The Historical Policy of the Russian Communists at the Present Stage.

Timshina Ekaterina Leonidovna PhD in History Associate professor, Department of Linguistics for State Administration Personnel, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation 119571, Russia, g. Moscow, ul. Prospekt Vernadskogo, 82 str.1 k.timshina@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

Unified assessments and interpretations of significant historical events have long been one of the main components of ideology for mass political movements, especially those representing the extreme flanks of the political spectrum, thanks to them a unique party identity is created, new supporters who share the party's ideas are attracted. Recent years have given many examples, including in the countries of Eastern Europe, when party ideas about the past, which until recently seemed to professional historians to be a collection of myths, in which emotionality, simplification and selectivity of the facts used replaced the methods of scientific analysis, after coming to power firmly became part of state policy, and subsequently successfully consolidated in mass collective memory.

M. Halbwaks pointed out the peculiarities of the perception of historical events in individual and collective memory in his articles back in the middle of the XX century, but the main wave of research on this issue appeared already in the 1970s, when the works of J. Le Goff, P. Hutton, P. Nor, A. Assman and P. Bourdieu ^[1-6] were laid methodological and practical foundations of the study of the phenomenon of historical memory. In our country, the interdisciplinary study of historical politics and the culture of memory took place after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The researchers (A. I. Miller, G. A. Bordyugov, O. I. Malinova, N. E. Koposov, etc.) focused on the problems of developing state historical policy in the Russian Federation, as well as the phenomenon of "memory wars" that swept the countries that were previously part of the socialist bloc and some republics of the former USSR ^[7-13]. The activity of Russian political parties as actors of historical politics has often remained on the periphery of the attention of researchers, however, in recent years, there has been an increase in interest in this aspect.

For three decades of the existence of the Russian Federation as a sovereign state, the main political parties of the country have developed their own vision of historical memory, including representatives of the left communist flank. The purpose of this article is to study the attitude of modern Russian communists to key historical events, to identify the features of their party historical policy, to compare approaches with other political parties and narratives of the Soviet era.

At the time of the collapse of the USSR, the Communists had a certain advantage over the new parties: they had a large layer of a well-developed Soviet narrative fixed in the mass consciousness of society, but it did not always fit the new realities and did not respond to the critical attacks of opponents, which prompted the Communist Party of the Russian Federation to look for new meanings.

In the 1990s, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as the successor of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, actively used the already established images: communist symbols, key dates of the Soviet era (especially May 1 and November 7) were used to gather and mobilize supporters, but already at this time the reassessment of the legacy of the USSR in ideology and the development of the party's own views began. In the 2000s, the main historical theses of the party were formulated, they were formulated in the writings of the Communist Party leader G. A. Zyuganov and fixed in the party Program (section "History lessons and ways to save the Fatherland") ^[13].

Like most political parties in Russia, the Communist Party practically does not plunge into history earlier than the beginning of the XX century. The pre-Soviet period is considered exclusively in the context of discussion by modern politicians of the causes of the revolutionary upheavals of 1917. The most significant deviation from this principle for the Communist Party is the discussion around the holiday of National Unity Day, established in 2004. The chosen date of the holiday (November 4) It was timed to coincide with the capture of the People's militia led by Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky by storming Kitay-Gorod. According to representatives of the Communist Party, the purpose of creating a new "red date" was not to perpetuate the memory of the heroes of the Time of Troubles, but to erase the memory of the anniversary of the October Revolution, the date of which ceased to be a day off. Since the establishment of the National Unity Day, the Communists have consistently criticized the state historical policy for attempts to destroy the collective memory of the revolution, in addition, they pointed out the inaccuracy of the chosen date: "November 7 is a holy day, the day of the revolution, it is a historical date. The initiators of this holiday (National Unity Day on November 4) did not let down the historical background and could not even choose the day. The capture of the Kremlin (by Minin and Pozharsky) was also on the seventh, so on the seventh it is necessary to celebrate both unity Day and the anniversary of the revolution..." (from a speech by a member of the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation V. F. Rashkin) ^[14].

The last years of the existence of the Russian Empire occupy a significant place in the idea of the past of the Communist Party, as they explain the cause of the revolutionary upheavals of 1917. The Communists counteract other actors of historical politics (the position of the state authorities in terms of perpetuating memory is especially criticized) by extolling a number of statesmen of the late empire. Predictably, the figure of the last Emperor Nicholas II is at the center of criticism. It is his indecision, incompetence and erroneous political decisions that the Communists consider one of the significant reasons for the fall of the monarchy. To characterize the last emperor, the media and Internet resources of the Communist Party often use the epithet "bloody" inherited from Soviet narratives. The vivid and negative assessment of the monarch is supported on the website of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation both by the opinions of professional historians and by artistic means: satirical images, quotations from critical works of contemporaries. The most frequently cited excerpts are from the prophetic poem of 1907 by K. D. Balmont "Our Tsar" ("Who began to reign – Khodynka, he will end up – standing on the scaffold").

If, in general, among modern political parties, the attitude to the image of Nicholas II does not differ radically from the position of the Communist Party, even the "Motherland" and the LDPR, who see a certain ideal of the state in the Russian Empire, are skeptical about the political and managerial talents of the last emperor, then in relation to his contemporaries, the position of the Communists has significant differences. Most Russian politicians of our time cite the heads of the Cabinet of Ministers S. Y. Witte and P. A. Stolypin as the ideals of a statesman, believing that thanks to their activities there was a possibility of an evolutionary transformation of the Russian Empire. Representatives of the Communist Party, who believe that the revolution has become a logical outcome of state policy, give both prime ministers a negative assessment, finding their fault in the crisis of the late empire: the policy of S. Y. Witte led Russia to a pernicious dependence on global financial capital, the result of P. A. Stolypin's activities is the failure of agrarian reform and modernization of agriculture, the collapse of the peasant communities and the brutal suppression of popular protests ^[15-16].

In Soviet historiography, the theme of the revolutionary events of 1917 was one of the most elaborated. In relation to the February Revolution, the Communist Party demonstrated a significant modernization of the Soviet characteristics, especially in terms of its results, although it did not directly declare this. In the narratives of the Soviet era, the main reasons for the February Revolution were the accumulation of socio-economic problems (unresolved agrarian, national and labor issues) and the need for democratization of power. The Bolshevik Party and its active activity among the workers and peasants were considered one of the driving forces of the revolution. Modern Communists in general continued to support these theses, although they more modestly assessed the participation of the Bolsheviks in its preparation. D. G. Novikov (Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation), speaking at a round table in 2017, said "The February and October revolutions were natural and inevitable. After all, by the beginning of the twentieth century, Russia was a tangle of acute contradictions. One of the most pressing issues is agrarian, peasant. 90 percent of the country's population lived in the village. The system of life there remained semi-feudal. <...> Agrarian overpopulation also created prerequisites for a social explosion. Along with the land, national and labor issues also remained unresolved" ^[17].

In modern society, including in party discourses, after a series of "color" revolutions in different parts of the world (the term usually refers to the participation of the United States and Western European countries in organizing popular demonstrations aimed at changing power in the country), the opinion has spread that the February or October Revolution is an example of such an event. This point of view is especially widespread in patriotic circles, for example, representatives of the LDPR and Rodina expressed it from political parties. The characterization of the overthrow of the monarchy as a "color revolution" also influenced modern communists, they pay more attention than was customary in the narratives of the Soviet era to the problems of the conspiratorial origin of the February Revolution. D. G. Novikov noted that there were features of a coup and a "color revolution" inspired from the outside ^[17]. The leader of the Communist Party G. A. Zyuganov, responding to opponents to the thesis about the "October coup", noted that conspiratorial methods were peculiar exclusively to the figures of the Provisional Government, not the Bolsheviks, and on the eve of the February Revolution, a significant number of conspiracies were noted, in which many figures of the bourgeois revolution were involved ^[18].

The main difference from Soviet historiography is the attitude to the results of the February Revolution. Soviet historians stated its incompleteness, in terms of solving socio-economic problems, and turning its results to the benefit of the bourgeois class, but noted the importance of the transition from monarchy to a democratic system (post-February Russia was called "the freest of all warring countries") and considered the bourgeois revolution the last step before the socialist revolution. Modern communists, on the other hand, transfer the negative from the autocracy to the political forces that came to power as part of the Provisional Government: "The real catastrophe in those days was not the collapse of the monarchical power, which lost managerial foresight and political will, and with them – and authority in society. The real catastrophe was that the February Revolution brought liberal forces to power, cut off from the people no less than the defeated monarchy" ^[17]. The modification of views was influenced by the parallel between the events of the last decades, when, after the collapse of the Soviet system, a liberal government came to power, which became the main opponent of the Communist Party.

Negative assessments of the Provisional Government help explain the need for the Great October Socialist Revolution (the Communist Party continues to use exclusively the Soviet name, although the official name of the event in state narratives since 2005 is "October Revolution", while the term "February bourgeois-Democratic Revolution" adopted in the USSR is practically not used on communist media resources). The incompetence of the Provisional Government and the disastrous nature of its policy for the country becomes the central explanation for the Bolsheviks coming to power: they are the saviors of a state on the brink of disaster. "The bourgeois Provisional Government of Liberals is coming. The same talkers, unable to solve a single problem. <...> The Bolshevik Party led by Lenin, in fact, saved a country engulfed in anarchy and disintegrating before our eyes" ^[17]. A similar assessment is fixed in the party's Program: "The Great October Socialist Revolution was for Russia the only real chance of national self-preservation in an environment of military, political and economic collapse, the collapse of the country and the complete incapacity of the ruling bourgeois-landowner bloc" ^[13]. Although the formulations developed by Soviet ideologists are used in describing the October Revolution, there has been a shift in emphasis: instead of the socialist revolution as a result of class struggle and the change of socio-economic formations, the main emphasis is on saving the state in trouble. This formula allows us to draw universal parallels with modernity, avoiding ideological cliches that scare the voter away by returning to the past.

The contrast of the February and October Revolution in the narratives of the Communist Party makes it impossible for the party to adopt the concept of the Great Russian Revolution of 1917-1921. The idea of combining the events of revolutions and civil war in one definition has been actively discussed by historians and politicians in recent years after its use in the draft of a unified history textbook prepared under the guidance of Academician A. O. Chubaryan in 2013 ^{[19, p. 40]}.

If the Communists consider the October Revolution to be one of the central events of Russian and world history, then the party mentions subsequent events much less frequently. Unlike the works of the Soviet era, the years of the Civil War do not occupy a central position in the historical concept of the party, for example, this event is not mentioned in the party Program. The party avoids assessing internecine warfare, even victory over foreign intervention is not often used in party narratives. The generalization is usually applied that thanks to the firm and uncompromising position of the Bolsheviks, it was possible to save the country.

If in Soviet historical politics the "founding myth" was the Great October Revolution and the subsequent Civil War, as a result of which the Soviet state was born, then the Communist Party is characterized by a shift of attention to Victory in the Great Patriotic War. Like the "party of power", the Communist Party considers this event central and most often mentions it in its narratives. The main difference in the position of the two largest parties is the attitude towards the personality of I. V. Stalin. The active use of the Great Patriotic War in the symbolic and historical politics of modern Russia should have led to the development of the position of the state elite to the key historical figures of the era, but this did not happen, the United Russia failed to formulate a unified and consistent attitude to I. V. Stalin, nor to find him a place in the ceremonies in honor of the Victory, focusing on the "feat of the people". For the Communist Party, "Generalissimo Stalin is the name of the great Victory over the black evil of Nazism" ^[20], without which victory in the World War would not have been achieved.

The Communist Party defines the reign of I. V. Stalin as the "golden age" of Russian history, the time of maximum progress in all areas, the repetition of which must be sought. If the transition of the central place in the historical structures of the Communist Party from the October Revolution to Victory in the Great Patriotic War can be considered with certain reservations as the development of Soviet historical policy – every year until the collapse of the USSR, the place of Victory in the official ideology increased, then in assessing the personality of I. V. Stalin due to the inconsistency of the Soviet narrative, the party had to develop new approaches. In contrast to the liberal criticism from the state in the 1990s, the Communists formed their own idea of the image of the Soviet leader and the time of his rule.

In the narratives of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, I. V. Stalin is represented as a "power builder", a "great statesman", a collector of the "family of peoples", a leader "restoring the Russian spiritual and state tradition" ^[21]. In the works of G. A. Zyuganov and other Communist leaders, I. V. Stalin acquired mythical features, he appears as an ideal leader endowed with the gift of foresight, a great teacher and practitioner of public administration, whose theory and experience are still applicable today. As part of the mythologization of the image, exaggerations also occur, in some of their components surpassing even the panegyrics of the times of the "cult of personality". By the time of Stalin, a number of social achievements of the era of "stagnation" are transferred. In terms of domestic policy, the "leader of the peoples" acquires the features of a Russian nationalist who opposes, including his fellow party members: ("Stalin consistently cracked the layers of Russophobia that formed not only after October, but also over the previous two centuries — since the time of the Bironovschina. And he did it not without its inherent symbolism. "I once told Lenin," eyewitnesses report his words, "the best people are the Russian people, the most Soviet nation" ^[21]). Stalin is also credited with the implementation of the doctrine of pan-Slavism in foreign policy, the cessation of persecution of the church and the creation of a new "patriotism" within the country. If for his contemporaries the "leader of the peoples" was the ideal of a communist, around which the "cult of personality" was built, then in the image of the Communist Party there is a blurring of the communist principle: Stalin appears as an example of a "just and wise ruler", a continuer of the ideas and beginnings of the Russian Empire. Among the main achievements of I. V. Stalin, the Communist Party in its program refers to the country's entry into a qualitatively new level of development, large-scale industrialization, collectivization, the "cultural revolution", victory in the Great Patriotic War and rapid post-war economic recovery ^[13].

After the debunking of the "cult of personality", the image of I. V. Stalin turned out to be extremely vulnerable to criticism for the policy of large-scale political repression, the exposure of which became an element of state historical policy in the late USSR and in the 1990s. In order to preserve and promote the image of I. V. Stalin created by the Communist Party, it is extremely important to overcome the existing mythologeme about the "great terror". The terms "Stalinist repression", "state terror", "political repression" are either not used in party narratives or are used with the use of lexical phrases that call the event into question. Instead of the term "repression", more neutral "individual violations" or "excesses" are often used, for example, the party program uses the phrase "violations of socialist legality of the 30s and 40s, which were strongly condemned by the party" as a description of the phenomenon ^[13].

 The Communist Party develops criticism of the image of Stalinist repressions that has developed in the collective memory of society in several directions.

Doubt about the persecution of the innocent and the number of convicts for political reasons. The Communist Party negatively regards the accusations of the conviction of millions or tens of millions of people during the Stalinist repressions: the leader of the Communist Party, G. A. Zyuganov, claims about 800 thousand people shot and about 4 million convicted under political articles, while most of them were guilty and judged fairly ^[21].

The need for repression. G. A. Zyuganov points out that "in this pre-war, military and post-war periods, in an unprecedented struggle, Stalin had no choice but to pursue a tough policy aimed at strengthening order and discipline, firmly and decisively stop all actions that undermine the state" ^{[22, p. 53]}. According to the materials of the Communist Party publications, the need for repression is explained not only by the preparation for World War, but also by the prevention of internal catastrophic events: the attempted coup and, as a consequence, the beginning of a new civil war ^[23-25] (the presence of conspiracies in the party and military environment is considered proven by modern communist authors).

Criticism of the personal responsibility of I. V. Stalin. According to the supporters of the Communist Party, the responsibility for the excesses committed in identifying "enemies of the people" lies with the heads of law enforcement and state security agencies who misunderstood the interests of the service, exceeded their powers, for which they were justly punished. "He [Stalin] not only did not incline to excesses those whose duty it was to ensure law and order in the country, but also harshly asked them for unreasonable "zeal" that cost the lives or freedom of the innocent" ^[21].

If in Soviet state historical policy, including during the period of the "cult of personality", the image of V. I. Lenin dominated, then in the collective memory of the modern Communist Party there is a shift in priorities in favor of Stalin, although complimentary assessments of Lenin as an ideologue, leader of the revolution and savior of the state in 1917 are preserved. The image of Stalin is usually opposed to all subsequent to the leaders of the USSR. If in the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the main criticism of the Russian communists was directed at Mikhail Gorbachev and other "architects of perestroika", thoughtless experiments led the country to ruin, then gradually the thesis of the three stages of the decline of the Soviet system, respectively, the Khrushchev thaw, Brezhnev stagnation and Gorbachev's perestroika, was consolidated in the historical views of the Communist Party.

The beginning of the end of the "golden age" in the view of the Communists is "de-Stalinization". The process initiated by both opponents within the party and external enemies ("The leader's body has not yet had time to cool down in the Mausoleum, as his successors have already abruptly reversed the political course. The entire "civilized" West loudly welcomed this maneuver, modestly keeping silent about the hard work it cost its politicians, diplomats, special services and "agents of influence" ^[21]), led to the weakening of the party, theoretical stagnation and inability to respond promptly to changes. In addition, "a lot of alien elements, careerists and opportunists without ideas have stuck to the ruling party. Underestimating the danger of the ongoing processes, the monopoly on power and ideology, the degeneration of some party leaders plunged the CPSU into a state of “arrogant party". The separation of its leaders from the millions of Communists, from the working people, became deeper and deeper. These carriers of petty-bourgeois ideology have always posed a special danger to socialism" ^[13].

            The final destruction of the system is the policy of Perestroika. Although the Communist Party does not deny that the modernization of the Soviet system was necessary, it is extremely critical of all the reforms of this period. The leaders of the country are also negatively assessed. If initially the emphasis was on their rebirth and departure from socialism, i.e. they were viewed as ideological renegades, then by now the dominant point of view has become about their betrayal of the motherland and active participation in the conspiracy of Western states. The result of this evolution of views was voiced by G. A. Zyuganov at an event on the thirtieth anniversary of the attempt to remove the President of the USSR from power by members of the State Emergency Committee: "the plan for the destruction of our country was developed not by traitors Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Yakovlev, Shevardnadze, but by American special services. It was called the Harvard Project. Moreover, the first chapter of this project was called "Perestroika", the second – "Reforms", the third – "Liquidation" ^[26]. The economic crisis, which most historians consider as a significant or the main cause of the collapse of the USSR, the Communist Party considers caused artificially as part of a conspiracy of the leaders of the CPSU. The confrontation between the Union leadership and the regional authorities (especially the administration of the RSFSR) is also seen as artificial and feigned, one of the elements of a global conspiracy. "The West was unable to break the Soviet system until it was able to rely on the support of a group of leaders led by Gorbachev and Yeltsin who betrayed it. These two imaginary opponents actually acted synchronously, in one destructive direction" ^[27]. Accordingly, the Communist Party perceives the reign of the first President of the Russian Federation B. N. Yeltsin extremely negatively, most of the actions of the state authorities are defined as criminal, especially the complex of events associated with the confrontation between the executive and legislative authorities, and the attempt to ban the Communist Party. "The shameful crown of these criminal acts was the bloody October 1993 — the shooting from tank guns of the House of Soviets in Moscow, the dispersal of the Congress of People's Deputies. These events served as a prologue to the creation of a bourgeois state and the establishment of a regime of national treason" ^[13]. Although the Communist Party criticizes the activity of state power in the XXI century, it regards it less categorically, especially in terms of foreign policy, but considers the only way out to be "the revival of the Soviet system and a return to the path of socialism."

As a result of internal conflicts and contradictions, political parties and movements stood out from the Communist Party. In the 2010s, the "Patriots of Russia" and "Communists of Russia", who participated in federal election campaigns, had the greatest influence and popularity. If the "Patriots of Russia" turned to history only indirectly, then the "Communists of Russia" actively used historical politics as an element of party promotion. In general, their views are close to the historical constructions of the Communist Party, but there are several differences. The whole modern history has been simplified by the "Communists of Russia" to the confrontation of good and evil, where all the undertakings of the Soviet (Stalinist) time are unconditional good, and "evil" is any manifestation of modern capitalism. Facts that do not coincide with this vision are either excluded (for example, there are no mentions of Stalinist repressions, famine, mistakes in planning the development of the country), or are additionally explained within the dualistic model (socio-economic achievements of developed capitalist states are associated with borrowing practices from the Soviet socialist system) ^[28]. The documents of the "Communists of Russia" do not mention the events before the October Revolution, which appears as an act of creation, after which the "golden age" begins. The period after the collapse of the Soviet Union was defined by the party as a "turmoil", while unlike other political parties, including the Communist Party, does not divide the history of the Russian Federation into "dashing 90s" and "stable 2000s" ("statements of United Russia that the dashing The era of stability came in the 90s, they turned out to be untenable" ^[28]). If the leaders of the Communist Party, considering the time of the collapse of the USSR, indicate that they opposed betrayal, then the "Communists of Russia" see in G.A. Zyuganov the same "degenerate": "In the days of the destruction of the USSR, the head of the Communist Party Gennady Zyuganov worked in the apparatus of the so-called "architect of perestroika", the ideologist of the reborn top of the CPSU, head of the propaganda department of the Central Committee of the CPSU Alexander Yakovlev; what tasks did Zyuganov receive from Yakovlev, accused by historians of having ties with the CIA?" ^[29].

Both Communist parties use traditional methods to support their historical views. They propose initiatives to erect monuments to I. V. Stalin in various regions, rename Volgograd to Stalingrad, hold flower-laying and rallies on key dates of Soviet history. The parties support the introduction of legislative restrictive and prohibitive measures to protect the memory of key historical events, usually we are talking about the October Revolution. The idea of legislative protection was most radically promoted by the "Communists of Russia" during the election campaigns of 2016 and 2018. In the election program for the elections to the lower house of parliament, the party announced its intention to introduce "responsibility for denigrating the history of our country, its state and public figures, including the Soviet period" ^[28]. A few months after the elections, the "Communists of Russia" expanded their proposals for the protection of history and proposed to the new composition of the State Duma to "adopt a law "On administrative responsibility for denying historical facts and distorting the nature of events concerning the October Revolution of 1917." This law should provide for administrative responsibility for the denial of well-known historical facts: the storming of the Winter Palace by the rebels, the firing of the cruiser Aurora at the Winter Palace, for the qualification of the October Revolution as a "coup d'etat"" ^[30].

The greatest differences between the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the "Communists of Russia" can be seen in the use of historical politics in election races. For example, the Communist Party, having a detailed concept of the country's history, did not use its ideas about the past in the election campaigns to the State Duma in 2011, 2016 and 2021. Apparently, this is caused by an attempt to expand the electoral base. Even before the elections, regular supporters were well acquainted with the party's policy in the field of the past, however, given the ambiguity of the attitude of modern society to the October Revolution and the figure of I. V. Stalin, the cornerstones of the historical structures of the Communist Party, the party considered it superfluous to use them in election narratives, although the promotion of such views actively continued in the party press (for example, materials for the centenary of the revolution and the 65th anniversary of the death of I. V. Stalin).

The "Communists of Russia" built their electoral campaigns on ideologems embedded in the collective memory of society, even by Soviet propaganda, which was clearly intended to show the continuity of the party's policy and the successes and achievements of the Soviet era, using the nostalgia of a part of society for the past. Stalin's time was mainly used as a model. This was most clearly manifested in the first federal election race for the party in 2016 . Already in the subtitle of the election program – "Ten Stalinist strikes against ugly Capitalism" – a reference is made to the cliche of the historiography of the period of the "cult of personality", describing a series of Soviet military victories in 1944. In the future, the program is full of phrases, stable expressions and epithets used in Soviet narratives ("Workers' Councils", "people's control", "all the best for children", "brown plague", "animal capitalism", "the Soviet education system is the best in the world", "confiscation of illegally acquired property", "strengthening peace and friendship between peoples", "defensive alliance of anti–imperialist states", "Lenin and Stalin are our banner") ^[28].

The parties also approach the argumentation of their historical views in different ways. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation, in addition to the theoretical research of its own leaders, widely uses the works of professional historians, regularly holds scientific round tables and conferences. The "Communists of Russia" mainly rely on the statements of their own leaders.

The communist flank of the domestic political spectrum has a developed historical policy. Among the Russian political parties, the Communists have built one of the most meaningful ideas about the past. If the historical policy of modern state power is built around positive events, and negative or controversial moments remain in the shadows, then the Communist Party has offered its vision for all the key events of the last century.

Having begun to develop its historical policy, the Communist Party was initially based on Soviet narratives, but quickly moved away from them and moved on to developing its own. The party demonstrated the most significant changes in relation to the personality of I. V. Stalin, who for modern Communists has become the ideal leader. In this regard, it should be noted that there is an internal conflict between the CPRF's attitudes: on the one hand, the Communists position themselves as a moderate systemic political party, "modern leftists" who do not intend to return Soviet practices, on the other hand, they act as defenders and guides of the mythologized past, transformed by the party into a utopian image. The presence of this contradiction makes it difficult to promote the historical structures of the Communist Party in society. Although the Communists managed to create a comprehensive historical policy, they poorly broadcast it in the public field, mostly it remains reactive and is the property of permanent supporters, is not used in election campaigns.