Knight's Move: Brazil's future in BRICS+

Kazelko Alisa Andreevna ORCID: 0000-0002-8184-1041 Student of Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Trainee at the Center for Expertise of Sanctions Policy at the Institute of International Studies 76 Vernadsky Ave., 11929, Russia, Moscow region, Moscow, 76 Vernadsky Ave., room 4156 alisakazelko@mail.ru

Introduction

Two cells vertically. One cell horizontally. Mat. 

The current geopolitical realities can be unmistakably compared to a chessboard, where active players form the playing field, and passive participants are systematically attacked by the former and, eventually, are thrown out of the game. The modern system of international relations really dictates new harsh rules, non-compliance with which increases the price of a mistake: having made only one unreasonable move, an international actor risks being taken out of the brackets of the entire political system. 

In the context of the growing confrontation provoked by the hostile rhetoric of the West, the consolidation of the Global South is of particular importance. Such a concept has become a forerunner for the promotion of international cooperation in the BRICS+ format, which has come to the fore of the political theater over the past five years. 

An increase in the number of members of the association will fundamentally change the balance of power in the developing world and will serve as the basis for the formation of a new multipolarity, in which the developed world will largely act as a catch-up.  Why is Brazil, as a member of the association, destined to play one of the leading roles in the new BRICS+ format and complete the political "chess game" against the West? 

Brazil's Political Course: Winner takes All

The left-right dichotomy, which runs like a red thread through the history of the political institutions of Latin American countries, is crucial for determining Brazil's priorities in BRICS+. At the present stage, the country's political system is experiencing a split due to the upcoming elections in October 2022, the victory in which provides virtually unlimited power in the state due to the peculiarities of the country's state system. Such high stakes on electoral processes inevitably undermine Brazil's political system: after the expiration of the term of the previous president, the new head of state subjects the political legacy to a large-scale revision. One way or another, regardless of the winner who "gets everything", it seems possible to identify three installations that will set the tone for Brazil's participation in the BRICS+ integration association in the foreseeable future (see Figure 1). 

Figure 1: Brazil's approach to participating in BRICS+ regardless of the winner of the 2022 elections.

Firstly, Brazilian political elites relatively quickly achieved consolidation of the public position on the subject of a special military operation: local diasporas believe that the conflict in Ukraine should not have an impact on building relations with Moscow. The most telling example here is the rhetoric of the leading presidential candidate in the election race, Lula da Silva, an interview with whom provoked a surge of mass discontent in Ukraine. During a discussion initiated by the American magazine ‘Time’ in May 2022, the former president of Brazil stated that the West is responsible for the inability to prevent the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine, while adding that Russian-Brazilian relations will continue to develop in the direction of strategic partnership^[1]. A similar position is held by the current head of state Bolsonaro, who called his February visit to Russia "a signal of good prospects for bilateral relations"^[2]. In other words, both leaders are constructive towards Moscow and are ready for further cooperation. 

Secondly, Brazilian diasporas share a common interest with other BRICS+ core countries in revising the number of participants in the integration association towards expansion. In this regard, it is worth noting separately the evolution of approaches to unification on the part of the current Brazilian government. A number of threats by American President Biden related to the potential exertion of sanctions pressure on the "tropical giant" due to activities in the Amazon, forced the Bolsonaro administration to direct the vector of the state's geopolitical priorities towards multilateral diplomacy. So, already during the fourteenth BRICS+ summit in June 2022, the current president called developing countries a "driving economic force" that has the potential to change the balance of power in the world^[3]. The leader of the election race, Lula da Silva, also assigns no less importance to the association, who, if elected, will preferentially use political tools: "The entry of new members will increase the power of BRICS+ as not so much an economic as a political association"^[4]. Thus, despite the dichotomy of economic and political approaches among the Brazilian elites, there is a clear tendency to increase the importance of the association in the new geopolitical realities, and the issue of including new members in the BRICS is increasingly coming to the fore. 

Thirdly, as the number of those wishing to join the ranks of this promising association increases, the five countries that make up the core of the BRICS are striving to give an accurate assessment of the political and economic benefits of expansion and are in the process of developing a number of criteria on the basis of which it will be possible to accept new members. At this stage, none of the five countries officially demonstrates a clear understanding of the BRICS+ configuration, but there is reason to believe that there is already a consensus among the Brazilian diasporas on this issue. The approach closest to Brazil is focused on "integration of integrations"^[5], implying the preservation of the core and the development of horizontal links between regional blocks of the Global South. This conceptual framework for cooperation was proposed by Lula da Silva: "countries wishing to join the association will receive a status affiliated with the BRICS, while they will influence the decision-making process." Such an initiative of the former president seems to be the most reasonable: the expansion of the core will disrupt the process of the participating countries coming to a consensus, while the "integration of integrations" will avoid difficulties in achieving it on key issues on the agenda. Based on the available information, it can be concluded that the dilemma of building the BRICS+ configuration is solvable from the Brazilian point of view: following the idea of pairing regional blocs and assigning "associated with BRICS" status to new members will be the forerunner of in-depth and pragmatic integration. 

In general, the three foreign policy guidelines discussed above will prevail over a temporarily unstable political system due to electoral processes: Brazil's national interests in the new BRICS+ format are above any ideological schemes. In the foreseeable future, the country will remain committed to increasing cooperation with Moscow, promote the concept of expanding the membership of the association and, with a high degree of probability, will set the main goal of making the idea of "integration of integrations" a reality. 

On the other hand, the development of Brazil's long-term strategy to promote national interests in BRICS+ is hindered by a number of contradictions, a consensus on which cannot be worked out between political elites due to the ideological dichotomy of the approaches of the administrations of Presidents Bolsonaro and Lula da Silva. Such contradictions are mainly related to bilateral Sino-Brazilian relations and different views on the primacy of political and economic aspects within the framework of unification (see Figure 2). 

Figure 2: Conceptual differences in approaches to Brazil's participation in BRICS+

In this regard, first of all, it is worth considering Brazil's full-scale cooperation with the new regional leader of the XXI century, whose economy has achieved exponential growth over the past few decades - China. During the presidency of Lula da Silva, the factor of increasing trade and economic relations with China was decisive for the foreign policy course of the "tropical giant". Obviously, a sharp jump in foreign trade and economic rapprochement between the two regional leaders took place after the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 (see Figure 3): both countries managed to ensure a relatively quick soft landing of their economies and, taking advantage of the instability of the Western economic conjuncture, gave impetus to tighter economic integration: the trade turnover of the two countries increased from 2001 to 2017 from 3.2 billion to 66.3 billion dollars (see Figure 3). 

Figure 3: Trade turnover between Brazil and China from 2001 to 2021.

Despite the record macroeconomic indicators of bilateral trade, during Bolsonaro's presidency, the political and economic legacy of his predecessors was subjected to a tough revision: from the first plan in Brazil's foreign economic activity, the current administration shifted China to the second due to its hegemonic aspirations, and political cooperation with him was placed outside the brackets of the agenda. Such ambivalence of the approaches of the two administrations to cooperation with one of the strongest economies in the world has a direct impact on the alignment of the foreign policy priorities of the "tropical giant" through cooperation with BRICS+ members. There is every reason to believe that when Lula da Silva comes to power, strengthening ties with China will be a decisive factor, while Bolsonaro will shift the emphasis to cooperation with India.It is also worth noting that both administrations consider close cooperation with Moscow as a constant. 

Another subject of deep disagreement between the Brazilian diasporas remains the role of BRICS+, discussions about which serve as a brake for the consolidation of public position. Lula da Silva's confidants actively promote the concept of the Global South as the cornerstone of cooperation. The former president himself has often stated that, given the importance of increasing economic cooperation, the only right thing for him seems to be redirecting cooperation between the BRICS countries to a more political channel and a more intensive movement towards a multipolar world^[1]. At the same time, the incumbent leader's assumption of office was characterized by a cooling of enthusiasm for increasing BRICS cooperation: the new elites unequivocally designated rapprochement with the United States as a benchmark in foreign policy, and in the rhetoric of the president himself there was a note of skepticism about the transition to multipolarity. 2019, the year of Brazil's BRICS presidency, forced the Bolsonaro administration to radically reconsider its priorities - the leader chose the tactics of narrowing the agenda to make cooperation within the framework of the association more pragmatic. In this regard, a striking example is the increase in the weight of technological and technocratic cooperation in the BRICS+ priority system: paradoxically, the narrowing of the agenda has received tremendous support from the participating countries. Thus, Russia's sherpa in BRICS and Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov noted the brilliant organization of a series of meetings, adding that there were much more specifics.  

Based on the information currently available, it can be summed up that in case of re-electionBolsonar's second term is likely to focus on the scientific and technological cooperation of the member countries of the association, as well as on the consolidation of business communities and the promotion of economic integration. However, when Lula da Silva is elected as the new leader, Brazilian participation in BRICS+ will take on a different meaning: the system of foreign policy priorities will include the embodiment of the idea of the Global South into reality, and Brazil's main goal will be to consolidate the political positions of the member states of the association and promote a common point of view in other organizations. Taking into account the distribution of votes during the election race, the second scenario is more likely, but the volatile Brazilian political situation, as experience shows, forces all of us to leave the victory in the 2022 elections to chance. 

The concept of three barriers: Brazil's bet on the BRICS economy+

The subject of multilateral relations between the BRICS member countries cannot be assessed outside the economic context: as new members join the association, economic integration is increasingly reflected in the agenda. Paradoxically, the inclusion of new states in the BRICS+ has forced the core of the association to face an unprecedented dilemma: the expansion of the BRICS will inevitably serve as both a catalyst and a brake for the further development and strengthening of ties between the participants. 

In other words, many of the countries on the list of those wishing to join the association have an asymmetric economic structure and demonstrate less financial stability compared to the countries forming the core during acute crises, such as the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and the coronavirus pandemic. Such an asymmetry risks implementing the worst-case scenario of economic integration: the dependence of weak BRICS economies on stronger ones and the dominance of the recipient-investor paradigm. In order to avoid this negative narrative, the current participating countries need to engage in a detailed development of criteria that allow those wishing to join the ranks of the association. From an economic point of view, this means putting up barriers to entry into the market. 

Wall 1: Low barriers to entry

The first scenario demonstrates the favor of the participating countries on the issue of accepting new States into their ranks. Such an approach will actually mean the predominance of the concept of consolidationThe global South over economic national interests. At the same time, betting on the developing world can drive the "five" into the "middle income trap": developing countries receiving financial assistance will not achieve economic parity with the more developed economies of the association. Obviously, such a scenario will meet with massive support from those wishing to join the BRICS+ participants. 

Wall 2: Medium barriers to entry

The establishment of medium-sized barriers to entry into the geo-economic space of BRICS+ translates the supportive, but at the same time cautious rhetoric of the core. The peculiarity of this scenario is the proposal of a minimum set of criteria for entry: those wishing to join the BRICS+ must have an economy symmetrical with the core countries, while the condition of regional leadership is not necessarily to be observed. This scheme will give an impetus to economic integration and at the same time will not negate the already achieved economic results of the association. This scenario seems to be the most beneficial for developing economies with great potential, such as Russia and Brazil. 

Wall 3: High barriers to entry

The third scenario implies the admission to the BRICS+ association of only economically symmetrical and financially stable states capable of being not only recipients, but also investors. Moreover, those who wish to join undertake to fulfill the duties of a regional leader. Such a scenario of events will be most convenient for the strongest economies that make up the core of the BRICS, - China and India.  

Conclusion

Based on the three economic configurations discussed above that shape the future of BRICS+, it can be concluded that Russia and Brazil will broadcast the narrative of the "middle wall" – the establishment of a minimum set of criteria for entering the unification market. 

Conclusion: what is the knight's move?

The considered political and economic mechanisms of Brazil's influence on decision-making within the framework of the BRICS+ integration association allow us to assess the actions of the future government of the "tropical giant". 

From a political point of view, depending on the winner of the 2022 elections, it seems possible to implement two concepts: "narrowing the agenda for the purpose of specifics" by Bolsonaro and "expanding cooperation of the Global South" by Lula da Silva. In any of these scenarios, Brazil will emerge victorious from the political chess game, since each of these two points of view has already proved its viability both during Brazil's presidency in 2019 and at the present stage. 

Economically, Brazil, judging by the official rhetoric of local elites, will choose the tactics of following the idea of expanding the membership of BRICS+, but this expansion will imply the establishment of certain criteria. As an author, I think it is most reasonable to include countries with economies symmetrical to the core states, while the condition of political leadership in the region can be omitted. Returning to the economic strategy of the "tropical giant", I emphasize that there is a consensus among the Brazilian diasporas regarding the tactics of the "middle barrier" - the most profitable scheme for the above reasons. 

And, finally, the most important thing is that Brazil, despite the huge political and economic influence projected by it on the region for two centuries, has learned harsh and painful history lessons for it so far. The web of political and debt dependence woven for the "tropical giant" by its northern neighbor has been destroyed. It's time for Brazil to play a game.