Culture of dialogue: metaphysical aspect

Kryuchkova Svetlana ORCID: 0000-0002-9213-8503 Doctor of Philosophy Professor, Department of Humanities, Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation 125167, Russia, g. Moscow, Leningradskii prospekt, 51/1 svetlana.kryuchkova2015@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

Today there is a noticeable increase in research interest in the problems of dialogue as an important component of the spiritual life of mankind. It is caused not only by the theoretical need to comprehend new forms of communication, but also, first of all, by the practical need to master the culture of dialogue, understood as a kind of integral education, including knowledge, values, norms of behavior, everything that allows participants to reach agreement on the issues discussed. Insufficient knowledge of the culture of dialogue, expressed in the inability to negotiate, overcome differences by reaching a rational consensus, is fraught with serious social risks in modern conditions. All this makes the task of increasing the culture of dialogue extremely relevant, which cannot be solved only by educating the individual morality of the participants, tolerance and special respect for the interlocutor. The latter is undoubtedly important, but without understanding the interlocutor's speech acts, which is possible only if his values and individual characteristics are taken into account, dialogue is impossible in principle.  And for it to take place, the participants must have a certain common field of meanings, which is formed on the basis of their ideas about each other's mentality. This implies the identification of the metaphysical foundations of the dialogue, an appeal to the ontology of the subject. 

 Recognizing the importance of the entire diverse spectrum of research on the problem of the culture of dialogue, this article will focus specifically on the metaphysical aspect of dialogue – its ontological prerequisites and epistemological mechanism, since a high culture of dialogue largely depends on the ability of participants to build adequate models of each other's mental field during communication. Indeed, we can improve our communication skills step by step, while continuing to depend on the degree of understanding of another person's consciousness (Other). Is it possible to understand at allThe other is in the dialogue, and who is he for us – the subject of riddles or our own construct, the result of our personal contextuality? An attempt to answer these questions involves the use of a philosophical and methodological approach. 

The relevance of the search for methodological approaches to the study of dialogue, understood as "communication with feedback" ^{[9, p.318]}, pushes us to turn to the ideas of the "philosophy of dialogue" - a broad philosophical trend, whose representatives at the beginning of the last century reflected on the metaphysical foundations of dialogue, making it an important topic for academic discourse, and dialogism the main a method in the studyThe other one. The latter in their works appears both as a model of a real participant in a communicative act, on the one hand, and as a theoretical construct, on the other. It is also a productive analytical tool for analyzing dialogue as a way to understandingAnother in the conditions of equal communication, a phenomenological approach can act, allowing you to "see" as a subject (I) models consciousness in the space of dialogueThe other one. ThemingThe other was carried out by such philosophers as E. Husserl, K. Jaspers, G. Marcel, M. Heidegger, J.-P. Sartre, A. Camus, etc.

 In addition to the principle of dialogism and the phenomenological approach, the methodology of the study of the problem of the culture of dialogue should be based on the communication approach developed by Yu. Habermas, who brought the theory of dialogue closer to sociology, in his concept of "communicative action". Proceeding from the interpretation of communication as a cooperative type of dialogical interaction, he understands by communicative actions such interactions that are focused on overcoming conflicts in dialogue caused by egoistic attitudes, achieving mutual understanding, "when actors go to internally coordinate their action plans and pursue certain goals only if they agree on this situation and the expected consequences, which either already exists between them, or it has yet to be agreed on." ^{[12, pp.199-200]}.

Another important methodological source for the study of the problem of the culture of dialogue is the non-rhetorical project X. Perelman, who carried out the reception of the ideas of Aristotelian "Topics" in the twentieth century. This well-known Belgian argumentation theorist continued the ancient research tradition, originating from the sophists, then in Socratic Maieutics, not only as a method of searching for truth, but also as a way to reach agreement or convergence of positions, as well as from Plato and Aristotle, who created the first theories of dialogue – eristics and dialectics. Despite the fact that dialogism, starting from Ancient Rome, was then supplanted by monologism, which focused on a universal (impersonal) audience, dialogue, as an empirical object, existed in the works of P. Abelard, G. Galileo, B. Fontenelle, G. Malebranche, J. Berkeley, J. G. Fichte, etc. Their works, which are written in a dialog form, show that the basic values of the ancient dialogue, which proceeded from the recognition of the intellectual right of its free participants to defend their point of view, have been preserved. They find a new life in the twentieth century in a non-rhetorical project. So for the author of the "New Rhetoric" H. Perelman, dialogue, first of all, is a "meeting of minds". His ideas served as a source for the so-called concept of "critical discussion", developed in the 80s of the last century by representatives of the influential Dutch school of pragmatic dialectics F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, F. S. Henkemans, P. Houtlosser, etc. This concept, which is an attempt to build a theory of argumentation on the ways of combining dialectics with normativity ^{[7, p.159]}, contains a set of organizational rules for dialogue and requirements for its participants, which, in our opinion, is a significant theoretical contribution to the development of the theoretical foundations of the culture of dialogue.

The listed conceptual and methodological approaches to understanding the phenomenon of dialogue and its culture not only summarize what has been done in this area, but also identify unresolved problems and thereby outline further research steps. Let's look at some of these approaches in more detail.

 The ideas expressed in the 20s of the last century by such representatives of the "philosophy of dialogue" as M. Buber, E. Levinas, M. Bakhtin, M. Bibler, etc., prepared the ground for a modern understanding of not only the nature of dialogue, but also communication in general, as a form of projective and constructive social activity. Based on the premise that all interpersonal relationships are somehow rooted in dialogue, they gave the latter not just a specific sound, but also an ontologically existential status. Since "life itself is dialogical by its nature" ^{[1, p.318]}, dialogue is a "genuine event of being", because for a person "to be" means to communicate dialogically, thus acquiring their own identity. The fundamental feature of this "unfinished" dialogue is that in order to implement it, exceptI must beYou (Other), as a condition of autonomyI. In this, the dialogist philosophers relied on the classical Cartesian intuition (cogito ergo sum), proceeding from the idea of self-consciousness, which necessarily generates another idea - the existence of anotherI (Another person) who has his own (closed) inner world. By doing so,Other forIn the Cartesian tradition, proceeding from the idea of an autonomous subject, I acted as an object, and the dialogue was a subject-object relationship between two independent self-sufficient beings.

 They saw the attitude quite differentlyI am another representative of the "philosophy of dialogue". Their dialogic paradigm turned out to be opposed to subject-object analytics, because they fundamentally abandoned models based on centeringI and binary oppositions ^{[6, p.113]}. For them, dialogue is a subject–subject relationship in whichThe other is a subject, an equal participant in communicative communication. So V. S. Bybler understands dialogue as an act of mutual understanding of "ontologically different personalities", but at the same time emphasizes thatI exist only in relation toAnother. The ontological premise of such a model of dialogue was to affirm, on the one hand, the inseparable inner connection and unity of its participants ("inseparability"), and on the other – their "non-unity" (otherwise dialogue is impossible). Despite this new understanding of dialogism, which was based on a personalistic intuition emphasizing subjectivity, the positions of dialogist philosophers on how subjective meanings arise in dialogue and how the latter is conditioned by language differ significantly.  So, if E. Levinas has an attitude toThe other, as to the interlocutor (being), "precedes any ontology", then M. Buber's dialogue is a "symmetrical meeting"Me andYou are face to face ^{[2, p.19]}. And so that the dialogue, at least, takes place, and at most, it is productive,I have to take into account the specificsAnother as an equal subject with personality properties. And here the key question arises: how to do it? What is the epistemological mechanism of this procedure? Thus, when considering the metaphysical aspect of the problem of the culture of dialogue, the answer to the question becomes fundamental: how can one penetrate into the mental semantic spaceAnother (interlocutor)?

It was this question in the form of "How can I constitute Another Self in myself?" ^{[4, p.162]} that became the starting point in the arguments of the founder of phenomenology E. Husserl ("Cartesian Meditations"), who set out to develop an intersubjective program for substantiating the structures of consciousness, which would allow him to take a fresh look at the problem of dialogue, which appeared in his epistemological function (in the form of a certain research program), pushing the traditional ethical and psychological aspect into the background. Having set the task to justify the existence ofAnother, E. Husserl first, by "feeling", discovers inI originally laid down the intentionality, in this case – the focus onThe other, and then, using the method of representational-analogizing transference, constructs another Self. So another subjectivity arises, another interlocutor in the dialogue, for whom there are also others who make up the community of transcendental Egos, which E. Husserl interprets as a human society communicating on one (nobody's) In this intersubjective "life world", which includes both nature and society, a dialogical meeting takes placeMe andThe other, the latter at the same time is not a copy, but a "projection of myself". But in this case there is a danger of interpretationAnother as a component of "my own essence, and ultimately," E. Husserl notes, he and I would be one and the same" ^{[4, p.140]}. The method of penetration into consciousness  The other, by exteriorizing his own mental states, calls into question the very possibility of the existence of a dialogue, since then, in fact, theThe self disappears the need to communicate with such a devoid of personal characteristicsTo others.

This situation of epistemological impasse, to which sophisticated phenomenological analysis led, was overcome by dialogist philosophers, who proceeded from the recognition of the internal connection and unity of the participants in the dialogue, and refused the method of rational-analytical constructionThe other (and thereby overcome subjectivism). The existentialists, who also rejected the Husserl model of interpretation, were in solidarity with themThe other one. At the same time, existentialists put forward the opposite understanding of interaction to dialogist philosophersMe andThe other in the course of argumentative discourse.  The other in the dialogue is radically Alien. Sartre believes that the very presence ofThe other ("Hell is others") – negatively, because he invades the worldI ("does what I didn't want").  However, the most important question for modern social life is why in the dialogueThe other often acts as an Outsider, left outside of their philosophical analysis. It will be problematized later, mainly in the works of sociologists who, with the help of their methods, could not raise this problem, although they did a lot in the studyAnother: we considered, for example, his different images in the space of intertextuality, highlighting a wider range of relations toThe other is rejection, appropriation and coexistence ^{[13, p.34]}. Nevertheless, despite certain successes, "the problem of creating a theoretical model of the subjects of the dialogue remained unresolved, and their relationship was not adequately explained" ^{[6, p.117]}.

In the methodological set of theoretical tools proposed by the representatives of the considered approaches, the normative dimension, traditionally constituting the main content of the culture of dialogue, as a rule, had a secondary, subordinate status, was evaluated lower than the metaphysical foundations of this process. However, later, the question of how to convey meanings in a dialogue begins to be replaced by the question of the conditions of their understanding. To a certain extent, such a turn is also a legacy of the ancient tradition, which, although centered on the value-personal, ethical component of the dialogue, however, did not ignore its formal and organizational aspect, including norms of behavior and speech communication, manifesting, for example, such requirements as: "consistent alternation of questions and answers, refusal from long speeches, brief formulation of answers, the prohibition on "interrupting" and "getting ahead of oneself" in reasoning, the requirement that the interlocutor bring his reasoning "to the end", ask only specific questions and one at a time, and not several at once, so as not to violate the logic of subsequent reasoning" ^{[10, pp.93-94]}. Many provisions concerning this aspect of dialogue will be reinterpreted and supplemented in the works of A. Schopenhauer ("Eristics, or the Art of Winning Disputes" and S. Povarnin ("Dispute") in the XIX-XX centuries.

Already in antiquity, different types of dialogue were distinguished: dialogue-conversation, dialogue-dispute, and today "in modern culture, where agonal, eristic, deconstructionist tendencies dominate, the concept of dialogue is closely related to ideas about dispute, discussion, debate" ^{[11, p.298]}.  A good example of this is the concept of "critical discussion", which describes effective ways to substantiate one's point of view and methods of persuading the other side in the dialogue. Let's take a closer look at this modern form of dialogue in its pragmatic-dialectical version.

Critical discussion is a modern theoretical model of dialogue between rational interlocutors, the purpose of which is to eliminate differences of opinion. "The disagreement can be overcome only in agreement with the critical philosophy of reasonableness. If there is a systematic discussion between two parties who reasonably weigh the arguments for and against the point of view being discussed, this means that the set of theoretical arguments that we need should contain rules and procedures that indicate which moves are acceptable in a critical discussion" ^{[5, p.67]}. The theoretical and methodological basis for This is supported by four meta-theoretical principles: dialectification, functionalization, externalization and socialization" ^{[5, p.71]}.

The existence of certain norms and rules of dialogue, if not a guarantee, then a necessary condition for resolving conflicts "peacefully". The mechanism of their action is as follows: "various points of view are put forward, arguments and facts supporting them are viewed, doubts are carefully discussed, argumentation is analyzed, as a result of which substandard steps are eliminated, new ideas and interpretations may arise. The resulting agreement appears as the fruit of collective efforts" ^{[3, p.204]}. The mechanism of such an ideal discussion is realized with the help of speech acts as necessary "conditions of identity and correctness applicable to performance" ^{[14, p.54]}, and is described using a model that includes four stages: (1) confrontation (a controversial point of view is formulated); (2) opening of the discussion (roles are distributed: protagonist – antagonist) and, what is important for improving the culture of dialogue, procedural, methodological and ethical rules of the discussion are discussed; (3) the main stage is argumentation and critical examination of positions; (4) the final stage - it determines how this dispute is resolved, whether differences of opinion have been overcome ^{[5, pp.79-82]}.

The achievement of the main goal should be facilitated by the presence of the necessary level of culture of dialogue, manifested in the observance of procedural rules by participants. There are fifteen of them and at each stage they are different. These regulatory rules, in turn, are divided into two groups: the rules of the "first order": the rule of freedom, the rule of the burden of proof, the right to challenge, the agreement on the rules of discussion, the correctness of proof and refutation, etc. But these rules will be pragmatically fruitless if the rules of the "second order" are not observed, which relate to the state of the minds of the participants, and which are accepted by them indirectly and most often implicitly. This is the so-called "code of conduct for participants in the discussion", which includes 10 "commandments". This is a very heterogeneous group, including both logical requirements (consistency of the propositional positions of the parties) and communicative (the need to accept a challenge and requests for explication, identification, justification of the arguments given). In the context of the topic of this article, it is important to emphasize that "in order for the rules to have any practical significance, there must also be potential participants in the discussion who are ready to play by these rules, since they accept them intersubjectively, so that the rules also acquire conventional significance" ^{[5, p.237]}.

These two groups of rules should be supplemented by conditions of the "external order" (social circumstances), including: the context of discussion, intellectual pluralism, institutional guarantees of the right to information and criticism, etc., as well as the mechanism of "strategic maneuvering". Only with these conditions in mind, a critical discussion can be not only a means of overcoming differences in dialogue, but also a heuristic tool. The main function of the idealized model considered is quite pragmatic: "by clearly and systematically indicating what the rules of critical discussion are, this model allows those who wish to play the role of reasonable participants in the discussion, providing a number of clearly defined guiding principles, which, although formulated at a higher level of abstraction and based on a more clearly formulated philosophical ideal, to a large extent the degrees are identical to the norms that they would like to see observed under any circumstances" ^{[5, p.239]}. Thus, the considered pragmatic justification of the Code of Conduct of Participants in a Critical discussion significantly complements the ethical dimension of the dialogue, which has retained its significance since ancient times.

Modern researchers of dialogue, as a rule, focus on its normative side - the forms and rules of organization of dialogic practices, building models of various "communicative projects" and strategies: tolerant (compromise), convergent (consent), etc. They often focus on undoubtedly important aspects of dialogue - the culture of speech and behavior, and do not strive for more deep consideration of the epistemological features of the subjects, their ability to perceive and adequately understand the point of view of the interlocutor, taking into account his values and ethical principles, as well as implicit pragmatic conventions, all that allows for a deeper and panoramic modeling of the phenomenon of dialogue that permeates all spheres of human life.

 Thus, the culture of dialogue is a necessary condition for its implementation. At the same time, dialogue, as an ideal of human interaction, developed in antiquity, in its value-humanitarian aspect, is extremely important in a situation when it is necessary to achieve mutual understanding between the parties, of course, if its participants demonstrate the desire and will to reach agreement. Such motivation contributes to the formation of a common space for dialogue. In its ideal state, the culture of dialogue is characterized by: an attitude towards the "peaceful" resolution of emerging disagreements, recognition of the initial equality of the participating subjects, the presence of recognized norms and compliance with the rules of interaction. "The general quality reflecting all these properties is tolerance. The general condition guaranteeing the effectiveness of the dialogue is social justice, embodied in all types of distribution, assistance, retribution" ^{[8, p.110]}. Compliance with this condition leads to responsible acceptanceThe other is in its otherness, which means it is a prerequisite for mutual understanding, cooperation, support, as well as the ability to "get used" to each other, despite the "irremediable roughness" (M. Heidegger), a quality that is extremely relevant in modern conditions. And in this sense, the culture of dialogue helps to search for common meanings, which, in a situation of high conflictogenicity of the modern information society, will undoubtedly contribute to reducing the danger of confrontation and achieving "peaceful" ways of resolving conflicts, both between individuals and between cultures, countries and civilizations.