Abstract: The article is dedicated to the confrontation between the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Congress in the 1970s, when the legislative power once again tried to regulate the activities of American intelligence agencies. Considering this confrontation as the subject of research, its object can be seen as the regulatory and legal framework for the activities of intelligence agencies during the Cold War era. The goal is to identify the factors that prompted Congress to make a new attempt to bring intelligence agencies under more careful control and to assess the effectiveness of this attempt. To achieve this, the tasks are: a) to examine the preconditions of the conflict, b) to analyze the actions of Congress during the crisis of trust in intelligence agencies by both the legislative authority and society, and c) to evaluate the effectiveness of these actions in the long term using material from the subsequent era. The research is based on A. Schlesinger's theory of political cycles, which suggests a shift between two phases – liberal and conservative. Through systematic, historical-genetic, and diachronic methods, the interaction between the CIA and state authority at the moment of transition from one phase of the cycle to another is analyzed. The novelty of the article lies in the application of A. Schlesinger's theory to the history of intelligence agencies during the era of political fluctuations. The article shows how the confrontation between the president and Congress during the era of "imperial presidency" extended to intelligence agencies, including the intelligence agency itself, the activities of which – along with those of the president and, simultaneously, the military – Congress attempted to regulate more strictly. It can be argued that nominally its goal was achieved; however, in reality, the new rules, if they were established, were applied for a very limited period of time – commissions were convened in 1975, formal directives based on the reports they issued appeared in 1976 and 1978 – and just three years later, marking the transition to the conservative phase, R. Reagan came to power, restoring to intelligence the role, status, and, consequently, greater autonomy and insubordination – including to Congress. The late 1970s and early 1980s fully demonstrated how geopolitical challenges can redirect this area.

Keywords: Cold War, special services, CIA, family jewels, Imperial Presidency, Congress, Rockefeller Commission, Church's commission, Pike Committee, Schlesinger cycles

Abstract: The subject of this study is the methodology of studying the interaction between the regional state authorities. The goal of the study is to analyze the existing methodological approach to studying the constitutional design of power distribution (the separation of powers) between the prominent actors of the political process (executive and representative branch authorities), and to demonstrate that this approach may become the first step to understanding the nature of conflict between the heads of the region and regional parliaments. The methodological approach employed by the author involves the analysis of the region's legal acts which regulate the powers of region heads and parliaments. The use of comparative studies reveals that the existing methodology is mostly employed by Western researchers (USA, France) to study the separation of powers models between the Federal authorities, while Russian researchers use its modified version to study the interaction between regional authorities. The central conclusion of this study is that the institution-based methodology of the power distribution models in Russian federal regions allows to understand the causes for conflict between regional heads and parliaments. Undoubtedly, the legal analysis of powers is but the first step on the way of understanding such political conflicts, because, along with the formal causes, there may be other, informal causes which require other methods of study. Overall, however, the constitutional design of separation of powers between the state authorities represents a crucial empirical field, a starting point for defining the political regime and identifying the success factors for democracy and scanning for distinct contradictions between state authorities.

Keywords: political regime, branches of power, political conflict, the powers of the authorities, checks and balances, executive authority, legislature, democracy, power, institutionalism