Military cooperation of Russia with the Syrian Arab Republic as an instrument of the Russia's New Middle East Policy (2000-2008)

Khizhnyak Anastasiya Vladimirovna Postgraduate student, Department of World History and International Relations, Luhansk State Pedagogical University 91055, Ukraine, g. Lugansk, ul. Oboronnaya, 2 xizhnyak_1996@mail.ru

Military-technical cooperation (MTC) can be considered one of the most conservative means of ensuring state interests in the international arena. The decades-old interstate relations in the field of arms trade today largely determine the agenda of world politics. This statement can be considered especially relevant in relation to the Middle East region, which is one of the most conflict-prone points of the planet, the supply of weapons to which is the subject of an acute struggle among world leaders in the field of production of means of warfare. Considering that the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR), which by the beginning of the period considered in this article already had a rich tradition of military-strategic cooperation with Moscow, remained one of the few countries in the region not controlled by the West and, as a result, was rightly regarded by experts as "Russia's main trump card in the Middle East" in the context of finding the most effective ways of a final settlement The analysis of the main stages of the resumption of bilateral strategic relations in 2000-2008 seems relevant to the situation in Syria.

Due to the relatively small chronological remoteness of the period under study and, as a consequence, the closeness of a significant part of the information on the volumes and main articles of military trade of the Russian Federation and the SAR, this problem has not been fully reflected in Russian historiography to date. Among the specialists (mainly in the field of political sciences. — A.H.), who to one degree or another touched upon the problems of military-technical cooperation between Moscow and Damascus in their works, may include M. I. Nazir, S. A. Myrzaibraimov, V. P. Yurchenko, S. G. Luzyanin ^{[10; 9; 19; 8]}. At the same time, the presence of an extensive body of information sources, among which it is necessary to highlight the official publications of Russian documents (websites of the President of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc.) ^{[11; 12]}, shedding light on the main stages of the Russian-Syrian strategic rapprochement, which was formed during meetings of representatives of the political and military elite of the two countries; the regulatory framework that allows us to judge the pace and scale of development of the mentioned cooperation ^{[6; 14; 16; 17]}; as well as materials of periodicals and online publications ^{[3; 4; 13; 15]}, which give an idea of the attitude of various strata of Russian society to the problem we are considering, creates real prerequisites for disclosure of the tasks set out in this article.

As you know, cooperation between Russia and Syria has a long history — its foundations were laid during the formation of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the Syrian state in 1944 ^{[8, p.75]}. During the Cold War, Moscow's policy towards Damascus was determined by the logic of a global ideological confrontation with Washington, and the SAR itself turned into one of the key levers of Soviet influence in the Middle East, receiving as allied support a wide range of weapons and special means, as well as assistance in training military and military-technical specialists: by the end of In the 20th century, the Syrian army was almost 90% equipped with Soviet weapons ^{[2, pp.35-36]}.

The period of temporary suspension of bilateral cooperation coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the existence of the Russian Federation as an independent state. This was largely due not only to the numerous internal economic and political problems of the young Russian state, and as a result, the lack of resources to pursue an active independent Middle East policy, but also the lack of understanding among the then Russian political elite of the need for such a policy: the highest diplomatic circles headed by Foreign Minister A.V. Kozyrev preferred not to get out of a common political course directed by the West, led by the world hegemon — the United States.

A new era in Russian Syrian politics began in 2000. On May 7, 2000, after Boris Yeltsin's voluntary resignation, Vladimir Putin took over the post of President of the Russian Federation. The coming to power of a young energetic leader led to significant adjustments in the development of Moscow's relations with Middle Eastern states, including with the SAR. The Kremlin's increased attention to the problems of the Middle East as a whole was reflected in the new Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, adopted on June 28, 2000. Drawing attention to the total dictatorship of the United States in the international arena established by that time, the document emphasizes the need to revise the structure of the unipolar world within the framework of international law. Proclaiming a course to ensure the national security of the Russian state on a global scale, one of the integral elements of which was called active participation in the resolution of conflicts in the Middle East region as a co-sponsor of the peace process, as well as calling for the development of interstate cooperation in the fight against international terrorism, the Kremlin, at the same time, was well aware of the importance of having a powerful a regional ally, the role of which could not be better suited to the SAR^[6].

The immediate result of the adoption of this Concept was the intensification of the Russian-Syrian dialogue in the field of military-technical cooperation. Thus, on May 23, 2001, the Minister of Defense of the SAR M. Tlas arrived in Moscow to meet with the Head of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation I. S. Ivanov on an official visit ^[3]. During the meeting, significant attention was paid to the issues of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, including the situation that tended to worsen around the presence of the Syrian military contingent in Lebanon. Emphasizing the desire of the leadership of his country to resume multilateral cooperation with the Russian Federation, M. Tlas expressed the desire of the Syrian government to restore and modernize the S-200 long-range anti-aircraft missile systems (SAMs) supplied by the Soviet Union. In addition, the Syrian side confirmed its interest in acquiring a wide range of Russian weapons: tactical Su-24 front-line bombers, MiG-21 front-line fighters, MiG-23 and Mig-29 multi-purpose fighters, MiG-25 and Mig-31 high-altitude interceptor fighters, BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles, T-tanks55 and T-72, reconnaissance and attack helicopters "Alligator" Ka-52, SAM "Buk" and "Tor". During further negotiations on the prospects for strategic cooperation, the parties also reached a preliminary agreement on the supply of the Iskander operational and tactical missile system, which was still undergoing testing at that time ^[19].

In addition to the mentioned areas of military-technical cooperation, an important aspect of M. Tlas' visit to Moscow was laying the foundations of a common Russian-Syrian vision of the key political problems of the Middle East region. In order to coordinate the positions of the two countries on the issue of combating international terrorism and the interaction of law enforcement agencies during operations in the fight against illicit drug trafficking, the head of the Syrian Defense Ministry held a meaningful conversation with the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation V. B. Rushailo ^[12].

The agreements reached in Moscow acquired a more concrete embodiment in 2002, when a number of multimillion contracts were concluded for the supply of Russian weapons to the SAR, including the promising Iskander operational-tactical missile system and the Kornet-E and Metis-M anti-tank missile systems ^{[9, p. 146]}.

It is important to note that during the first presidency of Vladimir Putin, the paradigm of Russian-Syrian relations itself changed. Passivity and indifference have been replaced by the position of an active participant, guided primarily by its own national interests and having clearly defined goals, among which the following can be distinguished: ensuring geopolitical stability in the Middle East region as a whole, strengthening the positions of Russian industrial and financial circles in the economy of the SAR, as well as diplomatic support for the Syrian government in the international arena. The latter became particularly relevant in the light of the growing unsubstantiated accusations of Damascus by the United States in the creation and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and cooperation with terrorist organizations — a strategy successfully tested by the Americans against Iraq ^[1]. In the current situation, the Syrian government, rightly considering the Russian Federation as a potential strong ally in the fight against the spread of American hegemony in the Middle East region, considered it expedient to remove all obstacles standing in the way of military-technical cooperation with Moscow, including the problem of unpaid debt for Soviet weapons.

In 2003 The military-technical cooperation between Moscow and Damascus continued: deliveries of Russian military products began to be carried out to Syria on preferential terms and without paying taxes. An important role for the further development of such cooperation was played by the expansion of the regulatory framework governing various aspects of relations between the two states. Thus, in the same year, the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic on the Avoidance of Double Taxation with respect to Income Taxes came into force ^[16]. This has had a positive impact on the continuation of the Russian-Syrian dialogue in the field of modernization of military equipment, carrying out research work on the territory of Syria, including those aimed at improving the country's defense capability. However, Moscow's accusations of "illegal supplies" of military products to Iraq and Iran, which were voiced at that time by the United States and Israel and received wide international resonance, led to the fact that Russia was forced to suspend the supply of Igla portable anti-aircraft missile systems and P-800 supersonic missiles to its Syrian ally for some time "Yakhont" as part of the Bastion anti-ship coastal missile system ^[15].

Despite a certain slowdown in the pace of cooperation between Russia and Syria in the military sphere due to the above-mentioned reasons, in October 2004 Damascus expressed interest in acquiring universal mobile multichannel anti-aircraft missile systems S-300 PMU-2 "Favorit" ^{[9, p. 146]}. In addition, it was decided to organize the production of armored vehicles at the factory in Homs with the participation of Russian specialists. As we can see, the Russian Federation, even in the conditions of strict isolation of the SAR, organized by the collective West, continued to effectively develop military-technical cooperation with Damascus

After the re-election of Vladimir Putin for a second term as President of the Russian Federation, military-technical cooperation with Syria received a new impetus, which was expressed, first of all, in the activation of high-level meetings. Thus, the first visit of Bashar al-Assad to the Russian Federation on January 25, 2005, during which key issues of cooperation in the military-technical sphere were touched upon by political leaders, was very significant for the development of strategic partnership between the two countries ^[11]. An important achievement of this stage of cooperation was the ratification of the Joint Declaration on the Further Deepening of Friendship and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic dated January 25, 2005, which laid the foundations for the settlement of many acute problems that stood in the way of further development of Russian-Syrian strategic relations, including the settlement of the Syrian debt ^[16]. As a result, the very next day, on January 26, 2005, a Protocol was signed on the coordination of the main parameters of the settlement of the Syrian debt. The corresponding Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic on the settlement of the Syrian Arab Republic's debt to the Russian Federation on loans previously granted to the former USSR was signed on May 29, 2005 and represented a serious step forward towards the final settlement of mutual claims of the Russian Federation and the SAR. Thus, the amounts of mutual debts were consolidated, on the basis of which the settled amount of $13.393.710.623.35 was agreed (as of January 1, 2005), which the Syrian side recognized as a debt for previously supplied military products ^[18]. At the same time, the Government of the SAR was exempt from paying 73% of the settled amount ($9.777.408.755.05), while the remaining 27% ($3.616.301.868.30) were repaid in accordance with the established procedure: the main part in the amount of $2.116.301.868.30 was repaid through a one-time transaction no later than one month from the date The Agreement was signed, while the remaining $1.5 billion was paid to the Russian Federation for 10 years in equal semi-annual payments starting from July 1, 2005 ^[18]. Article 12 of the document, however, stated that the Agreement "is temporarily applied from the date of its signing and enters into force on the day one of the Parties receives a written response notification of the implementation by the other Party of the domestic procedures necessary for the entry into force of this Agreement" ^[18].

During the same period, Russia resumed deliveries to the territory of the Syrian state of the latest models of weapons and military equipment mentioned above. It should be emphasized that the military-technical cooperation between Russia and Syria, which was actively developing in those years, continued to cause serious concern to Israel, which in 2005 resulted in the so-called "missile" scandal. Reports appeared in the Israeli media about the planned deal between Moscow and Damascus regarding the supply of advanced Iskander tactical missile systems and Igla man-portable air defense missile systems (MANPADS) to the SAR ^{[8, pp. 84-85]}. And although Bashar al—Assad himself has repeatedly stressed that the main purpose of his visit to the Russian Federation is to establish cooperation with Russia in the political sphere, and first of all, in the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as the situation in Iraq, it cannot be denied that the Syrian leadership was extremely interested in acquiring Russian MANPADS, especially in the context of the complication of relations with Tel Aviv. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, I. S. Ivanov, denied Israel's accusations, and Russia was forced to impose a moratorium on the sale of advanced Iskander tactical missile systems to the SAR and other states of the Middle East ^{[8, pp.84-85]}. 

In 2006, Bashar al-Assad's second visit to Moscow took place. Along with the discussion of issues related to the development of mutual understanding and strengthening of the Russian-Syrian dialogue in the political sphere, including on issues of the Middle East settlement, due attention was also paid to the further elaboration of some aspects of military—technical cooperation. As part of the development of the regulatory framework of the above-mentioned cooperation, on July 13, 2006, a Protocol was signed in Damascus between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic on the procedure for exchanging operational information and monitoring the supply, storage and targeted use of man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems, as well as missiles used with the help of sets of control equipment and launchers modules "Sagittarius" ^[14]. One of the main goals of this document was to ensure the improvement of the defense capability of the Syrian state, as well as to prevent the types of weapons mentioned in the protocol from falling into the hands of a third party and, above all, to terrorist organizations. In addition to the agreement on the Sagittarius MANPADS, the negotiations in Moscow also allowed the supply of other types of military products, in particular, self-propelled anti-aircraft missile and cannon complexes "Pantsir-S1", as well as the modernization of one thousand T-72 tanks delivered to Syria by the Soviet Union to the level of T-72M1^[3].

It is important to note that the international situation prevailing in the Middle East by the mid-2000s largely pushed both states to intensify their strategic partnership. Being under sanctions pressure, in conditions of almost complete political and economic isolation organized by Western countries, Damascus more than ever needed a strong ally to protect its national sovereignty — the example of Iraq, which was subjected to a virtually groundless invasion by the United States and its allies, left no illusions about which Middle Eastern country would be the next victim ^[13]. The above to a large extent made it possible to reach an agreement, as a result of which the Russian Navy, after a long break, was able to have a permanent presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Founded back in 1971, the logistics center of the USSR Navy in Tartus once again became a permanent base that provided repairs, replenishment of fuel and food supplies of the Russian fleet ^[4]. Since the base in Tartus has not been practically modernized or serviced since 1991 and, as a result, was in a deplorable state at the time of the conclusion of the agreement, in order to protect its ships, the Russian Federation undertook to install air defense equipment in the port using the latest anti-aircraft systems, as well as to carry out a large-scale modernization of the base itself. This would make it possible not only to repel a possible attack by a possible enemy on the ships of the Russian fleet, but also generally increased the defense capability of the Syrian state.

The following year, 2007, in the Russian-Syrian military-technical cooperation was marked by the signing of new agreements that provided for even more extensive combat re-equipment of the Syrian armed forces. Among other things, firm agreements were concluded this year for the supply of MiG-31E fighters, Buk air defense systems, as well as the mentioned Bastion-P missile systems with Yakhont anti-ship missiles. In addition, Russian military technical specialists received an order for the repair of 25 Mi-25 Crocodile attack helicopters, as well as the supply of simulators for training the management of multi-purpose Mi-17 helicopters and Mi-35 transport and combat helicopters (the main points of these agreements were successfully implemented in the period up to 2012. — A.H.) ^[3]. Summing up the above, we note that, despite the increase in the intensity of arms supplies, it was not possible to meet the deadlines outlined in the contracts due to the need for the Syrian military to undergo a long period of training in the rules of use and operation of high-tech air defense systems under the guidance of Russian specialists.

Separately, it should be noted that the expansion of military-technical cooperation between Moscow and Damascus, which by that time had begun to acquire truly strategic importance for the Syrian side, would have been impossible without the final resolution of the main problem that stood in the way of the development of bilateral relations — the problem of the Syrian debt to the Russian Federation for the supply of weapons and special equipment carried out during the Soviet period. As a result of lengthy consultations between authorized representatives of the Russian and Syrian sides, on January 17, 2007, an Addendum to the above-mentioned Agreement on the Settlement of the debt of the SAR to the Russian Federation was signed. The specified document established the payment currency — euro, the specifics of the recalculation of the amounts of payments expressed in US dollars — at the rate of the Central Bank of Europe (Euro Foreign Exchange Reference Rates), published on the Reuters page "ECB37" two working days before the payment date, and also established that the amendments entered into force simultaneously with the Agreement from On May 29, 2005, in accordance with the procedure provided for the entry into force of the said agreement ^[5]. After the relevant discussion in the legislative bodies of the Russian Federation, the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic on the Settlement of the Debt of the Syrian Arab Republic to the Russian Federation for Previously Granted Former USSR was ratified by the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (Federal Law No. 107-FZ of June 30, 2008) and entered into force on July 10, 2008. ^[5]. Thus, the last obstacle to the development of a full-fledged defense-technical dialogue was eliminated.

The significance of the ratified Agreement was increased by the fact that the SAR at that time was under increasing pressure from Israel, supported by the United States, and, as a result, needed more and more support from the Russian Federation. At the same time, when developing the military-technical cooperation with Damascus, Moscow then had to pursue a very thin diplomatic line, maintaining a balance between supporting the most important strategic ally in the Middle East and taking into account the national interests of other countries in the region. Therefore, when in 2008 the government of Bashar al-Assad expressed interest in acquiring a wide range of Russian weapons, among which were self-propelled anti-aircraft missile and cannon complexes "Pantsir S-1", operational-tactical missile systems "Iskander", combat training aircraft Yak-130 and even multipurpose diesel-electric submarines of Project 677 "Lada" — "Amur 1650". Russia, taking into account Israel's position, was forced to refuse to supply Iskanders, since this type of missile was capable of carrying nuclear warheads, among other things ^[7]. In general, the quintessence of the principles of military-technical cooperation between Russia and Syria in the period under review can be considered the statement of the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry Sergey Lavrov (since 2004. — A.H.), who stated that all exports of military products to Damascus "comply with international law" and will be carried out only "in the interests of strengthening stability and maintaining security" in the region, which is of paramount importance for ensuring the national interests of the Russian Federation, but taking into account the positions and interests of all countries participating in the Middle East settlement ^[20].

Summing up, we note that the resumption of military-technical cooperation with the SAR in 2000-2008 played an important role in the process of Russia's "return" to the Middle East as a full-fledged geopolitical player. Having received an initial impetus with the coming to the post of President of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin, the Kremlin's new Syrian policy was balanced and pragmatic, took into account the realities of international relations in the Middle East region, and, above all, was directed against the expansion of the hegemonic claims of the United States, which sought to turn this already conflictogenic point of the planet into a zone of "controlled chaos". That is why various aspects of military-technical cooperation played such a significant role in the development of bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the SAR during this period. Thanks to effective diplomacy, the ability to seek and find compromises, Russia under the leadership of V.V. Putin managed to eliminate all obstacles to the development of a mutually beneficial dialogue with Syria, settle the long-standing problem of mutual debts and establish regular deliveries to this country of the latest samples of Russian military products, thereby laying a solid foundation for the future Russian-Syrian alliance, which in the following years have shown their effectiveness not only in protecting the national interests of both countries (and in the case of the SAR — the preservation of the nation—state in general), but also in solving one of the most acute problems of the Middle East region - the problem of international terrorism.