fairly large theoretical fragment that strays from the general logic of the section: the author describes the conceptual framework of his research and even stops at clarifying the meaning of the term "expansion". The second of the substantive sections reveals the main provisions of the offensive, and in the next section – the defensive geopolitical model of the United States in relation to the Middle East region. Finally, the last of the substantive sections analyzes the specifics of relations between the United States and Russia and the policy opportunities opening up for Moscow in the Middle East. The style of the article also does not raise any questions: the text is written quite competently, in a good scientific language, with the correct use of scientific terminology. The bibliography contains 78 titles, including works in foreign languages, and adequately reflects the state of affairs in the field under study. The appeal to the opponents takes place in terms of discussing the theoretical framework of the study. GENERAL CONCLUSION: the article submitted for review can be qualified as a scientific work that meets the requirements for works of this kind. The results obtained by the author will be of interest to political scientists, sociologists, specialists in the field of public administration, world politics and international relations, as well as students of the listed specialties. The presented material corresponds to the subject of the journal "International Relations". The article is recommended for publication.
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