Ethnic minorities in the Middle East: realities and prospects of status transformation in the Geopolitical system

Malov Maksim Anatolyevich Postgraduate Student, National Research Lobachevsky State University of Nizhni Novgorod 603000, Russia, Nizhny Novgorod region, Nizhny Novgorod, Ulyanova str., 2 Maloy061113Max@yandex.ru

        At the moment, we can talk about the transformation of the status of minorities in the Middle East and North Africa region against the background of the policy of democratic reforms in the region and the tendency to strengthen the very culture of human rights and civic consciousness.  If we do not consider North African ethnic groups whose status is also changing, such as Berbers and Copts in Egypt, then the transformation can be considered logical and should be followed by the examples of Kurds in Iraq, Palestinians in Israel, minority regimes in Syria and Bahrain and various ethnic minorities in Iran.

After the Arab Spring, the Maghreb region became a new "front line" in the struggle for democratization and an open society. As the experience of other regions has shown, one of the most serious problems facing democratization is related to the rights of minorities. And its role continues to grow due to changes in the broader international context. Although this issue is quite controversial, and an expert like Huntington highlighted the rise of a self-sufficient Islamic culture as part of a separate civilizational process^[1], it cannot be denied that today we live in a world that is saturated with a global discourse of diversity and pluralism, strongly shaped, in this case, by the Western liberal democratic experience of minority rights and indigenous peoples, which defines these rights as a natural and appropriate extension of existing human rights. The struggle for minority rights can be tracked as part of a broader transformational agenda that also includes women's rights.      

This is reflected, for example, in the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities of 1992^[2] and in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 2007^[3]. And yet this global discourse on minority rights and multiculturalism is still being ostracized in many countries of the Levant and Maghreb and is perceived as a foreign and divisive trend. Throughout the Middle East region, minorities remain a certain group of citizens whose political mobilization is viewed with distrust, if not with direct opposition from State actors. The issue of minorities remains a taboo topic in many countries. That is why the Middle East has been one of the most problematic regions of the world for a long time.      

The problems of the Middle East region are connected with the problem of self-determination of national minorities, tense relations between Israel and Arab countries located in this region, the difficult domestic situation in many countries, the incessant acts of interference by Western countries in the domestic affairs of Middle Eastern States. However, one of the main disturbing factors is the growth of national liberation movements, interethnic clashes.      

Meanwhile, the great conflictogenicity of the Middle East region raises the question of the increasing role of small ethnic groups in the system of international relations. The modern world political system is based on the dominant role of states in geopolitical processes.  However, at the turn of the XX–XXI century, new actors of world politics appeared, under the influence of which the vectors of foreign and domestic policy of many states in international relations changed greatly. These are ethnic groups, diasporas, and migrants. These actors are actively provoking events affecting the international relations of the countries of the Middle East region. As a result of the actions of ethnic groups, diasporas, many constantly competing regional political subsystems have emerged, in particular, states and non-state entities, including quasi-states. The majority of the population of the Middle East today are Muslims, as it has been for centuries. However, being the place of origin of a number of religions, including world religions such as Judaism and Christianity, and others less widespread, the Middle East remains a region of religious diversity.      

Major historical events of the 20th century led to the formation of a difficult situation for many minority groups in the Middle East. The 1948 Arab-Israeli War and the resulting displacement of Palestinians stimulated Arab nationalism in the 1950s, and the creation of Israel led to an almost tripling of the Jewish population on its territory in 1948– 1972. Meanwhile, the Cold War reached its peak, the discoveries of large oil fields were made in the Persian Gulf region, and the growing global demand for petroleum products once again showed that oil is a resource of strategic importance, provoking an increase in interest in the region of actors alien to it, including such hegemonic actors as the United States, whose influence on the fate of minorities can be considered contradictory^[4]. Population growth in Arab countries and high rates of urbanization led to the flourishing of the lower class, which was susceptible to the calls of Arab nationalism or religious fundamentalism.

Sectarian tensions in religiously diverse Lebanon - already divided over whether the country should focus on France and Mediterranean Europe or on its Arab neighbors - escalated as a result of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which involved a large Palestinian refugee community, and led to a civil war in 1975^[5]. Dividing the map of the Middle East region Practically, the ethnic and confessional diversity of the countries of the region was not particularly interested in the line.

This has also led to the situation with the Kurds - the largest people in the world who do not have their own state. Do not forget about Palestine, the situation with which has turned into a long bloody Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Initially, after the collapse of the colonial system, the States of the region faced the delicate task of creating a sense of national unity while simultaneously managing ethnic and religious minorities.

     State borders in this case did not facilitate self-determination for the peoples of the region, being often an arbitrary result of colonial rule, uniting disparate groups into a new state, while dividing historical communities across borders. These contradictions became even more acute after the end of the Cold War, when the influence of the two opposing camps on the satellite countries and their neighbors weakened.

     Ignoring the complexity of the situation of the small peoples of the Middle East, which was the source of most of the bloody conflicts in this region, should be sought in the actions taken by Great Britain and France in the first two decades before the Second World War.  And what is being observed in the region today (including Russia's actions in Syria) is a struggle to preserve unchanged the agreements reached almost 100 years ago by the colonial powers. It is impossible to allow the complete disintegration of Iraq or Syria, because this could destroy the entire political structure of the Middle East, since these territories may pose a more serious danger in the future than they currently exist.

     Citizens of newly formed states often felt a sense of pan-Arab or pan-Islamic loyalty, as well as local ethnic, confessional or regional identity (some of which cross state borders), but perhaps did not feel any special "piety" before the state itself. Nor did they have traditions of political sovereignty or citizenship that were ethnically and religiously reinforced. Persistent and systematic leadership of the country is required, aimed at forming a comprehensive and solidary sense of statehood in these conditions.

     Instead, postcolonial States, whether secular or Islamized, by and large, gravitate towards rigid methods of state-building, which over time exacerbate the sense of marginalization and isolation of small ethnic groups. Many countries remain examples of "weak states, but strong societies" where the state struggles to assert its legitimacy in relation to competing identities at the level of sub-states and trans-states, and therefore acts as a "defender of the nation" or "defender of faith" in order to legitimize, including in the eyes of its own citizens, its fragile rule. In practice, defending the nation and faith too often means not only resisting the aggression of external forces, but also oppressing minorities within. In addition, the policy towards small ethnic groups is also burdened with the colonial legacy of manipulation and the "divide and rule" strategy, the protection of minorities was one of the justifications for colonial rule, it can even be extrapolated to the conclusion that the colonial powers "invented" minorities, which they themselves defended, but they, at the same time by such behavior, they strengthened the borders between ethnic and religious groups and opposed the creation of any single national liberation movement against the colonial power. The colonial rulers not only protected certain minorities, but also granted some of them privileges, both material (for example, giving them easier access to school education, and, consequently, wider access to public service), and symbolically (for example, describing minorities as more civilized or more freedom-loving), while humiliating the majority. The very "figure" of a small ethnic group in the history of the Middle East served as an example of the expression of European power and influence in this region ^[6]. The presence of diasporas of various peoples in the countries of the Middle East affects the relationship of ethnopolitics with geopolitics.

The discussion of minorities in the region by experts is often interpreted in the light of the historical policy of the Ottoman Empire towards minorities, known as the Millet system. Some commentators have argued that the term "minority" in the Arab world is simply a modern secular substitute for the term "millet", and, consequently, minority rights are considered something like the claims of "neo-millet". Under this system, the Ottoman Empire recognized that other monotheistic "peoples of the Book", especially Christians and Jews, were entitled to a certain degree of self-government and internal autonomy. This was supported by such a requirement of Islam as the Koran's injunction to protect religious minorities if they, in turn, accept Muslim rule^[7].      

A striking example is the Kurds, divided by state borders between Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq. Each time the aggravation of the social and political situation in the southern Kurdish-populated vilayets of Turkey inevitably affects the other three states in which Kurds live compactly on the territories bordering it. More than once, under the pretext of persecuting Kurdish militants, Turkish military units invaded the territory of Iraq^[8]. The beginning of this conflict situation was the division of the mass settlement of Kurds in 1916 during the territorial division of the Middle East between the above-mentioned states. This created conditions for the emergence of separatist sentiments among the Kurds and counteraction to the forced assimilation of the Kurds. For example, in Turkey, since the time of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the ideology of a single Turkish nation has been instilled in all small peoples and the Kurds were taught that they were just mountain Turks, bound by the will of historical fate to accept the Turkish mentality, culture and language. Thus, the Turkish government purposefully pursued a policy of forcible assimilation of the Kurds. The unity of the Turkish nation was fixed in all Turkish constitutions, including the current one, and in practice resulted in the fact that all manifestations of the national consciousness of non-Turkish peoples were punished as "separatism". This position led to a protest by non-Turkish peoples, including the Kurds. At the same time, the Republic of Turkey is not a mono-national state. Representatives of many nationalities live on its territory, however, Turks are the predominant ethnic group. And the issue of national self-identification of small ethnic groups, including Kurds, in the Republic of Turkey is problematic. Thus, article 66 of the fourth section of the new Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, adopted in 1982, caused an ambiguous reaction of society, since it states: "Everyone connected with the Turkish state through obligations of citizenship is a Turk"^[9].

The Arab Spring has also changed the balance of power between Turkey and the Kurds, and the new Kurdish geopolitics will lead to the creation of a new paradigm in Turkey. Since Turkey is unable to limit the autonomy of the Kurds in the region, Ankara's policy inevitably consists in developing a new strategy for peaceful coexistence with autonomous Kurdish regions in countries such as Iraq and Syria. And Turkey's way out may be to strengthen relations with the Sunni Kurds. However, the question remains whether Turkey will find the same strategy reasonable for the Syrian Kurds. Therefore, Turkey's success will be determined by Ankara's ability to work with existing and emerging Kurdish autonomous regions in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the second Kurdish autonomy will lead Kurdish politics to the final stage - nation-building. Theoretically, such a development of events may cause a change of borders in the future, although from the point of view of international law, the legitimacy of such a development of events is questionable^[10]. In Iran, the oppression of the Kurds began under the Shah's regime. The Kurdish population of Iran has always experienced discriminatory attitudes related to employment, the right to study in their native language, admission to higher educational institutions of the country and manifestations of cultural life.^[3] However, in general, the Kurdish population of Iran is not active in countering such phenomena, and the issue of national self-determination of Iranian Kurds is not currently relevant. In Iraq, on the contrary, the Kurdish movement has gained a powerful and ubiquitous character. The reason for this was the anti-Kurdish policy pursued in the second half of the XX century by the head of state Saddam Hussein, aimed at increasing the share of the Arab population in the northern regions of the country inhabited by Kurds, and the forceful suppression of armed separatist detachments. Despite this, the struggle of the Iraqi Kurds was crowned with success, and the adoption in Iraq on March 11, 1974 of the law on the proclamation of the Kurdish Autonomous Region (KAR) in the provinces of Erbil, Dohuk and Sulaymaniyah. As for the status change in the situation of the Kurds in Iraq, thanks to the prevailing favorable factors during the Western military operation against the regime of S. Hussein, the leaders of the Kurdish communities proclaimed broad autonomy leading to independence in accordance with the new Constitution of Iraq in 2005. The support of the Kurds of Iraq allowed the United States to acquire an ally in the region in the face of a virtually independent and relatively stable Kurdistan, which significantly strengthened the US position in the Middle East. This made it possible to use the so-called "Kurdish map" as a geopolitical tool in conducting US Middle East policy towards countries where there are problems with Kurdish separatism. The leadership of the Syrian Arab Republic, along with other countries where there is a Kurdish problem, has a negative attitude to the Kurds' desire for self-determination, which is aimed at preserving the territorial integrity of the state. Although the trend towards self-organization of the Kurds in Syria has been formed for a long time and is gradually growing. Despite the strong assimilation pressure of Damascus, the Kurdish political forces of Syria maintain contacts with external forces and seek to achieve a change in the status of the Kurdish minority in the country. The Kurds are the rightful owners of the autonomous region, and many observers predict the imminent creation of a Kurdish state. Nevertheless, the standard ideas about Arab-Kurdish relations, both in the scientific literature and in the popular press, are distorted by the "assimilation/resistance" dichotomy, which complicates the ability to understand the conditions under which genuine peace and stability are possible. This is important not only for the Kurds in Iraq, but also for the relations of the majority of minorities in the region.

     No less interesting are the Palestinian-Israeli relations. The majority of Israeli Arabs consider themselves to belong to four communities — Palestinians (ethnicity), Arabs (or Druze, Circassians — supranational, pan-Arab self-identification), Israelis (citizenship) and Muslims (or Christians, Druze — religious self-identification). This construction is mixed with a private identity — regional, cultural and ecological (among the Bedouins), clan; it is still significant in connection with the comparative youth of Palestinian, as well as pan-Arab nationalism (before the beginning of the XX century. All Arabs considered themselves primarily Muslims and were devoted mainly to the Ottoman Empire. Obviously, the self-identification of Israeli Arabs can be considered flexible. Arab citizens of Israel are Palestinian Arabs who found themselves within the established State of Israel in 1948 and became its citizens. Today, Arab citizens of Israel number more than 1 million people, making up over 20% of the total population^[11]. Israel's policy towards the Arabs is based on three contradictory principles. The principle of Israel's democratic development proclaims the equality of all citizens and provides for the inclusion of the Arab population in the life of Israeli society. Such principles as: the Jewish character of the state and the principle of the priority of the country's security until the conflict is fully resolved, prevent the Arab population from joining the process of this integration. Since the State of Israel was created as a state for Jews, the inclusion of Arabs in the development plans of this state is not provided by the country's leadership. Before the creation of the Israeli State, the problem of the non-Jewish minority was not in the spotlight. The Declaration of Independence of Israel proclaimed full equality, the granting of social and political rights to all citizens regardless of gender, religion and race. Meanwhile, no one thought about the fact that historically the Jewish people were in this territory as an ethnic minority, which was the beginning of contradictions between the two peoples. It was assumed that the Palestinian Arabs would be seamlessly integrated into the democratic structure of this region, and Arabs and Jews would be ready to cooperate in the new state. As a result, no clear and consistent policy has been developed on this issue. The results of this problem were voiced by the Israeli author A. Doughty: "... supporters of equality were powerless before the problem of the absence of a collective Arab-Jewish national consciousness and could not form the conditions necessary for its emergence."^[12] Initially, Israel's policy was aimed at separating and weakening the Arab minority, which was expressed in the reduction of transport links between Arab settlements, the lack of communications, the confiscation of land, the creation of Jewish settlements in Arab-populated territories, and the creation of obstacles to obtaining jobs. As a result, Israel's Arab minority found itself below the poverty line, its socio-economic situation worsened. Israel's irreconcilable position towards the Arab minority changed in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Arabs began to be provided with jobs, their standard of living and economic condition increased, and the creation of elected Palestinian bodies became possible. As a rule, an ethnic minority exposed to occupation experiences multilevel and versatile pressure, the purpose of which is forced assimilation through the use of force, the eradication or change of religious views and cultural values. This leads to a blurring of the cultural values of an ethnic minority, a change in its religious outlook, and a weakening of national values. To counteract external pressure and take measures for self-preservation, national minorities can only use unifying factors, for example, religion, customs, national values. This allows small ethnic groups to find support in an identity-threatening environment. This is exactly what happened with the Arab-Palestinian ethnic minority in Israel, when the Palestinians ignored the demands of the official authorities to become Israelis and assimilate into Israeli, essentially Jewish, society, break away from their traditions and customs and accept others. The national minority of Israel are Arabs, who have retained a sense of belonging to the Arab nation, a sense of homeland and a connection with their historical and cultural past. Since the Arab minority in Israel is connected with the Arab world, from the Arab point of view, the Israeli authorities did everything to separate the Arabs from their national roots – they began to spread Western ideas alien to the Arabs (Marxism, nationalism, pluralism), the impact of Jewish national culture increased.^[12] The Arab minority was going through a period when they tried to tear it away from its Islamic roots and customs, which was expressed in the following: - political and economic pressure; dislike of the Arab minority, the demand to obey the will of the majority; - a ban on religious education in Arab schools and the teaching of the Arabic language; - the suggestion that the Arab minority belongs to the Israeli state;   

Military administration in the Arab society of Israel covered the period from 1948-1966 .. The main problem of this stage was the problem of self-identification and obtaining Israeli citizenship.  At the same time, the Arab minority is gradually beginning to enter the political life of Israel. After the end of the 1967 war, relations between various Arab groups in the Arab territories occupied by Israel intensified. During the same period, the Palestine Liberation Organization became more active as a representative of the Palestinian people, and the Organization's influence on the Arab minority intensified in order to inspire Arabs to defend Palestine. After Israel occupied the Gaza Strip and the West Bank of the Jordan River in 1967, it became possible for Israeli Arabs to come to Gaza and the cities of the West Bank of the Jordan River, communicate and maintain contacts with the Arab population of these territories.In principle, the Arab minority of Israel has never forgotten that it belongs to the Arab world by language, culture, blood and religion.

The Israeli leadership as a whole gave them the opportunity to remain on their territory after the proclamation of the state, granted them citizenship. At the same time, Israeli Arabs felt like an ethnic minority, second-class citizens.

The military actions of 1967 exacerbated the sense of duality of their position, non-belonging to the State of residence and kindred solidarity with the Palestinian Arabs living outside Israel. As a result of the Six-Day War, two previously completely isolated territories were united - Israeli Arabs and Palestinians of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank of the Jordan River, which positively affected the situation of the Arab national minority in the territory of the Israeli State.

         Some forms of minority self-expression and self-determination contribute to democratization and the protection of human rights, while other forms reinforce or reproduce authoritarianism. Each case should be considered separately, provided that the parties are ready to cooperate and, probably, there is a third party ready to take on the role of facilitator. Therefore, during the short periods of independence of small ethnic groups, majority groups viewed small ethnic groups as, at best, illegally privileged, and at worst, disloyal. And, of course, foreign powers continue to exploit the problem of minorities in the Middle East, so that they continue to be seen as a kind of "collaborators"^[13] threatening the territorial integrity of the state. The very idea of "protecting minorities", especially when it implies potential attractiveness for international participants, is not considered as a legitimate and normal form of domestic political confrontation, but as a geopolitical threat to the security of the state.                

Now, when the North-South dichotomy and the division into developed and developing countries is blurring, and outside actors cannot fully influence the situation with their authority, the states of the Middle East themselves need to choose a strategy for modernizing and transforming the status of their small ethnic groups in accordance with both their requirements and the general socio-cultural situation in the country and the requirements of the international agenda items. Thus, the policy of minorities in the region is intertwined with security issues. These factors explain the hostility towards minority politics in the Middle East. There is resistance not only to each specific case of the struggle for minority rights, but also to the very idea of minority rights or even the very concept of "minority".