The UN peacekeeping system: from theory to practice

Torosian Akop Coordinator of the Vitaly Churkin Moscow International Model of the United Nations, UNA-Russia 129090, Russia, Moskovskaya oblast', g. Moscow, Prospekt Mira, 36 akop_08_93@mail.ru Other publications by this author

Historically, the evolution of UN peacekeeping activities directly depended on the development of block confrontation in the Cold War, which implied following the unspoken rules^[1] that contingents of permanent UN Security Council member countries were not sent to conflict regions. There are two exceptions to this rule: Britain's participation in the operation in Cyprus^[2] and France's dispatch of an infantry battalion as part of the UN forces in Lebanon^[3]. It was only after 1990 that Washington, Paris and London began actively sending their contingents to participate in UN peacekeeping missions.

In this regard, it should be noted that until the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping activities relied on traditional mandates that assumed control over compliance with the ceasefire regime and did not include peace-building goals. Such a strategy, based primarily on the principles of impartiality and non—use of force — the key conceptual foundations of UN peacekeeping - led to the relief of the symptoms of the conflict, but not the elimination of its sources, as a result of which the duration of missions increased, and contingents could be deployed for a period of ten to fifty years.

Until the 1990s, the main type of peacekeeping activity was peacekeeping operations (OPM), but after the end of the Cold War, there was the emergence of complex operations that combined the goals of peacekeeping and peace-building. So, among other things, it was prescribed to escort aid shipments in critical situations, mandates were issued to protect civilian victims of armed conflicts, and UN operations began to unfold not after the end of the acute phase of the conflict, but at its height. Such an evolution of approaches to conducting peacekeeping missions has led to an aggravation of problems with the development of mission mandates and their financing, which today is one of the key challenges to UN peacekeeping practice.

Evolution of the practice of UN peacekeeping operations in the post-bipolar period

After 1990, new tasks began to be included in the mandates of the missions, among which we will separately highlight the issues of disarmament and elimination of illegal armed formations, protection of humanitarian supplies. An innovation was the creation of civilian police forces within the framework of peacekeeping missions: today, any peacekeeping operation includes a civilian component, so we can talk about the versatility of modern peacekeeping missions^[4]. At the same time, for the first time, albeit on a limited scale, a police contingent was included in the mission within the framework of the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) of 1960-1964: first, the withdrawal of Belgian troops was made, and then assistance was provided to the government in preserving the political system^[5]. The active use of police officers in the UN peacekeeping mission was found during the work of the UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) in 1989-1990. Thus, peacekeeping activities assumed a deeper and more consistent level of involvement in the processes of promoting international peace.^[6]

Another innovation of UN peacekeeping in the post—bipolar period can be considered the active use of preventive diplomacy tools, including the early deployment of UN contingents on the border territory between the conflicting parties - for example, the deployment of 700 troops on the Macedonian border in 1992^[7].

As a distinctive feature of the evolution of UN peacekeeping after 1990, we will highlight the involvement of non-military contingents in peacekeeping operations: they included specialists in emergency situations who dealt with humanitarian assistance issues, and police forces. Specialists from other UN structural units dealing with human rights issues, economic development assistance and refugees were widely involved, which indicates the complexity of the tasks assigned to the missions and the shift of emphasis to pre-conflict settlement and the fight against the underlying causes of conflicts. As a result, peacekeeping contingents assisted in normalizing the political, economic and social situation in the conflict-ridden region, for example, ensuring the security of local government elections^[8].

Such an evolution of UN peacekeeping is inextricably linked with the changing nature of conflicts and the actors involved in them. Thus, among the UN officials, Boutros Boutros-Ghali was one of the first to highlight this trend, stressing that today new conflicts are primarily not interstate, but interethnic and interfaith, which makes the problems of pre- and post-conflict settlement and the involvement of UN mechanisms in it even more important^[9]. In addition, new conflicts are characterized by high intensity and protracted nature, and therefore, in the post-bipolar period, the key idea laid down in the basis of UN peacekeeping activities was the problem of conflict prevention.

Another method that has been actively used in the tools of UN peacekeeping since 1990 is the use of the sanctions mechanism, one of the derivatives of which is the mechanism of inspections. According to Article 41^[10] of the UN Charter, the Security Council is authorized to resort to a wide range of measures not related to the use of armed forces, and to establish on a regular basis subsidiary bodies — committees — to support and implement them. The sanctions that are most actively applied from this list are implemented with the support of specific committees and ad hoc groups or groups of experts. As an example, the Committee on Mali, established by resolution 2374 (2017)^[11], whose purpose is to monitor compliance with the requirements for a travel ban and asset freeze imposed on individuals and legal entities that appear to be "responsible for actions or measures that pose a threat to peace, security or stability in Mali"^[12].

In order to improve the mechanisms for the implementation of peacekeeping operations and to assess their effectiveness, four criteria for the success of peacekeeping missions were developed: 1) assessment of the implementation of the totality of the mandate; 2) the degree of assistance to the settlement of the conflict; 3) the degree of containment of the escalation of the conflict; 4) the measure of success in limiting the number of victims of the conflict. Evaluation of the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions in the post-bipolar period demonstrates that the greatest success is observed in preventing further escalation of conflicts; on the contrary, solving the tasks of implementing the totality of the mandate and limiting the number of victims of the conflict are only partially successful. At the same time, even the limited success of peacekeeping activities confirms the need to continue to conduct peacekeeping operations, while at the same time working to improve their effectiveness.

The expansion of the subject field of UN peacekeeping after 1990 is inextricably linked with a gradual change in the interpretation of the key principles of peacekeeping. The principle of neutrality of peacekeepers deserves special attention in this context. Proposals to legitimize the possibility of using force in the case of self-defense or protection of civilians, the promotion of the concept of "tough peacemaking" demonstrate the gradual prioritization of forceful peacemaking, as a result of which the UN contingents turn into a third party to the conflict. The need to prevent such developments and maintain the neutral status of the Blue Helmets is regularly noted in documents published by the Secretariat, including the report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in 2017^[13].

Key problems of functioning of the UN decision-making mechanisms in the field of peacekeeping

The key political role in decision-making in the field of UN peacekeeping belongs to the Security Council (SC). In the event of an aggravation of the situation, the UN Secretary-General, on behalf of the Security Council, informs the Chairman of the Security Council of the readiness of the Secretariat to provide all available data to the Security Council. Depending on the decision of the member states of the Security Council, the meeting may be held in an open (an official meeting with the participation of all interested countries, but without representatives of the media) or closed (the speeches of the participants are not made public, and the report of the meeting is kept in a single copy) format.

The result of such a meeting may be the establishment of a peacekeeping operation. In this case, the Secretary-General sends notifications to the countries with an offer to participate, the member countries develop a scheme for the mandate of the future operation, develop a common political approach, which is then submitted to the Security Council for approval. In this case, the Secretary-General is only the highest administrative person: all decisions are made by the member states of the UN Security Council, and the Secretariat, in turn, is obliged to implement these decisions.

At the same time, the current state of the system seems to us biased. Since the number of representatives of a particular country among the employees of the Secretariat is directly proportional to the amount of contributions of this country to the UN budget, and today the contributions of developed countries amount to about 80%, the proportion of employees from Western countries is disproportionately high in the Secretariat. As a result, there is a lack of pluralism and regular promotion of a pro-Western agenda. An example of the coordinated work of the UN Security Council member countries and the Secretariat can be the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) in 2002^[14], and the confrontation is the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in 1991^[15], when the Secretariat de facto supported the position of Morocco as opposed to the POLISARIO Front and Algeria.

The tasks of the UN Security Council itself include developing a mandate for a new peacekeeping operation or making changes to the old ones, for which the Secretary-General provides reports to the Security Council on the current situation, and conducting special Council missions to "hot spots" in order not only to exert political influence, but also to develop an adequate assessment of the situation "on the ground".

Recently, the Security Council has been actively using the so-called "Arria formula", named after the former representative of Venezuela to the UN. Its effectiveness lies in the fact that members of the UN Security Council have the opportunity to meet with representatives of civil society and individuals who have important information but do not want to disclose themselves (for example, we may be talking about politicians representing neighboring countries), and the meetings themselves are informal and with flexible procedural frameworks. Thus, Russia regularly uses the "Arria formula" mechanism to cover the situation in the Donbas and cases of violations of international humanitarian law by Ukraine with the involvement of video testimonies of local residents and foreign journalists working in the region^{[16] [17]}.

The work of the UN Security Council itself is divided into two parts: making political decisions and approving the military part of the mandates of peacekeeping operations. Within the framework of the political aspect of the activity, the reports of the UN Secretary-General are reviewed, the capitals' opinions are requested and instructions are received, taking into account the intelligence and relevant information available to the member countries, and an agreed solution is developed, that is, the de facto adoption of a UN Security Council resolution. On the contrary, with regard to the approval of the military part of the mandate of peacekeeping operations, there is no mechanism for developing a common approach to the military component of the mission or a dialogue of military advisers, as a result of which the UN Security Council approves decisions prepared in advance by the UN Secretariat. That is why the politicization of the Secretariat's activities poses a challenge to the normal functioning of the UN peacekeeping system.

In addition to the UN Security Council, another key instrument in the field of peacekeeping is the Special Committee of the General Assembly, which plays the role of an advisory mechanism in this area and holds annual sessions for three weeks. Its activity is to prepare draft political decisions taking into account financial expertise before the mandate enters into force; the document includes only those provisions on which the parties manage to reach consensus, while controversial points are omitted.

Problems of financing UN peacekeeping on the example of US participation

To date, the problem of financing the UN OPM is one of the key challenges of peacekeeping. It seems important to consider this issue through the prism of the financial participation of the United States, which has traditionally been one of the largest donors since the emergence of a separate system for financing UN peacekeeping operations in the 1960s.

Let's focus on the specifics of the formation of the OPM budget, since the very mechanism of financing these operations is complex and fraught with problems for the sponsor country. Let's highlight three main characteristics: firstly, there is no single UN budget that would cover all peacekeeping operations; instead, the budget for each operation is formed separately. Secondly, due to the unpredictability of conflict-related processes, forecasting the costs of peacekeeping operations for a year ahead is de facto difficult to implement. Finally, the amount of contributions of each Member country is individual, varies from country to country and is updated every three years after international negotiations at the General Assembly.

For the United States of America, 1990 can be considered a milestone in the field of participation in UN peacekeeping, when the US Congress decided to limit the financing of the OPM by introducing a limit of 25% of the total budget of the operation. However, in 1999, when the United States reduced its share to 26%, this barrier was temporarily lifted. At the same time, it should be noted that such a high share of US participation is explained by the UN budget rules, according to which the country's solvency and its share in world GDP are taken into account.

The reduction of US participation continued under the administration of Donald Trump: the president consistently criticized^[18] the existing principle, calling it unfair, which resulted in a return to a limit of 25% of OPM funding. The reduction would have been even more significant if it had not been for inter-party disagreements and the need for US lawmakers to ratify the decision: while D. Trump called for reducing contributions to international peacekeeping activities to 15-16%, Congress retained the previous figure of 25%.

According to the statement of the US Permanent Representative to the UN Nikki Haley, the US does not plan to go beyond the threshold of 25% and expects a more equitable distribution of the budget, "since one country cannot assume more than a quarter of the entire budget of UN operations"^[19]. At the same time, studies show that the financing of UN operations is much cheaper than the deployment of a separate US contingent, which demonstrates the state of the mission in the Central African Republic^[20]. The reasons lie in the different approaches to the methods of transportation of supplies and equipment and the difference in wages paid to civilian police and personnel, for which the activities of UN operations are more profitable.

D. Trump's policy of reducing contributions was aimed at reducing the budget not only of OPM programs, but also of other UN agencies, which eventually led to an increase in the US debt to the UN (which amounted to $1.3 billion in 2021. to the budget of peacekeeping operations and 1.16 billion — to the UN budget as a whole)^[21]. Such a position, in turn, has become the object of criticism of the new US President Joe Biden, who seeks to increase the international prestige of the United States, including by resuming the required UN funding. As Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the current Permanent Representative of the United States to the UN, noted at the Senate confirmation hearing, "if we want to have a seat at the table, we need to pay the bills"^[22].

Due to the growing budget deficit of the OPM, the potential of peacekeeping operations is also decreasing, to which UN Secretary-General A. Guterres responded in 2018 by proposing the "Actions for Peacekeeping" initiative, which was aimed at re-equipping and strengthening the UN forces^[23]. However, this initiative has shown the inconsistency of peacekeeping activities at the present stage: on the one hand, there is an intention to make peacekeeping operations more economical, on the other, the popular program for the protection of civilians is one of the most expensive areas in peacekeeping. 

The United States allocates approximately 0.03% of the annual budget for UN peacekeeping, which, according to the UN, is not enough to maintain the necessary level of OPM. In turn, such a position undermines both the success of UN peacekeeping activities and the authority of the United States. Firstly, it hurts the prestige of the United States, which advocates increasing the effectiveness of UN missions, while at the same time trying to reduce their funding on a regular basis. Secondly, the level of US debt already affects the success of UN missions: for example, Rwanda was unable to provide its forces for the mission in the CAR, as the country did not receive sufficient funds^[24]. Finally, the precedent of non-payment of UN contributions by one of the largest donors of the Organization is dangerous: in the future, this may encourage other countries to reconsider the level of their contributions, which will greatly affect the prestige of not only donor countries, but also UN peacekeeping as a whole.

Today, UN peacekeeping is becoming multifunctional, with the main focus gradually shifting to the problems of conflict prevention and peace-building. At the same time, such a change of priorities exposes the problems inherent in the very architecture of UN peacekeeping, primarily related to the definition of the mandate and politicization of the activities of the Secretariat and the financing of missions. In connection with the departure from the traditional function of maintaining the ceasefire, costs are increasing, and non-payment by member countries, such as the United States, of contributions to the budget of operations entails a decrease in their effectiveness. It seems to us that the solution to the above—mentioned problems lies in the continuation of the UN reform process, especially in the field of approving the military part of the mandate and creating a single budget of the OPM integrated into the general UN budget. If there is the political will of the member countries, this process seems to us quite feasible and follows in line with the reform of the UN peacekeeping of the last thirty years.