Abstract: The article analyzes the provisions of Russian electoral legislation regulating candidates and lists of candidates registration on the ground of voters’ signatures. The author notes that in the result of the recent unsystematic editing of electoral legislation, this legislation has lost its internal logic. The author studies the practice of registration of candidates and lists of candidates on regional and municipal elections of the past several years and notes that, according to the legal position of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the candidates and lists of candidates registration system is aimed at allowing the candidates with a sufficient electorate support to participate in the election. The author compares the provisions of electoral legislation about the number of voters’ signatures, necessary for registration, and about the practice of exemption of some political parties from gathering signatures. The comparison demonstrates the lack of logic in the provisions regulating the rules of candidates and lists of candidates registration. The analysis of the practice of candidates registration in regional and municipal elections demonstrates that the system of registration on the ground of voters’ signatures doesn’t discharge its constitutional function: it leads to the denial of access of popular candidates to election, but allows the candidates, subsequently gaining poor results, to participate. The author offers the measures of restoration of the normal electoral competition in Russia. 

Abstract: This article explores the positions of Russian electoral legislation that regulates candidate registration and electoral list based on electoral signatures. It is noted that as a result of an unsystematic amendments to the electoral legislation that took place in the recent years, this legislation has lost its internal logic. The author thoroughly researches the practice of candidate registration and electoral lists at the regional and municipal elections over the recent years. It is noted that in accordance with the legal position of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the purpose for the candidate registration system and electoral lists is to only allow candidates that have a sufficient support from the electorate. The author compares the norms of the electoral legislation on the mandatory number of signatures for registration and not requiring separate political parties to collect signatures for elections of various levels. The comparison reveals lack of logic in establishment of norms pertaining to the rules of candidate registration and electoral lists. Analysis of the registration process and electoral lists on the regional and municipal levels confirms that the registration system based on signatures does not carry out its constitutionally important function:it leads to exclusion of candidates that have voter support, but at the same time allows candidates that then get low results. The author proposes series of measures for restoration of normal political competition at Russian elections.

Abstract: The research is devoted to vote splitting (i.e. voting for a list of one candidates of one party or a candidate of the other party) in mixed electoral systems with the two ballot papers when single-member electoral districts are mostly used. The analysis is made based on the example of the three countries, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Russian Federation (including regional elections) and Ukraine. The authors of the article study elections held in different time periods and analyze votes for a large number of political parties as well as geographical differences within the aforesaid countrires. For each party in each campaign the average index of a rupture of voices, asymmetry of distribution of an index of a rupture of voices, an index of superiority of candidates, an index of influence of candidates and correlation between results of candidates and the party list were calculated. Also for each campaign the general index of a rupture of voices and an index of a specific rupture of voices considering only voluntary splitting of voices by voters were calculated. It is established that parties are divided on at what results of candidates it is generally best of all than results of party lists, and at what results of candidates are worse, and these distinctions generally remain in various campaigns. The authors make a conclusion about distinctions in behavior of voters in Germany, on the one hand, and Russia and Ukraine, on the other hand. 

Abstract: The author compares mixed bound election system used for the German Bundestag elections since 1953 and the mixed bound election system which was applied in Russia for the State Duma elections in 1993-2003.  The author points out their differences and similiarities.  The main difference is that the German election system guarantees proportionate representation of political parties with the minimal distortion, while the Russian election system allows for considerable distortions, including the situation when a party for which less than half of electors have voted gains majority of seats.  The author discusses factors, which lead to proportionality distortions in German election system, as well as the problems of "extra" mandates and splitting of votes. The author makes a conclusion that the German election system may be adapted to the Russian conditions, and within the majority part of the system there's a need to depart from the "winner takes it all" principle.  As one of the options the author offers to substitute single-mandate election districts with the multi-mandate ones.

Abstract: The author studies distortions of proportion in representation of political interests of elections with the use of proportionate and mixed election systems in regional and municipal elections in the Russian Federation. Much attention is paid to the situations of "fabricated majority" of persons voting against all candidates, when a leading party has more than 50% of mandates, while having less than 50% votes in a united election district.  The author studies the roles of voting "against all candidates", threshold, allocation of deputy seats in a majority element of a mixed election system  in formation of the "fabricated majority" effect.  It is shown that within a proportionate election system the leading role belongs to the threshold above 3 per cent and the Imperiali divider method. However, majority element of a mixed system plays the greatest role in the formation of "fabricated majority". The author concludes that it is necessary to abolish the mixed unbound election system.  As an alternative he offers a mixed bound system, which is analogous to the system used in Germany.

Abstract: The author of the article discusses the system interconnections between such parameters of the proportional election system as the size of an electoral district, threshold and a seat allocation method. It is shown that these parameters altogether influence on the exception threshold - the share of votes guaranteeing at least one seat for a list of candidates. Based on the legal and politological analysis of consequences of using the threshold, the author concludes that a reasonable threshold must not exceed 5 % and the most preferred threshold is 3 or 4 %. This threshold can be considered a reasonable compromise between demands in the parliament performance and the parliament's representation. The author also offers certain legislative solutions that would guarantee at least one seat allocation for a list of candidates who received over 5 % of votes. The author also describes the criteria allowing to use a proportional election system when vey few seats are being allocated.