The transformation of the CIA in the 1970s and 1980s under the influence of regulatory policies from the U.S. Congress

Panov Denis Sergeevich ORCID: 0009-0000-7454-5327 Postgraduate student; Institute of Social Sciences; Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration 82 Vernadsky Ave., Moscow, 119571, Russia denpanov3000@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

In modern realities, with the beginning of the presidency of Donald Trump, this study becomes more relevant, as there has been a change in American political cycles. The arrival of a conservative administration presupposes a significant change in the work of the structures responsible for national security, and therefore there is a need to consider intelligence activities using the example of the past. This will make it possible to determine with a high degree of probability the vector of changes that will occur in this area in the near future.

In the history of the CIA, the most famous American intelligence service, there were periods of omnipotence (for example, in 1961, G. Truman bluntly said that it "became a state by itself – and completely classified. They are unaccountable to anyone" ^{[1, p. 47]}), and periods of transformation into one of the many dumb tools in the hands of the state. This article suggests looking at one of the transitional periods – the events of 1971-1979, when the country's formal leadership once again tried to identify where, in its view, the boundaries of what was allowed should lie – and what came of it. The first part of the article will examine the prerequisites for the emergence of another round of conflict between the special services and the public authorities, the second – the specific actions of the executive and legislative branches and the consequences of these decisions for the CIA. The final part answers the question of whether these decisions can be considered as the foundation for some fundamentally new - and stable – system of relations between the designated participants in American politics, or whether after some time everything returned to normal.

Arthur Schlesinger, a well–known American historian, philosopher, and politician, in his work "Cycles of American History" suggests, developing his father's theory, considering this history as an alternation of two phases – liberal and conservative. The events to which the article is devoted occur at the time of transition from one phase, which can be simplified to identify with the era of the rule of R. Nixon (president in 1969-1974), and which is considered as liberal, stretching over the presidencies of D. Ford (1974-1977) and D. Carter (1977-1981) to another – conservative, which it can be correlated with the reign of R. Reagan (1981-1989), whom A. Schlesinger described as "an outspoken conservative, but one who <..He became a kind of reformer" ^{[2, p. 45]}.

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The most remote of the prerequisites for the aggravation of relations between Congress and the special services that we are considering is the conflict between Congress itself and the president in the era that Schlesinger calls the "imperial presidency", referring to "a situation in which the balance between presidential power and representative bodies provided for by the Constitution is violated in favor of the president" ^{[2, p. 399]}, referring to the "last, turbulent and dangerous period of Nixon's presidency" [ibid.]. And despite the fact that, as historian T. Weiner writes, at first "Nixon thought that the agency [CIA] was filled with Eastern elites, thoughtless [knee-jerk] liberals, Georgetown whisperers [university environment], Kennedy people" ^{[3, p. 291]} and later wrote bluntly that If Congress had replaced it with a newly formed organization ^{[3, p. 291]}, Congress considered that the CIA also had a certain role in strengthening President Nixon. Schlesinger notes that it is "foreign policy that is the most likely area of such a violation" ^{[2, p. 399]}, therefore, there was certainly some logic in this.

The next reason for dissatisfaction with the agency's activities was the scandal of 1974, when The New York Times (which had sued Nixon just three years earlier over the publication of the Pentagon Papers, an archive of the Vietnam War that was not intended for a wide audience), not unreasonably, accused the CIA of activities inside the country during the 1960s. This directly contradicted all written documents, starting with the National Security Act of 1947, which was key for the agency^[4], and in some cases, ordinary ethics. First of all, it was about the surveillance of those who disagree with the current political authorities, starting with ordinary citizens who opposed the Vietnam War and ending with congressmen.

More general rumors also added fuel to the fire – or rather, leaks of secret documents, the final declassification of which took place already in the 2000s. This concerned a report called "Family Jewels," compiled in 1973 specifically for the Director of Central Intelligence and containing information about all the unsightly actions of the intelligence agency. A small part of the leaked "diamonds" formed the basis of the NYT publication.

Finally, the Nixon re-election scandal that has been going on since 1972, well known as Watergate, which also involved former CIA officers. Former or not, the shadow was cast on the organization anyway. In addition, along with the FBI, Nixon hoped to involve the CIA to eliminate the consequences of the scandal. Even if nothing was implemented, it was still known about it. Under these conditions, Congress began to act towards regaining its previously lost powers, expanding transparency within the framework of the functioning of the executive branch and strengthening public control over the activities of the president. A number of laws limited the head of state's ability to use the secret services and the National Guard for his own purposes ^{[2, p.406]}. Thus, during this period of time, the legislature began to play a more significant role in American politics, which affected the work of the CIA.

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The most notable reaction of the legislative branch was the establishment of a number of commissions and committees in the mid–1970s. The most famous was the Rockefeller Commission in 1975, named after its vice president, N. Rockefeller, who headed it and became a direct response to the NYT publication. However, according to the historian and political scientist K. Kenneth, the convening of the commission should be viewed more as an attempt by the White House to be proactive and try to take control of the situation ^{[1, p.49-50]}. She was involved in the investigation of numerous allegations of CIA abuses and illegal operations. The commission's activities were initially limited in time, as a result of which President D. Ford even had to extend the initially announced deadline and still had to file drafts in the final reports ^{[1, p. 61]}. It is important to note that as part of the investigation, it was decided that intelligence should take measures to ensure that none of the units, regardless of the nature of the tasks performed, did not get out of control of the top leadership of the CIA and did not act at their discretion ^{[5, p. 155]}.

The Church Commission was established in 1975. The achieved results led the congressmen to realize the insufficient effectiveness of the existing system of control over intelligence agencies, and therefore another attempt was made by the legislature to strengthen control over the special services, whose activities caused discontent in society. The conclusions reached by the commission members justified the need to expand the legislative framework, as well as legally prohibit the CIA and other agencies from secretly supporting repressive political regimes that violate human rights; prohibit the organization of covert operations outside the United States aimed at the physical elimination of political leaders. The recommendations developed by the Church Commission became the starting point for the adoption of the Law on Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (FISA) and the creation of a special federal court for foreign intelligence Surveillance (FISC) ^{[6, p. 34]}.

However, despite the activity, the socio-political crisis at that time made itself felt. The ongoing investigations did not inspire public confidence. In their opinion, the work of the Senate commissions was in the hands of intelligence representatives. Contemporaries, in particular, NYT journalists, believed that "the commission, whose chairman is loyal to the administration, a number of whose members have worked in it in the past and which was at least partially organized to minimize the damage to the CIA, simply should not and cannot expect the required level of trust" ^{[1, p. 62]}.

In contrast to the first commissions, which operated under the auspices of the Senate, the House of Representatives decided to assemble its own. She was named the Pike Committee and launched her own investigation. Unlike the results of the activities of their colleagues from the Senate, its results have not been fully published. A notable result of the activities of Pike and his colleagues can be considered the establishment of a continuously operating Intelligence Committee (House Intelligence Committee), which received the right to publish any information that falls into the hands of its members. Also, after the completion of the committee's work, both chambers of Congress decided to create special intelligence committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives ^{[5, p.162]}.

According to some researchers, the unwillingness of the presidential administration to issue the documents requested by the commission members has brought the state to the brink of a constitutional crisis. The situation was aggravated by distrust of President Gerald Ford, the only American president to hold this position, as well as the previous one, vice President, without an election procedure, due to the resignations of his predecessors. According to researcher K. Kenneth, Ford stood on the side of the special services, inheriting more than one president in this, starting with Eisenhower ^{[1, p. 50]}.

The active press coverage of the work of these commissions led to the fact that 1975 was called the “Year of Intelligence” (Year of Intelligence) – it should be noted here that the article is devoted to the work of the CIA, but the commissions did check various intelligence services, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National Security Agency (NSA). The CIA was unlucky enough to be the most notable of them, as Kenneth writes ^{[1, p. 47]}.

Despite all the questions about the work of the commissions and the position of President Gerald Ford, in 1976 he issued Decree No. 11905 ^[6], strengthening control over the CIA by the executive branch and establishing the need to elect a person to the post of director of central intelligence "from outside", not from the intelligence community. And although, as Kenneth writes, this simultaneously meant – as critics of this decree pointed out – the possibility of a greater involvement of the president in the affairs of the agency than before ^{[1, p. 65]}, this could only work for intelligence in the absence of conflicts with him.

John Carter, who replaced Ford a year later, continued this policy, cutting at least 820 people, including experienced specialists. It is not for nothing that historians associated with the CIA itself call the 1970s the “Time of Troubles" ^{[7, chap. 4]}, which replaced the era of H. Kissinger, the man who took control of the intelligence agency when Nixon came to power ^{[3, p. 294-295]}. However, there is a different view of the seventies. For example, R. Jeffrey–Jones, who has been studying the history of special services for many years, believes that these reforms restored faith in the CIA to citizens ^{[8, chap. 8]}. He notes that the intelligence crisis was caused not only by specific mistakes (for example, Kenneth writes that Ford was informed in advance about the upcoming publication in the NYT, but he ignored this warning ^{[1, p. 48]}), but also by a change in the political situation towards improving relations on the world stage, which is associated with The visit of R. Nixon to communist China and the signing of the Treaty of Salt-I between the Soviets and the United States ^{[8, chap. 8]}, which sharply reduced the role and importance of the special services.

In parallel with the scandal surrounding activities in the United States, intelligence was involved in a number of unsuccessful operations outside the country, which also contributed to the narrowing of its powers. So, in the 1970s, two amendments were adopted – Hughes-Ryan (1974) and Clark (1976). The first was the Senate's response to special operations in Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) and established the responsibility of the president for all – including CIA–conducted actions of this kind. The second was the Congressional reaction to the involvement of intelligence services in the armed conflict in Angola (1975-1976), which resulted in blocking their activities and limiting financial support.

In Schlesinger's scheme, therefore, this crisis fits as neatly as possible. Among other things, he suggests defining a cycle as "the continuous movement of the point of application of the nation's efforts between the goals of society and the interests of individuals" ^{[2, p. 46]}. The publication in the NYT testified that citizens were not ready to sacrifice private interests for the public good, and the appearance of commissions, even if they were not fully satisfied, showed that the authorities were ready to respond to this request.

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The transition phase ended with the coming to power of conservative Reagan. He became president against the backdrop of several significant international crises that changed the balance of power during the ongoing Cold War. The most significant from this point of view was 1979, when the Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan, and the Islamic Revolution took place in Iran, as a result of which a regime came to power that opposed not only the Shah, but also his policy of westernization of the country^[9].

The new geopolitical challenges facing the state have contributed to the onset of a conservative cycle in the United States. The deterioration of the international situation, the tightening of policy towards the USSR and a new round of the arms race naturally required the activation of special services. The public reaction to intelligence abuses over the past eight years has also gradually faded, and the foreign policy situation has allowed him to return the cards to the intelligence agency.

In particular, Reagan began by appointing William Casey, a veteran of the Office of Strategic Services, to the post of head of the CIA. This became one of the measures to strengthen the organization and evidence that from now on the vector of work will move towards active participation in the confrontation between the two countries, since the OSS was a structure created and functioning during the Second World War ^[10]. W. Casey got a rather weak and reorganized structure. However, the new director understood this and was determined to restore the intelligence services to their former capabilities.

Casey built his policy in his new position based on three key points: The world is a dangerous place, the Soviets are responsible for most of its dangers, and the CIA cannot afford weakness ^{[7, chap.17]}. In his speech to the Senate, he stated that he plans to minimize the restrictions imposed on it before, as this interferes with the solution of the tasks entrusted to the organization. Moreover, close relations with President Reagan allowed the director of the national security agency to actively interfere in the activities of the American state on the world stage. Decrees No. 11905 ^[11] and No. 12036 ^[12], which limited intelligence activities, are being replaced by Decree No. 12333 ^[13], which expands powers.

The new president proclaimed a tougher policy towards the Soviet Union than his predecessors (it is worth mentioning, of course, the Carter doctrine separately, but it was adopted in the last year of his presidency). It was under him, in particular, that the invasion (1983) was organized, followed by the occupation of the island state of Grenada. A small island in the southern Caribbean, which was a British colony ten years ago and decided to follow the Soviet path as an independent state. The power policy began to gain momentum again. The military operation was carried out without Congressional approval and in violation of the charters of the United Nations and the Organization of American States. The fact that the island's population met the invasion quite positively does not negate the fact that the principles of international law were violated. Moreover, this action confirmed the ability of the state to carry out secret operations if, in its opinion, they correspond to its interests ^{[2, pp.126-127]}.

Of course, with such views on the limits of what is acceptable in politics, the importance of intelligence as a tacit policy has increased dramatically, as has the financing of its activities, which has reached absolute levels over the entire period of confrontation ^{[5, p. 166]}. The adjustment of the foreign policy led to the fact that the White House began to send financial assistance, equipment for the dissemination of anti-communist propaganda, and diplomatic support to the Solidarity movement through illegal channels ^{[14, p. 26]}. Issues related to the situation in Afghanistan began to be interpreted in the context of the fact that the Mujahideen became a symbol of the struggle for freedom and independence throughout the world, and their stubborn resistance to the Soviet invasion was the result of Afghans' desire for freedom. The Soviet Union, in fact, was left alone with the whole world ^[15]. This approach has contributed to increased assistance under Operation Cyclone. In this sense, it is difficult to imagine the Reagan Doctrine without the involvement of those services that moved aside under previous presidencies.

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Thus, the era of 1974-1981, when the United States was shaken by a political crisis, proved to be a difficult time for the intelligence agency. It can be assumed that each phase of the Schlesinger cycle is characterized by its own set of political rules. They may be comfortable for certain participants in political processes – intelligence, in particular, may not be – but they turn out to be at least understandable, allowing you to adapt to them and maneuver in the event of challenges of one kind or another. During the crisis of the 1970s, this period can fairly be called the intertemporal period, which transformed American society, which left its mark on the work of intelligence.

The political crisis led to an increased role for Congress in the second half of the 1970s, which began demanding greater transparency from the CIA in its work. Ronald Reagan's inauguration as president was an opportunity for the intelligence community to once again become an important tool of the state in an increasingly confrontational environment. This is due not so much to the specific direction of his domestic and foreign policy, but rather to the existence of a clearly defined strategic course in principle.

By studying the processes under consideration, the CIA can be viewed through the optics of cycle theory not only as an object for which some phases turn out to be more favorable, some less so, but which, in any case, affect it - but also as a subject. Schlesinger writes that any cycle can be imagined through people who share relevant values and should, believing “in the priority of public goals,” “interpret events, raise questions and seek solutions" ^{[2, p. 74]}. And the representatives of the CIA undoubtedly treated such people.

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