Afghanistan and Central Asian countries in the context of regional security

Shershah Aryan Postgraduate Student, Department of Theory and History of International Relations, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia 117198, Russia, Moscow, Miklukho-Maklaya str., 10/2 arian007@yandex.ru

 Security threats in Central Asia

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former Soviet republics faced new challenges of transforming the economy and social sphere, creating their own security systems at different levels – military, economic, technological, informational, environmental, etc.

At the stage of independence, the main problems were serious threats and challenges in the field of security. The existence of any sovereign State is closely linked to ensuring its own security and the need to protect its own interests.

For example, Central Asian countries have faced such internal threats as socio-economic instability, ethnic tensions, high unemployment, migration, increased influence of radical Islamism and drug mafia (due to the growth of drug traffic from Afghanistan through the region).

The most serious threats to external security include: the growth of Islamic extremism in the region, the increase in the number of terrorist organizations and cross-border crime and drug trafficking. The growth of external threats is strongly influenced by the development of the situation in neighboring Afghanistan and partly in Pakistan, where large Afghan insurgent forces are based.

Being at the crossroads of Central, South and Southwest Asia, Afghanistan has geostrategic significance for stability in the entire Asian region. Jihadists rooted in Afghanistan have developed closer relations with local militants, and therefore they pose a security threat not only to Afghanistan, but also to neighboring countries. Moreover, activists from Central Asian countries are also engaged in drug trafficking from Afghanistan, which later "successfully" cross the borders of Central Asian states and reach as far as Russia and Europe.

For many years now, the Afghan crisis has been the biggest problem of the international community. A major counter-terrorism operation under the auspices of the United States and NATO not only failed to achieve its goals, but also provoked an increase in extremism, terrorism, ethnic crime, illegal arms trade and much more, which became a headache for both the states neighboring Afghanistan and the entire vast Eurasian continent ^[1].

 However, in order to resolve the situation in Afghanistan, it is necessary to ensure not only stability in the country, which is a priority condition, but also political will and cooperation on the part of Afghanistan's Central Asian neighbors are necessary. The success of Afghanistan's transformation depends on the support the country receives from its neighbors, especially in Central Asia.

It is important that instability and unrest in Afghanistan have turned it into a safe haven for forces opposing the ruling regimes of the Central Asian republics. The most striking example of this is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) ^[2].

Both in Afghanistan and in the countries of Central Asia, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, favorable conditions have developed for the growth of radical Islamist groups, corruption and crime. Thus, this has led to the emergence of such extremist movements in the CAR countries as the "Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan" – operates in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan; "Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami" ("Islamic Liberation Party") – operates in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan; "Brothers -Muslims" (JAMA'AT/HARAKAT IKHWAN al-MUSLIMEEN) – the cells of this organization are a network of autonomous cells operating under different names; "Warriors of Islam" ("ISLOM LASHKARLARI") – operates in Uzbekistan.

Another factor in the spread of radical political Islam in the CAR countries is their geographical proximity to such conflict and instability zones as Afghanistan, Chechnya and Xinjiang. "These areas are not only a source of export of radical Islamist ideas: from there a stream of living carriers of radical Islam poured into Central Asia" ^[3].

Also, the porous (i.e. poorly protected) Tajik-Afghan border is another of the main sources of instability for Central Asia, as well as Russia and other countries in the region, given that the aforementioned border has become a favorite route for drug traffickers who smuggle Afghan heroin through Tajikistan and Central Asia, and then ends up on Russian, European and Chinese markets, thereby fueling corruption.

It is no longer possible to talk about the security of Central Asia, separating the problem of drug trafficking from it. Most of the processing of opium into heroin is currently carried out inside Afghanistan, and the largest increase in production is observed in the northern regions of the country, from where access to the Central Asian states opens ^[4].

To transport drugs through the countries of Central Asia, the "Northern Route" is used, which was revived after the recession in the period from 2008 to 2012.

Opium cultivation and production in Central Asia is minimal: more than 99% of opiates in the region are imported from Afghanistan. There are also no known production facilities in Central Asia for converting opium into heroin. Consequently, all opiates passing through Central Asia are either processed in Afghanistan or remain as opium until they are processed elsewhere.

The maximum interception of opiates in Central Asia is observed in Tajikistan, since it is there, first of all, that drugs are sent from Afghanistan, which will then follow the "Northern Route" to the Russian and European markets. According to the estimates of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the scale of opiate trafficking in the region is significantly higher than the volume seized (the total volume of seizures is less than 4% of the estimated flows of opiates in the equivalent of heroin) and increases annually (by 12% in 2006) due to the abundant food from Afghanistan ^[5].

The area of opium poppy cultivation increased in 2017 by about 37% compared to last year and doubled compared to 2006, reaching almost 418,000 hectares. A combination of events, including political instability, corruption, and lack of State control and security, may have exacerbated the problems of the rule of law ^[6].

Threats of a global scale have been solved at the international level for many years. The Central Asian States use international organizations to solve security problems in Afghanistan and in the region. These platforms allow Central Asian States to use external resources, as well as initiate dialogue and improve coordination among themselves. Individually, the Central Asian countries do not have sufficient ability to significantly influence the processes in Afghanistan. One of the obstacles to their positive contribution is the lack of trust and cooperation in the region. Moreover, the Central Asian states are constrained by a complex geopolitical location and intra-regional rivalry. In this regard, the involvement of world powers and international organizations is vital to resolve the current situation in the region.

Afghanistan's bilateral relations with Central Asian countriesExperts from Central Asian countries usually explain the protracted armed conflict in Afghanistan as caused by a combination of factors, including the failure of political centralization and state-building processes; ethnic, religious and tribal divisions; interference by external forces; and criminalization of society.

On the eve of the military campaign in Afghanistan, first led by the United States and then by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Central Asian states had a dual attitude towards Afghanistan. On the one hand, they were concerned about the potential transfer of the already existing instability from Afghanistan, which in 2000 was realized in the form of the incursions of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) into Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. On the other hand, Turkmenistan and, to some extent, Uzbekistan were looking for opportunities to resolve issues with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, while at the same time trying to get economic benefits from the stabilization of Afghanistan and the construction of a gas pipeline to South Asian markets.

In order to better understand the positions of the main Central Asian States on the issue of resolving the situation in Afghanistan, it is necessary to analyze them separately.

For example, Kazakhstan has no borders with Afghanistan and is therefore less vulnerable than other Central Asian States to security threats and challenges emanating from Afghanistan. This, along with the lack of ethnic identity between people in Kazakhstan and Afghanistan, allowed the Central Asian state to be more calm and less biased towards the events in the IRA.

However, despite the absence of borders with Afghanistan, Kazakhstan considers itself a key economic partner of Kabul. It is the only country in Central Asia that has its own Assistance Program for Afghanistan (implemented since 2007), which includes projects related to water supply, infrastructure development and the supply of cement and construction goods.

Kazakhstan is convinced that the settlement of the situation in Afghanistan (prevention of the spread of terrorism, religious fundamentalism, drug trafficking) is possible provided the stable development of the country is ensured. The main assistance can be provided by the world community and the United Nations through their cooperation with the Government of Afghanistan, as well as by providing the State with significant economic assistance in the form of construction of social and industrial facilities, infrastructure development, etc.

Among other things, Kazakhstan is a participant in many international platforms within which the issue of resolving the situation in Afghanistan is discussed, such as the SCO, the CSTO. Kazakhstan is a member of the Working Group on Afghanistan under the CSTO Foreign Ministry and a member of the Contact Group on Interaction and Coordination of Efforts of the SCO member states in Afghanistan reconstruction projects ^[7]. Kazakhstan is working in the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on Afghanistan within the framework of the sanctions policy imposed by the UN against individuals or organizations supporting the Taliban movement. 

Kazakhstan is also working independently to improve the standard of living and infrastructure facilities in Afghanistan. Humanitarian aid is provided annually in the form of food supplies, essential goods. A program of training of Afghan students in Kazakh universities is also being implemented. In addition, the construction of schools, hospitals and roads is carried out at the expense of Kazakhstan ^[8]. In particular, within the framework of the Tashkent Conference held in March 2018, Kazakhstan took the initiative to continue the education program for Afghan citizens with its co-financing from the European Union and other partners ^[9]. 

It is important to note that Kazakhstan is actively providing financial and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. In March 2008 The Government of Kazakhstan allocated 0.5 million US dollars as humanitarian aid, and in July of the same year another 2.38 million US dollars were transferred to the account of the Ministry of Finance of Afghanistan. In 2009, Kazakhstan transferred 1.47 million US dollars to Afghanistan and transferred the same amount in December 2014. The funds were intended for the construction of bridges and strengthening the banks of rivers. It is noteworthy that in 2009 Kazakhstan transferred 1 million US dollars to the OIC Special Islamic Solidarity Fund for the Reconstruction of Afghanistan. In addition, Kazakhstan has made a special contribution to the UN Trust Fund for Combating Terrorism in the amount of 300 thousand US dollars, aimed at implementing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia ^[10].

In October 2016, Kazakhstan allocated $2 million to the Afghan National Army Trust Fund (ANATF) to support the Afghan National Army. 

In addition, Kazakhstan provides humanitarian assistance to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in the form of food and essential goods ^[11]. 

Thus, Kazakhstan sees the possibility of resolving the situation in Afghanistan through the following three methods: 1) providing assistance by the international community and the UN as a central actor; 2) creating an "anti-drug and anti-terrorist security belt"; and 3) providing economic assistance to Afghanistan.

Despite the fact that Kazakhstan has no borders with Afghanistan, it is actively involved in resolving the situation in this country, and the need to provide assistance to Afghanistan is officially reflected in the Decree of the President of Kazakhstan No. 415 "The main directions of the state policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the field of official development assistance for 2017-2020". The document says: "Based on the above criteria for choosing geographical priorities and comparative advantages, the Republic of Kazakhstan has decided to provide priority development assistance to the countries of Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) and Afghanistan."

Kyrgyzstan also does not share a common border with Afghanistan, but has poorly protected borders with Tajikistan. Thus, although it is not so much exposed to the threats emanating from Afghanistan, it is still not fully protected from them, as evidenced by the invasions of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in southern Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000.

The situation in Afghanistan is one of the most difficult international problems for Kyrgyzstan. More precisely, there are several fundamental factors that determine the current situation of Afghanistan, which can affect the future of the entire region. These factors certainly include drug production in Afghanistan, terrorism, etc.

Kyrgyzstan, like other countries in the region, is increasingly aware that it must somehow join the efforts to solve the "Afghan problem". Unlike Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan has very few interests in Afghanistan, and its general approach to the Afghan situation is based on perceptions and concepts borrowed from other countries in the region, Russia, the CSTO and the SCO. This is a consequence of the fact that, firstly, Kyrgyzstan lacks a common border with Afghanistan. Its geographical remoteness and linguistic and cultural differences make the perception of danger somewhat vague. Secondly, unlike many of its neighbors, Kyrgyzstan has no ethnic interests, which eliminates the emergence of ethnic solidarity, as well as the perception of danger and challenges. A small part of the Kyrgyz population lives in Badakhshan (Afghanistan), but this is not a serious problem at all.

The Kyrgyz Government and the expert community are more concerned about the migration of Kyrgyz who are members of various terrorist and extremist groups based in the tribal areas of Pakistan or in northern Afghanistan.

Thirdly, it is difficult to determine Kyrgyzstan's trade and economic interests in Afghanistan. Even if they exist, they are so weak that they are not amenable to broad discussion ^[12].

For a number of the above-mentioned reasons, it is not easy for Kyrgyzstan to promote bilateral relations with Afghanistan. Therefore, Bishkek participates in solving Afghan issues through membership in international organizations dealing with Afghanistan's problems, such as the SCO, the CSTO and the recently launched (in 2011), the so-called Istanbul process.

Tajikistan shares a 1,344 km border with Afghanistan, which is why it can be described as the Central Asian state most vulnerable to instability from Afghanistan. It also has the strongest ethnic identity, with ethnic Tajiks making up more than a quarter of Afghanistan's population. About 8 million Tajiks are the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan after the Pashtuns. They have had privileged positions in the country's power structures since 2001 and are direct competitors of the Pashtuns.

Electricity is at the center of the economic partnership between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Dushanbe hopes to take advantage of the CASA-1000 (Central Asia-South Asia) project, designed to export excess hydropower from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The project is funded by the World Bank, the Islamic Development Bank and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) ^[13].

Tajikistan, as a direct neighbor of Afghanistan, is very concerned about the outgoing threats from the IRA and, therefore, cannot stay away. Speaking at the plenary session of the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly, President of Tajikistan E. Rahmon said: "The military-political and socio-economic situation in neighboring Afghanistan causes us serious concern. Today it is obvious that sustainable peace and stability in Afghanistan are a key factor in ensuring stability and security in Central and Southern Asia and other neighboring regions" ^[14]. 

According to him, an important factor in this case, in particular, is the involvement of Afghanistan in the processes of regional integration by strengthening economic and trade relations with it. 

Rahmon also said: "We call on the international community to provide targeted assistance and support to Afghanistan in reviving its socio-economic life, developing transport and communication infrastructure. Tajikistan, which has almost 1,400 kilometers of common border with Afghanistan, expresses its readiness to contribute to this noble cause" ^[15]. 

It is important to note that, according to the President of Tajikistan, the most important factor in improving the situation in Afghanistan is its socio-economic development by coordinating the efforts of the international community and involving the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in regional projects. According to E. Rahmon, regional cooperation is an important element for strengthening stability in Afghanistan and the region ^[16].

To date, Tajikistan, as well as Kazakhstan, is making efforts for the socio-economic development of Afghanistan and exports electricity, construction materials, agricultural products, mineral fertilizers and food products to the country.  In addition, it pays attention to the issues of education and training of national personnel, which are an important element in ensuring peace, harmony and economic development of Afghanistan.

In general, Tajikistan mainly depends on Russian military and economic assistance in solving problems related to Afghanistan and is interested in developing the capabilities of the CSTO. However, like Kazakhstan, Tajikistan is trying to maintain a multi-vector foreign policy in order to benefit from numerous sources of assistance.

Turkmenistan shares a 700 km border with Afghanistan. In the 1990s, Turkmenistan was the only Central Asian State that refused to officially recognize any threat emanating from Afghanistan. Following the results of the Alma-Ata meeting of the heads of Central Asian states and Russia on October 4, 1996, President of Turkmenistan S. Niyazov said: "Turkmenistan, being a neutral state, does not intend to take part in meetings of this kind. Everything that happens in Afghanistan is an internal matter of the Afghan people, we are not threatened by the Taliban movement. For more than a year, part of the Turkmen-Afghan border on the Afghan side has been controlled by representatives of this movement, and this section of the border is currently the calmest" ^[17].

 S. Niyazov insisted on a policy of neutrality and tried to establish business ties with the Taliban, primarily focusing on the development of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline.

Over the past few years, Turkmenistan's sense of vulnerability to the effects of instability from Afghanistan has increased. According to Fabio Indeo, a leading expert on Central Asia at Hanyang University (Seoul, South Korea), "security threats emanating from neighboring Afghanistan may encourage Turkmenistan to cooperate more closely with other partners in the region" ^[18].

Turkmenistan, being the closest neighbor of Afghanistan, pays special attention to relations with this country, supporting the establishment of lasting peace and harmony in the neighboring state. The fundamental point in Turkmenistan's position on this issue is its firm conviction that a political settlement in Afghanistan can be achieved only by peaceful diplomatic means. Proceeding from this, Ashgabat offered its political space for the creation of a broad national dialogue between all constructive forces and interested parties in Afghanistan under the auspices of the UN.

On November 15, 2017, a ministerial meeting of the 7th Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan was held in Ashgabat. At the conference, Turkmenistan confirmed its confidence that economic growth, creation of new jobs, implementation of large-scale social programs, improvement of material well-being, educational and cultural level of people will have a beneficial effect on the political situation in Afghanistan, reduce the likelihood of conflict situations, reduce the social and economic prerequisites for the emergence of terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking and it will give hope to millions of Afghans for a better future.

Turkmenistan is interested in stabilizing the situation in the neighboring state, if only because it benefits from the development of the TAPI gas pipeline project through Afghanistan.

Today, Turkmenistan is consistently implementing a number of major socio-economic projects in Afghanistan, including the construction of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan railway, as well as power transmission lines to Afghanistan.

Particular attention was paid to the construction of the TAPI gas pipeline, which, in addition to direct supplies of Turkmen gas to Afghanistan, will create thousands of jobs in those provinces through which the pipeline will pass and will contribute to attracting additional funds to the country's budget ^[19].

Ashgabat has also initiated a project to supply Turkmen electricity to Afghanistan and further to Pakistan through the energy systems of Afghanistan. Thus, the implementation of these projects will actually help transform Afghanistan from a recipient of electricity into a transit country and a direct participant in the regional power supply cycle with all the positive consequences and benefits that follow from this. Ashgabat believes that consistent, substantial political, diplomatic, financial and economic support of these projects from the international community is actually a direct support for Afghanistan's desire to overcome long-term stagnation and regression.

In addition to working in an international format, Turkmenistan has long provided Afghanistan with targeted economic and humanitarian support, such as the construction of medical and educational institutions in the IRA, preferential electricity supplies, training of Afghan students in educational institutions in Turkmenistan, regular dispatch of humanitarian convoys to Afghanistan and other types of assistance.

In general, Turkmenistan supports the adoption of concrete and targeted measures in support of Afghanistan, which would demonstrate the determination of the international community to achieve its goals.

Although Uzbekistan has a relatively short 210-kilometer border with Afghanistan and has significant border protection capabilities, it has also made public internationally its concerns about security threats emanating from Afghanistan. The Government of Uzbekistan is particularly concerned about the activities of the IMU and its determination to turn Uzbekistan into an "Islamic Caliphate".

Former Uzbek Foreign Minister Vladimir Norov noted that "instability in the IRA in the 1990s led to the emergence of stable sources of threats and challenges in Central Asia, including terrorism, religious extremism, drug trafficking and illegal arms trade" ^[20].

Tashkent is interested in a stable Afghanistan for a number of reasons, including not only their close geographical location to each other, but also the presence of oil, gas and non-ferrous metal deposits in Afghanistan, in the development of which Uzbekistan wants to participate.

In March 2018, the Tashkent Conference on the settlement of the situation in Afghanistan was held, at which the representative of the Uzbek Foreign Ministry, Otabek Akbarov, said: "The international community is increasingly aware of the impossibility of solving the Afghan problem by military means, the importance of peace talks with the Taliban (an organization whose activities are banned in the Russian Federation), support for the integration of Afghanistan into trade, economic and infrastructure relations with the states of the region" ^[21].

Uzbekistan does not recognize only a military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan and considers it necessary to increase the role of the economic component for the restoration of the country. His fundamental idea is that only economic recovery will reduce the level of conflict potential within Afghanistan ^[22]. Following its position, Uzbekistan participates in various projects in the field of road construction, infrastructure, electric power, mining, education.

Uzbekistan plays a central role in two sectors of Afghanistan: electricity and transport. Since 2009, the State Electric Corporation of Uzbekistan "Uzbekenergo" has been supplying from 90 to 130 megawatts per year to Kabul thanks to a line built at the expense of the Asian Development Bank of Central Asia and South Asia (CASAREM) ^[23].

The Republic of Uzbekistan makes an effective contribution to the implementation of UN programs for post-conflict reconstruction of Afghanistan, in particular, it has opened a bridge on the Uzbek-Afghan border for international supplies of humanitarian goods, promotes the construction of many infrastructure facilities on the territory of Afghanistan. In April 2009, a new power transmission line from Uzbekistan to Kabul was launched ^[24].

Uzbek National Railway Company "Uzbekistan Temir Yullari" has built 75 km. railway line between Hairaton and Mazar-I-Sharif, which has been operating since mid-2011.

As you can see, each country in the Central Asian region has its own benefits and proposals for establishing peace and security in Afghanistan. Table 1 briefly shows the positions of the Central Asian countries on the situation in the region.

Table 1

Thus, it is clear that the so-called locomotive in the settlement of the situation in Afghanistan among the Central Asian countries are Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.  Kazakhstan, as the most economically developed state, provides all possible support to Afghanistan in the form of financial, humanitarian assistance, as well as the development of the educational sphere. Moreover, in 2007, its own Program of Assistance to Afghanistan was founded. In turn, Uzbekistan is no less involved in the work to establish security in the region as part of assistance to Afghanistan. In addition to assistance in construction, reconstruction, electricity supplies and the development of the mining industry, Uzbekistan has always been ready to assist in negotiations with the Taliban, which Kazakhstan fears, for example.

Tajikistan and Turkmenistan also provide considerable support to Afghanistan through the promotion of economic ties. For example, Tajikistan supplies Afghanistan with electricity; Turkmenistan promotes the possibilities of the TAPI gas pipeline, for which Afghanistan, as a transit state, can receive huge financial resources.

To a lesser extent, Kyrgyzstan provides assistance in resolving the situation in Afghanistan. The Republic of Kyrgyzstan has no direct contacts with the Government of Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan carries out its main activities within the framework of the SCO and the CSTO.