About the Psychological Mechanisms that Create a Person's Character

Yanovsky Mikhail Ivanovich ORCID: 0000-0002-9265-6917 PhD in Psychology Associate Professor, Department of Psychology, Donetsk National University 283001, Russia, Donetsk People's Republic, g. Donetsk, ul. Universitetskaya, 24 m.i.yanovsky@mail.ru Other publications by this author     Borisov Nikolai Arsen'evich executive director 283001, Ukraine, Donetskaya oblast', g. Donetsk, ul. Shchetinina, 29 nborisov@mail.ru

Kuznetsov Yurii Mikhailovich psychologist-doctor, Psychological support Center "Me and You" 354000, Russia, Krasnodarskii krai, g. Sochi, ul. Lesnaya, 10 k19775@mail.ru

The concept of "character", despite its popularity at the level of everyday psychology, remains a "tough nut" for science. The difficulty of moving from a descriptive consideration of character to an analytical approach to it, to how it is produced and reproduced in the life practice of an individual, leads to the weathering of characterological topics from the latest psychological manuals, educational and reference manuals ^[5]. L.V. Borozdina states: "In most countries of the world, the topic of character has lost its autonomous status, and the corresponding category is either directly identified with the term "personality", which is done most often, or is considered an anachronism" ^{[4; p. 38]}.When psychological searches opened up to everyday everyday practice, it turned out that such a familiar and practical category as "character" is hardly instrumentalized, covers an indefinite, sometimes too wide range of phenomena.

Nevertheless, character is still one of the tools and, at the same time, the subject of psychological research and practice of people. Despite the fact that most psychological schools have not bypassed the problem of character, the request for its reasonable understanding remains unsatisfied.

What is the reason for this situation?

The concept of character is one of the oldest (even ancient) among those that psychologists still use. The reason for its popularity is that character appears as an independent and self-sufficient characteristic, a basic concept from which one can build a certain part of knowledge about human psychology, a system of psychology. However, since character does not so much reflect the essence of a person as it reduces his individuality to a type, then with the spread of psychological practices, where an individual approach to a person is in demand, his popularity in the professional psychological and scientific environment has fallen. Perhaps it is a matter of a certain formality of this tool; it is used to denote the operational characteristics of a person, the forms of his actions, and not their content, behavior, and not the essence of his life activity.

 Nevertheless, this fact in itself cannot be a reason for neglecting the concept as an instrument of scientific knowledge, with its real content and with its scope of application. The "competitor" of the concept of character – temperament – is fully accepted by modern science and developing practice, despite the same venerable age. Therefore, the question is not whether the term is obsolete, but whether it is possible to interpret the character in accordance with the original meaning and originality of this concept in the space of modern scientific psychology. Psychologists, psychiatrists, philosophers, and writers still turn to the problem of character. The theme of character has not lost popularity since the time of Plato.

The methodological and theoretical inadequacy of the nature problem is the relevance of the topic we have chosen.The novelty of our research is in an attempt to propose a concept describing the psychological mechanisms that produce character from within the subject itself, and not to reduce it to summing up the influence of social and biological factors.

CHARACTER AS A FORMThe presence of a certain "basic integrity" ^[18] in the structure of personality means a certain independence and arbitrariness of human behavior in relation to the surrounding world.

Apparently, there is an initial individual internal logic of human behavior, relatively independent of the external situation. On the basis of it, stable mental structures are formed. The diversity of their types is also connected with the way personality manifests itself: behavior caused by the diversity of the surrounding world. This is the semantic context of the concept of character.

Initially, character is a concept related to the manifested mental identity of an individual. One of the first psychological typologies based on the idea of the existence of invariants of social behavior is found in Plato. Thanks to the Platonic school, we have clear characteristics of socio-political types of people ^[20]. Plato's typological tradition was refracted in Aristotelianism and gave impetus to the theory of character of Theophrastus ^[26], who is the author of the term "character". Being a disciple of Aristotle, he put the Aristotelian approach into this name of typological units: according to Aristotle, the soul is the form of a living body ^[22]; but character is also a form (from the Greek. – "impression, stamp, meta" ^{[4; p. 36]}), only the form of the soul itself, figuratively speaking, its individual relief, or the manifestation of this relief.

      The fact that character is precisely a form, and not just a peculiarity of individuality, is also reflected in modern ideas about character as a kind of appearance, a "relief" of personality. Thus, G. Allport believed that character is a personality, but not as such, but projected into a certain plane for its evaluation: "character is an estimated personality" (cit. by: ^[18]). At the same time, we mean an assessment in a certain system of values, in a moral and ethical perspective. But in addition to the ethical aspect, the concept of character also has an aesthetic aspect. So, in literature and, accordingly, literary studies, the character of a character is an aesthetic category. But both ethical and aesthetic perspectives have in common that they reveal to us the "pattern" of human behavior in its projection onto a certain evaluative plane. This is a hint of what character is. Character is not the person himself, not his essence, but a form that partially expresses, but also obscures and replaces this essence.

THE EMERGENCE OF CHARACTER FROM THE GAP OF MOTIVE AND BEHAVIORNext, we will outline the concept of character-producing mechanisms.

There are indications of two important character preconditions. S.L. Rubinstein says about one thing: "a person's character is a system of generalized generalized motives fixed in an individual" ^[21]. "Every effective motive of behavior that acquires stability is in potency a future character trait in its genesis" [ibid.]. These "situationally conditioned motives" [ibid.] determine the essence of character, which is expressed in "the features of stable ways of an individual's response to the environment" ^{[2; p. 111]}.

The second well–known condition is the statement that character is a derivative of "those actions that are most often used, becoming a habit" ^{[4; p. 40]}.

Thus, the totality of generalized motives and the totality of stable (habitual) forms of behavior are two sides, two levels of character. However, their relationship is more complicated than it seems. Moreover, it is these correlations that are important for understanding character as a psychological phenomenon.

We know that there is a correlative relationship between a motive (motivation) and behavior: a motive is the basis of behavior, an incentive to it, i.e. this behavior is in the bud. However, in practice, the motive does not automatically translate into behavior. The process depends on a number of factors, including some mechanism. Thus, Rubinstein speaks of "generalization", "generalization" of motives (see above). But what is this "generalization"? How legitimate is the use of this concept for understanding human character?

The concept of "generalization" is used in psychology to denote one of the mental operations. For our purposes, the idea of A.N. Leontiev is of interest, who drew attention to the fact that "generalization" is also the process of building a subject's relationship with the surrounding reality, an internal mechanism that provides new opportunities for human interaction with the outside world, the transition to a higher level of interaction, accompanied by internal restructuring and the emergence of a new relationship ^[12]. The latter (the possibility of new relationships) allows us to consider "generalization" as an operational means, a marker of the production of independent virtual reality not only "as a relation to reality, but as a relation in reality" ^[9].

The fact is that one of the effects of generalization for the subject is detuning from the immediate reality. This detuning plays a special role in the production of character. Let's explain this.

Detuning by generalization from events with certain repetitive properties, provides the possibility of a "generalized" response. The selection by the subject of classes of the same type of events from the entire flow of changes occurring with and around him allows both to notice them and to ignore them in behavior, to rebuild. In this case, it depends on their own states, specific motives and forms of reaction, and, since the motive is behavior in the bud, detuning and from the implementation process itself "motive ? activity".

What caused the detuning "disappears", but only in the external plan, for an external observer. Events are replaced by their signs – carriers of generalization. Thanks to the detuning, they become operational: a sign is a certain form, a "kind", an object used to replace and represent other objects ^{[17, our italics]}, in the case under consideration, "objects" of the subject's inner world – states, motives, mental actions, etc. At the same time, it is also a means of controlling them.

The sign becomes a mediating link, determines relations both in the "motive-behavior" structure and in the act that is carried out by this structure (a similar process is described by Sh.N. Chkhartishvili as a replacement of its need in a generalized way – in the formation of volitional behavior ^[29]). Without detuning, the familiar motive would be more likely to pass directly into behavior. The inclusion of this link "breaks" the bundle, detaches the subject from both motive and action. But – this is important – the detuning can also get a self-sufficient character. Then the generalized type of behavior itself can perform a sign function, sometimes even inconsistent with the motivation, interests of the subject, thus contrasting it with itself.

Here we are faced with what can be described as an imitation of an activity.

In what cases does this happen? What is the psychological nature of this phenomenon?

PSEUDO - ACTIVITYOf interest are the theoretical moves of the theory of activity, the possibility of which was, in general, open, but not implemented.

In this theory there is a space for the study of new forms of psychic reality, which were ignored at the time.

Such forms include the phenomenon of pseudo-activity.

This term itself was first used by G.P. Shchedrovitsky in the context of activity analysis. He argued that the subject-sign forms of activity alone are not enough to master it, but enough for the appearance of pseudo-activity: "When a student is given subject forms of organization [of activity], without revealing in such a subject form of organization its activity meaning by recreating the scheme or structure of this activity, then the student himself attracts his old, habitual former activity, inserts these iconic, subject-organized means into it, and he always forms a pseudo-activity" ^[31]. However, Shchedrovitsky has not explained what this form is, although the critical subtext of his statement is obvious. In fact, here he described not so much the fact of unsuccessful pedagogical influence, as the fact of using imitation of activity for successful communication.

However, the possibility of fixing the mechanism of pseudo–activity and its description is outlined much earlier - already in the studies of the L.S. Vygotsky school within the framework of the concept of "interiorization" of forms of external actions into the internal plan. Such a process can be interpreted not only traditionally – as the formation of higher mental functions, but also as the transformation of activity with a real object into simulated manipulations with a simulated object.

The composition and meaning of the activity itself can become imitated – a sequence of operations and actions (due to the processes of their folding and substitution with signs). This is a pseudo-activity, a game, an imitation of activity. Such a game should not be confused with children's play activities. If the main goal of the game for children, whether it is subject or role-playing games, is, in the words of D.B. Elkonin, "the discovery of a new world by a child", the world of objects, or the world of adults ^[32] and the development of these worlds, then pseudo-activity is an imitation of already mastered ("collapsed") ways of manipulating known objects and in known relationships. Accordingly, the motives of pseudo-activity are different from the motives of role-playing games. One way or another, they are connected with the position of a person in the system of social relations.

ATTITUDE AND PSEUDO-ACTIVITYNot only the object and the action with it can be imitated, as it happens during interiorization, but also the subject of activity, and its motives and even needs, and therefore its meanings (recall, the character, according to S.L. Rubinstein, "determines the certainty of a person as a subject of activity" ^[21]).

Despite the fact that, in general, the idea of the connection of character with a person's attitude to something has become almost a common place in psychology (this is evidenced by the definitions and characteristics given to character in most Soviet and post-Soviet textbooks on psychology), this is rather a possible way of his research that requires clarification than a statement that provides a sufficient understanding of nature character. Clarification of the phenomenon of the relationship itself is required.

Consider the psychic reality, which is fixed by the concept of "attitude".

The word "relation" means a certain selective orientation of the subject ^[15], his ideal (i.e. virtual) connection with any object. This is a subjective "gesture", the expression of a state "related" to the object associated with it. The relation is, therefore, the ideal (i.e., performed internally) action of the subject with the object, i.e., a kind of imitation of external action. It allows the subject to act on the object, as it were, to send him a message from himself, and, also, to imitate himself in this "action". The attitude, therefore, is a replacement and imitation of the subject's action, and the presence of oneself through action, in a given situation. For example: the condemnation of one person by another acts as a substitute for his real interaction with him in a situation of possible conflict: the subject, as it were, puts his attitude to another instead of a concrete real himself and his action. But this is not quite pseudo-activity, because there is a real (i.e. not pseudo-) motive (object of activity), which is the real actions of another person. Only the subject of interaction is imitated. Pseudo–activity, in the full sense of the word, is an imitation of both the subject, the object, and the motive. Perhaps this is when the mechanism of detuning comes into play, when the attitude is not a response to the actions of another, but a standard manifestation in a typical situation, or in a situation read by the subject as typical. (A detailed study of such situations was done by Irving Hoffman in the fundamental work "Frame Analysis" ^[8]).

(Note that the concept of "attitude" is sometimes used as a key one in determining and analyzing not only character, but also emotions and feelings (see, for example: ^[21]). Indeed, emotions largely fall under the above description of the phenomenon of attitude, which is reflected in some attentive researchers. Thus, J.-P. Sartre in his "Essay on the Theory of Emotions" ^[22] considers emotion as the substitution of a real action with a kind of "magical [virtual] behavior" aimed at transforming either the image of the world, or oneself, or the object in it. For the ordinary consciousness, the richness and power of emotions is the equivalent of authenticity, the involvement of reality. However, sometimes studies show that increased emotionality may be associated not with a decrease, but with an increase in sensitivity thresholds, i.e. detachment from reality ^[23], which confirms Sartre's understanding of emotions.)

STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS OF THE ACTIVITY AND HOLISTIC-SUBJECTIVE STATES

In general, relationships are a substitute for actions, activities and, including the subject in the activity.

It would therefore be logical to analyze the structure of the activity as such and the subject in it.

The subject is active by nature, and therefore activity is its manifestation ^[16]. The implementation of the activity takes place through the formation of a number of specific components [ibid.]:

- purpose- means

- process

- resultHowever, they are not the direct manifestations of subjectivity.

The subject "interacts" with them, forming in himself the corresponding integral-subjective pre-activity states of readiness for real action – attitudes.

Specifically speaking:

in relation to the goal, such a subjective state of readiness can be designated as responsibility;

in relation to the means – competence;

in relation to the process – readiness for the dynamics and forms of the activity process – for functions, i.e. tone and functionality;

in relation to the result – holding the pairing of current actions with the current result, i.e. the state of control, domination:

Table 1

Correspondence between activity components and pre-activity states Components

By A.K. Osnitsky, "subjectivity is <...> a characteristic of activity that emphasizes the intentionality of the subject" ^[19]. This means that the intentionality of the subject, in certain invariants, can act as a sign of an active subject. It can be, as it were, a form of the subject, imitating the presence of activity, presenting a kind of active state of the subject.

But intentionality is essentially a synonym for the concept of relation.

INTENTION AS A VIRTUAL ACTION OF THE SUBJECT

Sometimes the relationship is defined through the concept of "connection" (see for example: ^[3]), which, in our opinion, takes the researcher from the psychological plane to the sociological plane. Psychologically, the phenomenon of "attitude" as a form of the subject's inner life coincides with the content of the concept of "intentional attitude" by F. Brentano. Let's analyze the essence of this concept.

"Intention" in F. Brentano is defined as a subjective attitude to something ^{[7; p. 48]}, i.e. as the orientation of the subject to an object. F. Brentano believed that intentions imply the interaction of the subject not with a real object, but with its representation, while not necessarily the existence of this object in reality [ibid.]. "Consciousness contains a subject-semantic image, a semantic impression of an object, but the object itself may not exist, it may be illusory" ^[14]. If we switch to the language of activity theory, then intention is the work of consciousness with a virtual object, which is not given to consciousness, but is produced by consciousness itself, by the intention itself. I.e., it is an imitation of an object. Consequently, the intentional relations that Brentano is talking about are of one degree or another of the unfoldment of action in the internal plane with the represented (virtual) object, i.e. something that organizes itself, as it were, outside the influence of the external world (A.N. Leontiev considered the intentional aspect of the work of consciousness – "the content presented to the subject" – as a means of determining the purpose of an action ^[11]). Indeed, according to Brentano, it cannot be argued that the imagined (ideal, conscious) object reflects the real one. It is correlative with intentions, not with reality.What does F. Brentano's concept give us to clarify the role of relationships in character formation?

Brentano's analysis of intention as a phenomenon of consciousness is generally applicable to attitude as the basis of character. After all, according to R.M. Chislom, intention as such assumes that each person has internal properties that are not conditioned by people's relationships to each other, but, on the contrary, predetermine them ^[28].

TYPES OF INTENTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS AS THE BASIS OF CHARACTER TYPOLOGY

Thus, the generic trait of both the subject's relationship to something and intentions is the ability to be a substitute for real communication, interaction of the subject with the object, including in real activity.

But by substituting a real action with an object with an action with it in the virtual plane, intentions-relationships introduce a break in the connection of the subject with the object. They arise on the basis of virtualization of one or another component of activity, or, more precisely, the pre–activity states of the subject. At the same time, functionally they (intentions-relations) turn out to be a form of imitation of activity, i.e. pseudo-activity. Thus, intentions-relations can be a "parasitic" formation over activity, a kind of over-activity states of the subject.

However, it is important for us that intentionality as such, as the configuration of the subject's relationship to the world, etc., turns out to be the form of the subject, i.e. it is just the basis of character.

Therefore, the typology of intentions can be used to classify characters.

The classification of intentions proposed by F. Brentano differs from the traditional classifications of relations. In the latter, the relations differed in what sphere they were directed to: activity, people (society), the subject himself, etc. ^[10],[15]. In F. Brentano, intentional relations differ as varieties of the content of the "actions" themselves-"acts" implemented in intentions.

Brentano distinguished three types of intentions ^[34]:

1) a judgment about something; a judgment about something as true or false (i.e. a statement, not a conclusion);

2) representation (or representation, as M.G. Yaroshevsky calls it ^[33]), representation as representation of the image of an object in consciousness;

3) feeling, emotional evaluation, experience ^{[33; p. 227]}, sympathy or antipathy (love or hate) to something as desired or rejected ^{[7; p. 50, 131]}.

Once again, we emphasize that the subject of intentional attitude, according to Brentano, is not reality, but representations that replace it, not necessarily reflecting reality, i.e., like "shadows" on the screen of consciousness, and, consequently, intentions are quasi-actions, acts of consciousness that are played out in the arena of consciousness. This means that intentions are not genuine thinking, imagination, etc., but imitation of their forms: affirmation is an imitation of a form of thinking, representation is an imitation of a form of imagination, etc.

Let's correlate Brentanov's intentions with the components of activity and pre-activity states – taking into account the fact that intentions arise as a kind of pseudo-activity formations, based on activity ones.

1) This type of intentions as a judgment is – if we take it psychologically, as a gesture-intention, and not a logical form – an assertion of an idea, value, etc. As a subjective quasi-action, an assertion is a kind of compulsion to accept the truth of an idea (F. Brentano emphasizes that there is a sense of compulsion in a judgment as a form of assertion ^{[7; p. 94]}). A statement in this sense puts a person (and the person to whom the judgment is addressed, and also the author of the statement) in a dependent position. But in general, psychologically, the statement itself is a "guide", an agent of dependence on grounds, logic, values, internal or external circumstances, conditions, etc. It means that this type of intention implements the relationship of dependence, and in two aspects: firstly, the compulsion present in the statement is the realization of dependence on something secondly, coercion by affirmation is dependency.

What kind of subjective state does the intention of the statement imitate and thereby replace (the relation of dependence)? It imitates serving a purpose, and, therefore, responsibility (see above). Moreover, it imitates, since the statement replaces knowledge with compulsion to believe in the truth. In fact, it even removes the internal (genuine) responsibility – while maintaining its visibility.

2) Presentation (presentation) as such, it is a re–creation, placing a certain image, representation, picture of reality in front of the subject – instead of reality itself. Representation is realized not so much to reflect reality as to replace it with some imitation, an image of it. But treating the world not as a reality, but as an image, as an "action" that obeys certain rules, the subject himself must be in the image of a figure who "functions" according to the rules. This imagined image is a form of oneself that fits into a certain imagined image of the environment, situation, expectations of others, etc. The form of the environment presented by a person comes to the fore (for example, in a social environment – a set of its conditional rules), and the degree of inclusion, inscribability of the presented form of oneself, self-image into it. Therefore, this type of intentions produces an attitude of conformity with people and the world, as a kind of dominant in interaction with the world.

What kind of subjective state imitates and thereby replaces the correspondence relation? In our opinion, it imitates and therefore replaces the subjective attitude to functionality as an internal mood, mobilization to participate in a certain way organized process of activity. Imitating the pre-activity state of functionality, it becomes a support for the pseudo-activity process of depicting compliance with certain norms, conditions, etc.

3) Feeling, emotional evaluation involves "measuring" the object with certain needs, values. Here it is realized that the object is given some degree of value and importance for something. "Value for something" is the possibility of using it to achieve some goal. Therefore, we will call this relationship a usage relationship.

Artificial endowment of an object with value (prospects of its use options) replaces the real readiness to use the object in activity, i.e. competence.4) Let's make our own addition to the three intentional relations according to F. Brentano.

The fact is that they do not contain a class of intentions that would adequately reflect the specifics of emotional phenomena. "Feeling, emotional evaluation" – the type of intentions closest to emotions-relationships – is an expression of evaluation. But emotion is not always an assessment of something (emotions are not necessarily objective). Therefore, we will supplement the classification being analyzed with the fourth type of intentions, which, in our opinion, more directly reproduces the specificity of human emotionality. Such a view can be deduced from finding the polar opposite of affirmation as a kind of intentions, since the latter are connected with the opposite pole to the emotional sphere – reason. The opposite of the statement as the realization of the relationship of dependence, we consider acts of denial of dependence, denial of restrictions, ignoring norms, etc. Such acts of denial, on the other hand, are acts of appropriation, absorption, etc. Therefore, they make the object part of the subject. But the subject himself here experiences his involvement in something big, significant (as if "dimensionless"), and therefore allows himself to deny the "small" as an object of absorption for the "great". Let's call it the involvement relationship. Such acts of consciousness are emotion-centered; here it is assumed that the boundaries and forms of something (consciousness, behavior, etc.) should give way to impulsive emotions as expressions of the significance and priority of something "big and significant".

In our opinion, the relationship of involvement in something as if big replaces the subject's attitude to control the result of activity, since they create the illusion of deliberate control over everything.

In a generalized form, the ratio of subject states, relations and intentions can be represented as follows (Table. 1 and fig. 1):

Table 2

Correspondence between activity components, pre-activity states and intentions-relationshipsComponent

THE PSEUDO-ACTIVITY NATURE OF CHARACTER.

CHARACTER AS AN UNCONSCIOUS INNER MASK

The totality of gestures-intentions that arise as a result of the work of internal generalization of situationally arising motives, forms of behavior, and forms a form – a kind of "intentional relief" of the subject.

This is character (recall, character, according to S.L. Rubinstein, is "the certainty of a person as a subject of activity"; our italics are N.B., Yu.K., M.Ya. ^[21]). Character, thus, acts as a kind of artificial psychological education, replacing the real subject, his real motives, his real activity. Substitution is also imitation.

Imitation means that the subject, as it were, goes into a mode of alienation – from activity and from himself. It functions, but does not "produce" the result. He does not enter into the situation, into interaction with the object, replacing himself with his form (like in I. Kant's "thing-in-itself" is replaced in cognition by a kind of "decoration" – "thing-for-us"). This causes a number of consequences, in particular: the loss of plasticity, development by the subject, he "freezes" in some unreflected, not subject to revision form. The real ego is replaced by a form of ego, i.e. something like an unconscious inner mask.

CHARACTER TYPES AS CARICATURE IMAGES OF THE SUBJECTSince intentions-relations are not directed at real objects and situations, and the subject himself is replaced by his imitations, he becomes, figuratively speaking, "passing by" ("past" reality).

Based on the implementation of four types of intentions-relationships, four types of character arise, as types of "passing". In the Russian language there are words expressing this in a caricature form: "pro-walker", "pro-tail", "pro-idoha", "pro-hindey". Despite its ironic-evaluative stylistic coloring (note that the first typology of Theophrastus' characters was also ironically evaluative ^[26]), these words record just pseudo-activity manifestations of a person – as opposed to genuine activity. Therefore, we consider it possible to introduce them as names of character types, which, although in a somewhat caricatured form, still quite clearly express those specific features that arise from the system-forming relationship in the composition of each type of character-intentions.

Thus, the word "crook" clearly expresses in its meaning the intention of denying restrictions, i.e. the attitude of involvement.

The word "scoundrel" is the ability to give something pseudo–value or, conversely, to devalue, which means a tendency to the intention of evaluation and the attitude of use.

The word "rascal" expresses the ability to pass through different situations, as if mimicking different images – this is the intention of presenting and the attitude of conformity.

The word "scoundrel" expresses the ability to proclaim (affirm) something as truth (as if not by virtue of personal arbitrariness, but by necessity), and thereby mislead others – the intention of affirmation and the attitude of dependence.

EXAMPLES OF CHARACTER TYPES FROM THE NOVEL "WAR AND PEACE" BY L.N. TOLSTOY

The idea of pseudo-activity is not new.

For example, we meet it as one of the central ideas of L.N. Tolstoy's novel "War and Peace", however, in such a controversial version as the statement about the pseudo-activity nature of power (see part two of the Epilogue). The gallery of character types in a pseudo-activity key can be considered a description of a series of characters from the French army, met by the envoy of the Russian tsar to Napoleon Balashev (volume three, part one, sub-parts II-VI). Let's briefly comment on this.

The first person he meets is the French General Murat, who, with pleasure and seriousness, but without real grounds, bears the title of "King of Naples" (imitation of power, realization of an attitude of involvement). Murat's "denial of restrictions" is found at the end of the episode: Murat unexpectedly releases the enemy general Balashev, although he is on the territory of the French army. The "denial of restrictions" is anecdotally shown in another episode of "War and Peace", which describes how Murat simulated an action not according to the rules of war: he gave the command to an enemy Austrian officer guarding one of the main routes to the Austrian capital to let the French army pass (this imitation of power and control worked). Thus, we can qualify Murat as a "crook".

Then Balashev meets Marshal Davout, who all the time of the meeting demonstrates "compliance" with the process of performing important, urgent functions (checking accounts, etc.). Tolstoy says that people in the Davout family "are always hurriedly and persistently busy" ^{[24; p. 22]}. "The main pleasure and need of these people is to meet the revival of life and throw their gloomy, persistent activity into the eyes of this revival" [ibid.; pp. 22-23]. Obviously, this is more an imitation of functionality and functions than their actual execution. Davout represents some important function, in the form of an image, with which he "merges" and with which he replaces himself. Thus, Davout is an example of a "rascal".

After Davout, Balashev meets with Napoleon himself. One of the surprising moments in the position of Napoleon (in the description of Leo Tolstoy) is that he presents himself as a completely unfree person, as being forced to start a war against Russia: "I do not want and did not want war," he said, "but I was forced into it" [ibid.; p. 25] (dependency relations). In Napoleon's reasoning, one of the main motives is the need to bear the "crown" of responsibility for the fate of European states. Napoleon "has to" correct the mistakes of stupid and "disobedient" sovereigns of European states – the Russian emperor, the Austrian, etc. Obviously, such self–appointed responsibility is, in fact, an imitation of responsibility. Napoleon within our classification can be qualified as a "scoundrel".

In addition to these three characters seen by Balashev, L.N. Tolstoy also shows the "scoundrel" on the same wave of images of pseudo-activity types. Such is the Polish Uhlan colonel, who, for the sake of demonstrating his value to the "super-valuable" Napoleon, pointlessly directs his detachment to cross the Neman in an unfavorable place and thereby drowns forty people of his detachment. The reason for such pseudo-heroism was the desire to demonstrate its usefulness as a means for the "great" Napoleon, i.e. to simulate the use of soldiers and oneself as a means in military operations.

conclusionsThus, we consider the character as an individual intentional, "relational"

the relief of the subject, in other words, as its internal psychological form, defined by relationships as imitative internal actions ("pseudo-activity"). Attitude is a complex mental phenomenon. A significant part of our work is devoted to its consideration. In particular, the attitude is the result of generalization of motives and behavioral acts; but, at the same time, the attitude is a virtualized internal quasi–action, it is the result of detuning from external reality and from real activity as a form of human interaction with external reality. Therefore, character types are a consequence of detuning from different components of activity, which determines the possibility of creating a basic typology of characters.Summing up our presentation of the concept of the psychological nature of character, we note that its advantage is that, unlike existing approaches to character (character as accentuation, social character according to E. Fromm, etc.), it allows you to combine a descriptive approach to character with the ability to analyze the internal mechanisms generating it.

Thus, character becomes a psychological phenomenon for us, and not just a socio-biological one, as is typical for many concepts.