Perception of the Policy of Soviet Russia in British Government Circles in November 1917 – August 1918 .

Romanova Ekaterina Vladimirovna ORCID: 0000-0001-6138-5109 PhD in History Associate Professor, Department of Modern and Contemporary History, History Faculty, Lomonosov Moscow State University 119192, Russia, Moscow, Lomonosovsky Prospekt str., 27, building 4 ekaterinavlromanova@gmail.com

The topic of Anglo-Russian relations in the first months after the October Revolution was repeatedly touched upon by domestic and foreign historians. However, the British perception of the positions and policies of the Soviet government, being one of its aspects, still, as a rule, remained in the shadow of the decision-making process, diplomatic steps or military actions on the pages of monographs and articles. Meanwhile, perception is one of the important components of motivation when choosing a foreign policy course, and therefore its analysis allows shedding additional light on certain foreign policy decisions and actions.

Differences in the assessment of which factors – strategic, economic, ideological – were fundamental in the formation of British policy towards Soviet Russia in the autumn of 1917 – summer of 1918 also push for such a statement of the problem. Their evidence can be found already in the works of contemporaries of the events.

Thus, P. M. Kerzhentsev (V. Kerzhentsev), the author of the brochure "Allies and Russia", published in the Publishing House of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of the R.S.K. and K. Deputies in 1918, does not single out an obvious dominant in British politics: the reconstruction of the Eastern Front, and the "outright robbery of Russia", the transformation of its to the colony, and "the overthrow of the socialist Bolshevik government" ^{[1, pp. 64-66]}.

M. Pavlovich (M. L. Veltman) is more categorical in his assessment. From his point of view, the main thing for Great Britain was "to achieve the final weakening and disintegration of Russia" ^{[2, p. 25]}. He likened British policy to German policy: it "was essentially the policy of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with the only difference that another great power, England, had to take Germany's place" ^{[2, p. 25]}. Pavlovich did not share the thesis of "hatred of Bolshevism" as the most important motive of British policy (at least during the beginning of the intervention – in the spring of 1918), believing that "the British government did not believe in the strength of Soviet power" ^{[2, p. 25]}.

M. N. Pokrovsky placed accents in a different way in lectures on Russian foreign policy at the beginning of the twentieth century, written in 1926. For him, anti–Bolshevism is also not the main motive for intervention, but for other reasons: only after the November Revolution in Germany, the Entente countries began to consider it as a threat. Prior to this event, "the Entente looked at Bolshevism ... as a local phenomenon – it is a Russian disease ... therefore, it is not worth paying attention to it." ^{[3, p. 439]}. The main goal of London's policy towards Russia until November 1918, Pokrovsky saw in the desire to recreate the Eastern Front.

The motivation of British politics appears ambiguous in the work of Ya. A. Ioffe "The organization of intervention and blockade". It is both in the desire to force Russia to continue the war, and in class hatred of the Bolsheviks. At the same time, the following statement of Ioffe seems to be consonant with the views of M. N. Pokrovsky: "it is hardly necessary to talk about the struggle of the allies during this period with the Soviet government as a conscious struggle against the world revolution" ^{[4, p. 15]}.

Since the 1930s, the class approach to assessing British policy towards Russia has been coming to the fore. As you can see, already in the late 1910s - 1920s, the topic of intervention and the explanation of its origins occupied a large place when considering the policy of the Allies (in particular Great Britain) after October 1917. In subsequent years, this trend has continued. In a significant number of works, Anglo-Russian relations were considered as part of the interaction of Soviet Russia with the Entente countries and the United States, and the chronological segment included in the title of this article was within a longer period, including intervention. At the same time, the problems of identifying the causes of the latter often set the general direction of analysis. The decision to intervene, as I. Mints wrote, was taken from the first steps of the Soviet government, it was considered as "self-defense" from Bolshevism, which poses a threat to the world revolution" ^{[5, p. 26]}.

The period from November 1917 to the spring of 1918 appears in many works as a time of preparation for intervention. Thus, S. V. Tsybulsky, summarizing the conclusions of the research of Soviet historians, concluded that from the very first days after the October Revolution, the British hatched plans for intervention in order to crush the young Soviet republic ^{[6, p. 214]}. V. S. Vasyukov interpreted the Entente's policy towards Russia as a course towards the overthrow of Soviet power. Criticizing the thesis about the concentration of the Allies "on the exclusively military side of the matter," the historian argued that the "main and main content" of the "Russian question" was the struggle against the socialist revolution ^{[7, p. 233]}.

Modern Russian historians are moving away from rigid class determinism. Studies of the beginning of the XXI century emphasize that British policy towards Russia in the first months after the October Revolution was characterized by fluctuations, a change of tactics, and the absence of a clearly developed course. The perception of the fact of the revolution itself looks ambiguous. So, E. Yu. Sergeev shows the breadth of her assessments in the ranks of the British establishment: from rejection to sympathy for her political slogans ^[8]. The thesis that the circumstances of the war determined the goals of British policy towards Russia sounds more clearly. It is emphasized that, when deciding on intervention, London was guided by the motive of restoring the Eastern Front ^{[9, pp. 54-71]}. N. E. Bystrova notes that "during the First World War, the strategic goal of the Allies – keeping Russia in the war – was combined with the tactics of contact with the Soviets" ^{[10, p. 137]}. However, in the monograph of the same author, the restoration of the Eastern Front is called the reason for the activity of the allies on the territory of Russia ^{[11, p. 177]}, which raises a legitimate question about its causes. This is combined with the author's very controversial statement (due to the continuation of the war with Germany) that "neither Great Britain, nor France, nor the United States wanted a strong Russia and, seeking to use it in their geopolitical and strategic interests, would prefer its withdrawal from world politics as an influential force – a great power" ^{[11, p. 9]}.

The motive of the reconstruction of the Eastern Front was considered as largely determining British policy towards Russia by the American historian R. Ullman, author of the three-volume "Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921" published in the early 1960s, which to this day remains one of the most profound and thorough studies of this topic ^[12]. At the same time, the modern Canadian historian M. J. Carley is inclined to focus on the rejection of the Bolshevik regime by Western elites, an ideological conflict that often hindered the development of a pragmatic course towards the Soviet state ^{[13, p. 7-9]}.

Researchers differ not only in the interpretation of the goals of British policy towards Russia, but also on a number of more private issues: how strong the positions of the Bolsheviks were considered in the UK, when and why the allies switched from betting on tactical cooperation with the Soviet government to a policy of intervention that was anti-Soviet in nature, and was the Brest Peace, from this point of view vision, milestone event.

It seems that to some extent an analysis of how the policy of the Soviet government was perceived in London in the first months after the October Revolution and how its assessments changed during the autumn of 1917 – summer of 1918 can contribute to solving these issues.

Theoretical understanding of the role of the perception factor in international relations is associated with the name of the American political scientist Robert Jervis, whose work "Perception and Misperception in International Politics", published in 1976, remains a classic in its field to this day. The practical purpose of Jervis's research is to find ways to minimize errors in assessing the policies of other states and the international situation as a whole, so he focuses on analyzing the sources of incorrect perception. However, in the context of this article, the theoretical justification of the importance of the perception factor in the process of making foreign policy decisions, supported by concrete examples by an American political scientist, seems more important ^[14].

Recognition of his role in politics also distinguishes adherents of the constructivist trend in the theory of international relations. These researchers emphasize the subjective component of the process of interstate interaction. According to one of the founders of the school, A. Wendt, the policy of players in the international arena is largely determined by the complex of their ideas not only about their own goals, but also about allies, opponents, the very nature of the international system ^[15]; ^[16].

Within the framework of the realistic paradigm, S. Walt paid attention to the "perception problem", who formulated the concept of the "balance of threats", clarifying and supplementing the well-known theory of the "balance of forces". According to Walt's views, the foreign policy of states (in particular, in the issue of forming alliances) is determined not only and not so much by calculations of the balance of forces in the international arena, as by the fact of perception of the presence or absence of a threat from other states ^[17].    An important methodological problem when considering the stated topic is the selection of sources for analyzing the perception of Soviet policy in British government circles.

In foreign (primarily English) literature, it is reflected in the discussion on the existence of the so-called "state point of view" ("official mind") on the conduct of foreign policy. This concept was introduced by Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher when considering British expansion in Africa in the second half of the nineteenth century. The researchers put forward the thesis that the unified opinion of the political establishment became one of the driving forces of imperialist politics and determined the forms it took. The "state point of view", in their interpretation, appeared as a kind of collective opinion of government officials and politicians involved in the development of foreign policy decisions.  Information from various sources flocked to them, they found a compromise between different positions and formed a foreign policy course. The possibility of a single "state point of view" was explained by the commonality of ideas characteristic of the British political elite, which was determined by the common social origin and was supported by the experience of studying in private schools and leading universities, and later – public service ^[18].

Critics of this concept rightly pointed out its certain limitations. On the one hand, it can create the impression that the government is alienated from external influences, interest groups, and public opinion. On the other hand, it is fraught with exaggeration of the degree of unity of views of representatives of the state apparatus and the government ^{[19, p. 432-437]}; ^{[20, pp. 73-74]}.

Recognizing the validity of these objections and by no means considering the position of the ruling circles to be neither free from external influences nor monolithic, the author in this article nevertheless did not set out to study in detail the various approaches to what was happening in Russia among the British elite, but rather focused on identifying a set of factors that were taken into account in the Government of the United Kingdom when determining the policy towards Soviet Russia at the end of 1917 – the first half of 1918 .

The conclusions of the work are based on the analysis of documents from the funds of the British Cabinet of Ministers: minutes of meetings and decisions of the government, memoranda and notes submitted for its consideration. An important source on the problem of perception of the policy of the Soviet government is the weekly reports on Russia of the Intelligence Bureau of the Department of Information. The functions of this department, established in April 1917, included the preparation of reports on the situation in foreign countries. Their goal, in accordance with the appointment of the Information Department, was to develop proposals for conducting effective propaganda abroad. At the same time, the bureau's reports were sent to members of the Cabinet of Ministers and served as one of the sources of their ideas about the situation in a particular country. The importance of this department is evidenced by the fact that in March 1918, on its basis, the Department of Political Intelligence was created within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which became one of the key bodies in the process of developing the British position on the conditions of peace. After the reorganization, the staff of the new department, as before, collected information about the political situation in other countries and prepared reports for the government ^{[21, p. 51-89]}.

In addition, some materials from the collection of personal documents of the British Foreign Minister A. Balfour, as well as memoirs of those who were involved in the process of developing and implementing policy towards Russia, were involved.

The fact that the revolution in Russia broke out during the World War largely determined the specifics of London's perception of the policy of the Soviet government, which was evaluated primarily in terms of its real and potential impact on the course of the military confrontation with the Central Powers. This is confirmed by the fact that one of the key objects of the analysis of the situation in Russia was the position of the Bolsheviks in relation to Germany. Russian Russian Prime Minister D. Lloyd George recalled that despite the disagreements, "in the end, the cabinet decided that His Majesty's government was interested not so much in this or that composition of the Russian government and not so much in these or other claims of the Bolsheviks or other Russian political parties, as in what the position is important." those and others in relation to our conflict with the central powers" ^{[22, p. 91]}.

The way British politicians and experts answered this question shortly after the October Revolution, there were significant changes compared to the pre-October period. If in the preceding months the Bolsheviks were regarded as a pro-German force, then already on November 12, the weekly report of the intelligence bureau of the Department of Information stated: "it would be wrong to dismiss the Bolsheviks as just a gang of German agents" ^[23]. "Bolshevism," the report stated, "is essentially a Russian disease" ^[23]. The bureau's analysts were favorably impressed by the behavior of the Russian delegation during negotiations with the Central Powers on peace, when they were terminated in response to Germany's refusal to withdraw troops from the occupied territories to hold plebiscites there. The attacks on the Germans that appeared in the newspaper Pravda did not escape their attention. Experts noted with some surprise, but at the same time with satisfaction, that contrary to expectations, the Bolsheviks did not "sell Russia to the Germans" and remained committed to the proclaimed principles ^[24]. Finally, in the report of January 25, 1917 they were called "from the point of view of the European situation", the most "anti-German elements in Russia" ^[25]. 

Even the conclusion of peace in Brest-Litovsk did not significantly change this view ^[26]. The world was viewed by Great Britain as forced, more like a truce. Analysts of the intelligence bureau referred to the statements of V. I. Lenin, who likened the Brest peace to Tilsit and thereby emphasized its temporary nature ^[26]. However, having paid attention to Lenin's comparison, they mistakenly interpreted the Tilsit Peace in its interpretation as the Russian-French treaty of 1807, whereas the head of the Soviet government was referring to the peace concluded in the same year between Prussia and France, which actually deprived Prussia, which lost a huge territory under its terms, of the status of a great power ^{[27, pp. 23-26, 107-110]}. Nevertheless, London caught the meaning of the Bolshevik leader's statement. The report spoke about the difficult conditions of the Tilsit peace for Russia and its temporary nature.

The intelligence bureau staff concluded that "there can be no real peace between two governments with such fundamentally different views" ^[28], predicted that the state of peace would not last long ^[29]. British politicians were less optimistic in their assessments. Thus, Balfour, expressing readiness to agree with those who refused to see the Bolsheviks as German agents, bitterly noted that their actions favored Berlin, and not the allies. ^{[12, p. 125]}. Nevertheless, London's perception of the position of the Soviet government seemed to open up opportunities for tactical cooperation with the Bolsheviks on an anti–German basis - a scenario that was actively discussed by the Cabinet of Ministers in the spring of 1918 and was partially embodied in the so-called "intervention by invitation" or "intervention by agreement" in Murmansk ^[30]; ^{[9, p. 57-63]}.

One of the factors that forced Great Britain to avoid an open break with the Bolsheviks for as long as possible was the recognition already at the beginning of 1918 of the relative strength of their positions in Russia. Analysis of the intelligence bureau reports shows the evolution of estimates from November to the end of January 1918: from the statement that "the Bolshevik government is on its last legs" ^[23] on November 12, 1917 to the recognition in January that the positions of the Bolsheviks are not under threat and the thesis of the failure of calculations for their imminent fall ^[24]. Finally, in a report on January 18, the bureau's experts concluded: "Now they (the Bolsheviks – E.R.) demonstrate more strength and determination (backbone) than any other political party, and, in the face of growing discontent, this is the only party with strength and determination that can try to govern the country" ^[31]; ^{[32, p. 119]}.

The issue of the strength of the positions of various political forces in Russia was also given great importance because of the rather high probability (as it was then believed in London) of the continuation of the Anglo-German economic rivalry after the end of the war, which was the struggle for control over Russia's resources. It is precisely because of the latter circumstance that the above thesis of N. E. Bystrova about the desire of the allies to reduce Russia to the status of a minor power seems controversial. England has traditionally been committed to the principle of balance of power. The weakening of Russia meant its violation and was fraught with the danger of excessive strengthening of German influence in Europe. In the UK, it was believed that Germany would certainly take measures to take advantage of the "collapse of Russia", which, from the point of view of British experts, opened up "opportunities for German activity ... in the East, going far beyond the pan-German dreams that led to this war" ^[33]. In such a situation, it seemed that the right bet on the winners in the struggle for power in Russia and their support could allow them to gain an advantage not only in the war, but also in the post-war world. Thus, at a cabinet meeting on December 21, 1917, it was indicated that "the power that will help the future Russian government in rebuilding the country will put all its [Russia – E.R.] resources under its control" ^[34].

            According to Kerzhentsev, the Times newspaper wrote: "the Russian problem is a world problem, since the force that will be able to transform and organize Russia will dominate all of Europe for at least a generation" ^{[1, p. 62]}. In June 1918, a joint memorandum of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Commerce regretfully stated the weakness of British economic policy towards Russia. The justification given in the document for the expediency of sending a trade mission to Moscow is indicative. It was intended to expand "very fragmentary knowledge about the economic situation ... in Russia" and assess the prospects in this area, as well as "help in countering enemy schemes of trade penetration, which, according to the authors of the document, the Germans promoted with the help of such leading financiers and industrialists as Gwinner, Ballin, Rathenau" ^[35]. It seemed that in the matter of Russia's involvement in the economic system under the auspices of the United Kingdom, the fact that the Bolsheviks with their anti-capitalist ideology were in power receded into the background.

However, this does not mean that British analysts, statesmen and diplomats did not pay attention to the problem of Bolshevik ideology. It was seen as destructive, incompatible with the principles for which the Entente countries fought.  For example, the appeal of the Council of People's Commissars "To all working Muslims of Russia and the East" was characterized in the report of the intelligence bureau "as another evidence of the essence of the Bolshevik policy, which is neither self-determination, nor the status quo, nor peace, but which uses these formulas for the purposes of a general sabotage campaign aimed at overthrowing the order all over the world, as it would have already been overthrown in Russia" ^[36]. The Minister for Blockade Affairs R. Cecil spoke about the ruinous nature of Bolshevik propaganda at cabinet meetings ^[37]. J. Buchanan, at first a supporter of the policy of maintaining contacts with the Bolsheviks, soon abandoned it, leaning towards the idea of the expediency of providing assistance to the forces of Southern Russia opposing them and organizing intervention. The establishment of the Bolsheviks in power, according to the former ambassador in Petrograd, would entail the spread of Bolshevik propaganda, dangerous from the point of view of maintaining the positions of the British Empire, to large areas of Europe and Asia ^{[38, p. 256]}.

However, not all statesmen were inclined to attach such great importance to the ideological factor. Thus, Lloyd George explained the non-recognition of the Bolsheviks solely by the fact that they were not the de facto government of Russia, did not control its entire territory, denying any influence of the factor of ideological antagonism with the Soviet government on the adoption of this decision. The Prime Minister stressed that Bolshevik propaganda poses a threat primarily to Germany and Austria-Hungary, exerting a revolutionizing influence on them and thereby weakening them in the war ^[37].

Some reports of the intelligence bureau contained, in fact, justification of the Bolshevik regime by the inevitability of dictatorship in the prevailing conditions in Russia. At the same time, the readiness of the Soviet government to resolve the land issue made it possible to consider its "dictatorship" as a more preferable option (in terms of its ability to stabilize the situation) than a potential alternative to the military leader coming to power ^[39]. The dispersal of the Constituent Assembly, of course, could not be welcomed by British experts. At the same time, having once again demonstrated that the new regime in Russia does not pretend to establish democracy, this event turned out to be predictable and understandable, and, as it seems, did not cause much regret. Analysts pointed to the preservation of the institution of Soviets, which, in their assessment, was much better organized and effective than the Constituent Assembly could hypothetically be. The Soviets, as stated in the bureau's report, were an important obstacle to rampant anarchy in Russia ^[40].

Be that as it may, Britain's recognition of the goal of achieving victory over Germany as the main one pushed the factor of ideological incompatibility with the Bolsheviks into the background; priority was given to tactical cooperation on an anti-German basis. However, London's inconsistent policy, its unwillingness to refuse to support anti-Bolshevik forces on the territory of Russia, and the tactics of maneuvering the Soviet government between Great Britain and Germany made the grounds for such interaction extremely shaky ^[41].

The shift in emphasis in London's assessment of the policy of the Soviet government can be seen in mid–May - July 1918. Supporters of the support of anti-Bolshevik forces and intervention in Soviet Russia during this period brought new arguments to substantiate their views. Thus, Robert Cecil wrote to the head of the Foreign Office A. Balfour on May 13, 1918 about the lost time during which the Bolsheviks managed to crush or weaken the forces friendly to the allies and capable of resisting Germany and Turkey ^[42]. If at a meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers on May 11, 1918, the option of sending British and French units to Russia with the consent of the Soviet government was still discussed ^[43], then at the end of the month the politicians of the Entente countries came to the conclusion that hopes for the readiness of the Bolsheviks to cooperate in organizing intervention were futile, as due to the fact that such a policy would contradict their doctrine of class war, and out of fear of provoking a German offensive on Petrograd and Moscow. The ideology of the Bolsheviks was regarded as almost equally hostile to the "bourgeois governments of the Allies" and "German military imperialism." It is noteworthy that the recognition of this fact did not remove the fears of Soviet-German rapprochement. Thus, the Supreme Military Council of the Entente stated on May 31: "there is information that in recent days the Bolsheviks and the Germans have come to an agreement" ^[44]. The British unofficial agent in Russia , B. Lockhart , wrote to A. Balfour about some adjustment of German policy in the East on May 23 , 1918 . The essence of the change, in Lockhart's interpretation, was that due to the need to concentrate forces for an offensive in the West, Germany abandoned the course of military pressure in the East in favor of reaching an agreement with the Bolsheviks ^{[12, p. 187]}.

At the same time, in the summer of 1918, doubts about the ability of the Soviet government to control the situation in Russia increased. Indicative, from this point of view, is the memorandum of the Department of Political Intelligence dated July 3, 1918. British experts predicted the imminent collapse of the Bolshevik regime, the onset of a counter-revolution, the result of which would be the strengthening of German influence. If at the beginning of 1918, analysts wrote about the successes of the Bolsheviks in somewhat expanding the social base of their own regime, then in July they came to the conclusion that their "tyranny" was causing increasing discontent, generating "violent", albeit unorganized opposition ^[45].

Such an assessment was in tune with that given by the First Lord of the Admiralty, E. Geddes, who visited the north of Russia as part of a special mission. Based on what he had seen in Murmansk and the information transmitted to him by British representatives, Geddes wrote: "In reality, there is no government, there is no organization, there is no power. Orders are issued by the central government in Moscow, but no one obeys them if they don't want to" ^[46].

Against this background, it seemed logical to conclude "that it was impossible to rely either on the existing Soviet government or on its ability to fulfill any agreements. Geddes did not believe that the Bolshevik government was going to fight the Germans and feared that the enemy would gain significant advantages" ^{[30, p. 262]}.

The stage of uncertainty in Anglo-Soviet relations ended in the summer of 1918. Evidence of a change in the approaches of both the central Soviet government and Great Britain to the events in Northern Russia was the order to the Murmansk Council to remove British forces from the city, as well as the landing of the British in Arkhangelsk in August 1918 and the creation, with the support of the Entente, of an anti–Bolshevik government - the Supreme Administration of the Northern Region. On August 19, Great Britain concluded an agreement with the Transcaspian government, which was justified by "the common danger from Bolshevism and the Turkish-German offensive into the Transcaspian region and Turkestan" ^[47]. It was these events that determined the upper chronological frame of this article.

The conducted research demonstrates the lack of unity of opinion among the British establishment about the situation in Russia in the autumn of 1917 – summer of 1918. Differences in assessments and accents, noticeable even at the level of cabinet ministers and departmental staff, open up a wide scope for interpretation of the motives of British politics. Nevertheless, against this background, it seems possible both to identify the main criteria through which London evaluated the policy of the Soviet government, and to trace a certain evolution in its perception. For Great Britain, the strength of the positions of the new government, its relations with Germany, as well as the essence of ideology and the direction of propaganda were important. To a somewhat lesser extent, the possibility of Russia's involvement in the sphere of British economic influence was taken into account.

It seems that the changes in the assessments of the first two factors were mainly correlated with fluctuations in British policy – from the recognition of the possibility of tactical cooperation with the Bolsheviks on an anti-German basis in early 1918 to the rejection of it in the summer of the same year. Ideology, in conditions when the main goal of Great Britain was victory over Germany, receded into the background, but the awareness of antagonism in this area was latently present, determining the possibility of only temporary interaction with the Soviet government. 

In the conditions of the continuation of the war with Germany and uncertainty in the development of the situation in Russia, London has not developed a clear course in "Russian politics". At the same time, in the autumn of 1917 – summer of 1918, the factors that will determine the development of Anglo-Soviet relations in the interwar period were outlined.